feffed of all the skill that military fcience could afford, and impelled by all the fubordination and management that military difcipline could impofe, with the aid of the local militia alfo, would deferve well of their country, if they fhould preferve NewYork from the grasp of Great Britain, in cafe the fhould think proper to direct the force the might have at command against that city. Then why fend one thoufand on a fervice, when we know that two thoufand are neceffary, and perhaps incompetent ? Is it because the United States have not the capacity to fend 2000? This question fhall be examined prefently. The fame obfervations will apply to the protection of Rhode-Ifland, where 2000 more will be neceffary; and 10CO will be as few as can poffibly be detached for the other fortifications. Admitting then 5000 men to be neceffary to man the various fortifications on the feaboard, and fupponing every man to be raised, as proposed in the bill, there will be a difpofable force of only 20.000 men for the occupation of Canada. But upon the executive project, there would be left for that fervice only 5000 men; unlefs, indeed, the western and fouthern frontiers fhould be left unprotected, or the fortifications on the fea board fhould be only half manned, and of course left to the fport of the enemy.-Mr. G. faid, he apprehended that in the first onset of the war, Great Britain would direct her force to the occupation of New-York and Orleans, and if the fhould poffefs herfelf of those two points, he would venture to predict that the adminiftration which commenced the war would not finish it; efpecially under a fyftem of policy, which would only furnith one half of the means deemed neceffary for their protection-yes, fir, known to be inadequate at the time of applying it. What apology could be made to an injured nation under fuch circumftances? We knew 2000 men to be neceffary for the defence of New-York; but we fagely determined to apply 1000 only to that object, for fear of incurring the expenfe of the re. quifite number! This would be felf-condemnation. The people would lofe all confidence in fuch calculators, and would certainly make the experiment of a change. Under fuch circumftances, Mr. G. faid he would be the first to cry out for a change of administration; for it would not be poffible to lose by it. Defend NewYork with all the judgment and skill you can command; fill the fortifications with the full complement of troops amply provided; call in the local militia, &c. and he fhould not be furprifed if the British fhould get poffeffion of that city. But then there would be no blame on the administration; all its duties will have been performed, and the refult would reft upon the fortune of war; but a fingle act of neglect or misconduct would certainly deprive the administration of the public confidence. If Great-Britain fhould get poffeffion of New-York and Orleans, and you fhould get poffeffion of Canada, you would be very glad to make the exchange upon the termination of the war. Therefore, take care of these two points. Mr. G. faid he alfo requested the Hon. Secretary to confult with the Prefident, and inform him, as the Prefident's Secretary, whether the Prefident wifhed to have the number of men reduced, or whether he had a preference for any other number. The reply, after the confultation, very properly, was, that the Prefident had no opinion to offer on that point. He confidered it a fubject of legiflative difcretion, &c. Of course any informal executive views ought not to be fubftituted for our own difcretion and responsibility. He knew it had been fuggefted, and perhaps from very high authority, that nothing was neceflary to induce Great-Britain to recede from her aggreffions, but to convince her, that inftead of oppofing to them inefficient commercial restrictions, they would be refifted with phyfical force and that railing ten thoufand men would produce this conviction without incurring further expenfe. This fuggeftion furnished fome of his strongest objections to limiting the force to be raised to ten thoufand men. So far from producing that conviction on the British cabinet, he was convinced it would produce precifely the oppofite effect. The British cabinet would look at the means provided for effecting the object. And as thefe means would be viewed fo utterly inadequate to the purpofs of war, the cabinet would neceffarily conclude, that we were not in earnest; that we were joking, even upon the moft ferious fubject; that war was not intended, and would not be reforted to under any circumftances. This impreffion, the neceffary refult of our former meafures, has become fo general, both at home and abroad, that we have much to do to retrieve our loft reputation; we do not ftand upon original ground. Our measures must be of a very different character from what they have been, to produce the defired conviction either at home or abroad. Having changed our principle of action from commercial