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it gives to its po, over the necessaries and/articles which I have enumerated or not. The luxuries of life. It is perfectly absurd, there-burthen is unalterably fixed upon the planter as

fore, to deny that the real price, the exchange-a producer; for he is compelled either to imable value, of cotton is diminished, because the port these articles himself, in direct exchange

same number of silver dollars can be obtained

for it, when it is notorious that it will require

one hundred and thirty or one hundred and change for

fifty of these dollars to purchase 'the same

for his cotton, and pay the duties on them out

of his own pocket, or to receive money in ex

i. If he imports or receives money, he obtains

quantity of the comforts of life that one hun-a commodity degraded in value by the very dred dollars would purchase, if it were not for system which compels him to receive it. It is

the protecting duties.
a source of enjoyment. If I could purchase
the same amount of enjoyment for one dollar,

that I can with ten, I would be precisely as

wealthy with ten thousand dollars as I am with one hundred thousand. Nothing but a puerile and contemptible vanity can be gratified by increasing a man’s store of gold and silver, unless it increases also his command over the various productions of human industry which minister "to his wants and his desires. It is of the utmost importance, therefore, to the true understanding of this subject, that we bear constantly in mind the distinction between the money price and the exchanegable value of cotton, tobacco, and rice, as they are affected by the protecting system. In the report of the Committee of Ways and Means, it is assumed that the real price or exchangeable value of cotton is diminished at least two cents a pound by the indirect operation of the protecting duties. I confidently believe that the diminution is much greater than even this estimate, which I will now attempt to prove by a plain analysis. It is agreed that the planter gets no more money for his cotton, and I have granted (contrary to the fact) that he gets as much, as he would if he enjoyed a free trade. Now what are the uses to which the planter can apply his money? If he wishes to purchase cotton or wollen manufactures, he will have to give, upon an average, forty or fifty per cent, more for them in consequence of the protecting duties; and, as a matter of course, in this branch of his exchanges, the value of his money will be proportionately diminished. If he wishes to purchase iron for the purposes of his plantation, he will have to give at least one hundred per cent. more than it would cost, if trade were free, and of course it would require two dollars to purchase what ought to cost but one. If he wishes to purchase iron manufactures, he will have to give twenty-seven and a half per cent.; and, if shoes or hats, thirty-three per cent, more than they would cost him, but for the protecting duties. Applying this course of reasoning to the whole catalogue of protected articles, it will be found, that, upon the grand aggregate of the purchases, he has occasion to make of these articles, with the money obtained for his cotton, it will require, upon an average, about fortyfive per cent. more than it would cost if the protecting duties were repealed. And here, Sir, it is proper to remark, that these facts clearly indicate a diminution of the real price or exchangeable value of cotton, whether the

Money is not, in itself, precisely the same thing to him as if he were

|compelled to receive any other commodity, in

like manner degraded in its value. Even,
therefore, if he should not wish to lay out more
than one-half or one-third of it in protected
articles, he must either retain it barren and un-
productive in his coffers, or let some other per-
|son have it, by whom it would be applied to
the purchase of these very protected articles.
And as it would be no more valuable in the .
hands of this third person, for purchasing such
articles, than it was in the hands of the planter,
it evident that whatever article the planter
might receive for it, would be diminished in
quantity in exact proportion to the degradation
of the value of specie.
So that unless it be assumed that money has
an intrinsic value, without any reference to the
other commodities it will purchase, it follows
that the exchangeable value of cotton is dimin-
ished by the protecting system in the exact pro-
portion that the prices of other articles are in-
creased by it.
If, when the planter exchanges his cotton in
Liverpool for money, he were permitted to ex-
change that money for English manufactures,
as freely as he is permitted here to exchange it
for northern manufactures, he would undoubt-
edly obtain a much more valuable exchange for
his productions. In a word, money which he re-
ceives in England, is worth forty or fifty per
tent. more there than itis here, for all the uses
co which he wishes to apply it. But you inter-
pose your protecting duties, and thereby pre-
vent him from using it in England under the
heavy penalty of forty or fifty per cent, in
order that he may be compelled to bring it into
the United States, and apply it to the pur-
chase of domestic manufactures, at prices forty
or fifty per cent. higher than they would cost
him in England. However it may be disguis-
ed, therefore, by the interposition of the vari-
ous agents by whom the complicated process of
the foreign exchange is performed, it is never-
theless certain, that the alternative is presented
to the planter, either to exchange his cotton for
foreign manufactures, and pay forty or fifty per
cent on the value of them for the privilege of
making the exchange, or to exchange it for do-
mestic manufactures, and pay forty or fi
per cent. for them, beyond the price for whic
the same articles could be obtained from Eng-
land. Heavy as the penalty is, the planters
find it to their advantage to adopt the former
branch of the alternative. Yes, Sir, they find
it more advantageous to pay this enormous
penalty, and go to those natural markets from

