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fefled of all the skill that military science could afford, and impelled by all the subordination and management that military discipline could impose, with the aid of the local militia also, would deserve well of their country, if they should preserve New. York from the grasp of Great Britain, in case the should think proper to direct the force she might have at command against that city. Then why fend one thousand on a fervice, when we * know that two thousand are necessary, and perhaps incompetent? Is it because the United States have not the capacity to fend 2000 ? 'Tnis question shall be examined presently. The same observations will apply to the protection of Rhode Island, where 2000 more will be necessary ; and 10CO will be as few as can possibly be detached for the other fortifications. Admitting then 5000 men to be necessary to man the various fortifications on the fea. board, and supporing every man to be raiscd, as proposed in the bill, there will be a disposable force of only 20.000 men for the occupation of Canada. But upon the executive project, there would be left for that service only 5000 men ; unless, indeed, the western and southern frontiers should be left unprotected, or the fortifications on the fea board should be only half manned, and of course left to the sport of the enemy.-Mr. G. faid, he apprehended that in the first onset of the war, Great Britain would di. rect her force to the occupation of New York and Orleans, and if she should possess herself of those two points, he would ven. ture to predict that the administration which commenced the war would not finish it; especially under a system of policy, which would only furnish one half of the means deemed necessary for their protection--yes, sir, known to be inadequate at the time of applying it. What apology could be made to an injured nation under such circumstances? We knew 2000 men to be necessary for the defence of New York ; but we sagely determined to apply 1000 only to that object, for fear of incurrug the expense of the re. quisite number ! This would be self-condemnation. The people would lose all confidence in such calculators, and would certainly make the experiment of a change. Under such circumstances, Mr. G. said he would be the first to cry out for a change of ad. ministration; for it would not be possible to lose by it. Defend New. York with all the judgment and skill you can command ; fill the fortifications with the full complement of troops amply provided ; call in the local militia, &c. and he should not be surprised if the British should get poffeffion of that city. But then there would be no blame on the adıniniftration ; all its duties will have been performed, and the result would reft upon the fortune of war ; but a single act of neglect or misconduct would certainly deprive the administration of the public confidence.
If Great-Britain should get poffeffion of New York and Orleans, and you should get poflession of Canada, you would be very glad to make the exchange upon the termination of the war. Therefore, take care of these two points.
Mr. G. faid he also requested the Hon. Secretary to consult with the President, and inform him, as the President's Secretary, whether the President wished to have the number of men reduced, or whether he had a preference for any other number. The reply, after the consultation, very properly, was, that the Preliclent had no opinion to offer on that point. He confidered it a subject of legislative discretion, &c. Of course any informal executive views ought not to be substituted for our own discre. tion and responsibility. He knew it had been suggested, and per. haps from very high authority, that nothing was necessary to induce Great Britain to recede from her aggressions, but to convince her, that instead of opposing to them inefficient commer. cial restrictions, they would be resisted with physical force : and that railing ten thousand men would produce this conviction with out incurring further expense. This suggestion furnished some of bis strongest objections to limiting the force to be raised to ten thoufandi men. So far from producing that conviction on the British cabinet, he was convinced it would produce precisely the oppofite effect. The British cabinet would look at the means provided for effecting the object. And as these means would be viewed fo utterly inadequate to the purposes of war, the cabi. net would necessarily conclude, that we were not in earneft; that we were joking, even upon the most serious subject ; that war was not intended, and would not be reforted to under any circumstances. This impression, the necessary result of our former meafures, has become so general, both at home and abroad, that we have much to do to retrieve our lost reputation ; we do not stand upon original ground. Our measures must be of a very different character from what they have been, to produce the defired conviction either at home or abroad. Having changed our principle of action from commercial restrictions to physical force, limiting that force to ten thousand men would be, in his judg. ment, as much trifting with the energies of the nation, as inefficient commercial restrictions had heretofore been trifting with the character and interests of the nation, and he feared was dictated by the same unfortunate imbecile spirit and policy. Mr. G. said, that whillt upon this part of the subject, he begged to be excused for reading a few paragraphs from a newspaper which he accidentally picked up last evening, containing the annunciation of the President's message at Quebec ; the very point to which the proposed force might probably be directed. It fully demonstrates the impressions existing there, and which have been produced by our former measures.
“Quebec, Nov. 18. President's Message.--Happily the expectation of Mr. Madison's speech steps in opportunely, as something of an antidote to the effect of the European dearth. From that speech we learn, that the terrible being, John Bull, does not suffer his thousand armed vessels, manned and equipped at an enormous expense, to lie wholly idle ; but that they are guilty of the audacious tyranny of being in some degree a check on the violent inclinations of Dame Columbia to extend her arms, to cherish, aid and affist her admired hero, Napoleon, in effecting John's annihilation. Much will the speech complain that the sovereign of the ocean is not powerful to no purpose, and does not descend to, and put himself on a level with the imbecility of the United States with their dozen ibips. Unpardonable is the grievance that the Leviathan is not powerless as the Cod; that the Jackal, whom nature meant for the Lion's provider, is not permitted to divert its provender to the support of the Tiger, with a view to the deftruction of the Lion.
