purpose, two thirds of both houses, clearly with BODY THE WILL OF THE STRONGER INTEREST, IN a view of interposing a barrier against this THE OPERATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT, AND NOT strong instinctive appetite of the Government THE WILL OF THE WHOLE COMMUNITY, AND TO for the acqusition of power. But it would have LEAVE THE OTHERS UNPROTECTED, A PRET TO ITS been folly in the extreme, thus carefully to AMBITION AND CUFIDITY just as would be guard the passage to the direct acquisition, had the case between the rulers and ruled, if the the wide door of construction been left open to right to govern was vested exclusively in the it indirect; and hence, in the same spirit in hands of the former. They would both be, in which two thirds of both houses were required reality, absolute and despotic governments; the to propose amendments, the convention that one as much so as the other. framed the Constitution rejected the many They would both become mere instruments of cupidity propositions which were moved in the body, and ambition in the hands of those who wielded them. with the intention of divesting the States of the No one doubts that such would be the case, were he Government placed under the control of irresponsible rulers, right of interposing, and thereby of the only ef- but, unfortunately for the cause of liberty, it is not fectual means of preventing the enlargement of seen, with equal clearness, at it must as neccessa the powers of the Government by construction. and yet, the former is not more certain than the later. rily be so when controlled by any absolute majority, It is thus that the Constitution-making power To this we may attribute the mistake so often sud re has fortified itself against the law-making; and fatally repeated, that to expel a despot is to establish that so effectually, that however strong the dis-liberty-a mistake to which we may trace the fatture of many noble and generous efforts in favor of liberty. The position and capacity of the latter to encroach, error consists in considering communities as formed of the means of resistance on the part of the form. interests strictly identical throughout, instead of ing er is not less powerful. If indeed encroach-distinct interests as there are individuals. The interests composed throughout, as they in reality are, of as reas ments have been made, the fault is not in the no two persons are the same, regarded in reference to each system, but in the inattention and neglect of other; though they may be, viewed in relation to the rest of the community. It is this diversity, which the several those whose interests and duty it was to inter- portions of the community bear to each other, m reference pose the ample means of protection afforded by the Constitution. To sum up in few words in conclusion, what appears to me to be the entire philosophy of government, in reference to the subject of this communication to the whole, that renders the principle of the concurring najority necessary to preserve liberty. Place the power in the hands of the absolute majority, and the strongest of these would certainly pervert the Government from the object for which it was instituted, the equal protection of the rights of all, into an instrument of advancing itself, at the expense of the rest of the community. Against this abuse of power, no remedy can be devised but that of the Two powers are necessary to the existence concurring majority. Neither the right of suffrage nor and preservation of free States; a power on the public opinion can possibly check it. They, in fact, but tend to aggravate the disease. It seems really surpris part of the ruled to prevent rulers from abusing jog, that truths so obvious should be so imperfectly untheir authority, by compelling them to be faith-derstood. There would appear, indeed, a feebleness in ful to their constituents, and which is effected our intellectual powers on political subjects, when directed to large masses. We readily see why a single indithrough the right of suffrage; and a power To vidual, as a ruler, would, if not prevented, oppress the COMPEL THE PARTS OF SOCIETY TO BE JUST TO rest of the com...unity; but are at a loss to understand why seven millions would, if not also prevented, oppress ONE ANOTHER, BY COMPELLING THEM TO CONSULT six millions, as if the relative numbers on either side THE INTEREST OF EACH OTHER, which can only could, in the least degree, vary the principle. be affected, whatever may be the device for In stating what I have, I have but repeated the experithe purpose, by requiring the concurring assent ceding ours, and ours as far as it has progressed. The ences of ages, comprehending all free governments preof all the great and distinct interests of the practical operation of ours has been substantially on the community to the measures of the Government. principle of the absolute majority. We have acted, with This result is the sum total of all the contrivances to interpret its own powers, without limitation, or check some exceptions, as if the General Government had a right adopted by free States to preserve their liberty, and, though many circumstances have favored us, and by preventing the conflicts between the several greatly impeded the national progress of events, under such an operation of the systein, yet we already see, in classes, or parts of the community. Both pow-wha ever direction we turn our eyes, the growing symp ers are indispensable. The one as much so as tons of disorder and decay-the growth of faction, cupidithe other. The rulers are not more disposed, and corruption; and the decay of patriotism, integrity, and disinterestedness In the midst of youth, we see the to encroach on the ruled than the different in-flushed cheek and the short and feverish breath, that terests of the community on one another; nor marks the approach of the fatal hour; and tome it wil, -would they more certainly convert their power the great conservative principle, which brought the Beunless there be a speedy and radica, change-a relum to from the just and legitimate objects for which publican par y into authority, but which, with the pos Governments are instituted, into an instrument session of power and prosperity, it has long since ceased of aggrandizement, at the expense of the ruled, unless made responsible to their constituents posed If I have been so fortunate as to add to year than would the stronger interests theirs, at the fund a single new illustration of this great conservative expense of the weaker, unless compelled to con- argument calculated to sustain the State in her noble principle of our Government, or to furnisiran additional sult them, in the measures of the Government, and patriotic struggle to revive and maintain it, and in by taking their separate and concurring assent. which you have acted a part long to be remembered by the friends of freedom, I shall feel amply compensated The same cause operates in both cases. The for the time occupied in so long a commun cation. constitution of our nature which would impel believe the cause to be the cause of truth and justice the rulers to oppress the ruled, unless prevent ordinary party struggles of the day sink into perfect of union, liberty, and the Constitution, before which the ed, would in like manner, and with equal force, insignificance; and that it will be so regarded by the impel the stronger to oppress the weaker inter-distant posterity, I have not the slightest dræbt. To vest the right of Government in the With great and sincere regard, I am yours, JOHN C. CALHOU. absolute majority, would be, in fact, BUT TO EM- His Ex. James Hamilton, jun, Gor. S. C. est. to remember. I have now finished the task, which your request im st |