remarks on it. Congress shall have the power "to provide for calling forth the militia, to execute the laws of the Union, to suppress insurrections, and repel invasions." The first object for which the militia may be called forth, is to execute the laws of the Union; and if the war is to be carried on beyond the limits of the U. States, it is still a law to be executed, altho' beyond the limits of the U. States; and he could see no reason why the militia could not be called forth to execute it. Indeed it is one of those laws, to the execution of which force is indispensably and properly applicable; and if the laws can have a legitimate influence beyond the limits of the U. States, the power of congress over the militia must be co-extensive with the laws, which are thus required to be executed. He would only observe farther, that when this subject was more particularly brought into discussion upon a former occasion, it was said, that even in G. Britain, the militia could not be ordered out of Great-Britain; no, not even to Ireland. But it should now be reccollected, that since that time, the British parliament, without even a question as to the right, has ordered British militia to Ireland, and Irish militia to G. Britain. Twenty-six regiments are said to be transported at this time.

Mr. Giles said, that in considering the peculiar geographical situation of the United States, with colonies at each end of them belonging to powerful distant nations, with which we may often be brought into collision, it would be unfortunate for the United States, if the militia bordering on the lines of separation could not be called forth for any purpose of chastisement, or any other object the government might have in view, in relation to those colonies, or their respective mother countries. If such be the unfortunate organization or interpretation of the constitution, an amendment for remedying so important a defect ought to be instantly proposed and adopted. Its inconvenience is now sensibly felt, in precluding all reliance upon that important auxiliary force. Gentlemen, however, propose to remedy this defect, by a volunteer force. Mr. G. said, he would not reject, nor did he mean to disparage this species of force. But from the nature of its organization, it cannot be suited to offensive war, nor to the occupation of a country after it should be taken. He had been told too, by military gentlemen, without exception, that it was always found to be the most expensive and least efficient force.He hardly expected to have heard it relied upon for the contemplated object, by the honorable mover, because he thought that gentleman concurred with the other experienced military gentlemen in these respects.

Mr. G. said, upon an impartial view of all the considerations he just had the honor to suggest, he thought it was demonstrated, that the force proposed was not more than competent to the objects of the government; and that a smaller number would correspond neither with the national spirit nor expectation. He would therefore proceed to consider, whether that number proposed exceed the national capacity to furnish.

It will appear, said Mr. Giles, from the census lately taken, that the population of the United States is perhaps not less than seven and a half millions of souls. Now, sir, this must be a population of most extraordinary character, and under the influence of a government of a most extraordinary organization, if it cannot command the services of thirty-five thousand men, upon the most extraordinary exigencies. But we are not without a memorable experiment upon the population and government of the United States, at a former period. In 1775-6, we commenced the revolutionary war with Great Britain, with a population, very little, if at all, exceeding two millions of souls. Let us see the numbers of regular troops, not merely voted, but actually brought into the field, and paid for their services during the whole of that war. They are as follow:-Total in pay, in 1775--27,443 in 1776--46,391 in 1777--34,820: in 1779 --27699 in 1780-21,015: in 1781-13,292: in 1782--14,356: in 1783--13,476. These are the regular troops actually in pay, exclusive of militia.

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In making this comparative estimate, he was willing, in these degenerate days, to give two, nay three for one, over the population of 1775-6; and it would appear, that the committee had not drawn upon the existing population beyond moderation. With a double, way threefold population; with more than quadrupled pecuniary resources; with a capacity for furnishing munitions of war above one hundred fold; the committee proposed to draw upon the existing population for 35,000 regular troops in the whole. In 1776, there were actually in the field, and paid, 46,891 regular troops, exclusive of militia. Great Britain, with a population of but little more than double that of the United States, laboring too under a debt of more than seven hundred millions of pounds sterling, has, at this time, in her land and naval service, perhaps 300,000 men ; yet an alarm seems to be produced here, by a proposition to call into the service of the United States 35,000 men. This too for repelling the aggressions of the same Great Britain that we encountered in 1775-6, and for the same cause. Yes, sir, it is as much a question of independence now, as it was then. It was then a question, whether Great Britain should impose a tax of three pence per pound on tea, when in our colonial state. It is now a question, whether Great Britain shall regulate, by force, the whole of our commerce, in contempt and violation of the laws of nations, when we affect to be in an independent state! If sir, our fathers had condescended to calculate the costs of a tax of three pence on a pound of tea, compared with the costs of the war for achieving our independence, as some of their sons are now doing with respect to the value of our commerce submitted to the regulation of Great-Britain, we should not now have it in our power to degrade their memories, by the profligate abandonment of the independence achieved for us by the profusion of their blood and treasure. And what, sir, became of the 46 891 men raised to oppose Great-Britain in 1776? We know they were often compelled to

fly before superior British forces, and by the waste of the war and short enlistments, were reduced in 1783, to 13, 476. Yet we seem now willing to fall into the same fatal error——— -And for what? and from what cause? From groundless and visionary fears of the possible influence of regular troops upon our liberties. But sir, these fears come too late. They should have come upon us long ago. It is too late to say, we are more afraid of the means of annoyance, than the enemy to be annoyed. We have now taken the ground of resistance, and cannot recede! He hoped that the considerations urged the other day upon this subject, were sufficient to demonstrate the fallacy of these alarms, and their unfortunate tendency in relation to the public welfare in the present state of our affairs. Upon these views of the whole subject, he trusted the senate would concur with the committee in opinion that the number of men recommended, is not 100 great for the purposes of the government; nor beyond the convenient abilities of the United States.