“The speech may not say these things in direct terms, but such will, unquestionably, be its meaning :
“With syllogisms 'twill make a clatter,
To retail apples, plums and pears." Limit all our mighty efforts to 10,000 men, and it will afford a better subject for another Pasquinade, than the President's meffage had done for the one just read. He should not have ventured to have read thefe paragraphs to the Senate, however, it thefe impressions were merely local. But he believed similar impres. fions, pervaded Europe and America, and had unfortunately found their way into the French and British cabinets. Nor should he have thought these sarcasms worth regard, were it not for the truisins with which they were pointed. When the Duc de Cadore, upon his review of our proceedings, told us officially that he would have expected more from a Jamaica assembly, he thought it both impertinent and infolent ; but the point of the offence, was a consciousness that it was too much like the truth. It is the truism which forms the sting of every sarcasm. We find the Emperor Napoleon, too, acting under thefe fame impressions, when he seized and confiscated your property, without even a plausible pretext_The only ground upon which he acted was a conviction that you would not refent it, and he therefore might plunder with impunity. The same impressions directed the Brit. ish cabinet in its 'inflexible hostility, and its war upon our commerce, both in character and effect brought home to the threr. hold of our territory.' If our protracted moderation, &c. by wKich he presumed
were meant our feeble contrivance for the last three years, and of which, he feared, the requisition of 10,000 men was a branch both in fpirit and policy, should still be continued, he believed it would degenerate into something of a very different character, and would receive a very different denomina. tion from tie public.
Mr. Giles begged the Senate to turn its attention to the means
unde se scaras
of resistance now actually in Canada, which
for calling opposed to the contemplated force. From ti.
insurhe could obtain, the British had at this time in 10,000 regular troops, and from 12 to 15.000 well furnished militia, drawn from a population of n37 fouls. If therefore your troops could be ready to spring before the breaking up of the ice, and before th could throw further fuccors into that country, it appeared there would be very good employment for 20,000 men in fubdu. ing this force and population; and if undertaken with fewer men, a failure of the enterprise would probably be the consequence. Besides, sir, we should recollect, that Great Britain is the lame Great Britain we encountered in 1775, 1776, &c. and although some gentlemen seemed to suppose that the was fully occupied with her European war; that she was impoverilhed, fighting for her existence, &c. and of courte had at command very little disposable force, he viewed the subject very differently.
It is true, G. Britain is engaged with a formidable enemy; but hitherto she has greatly the advantage in the war. Where has she lost one inch of territory? What acquisitions of terfitory and population has she not made, both in the East and West Indies ? What obstacles is she now opposing to the occupation of the sovthern peninsula by her enemy? So far from her population being diminished at home, it appeared to be greatly increased by the last census, notwithstanding all the distresses and starvations we have heard of, &c. Count the number of French and English prisoners, and you will find that G. Britain has the advantage of perhaps ten to one. Her feet is unrivalled—of course left more free to act than at any time during the revolutionary war. He therefore concluded that we should have to contend now, with the fame G. Britain we did then, with renovated powers and resources. Yet to this power, it is proposed to oppose only 10,000 additional troops. Mr. G. said, it was uncertain how long G. Britain might keep her army upon the peninsula ; but whenever it shall be withdrawn, either by choice or necefsity, she will have a very formidable disposable force, in numbers, skill and bravery; and whether she withdraws that army or not, you will find that she will command a respectable force for the protection of Cana. da, if you wait for the breaking up of the ice, which now envelopes all the avenues of that country. Time, therefore, is all important, and not a moment for preparations ought to be loft.
France, it is true, has astonishingly aggrandized herself during the existing war in Europe ; but it has been done at the expense of other nations, not of Great Britain. G. Britain has had her share of the spoils also.
Let us not then undervalue our enemy. Sir, this project of limiting our efforts to 10,000 men, seems to be too much upon the plan of a scare-crow, and it appeared to be regarded in that light by some gentlemen. He said G. Britain was the last nation on earth that he
are guiltyrtake to frighten with scare-crows: besides, even upon check her than 10,000.' Mr. G. said said he disliked this project ex
-crow plan, he should suppose that 25,000 men would be Wnely, from another consideration, which it forcibly impressed upo
It must evidently have been recommended by the same spirit and policy, which had heretofore relied upon the chapter of accidents for success, and not upon our own energies and resources. It seems to have been founded on the hope, that G. Britain would recede without an effort on our part. It is a fallacious hope. The hope itself will always defeat its own objects, by avoiding the means necessary to ensure its own success. He said we had enjoyed a long course of prosperity ; but we ought not to calculate upon a perpetual exemption from the common calamities of nations. When days of adversity shall arrive, we should meet them with becoming fortitude and energy. He deprecated that spirit, which appeared to be longing and whining after that prosperity that is past, as if it feared to look adversity in the face. Mr. President, when adversity comes, you must look her in the face ; yes, sir, you must stare her out of countenance ; you must meet her with courage, and with means sufficient to subdue her. Mr. President, if, after we have been solemrly called together to receive communications of great and weighty matters ; and after our meeting, have been told, that our independence is at hazard; that there is actual war, both in character and effect, upon our lawful commerce, brought home to the threshhold of our territory; that rights are trampled upon, that no independent nation can relinquish, &c. &c. when, in short, our wrongs are painted in such glowing terms, as to have set the whole nation on fire: if, after all this, we should taper down to 10,00 men to subdue such a crisis, would it not be a wonderful discovery in the art of sinking? Would it not undervalue the resources and energies of the nation? Would it not insult and deceive the national spirit and expectations? Whether he viewed this subject in reference to the inter. ests of the nation, or the party in power, he should equally protest against this little miserable policy of resorting to means so utterly incompetent to the objects. He cautioned the party in power now, as he often had done before, against longer sporting with the national sensibility, the national character, the national interests.
Mr. Giles said, in making the calculations of the degrees of force required, the committee was precluded from taking into the estimate any auxiliary force to be derived from the militia ; because an impression appeared to be almost universally cntertained, that Congress could not constitutionally command the services of the militia beyond the limits of the U.States; of course, the regular force must be proportionably augmented. He said, although he believed he stood single and alone, he protested against this doctrine. He did not propose now to examine this question ; because it would be useless. He would, however, read the clause of the constitution, which gave to Congress the power of calling forth the militia, and make one or two