restrictions to phyfical force, limiting that force to ten thousand men would be, in his judg ment, as much trifting with the energies of the nation, as inefficient commercial reftrictions had heretofore been trifling with the character and interefts of the nation, and he feared was dictated by the fame unfortunate imbecile fpirit and policy. Mr. G. faid, that whilst upon this part of the fubject, he begged to be excufed for reading a few paragraphs from a newspaper which he accidentally picked up laft evening, containing the annunciation of the Prefident's meffage at Quebec; the very point to which the propofed force might probably be directed. It fully demonftrates the impreffions exifting there, and which have been produced by our former meafures. "QUEBEC, Nov. 18.--President's Message.-Happily the expectation of Mr. Madifon's fpeech fteps in opportunely, as fomething of an antidote to the effect of the European dearth. From that fpeech we learn, that the terrible being, John Bull, does not suffer his thousand armed veffels, manned and equipped at an enormous expenfe, to lie wholly idle; but that they are guilty of the audacious tyranny of being in fome degree a check on the violent inclinations of Dame Columbia to extend her arms, to cherish, aid and affift her admired hero, Napoleon, in effecting John's annihilation. Much will the fpeech complain that the fovereign of the ocean is not powerful to no purpose, and does not defcend to, and put himself on a level with the imbecility of the United States with their dozen fhips. Unpardonable is the grievance that the Leviathan is not powerlefs as the Cod; that the Jackal, whom nature meant for the Lion's provider, is not permitted to divert its provender to the fupport of the Tiger, with a view to the deftruction of the Lion. "The fpeech may not say these things in direct terms, but fuch will, unquestionably, be its meaning: "With syllogisms 'twill make a clatter, With abstract rights, three-deckers batter: A sea-board boast shut from the main; Limit all our mighty efforts to 10,000 men, and it will afford a better subject for another Pafquinade, than the Prefident's meffage had done for the one juft read. He fhould not have ventured to have read thefe paragraphs to the Senate, however, if these impreffions were merely local. But he believed fimilar impreffions, pervaded Europe and America, and had unfortunately found their way into the French and British cabinets. Nor fhould he have thought these farcafms worth regard, were it not for the truifins with which they were pointed. When the Duc de Cadore, upon his review of our proceedings, told us officially that he would have expected more from a Jamaica assembly, he thought it both impertinent and infolent; but the point of the offence, was a confciousness that it was too much like the truth. It is the truifm which forms the fting of every farcafm. We find the Emperor Napoleon, too, acting under thefe fame impreffions, when he feized and confifcated your property, without even a plaufible pretext-The only ground upon which he acted was a conviction that you would not refent it, and he therefore might plunder with impunity. The fame impreffions directed the Britifh cabinet in its inflexible hoftility, and its war upon our commerce, both in character and effect brought home to the thref hold of our territory.' If our protracted moderation, &c. by which he prefumed were meant our feeble contrivance for the laft three years, and of which, he feared, the requisition of 10,000 men was a branch both in fpirit and policy, fhould ftill be continued, he believed it would degenerate into fomething of a very different character, and would receive a very different denomination from the public. Mr. Giles begged the Senate to turn its attention to the means for calling unde scar insur miliif of refiftance now actually in Canada, which oppofed to the contemplated force. From t he could obtain, the British had at this time in 10,000 regular troops, and from 12 to 15.000 well furnished militia, drawn from a population of n37 fouls. If therefore your troops could be ready to fpring before the breaking up of the ice, and before th could throw further fuccors into that country. it appearedthere would be very good employment for 20,000 men in fubduing this force and population; and if undertaken with fewer men, a failure of the enterprife would probably be the confequence. Besides, sir, we fhould recollect, that Great Britain is the fame Great Britain we encountered in 1775, 1776, &c. and although fome gentlemen feemed to fuppofe that the was fully occupied with her European war; that he was impoverished, fighting for her exiftence, &c. and of courfe had at command very little difpofable force, he viewed the fubject very differently. It is true, G. Britain is engaged with a formidable enemy; but hitherto fhe has greatly the advantage in the war. Where has fhe loft one inch of territory? What acquifitions of territory and population