planter himself actually consumes these various

which it is the whole scope of your legislation

to exclude them, than to go to the miserable domestic market to which you wish to confine them, without paying any penalty at all. And, Sir, as long as cotton, tobacco, or rice continue to be produced for exportation, this must continue to be the case. It is utterly impossible to excludes the importation of protected articles, to whatever extent you may carry your duties, until you have destroyed the business of rearing staples for exportation. No proposition is capable of clearer proof than this, and yet few are solittle understood. I will endeavor to make it plain. When the tariff of 1828 was passed, almost every body believed it to be prohibitory, as to most of those articles which were subject to as high a duty as fifty per cent. It was, in fact, temporarily so, as to many articles. But as soon as the distribution of the precions metals, or their substitutes, became

adjusted and proportioned to this new state of

things, importations were freely resumed, and as large an amount of protected articles camein, at an ave of nearly fifty per cent, as had come in before at the lower rates of the former tariff. The whole experience of the country has, in fact, been but a practical illustration of the view. I have here presented. After the passage of each successive tariff, importations have been for a time diminished, and the manufacturers have been satisfied. But after the lapse of a few years, the importations become as great as ever, and the manufacturers became as clamorous for additional protection. By a singular fatality, illustrating the pernicious connection between the Presidential election and the tariff, the protection of each successive tariff has only been deemed sufficient for four years, and the necessity. of increasing it, has always become apparent just in the midst of the canvass for the Presidency. But however this may be, certain it is, that a clamorous demand for protection has been made at eve interval of four years since the tariff of 1816; and but for the extaordinary state of the coun. try, I think it not "...". that a similar demand would have been made now. These facts satisfactorily prove that no rate of duties that will not prohibit the exportation of our

southern staples, can prohibit, for any length of time, the importation of those manufactures

which are now imported in exchange for them. if you were to raise your average of duties to 60 per cent to-morrow, in less than twelve

months nearly the same amount of manufactures would be imported as is imported now, unless the exportation of southern staples should be cutoff or curtailed by it. How can it be other

wise? How is it possible that cotton, tobacco,

and rice, can be exported, if something re-
quired for our national consumption be not re-
ceived for it from foreign nations? The non-
sensical idea of importing specie, the most ab-
surd of all the follies of the mercantile system,
It is neither more
nor less than the old spanish policy of making

o by hoarding specie, exhibit-
ifferent but much more efficient from

can now find no advocates.

the nati ed in a

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xhibited by
Spain.
She attempted to prohibit, by penal laws,the
exportation of specie; you do that which is more
effectual, by forcing its importation and then
prohibiting the importation of anything which
can give rise to the exportation oft
If the planters of the south should be weak
enough to attempt to enrich themselves and the
nation by receiving the annual amount of their
staples in specie, from foreign countries, they
would exhibit the folly and fatuity of the
wretched miser who perishes amidst the hoards
of his treasure for the want of food.
What, then, can they receive for their so-
ples? If you exclude the protected articles, .
the whole amount of our national imports
would not amount to more than one half the
value of the southern staples, and these are
principally imports which are now received in
exchange for the productions of other parts of

consumption of the country. When I presented these views ofthe unequal operation of the protecting system, two years ago, they were denounced as novel and visionary theories. I will now produce the authority of the twowriters I have already quoted, to sustain the doctrine just laid down, as to the effect of commercial restrictions in changing the value of the precious metals. - Professor Senior says: “They cannot deny that the commodities they would exclude must begiven tous gratuitously, or in exchange for our own produce do for money. The first supposition, granting we could be sufferers by it, is to absurd even for the reasoners whom I am describing. If they adopt the second, they must admit that the loss to the producers whose exports we indirectly prohibit,balances the gun to those whom we forcibly encourage, leaving the loss to the public uncompensated. They are driven, there fore, to maintain that the payment would be in money; and to suppose that such a paymen, could be continued, and would bean evil, is the mercantile theory.” Again: “I will suppose that all the proing duties with which we have clogged our commerce with France, are suddenly removed. and that the removal is immediately followed by an increased importation of French commodities to the amount of five millions sterling. And I will suppose the commercial restrictions on the part of France, to remain unaltered. I will suppose, too, that the five millions in onetion are actually remitted in money. It o almitted that the afflux of so large a sum from England, and its influx into France, must sink all English prices, and occasion a general rise of prices in France. Indeed, if it did o the transaction would be one of pure benefit to England, and of pure loss to Founce. As money is not a source of gratification. but a mere instrument of commerce, if our prices were not affected by parting with a portion of our money, we should be insensible of our loss; or rather