has fhe not made, both in the Eaft and West Indies? What obftacles is fhe now oppofing to the occupation of the fouthern peninfula by her enemy? So far from her population being diminished at home, it appeared to be greatly increased by the last cenfus, notwithstanding all the diftresses and ftarvations we have heard of, &c. Count the number of French and Englifh prifoners, and you will find that G. Britain has the advantage of perhaps ten to one. Her fleet is unrivalled-of course left more free to act than at any time during the revolutionary war. He therefore concluded that we fhould have to contend now, with the fame G. Britain we did then, with renovated powers and refources. Yet to this power, it is proposed to oppofe only 10,000 additional troops. Mr. G. faid, it was uncertain how long G. Britain might keep her army upon the peninfula; but whenever it fhall be withdrawn, either by choice or neceffity, fhe will have a very formidable difpofable force, in numbers, fkill and bravery; and whether she withdraws that army or not, you will find that she will command a refpectable force for the protection of Cana da, if you wait for the breaking up of the ice, which now envelopes all the avenues of that country. Time, therefore, is all important, and not a moment for preparations ought to be loft. France, it is true, has astonishingly aggrandized herself during the existing war in Europe; but it has been done at the expense of other nations, not of Great Britain. G. Britain has had her share of the spoils also. Let us not then undervalue our enemy. Sir, this project of limiting our efforts to 10,000 men, seems to be too much upon the plan of a scare-crow, and it appeared to be regarded in that light by some gentlemen. He said G. Britain was the last nation on earth that he are guilty take to frighten with scare-crows; besides, check -crow plan, he should suppose that 25,000 men would be her than 10,000. Mr. G. said said he disliked this project ex mely, from another consideration, which it forcibly impressed upon his mind. It must evidently have been recommended by the same spirit and policy, which had heretofore relied upon the chapter of accidents for success, and not upon our own energies and resources. It seems to have been founded on the hope, that G.Britain' would recede without an effort on our part. It is a fallacious hope. The hope itself will always defeat its own objects, by avoiding the means necessary to ensure its own success. He said we had enjoyed a long course of prosperity; but we ought not to calculate upon a perpetual exemption from the common calamities of nations. When days of adversity shall arrive, we should meet them with becoming fortitude and energy. He deprecated that spirit, which appeared to be longing and whining after that prosperity that is past, as if it feared to look adversity in the face. Mr. President, when adversity comes, you must look her in the face; yes, sir, you must stare her out of countenance; you must meet her with courage, and with means sufficient to subdue her. Mr. President, if, after we have been solemnly called together to receive communications of great and weighty matters; and after our meeting, have been told, that our independence is at hazard; that there is actual war, both in character and effect, upon our lawful commerce, brought home to the threshhold of our territory; that rights are trampled upon, that no independent nation can relinquish, &c. &c. when, in short, our wrongs are painted in such glowing terms, as to have set the whole nation on fire: if, after all this, we should taper down to 10,000 men to subdue such a crisis, would it not be a wonderful discovery in the art of sinking? Would it not undervalue the resources and energies of the nation? Would it not insult and deceive the national spirit and expectations? Whether he viewed this subject in reference to the inter. ests of the nation, or the party in power, he should equally protest against this little miserable policy of resorting to means so utterly incompetent to the objects. He cautioned the party in power now, as he often had done before, against longer sporting with the national sensibility, the national character, the national interests. Mr. Giles said, in making the calculations of the degrees of force required, the committee was precluded from taking into the estimate any auxiliary force to be derived from the militia; because an impression appeared to be almost universally cntertained, that Congress could not constitutionally command the services of the militia beyond the limits of the U.States; of course, the regular force must be proportionably augmented. He said, although he believed he stood single and alone, he protested against this doctrine. He did not propose now to examine this question; because it would be useless. He would, however, read the clause of the constitution, which gave to Congress the power of calling forth the militia, and make one or two |