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we should have sustained no loss whatever, and have gained the five millions worth of French commodities without any real sacrifice, while France would have parted with those commodities and received no sensible equivalent.” The case put by the author, it will be seen, is the counterpart of that which I illustrated the effect of our restrictions upon the value of money. The same argument, however, which shows that the repeal of restrictions would cause money to flow out of the country, and rise in value, equally proves that the imposition of restrictions would cause money to flow in and sink in value. Mr. Ricardo, one of the most distinguished of the practical economists of Europe, lays down these principles:

these authors, the principles they have laid down would induce them to pronounce the same opinion in relation to it which I have endeavored to present. It is distinctly affirmed that the accumulation of money depresses its value; and as all commercial restrictious upon imports while exports are free, must not only cause an accumulation of money, but permanently retain it as long as the restriction continues, it follows that the rice, or, more properly, the exchangeable vaue of exports must be permanently diminished in the precise degree that the value of specie is depreciated. This view of the subject furnishes a com

“Gold and silver having been chosen for the to..." of circulation, they are, by

e competition of commerce, distributed in such proportions amongst the different countries of the world, as to accommodate themselves to the natural traffic which would take place if no such metal existed, and the trade between countries were purely a trade of barter.”

lete and satisfactory solution of a puzzling difculty which many persons cannot get over, and which may appropriately be denominated the Pons Asinorum of this great controversy. When it is contended that the protecting duties do not fall exclusively upon the consumers, but partly upon the producers of the exports, and partly on the consumers of imports, every

merchant's clerk is ready with the reply, that, as the importing merchant must add the duty

* “Now, suppose England to discover, a process for making wine, so that it should become her interest rather to grow it than to import it, she would cease to manufacture cloth for exportation, and would grow wine for herself. The money price of these commodities would be regulated accordingly. Cloth would continue for some time to be exported from this country, because its price would continue to be higher in Portugal than here; but money, instead of wine, would be given in exchange for it, till the accumulation of money here, and its diminution abroad, should so operate on the relative value of clothin the two countries, that it would cease to be profitable to export it.” “It is thus that the money of each country is apportioned to it in such quantities only as may be necessay to regulate a profitable trade or barter.” “But the diminution of money in one country, and its increase in another, do not operate on the price, of one commodity only, but on the prices of all.” “This higher value of money will not be indicated by the exchange; bills may continue to be o: at par, although the prices of corn and labor should be 10, 20, or 30 per cent. higher in one country than another.” “When each country has precisely the quantity of money which it ought to have, money will not, indeed, be of the same value in each, for, with respect to many commodities, it may differ 5, 10, or even 20 per cent, but the exchange will be at par.” Here, sir, is a distinct recognition of the principles for which I am contending, as it regards the distribution of money amongst different naions, and the changes produced in its value by the increase or diminution of its quantity. The cases stated, by way of illustration, are not precisely analagous to our case; but I feel war.

as well as his usual profits to the cost of every import, it necessarily follows that the consumer must pay the duty. Now, it is admitted, that the importing merchant must increase the money price for which he sells a foreign manufacture, so as to indemnify himself for the duty paid on it; but we have seen that this enhanced money price is produced in part by the depreciation in the value of money. In whatever degree the increased price of protected articles arises from this depreciation in the value of money, all other commodities, in the same market or commercial community, will experience a corresponding increase of price. It is not true, therefore, as is sometimes supposed, that the northern farmers and laborers are as much oppressed by the protecting system as the people of the southern States, other than the planters. Experience confirms the conclusions of theory on this subject. Whatever increases the prosperity and profits of the great and leading employments of capital in any community, has always been found to increase the prosperity and profits of all subordinate employments, as well as the wages of labor. It is obvious that, in the same local community, where the transfer of capital and labor from one employment to another, is easily effected, there cannot long continue different rates of profit and wages of labor. The truth of this remark will strike the commonest observer. But the precise mode in which this equality of profits and wages is produced, is not so obvious. If, for example, protecting duties enhance the money price of the various manufactures upon which they are laid, to the full extent of these duties, they, at the same time, enhance the price of all other articles in the manufacturing region, though not to so great an extent. In whatever degree the rise of the price of protected manufactures is produced by

ranted in saying, that if this were submitted to

the increased quantity and diminished value of

500

money, in that degree all other articles in the same region of country are enhanced also:While, therefore, the price of manufactures is increased 40 or 50 percent, by the protecting duties, the price of all farming productions is probably increased twenty-five or thirty per cent. It results that the burthenimposed upon the northern consumers, is only the difference between the price ofthe protected, and the unprotected productions of that part ofthe Union: For the same reason that the prosperity of the great manufacturing interests of the north produces a corresponding prosperity in the other classes there, the depressed condition of the southern planters must produce a corresponding depression in all the subordinate departments of southern industry. The protecting oluties have a double operation upon them. They, at the sometime, diminish the price of their great staples, and increase the price of all the articles they have occasion to purchase from other parts of the Union. I will now inquire what is the aggregate af. fect of the whole protecting system on the two great subdivisions of the Union—the planting and the manufacturing States. Assuming the average rate of protecting duties at 40 percent, (though it is in fact more:) and setting down the southern exports at thirty-five millions of dollars, we have the sum of fourteen millions of dollars as the amount of the revenue annual. ly levied from the productions of the planting States, of which more than one half is transfer. red as a tribute to the manufacturing States. But the actual extent of the transfer of wealth which takes place, annually, from the south to the north, cannot be fully realized until we take into the estimate the exchanges between those two sections, as well as our foreign exes. * whole amount of the southern staples which we sell to the manufacturing States, cannot amount to less than six millions of dollars. Cotton alone, by the estimate of the manufac. turers, amounts to more than that sum. w hile we certainly obtain no greater money price for our staples in this exchange, in consequence of the protecting duties, we as certainly give from twenty-five to fifty per cent more for all thearticles we receive. The amount of the direct annual tributelevied upon the south, in this intermal trade, is not less than two millions of dollars. The estimate of .Fo of Ways sis much too small. **‘. burthen, there can be no mistake; for it is certain that the money price of the ar. ticles we receive from the north; for the staples there consumed, is increased to the amount of at least two millions by the protecting duties, and it is as certain that the money price of cotson, tobacco, and rice, is not increased at all, but rather diminished by those duties. Upon the whole, then, the annual production of the three great agricultural staples of the south, consumed both abroad and at home, amounts to at least forty millions of dollars.

UNITED STATES WEEKLY TELEGRAPH. *
of this whole amount of production, som. -

pared both with the manufactures of the north, and with foreign manufactures, in the exaco

e that it enhances the prices of those mam. actures. In other words, upon all the exchan. ges of the planters, at home and abroad, they pay an average offorty percent more for who they purchase, while the price oftheir staples

their exchanges is exclusively produced by the protecting duties. Sir, this is no picture of the imagination; it is a plain analysis, a strict business view of our ondition. And I do not know any language by which I can better describe th: aggregate operation of the protecting system upon the different sections of this Union, than to say its an annual legislative draft upon the productive industry of the planting states, info. manufacturing States, for between ten anafis. teen millions of dollars, signed by the presidin officers of the two Houses, and countersig by the President of the United states. Having now explained the agency of money in the exchanges of foreign commerce, and its tendency to disguise the octual operation of the protecting system, the committee will the more oadily perceive the force and propriety of the illustrations which have been adduced, to prove the greatinequality and injustice of th: system. The reason is now apparent why import au. ties have been erroneously supposed to oper. ate differently from exciseduties, upon the producers and consumers of the articles subjected to these respective duties. If, for example, a discriminating exose onty worelevied upon the producers of one-third part only of the cotton manufactures of the united States, everybody would admitthat almost the whole burthen of this duty would fall upon the producers of the proscribed manufactures. To exemption of the other two-thirds from taxation, would renderit obviously impossible to throw the burthen of the duty on the consumers Now, this is equally true of import duties le. Yied upon foreign manufactures, while domes. tic manufactures of the same kind, and artwice **mount, are exempted from outs. And the reason why it is not equally oppons, is that, as excise duties operate upon domestic exchanges, there is nothing in the transaction that brings an increased quotity of money into the market. Everybody sees, therefore, that, in the case stated, the price of the dutied article cannot be increased as much even as one-third part of the amount of the duty, and the principal burthen must consequently be borne by the producer. of money were not admino free of duty from foreign countries, and of the quantity of it in the United states remonohomeone. * he imposition of ongo ho fore it would be equally as apparent, as in the case of excise duties, that th: producers must bear most of the bus then

- The very its ef. The effect of the protecting system, as welfect of. ing on protecting duties, in such a have seen, is to depress the exchangeable value state of o: would be a plain palpable foll - - - - - - --

is not at all increased; and this unequal state of .

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