Mr. G. said, he would now proceed to the tenderest point of this discussion-the decrepid state of the treasury departments. Mr. G. said, he did not think this the true standard for estimating the national resources, nor energies; nor for estimating the means necessary for repelling aggressions upon our national rights: nor is it the one recommended in the president's responsible message. But the honorable mover had said, it demanded and ought to receive our first attention. He complained too, that Mr. G. had said the objects at stake were too great for counting the costs. Mr. G. said, this was not precisely the view he had before presented on the subject. The opinion he expressed was, that there would be an economy in furnishing means sufficient to effect your objects; that the costs could not be excessive, which would ensure success; but if you dealt out your means so sparingly as to fail of your object, it would then become prodigal waste and profusion of economy. To this opinion he still adhered; and he tho't that never was an occasion, where the remark would apply with more force and propriety than at present. The gentlemen who express so much concern for the treasury department tell us, that the gentleman at the head of that department possesses the most splendid financial talents, &c. Mr. G. said, he hoped he did; and he was not disposed to detract aught from this impression; but he could not help remarking, that he should feel more confident in that gentleman's financial reputation, if it were founded more on facts, and less on rumor and anticipation. The honorable Secretary's financial reputation was made to his hands by others. He has had little or no share in it. He has annually given us the most lucid views of the amount and manner of revenue received at the treasury, which was provided by others, and the manner in which is has been disbursed for the purposes of the government. But this is no difficult task,and is no evidence of financial skill; which he understood to consist in the faculty of getting the most money in to the treasury, with the least inconvenience to the contributors. He

was not disposed, however, to complain of the inactivity on the part of the honorable Secretary; because the government had never called upon him for greater exertions, and perhaps had no occasion to have made such a call, until about 3 years ago. But, sir, what does this gentleman tell us, upon whose splendid financial talents we all rely? That the national resources are equal to all the national exigences. In his last report, he says, in substance, there can be no doubt of the ability and the will of the nation to furnish all the necessary supplies. If, then, reliance can be placed on his splendid financial talents; only give them scope for action; apply them to the national ability and will; let them perform the simple task of pointing to the true modus operandi; and what reason have we to despair of the republic? What reason have we to doubt of the abundance of the treasury supplies? Until now, the honorable Secretary has had no scope for the demonstration of his splendid financial talents. Of all the revenues receivable at the treasury, he knew of but one fund for which we are indebted to the suggestion of that gentleman. That is what is called the Mediterranean Fund; and that is annually presented to us in a very awkward and crooked form. But against this may be placed the repeal of the salt tax; one of the most improvi dent measures ever adopted by this or any other government. He presumed the Secretary at last yielded his assent to that measure. Mr. G. said, he was extremely opposed to this measure at the time of its adoption; had twice reported against it, as the chairman of a committee, to whom the subject was referred; and he believed, it was twice rejected by this honorable body.-His single vote, he believed, turned the scale. He should have persevered in his opposition, notwithstanding the popular cry raised at the time; but he yielded at length to an imposing claim urged on him by many members of the house of representatives-that the House of Representatives was peculiarly entrusted by the constitution with the power of raising revenue; and it could hardly be considered as correct in a single individual of the other branch of the legislature, to put his veto to a measure in relation to revenue, which was recommended by so large a majority of that branch, to whose discretion all subjects of revenue were entrusted in a peculiar manner. To this claim, andthe very high respect he entertained for the House of Representatives, he yielded a reluctant consent, upon condition that the repeal should be postponed until one month after the meeting of the next session of Congress; and that the House of Representatives would again review and consider the subject. The month elapsed without re-enacting the law, and the tax ceased. Mr. G. said he never gave a vote more against the convictions of his own judgment than he did on that occasion, although the motive was one which he conceived ought to exempt him from censure. If gentlemen will now multiply the product of that tax, by the number of years since it was taken off, they would find, it would have produced all the sums which have since been called for by loans, provided no greater expenditures had been

incurred by the government than have taken place. Besides the diminution of treasury funds, it has had the most baneful influence upon the salt works which had been established under its protection, and which would, under the influence of the same protection, in a very short time, have rendered us independent of foreign nations for the supply of this article of the first necessity. He was not disposed, however, on these accounts, to distrust the splendid financial talents of the honorable secretary: although candour compelled him to acknowledge, that he should feel more confidence in them if it were not for the unwillingness evidently manifested by that gentleman himself, during the last three years, in affording their usefulness to the government in times which imperiously demanded their full and prompt

exertions.

Mr. G. said, the recession of the treasury department, from the trying difficulties of the nation during that period, must be evident to every impartial observer; and he believed he was acquainted with circumstances, which amounted to a knowledge, that all the measures which have dishonored the nation during the same time, are, in a great degree, attributable to the indisposition of the late and present administration to press on the treasury department, and to disturb the popularity and repose of the gentleman at the head of it. That the inexecution of the embargo, is properly attributable to that cause, he had no doubt; and notwithstanding all the clamor upon that subject, its inexecution had produced its repeal. The executive refused to incur the expense, and accept the means necessary for its effectual execution; which, he believed would have been readily and zealously granted by Congress upon the executive request at any moment. When we were driven from that measure by the inexecution of the law, this honorable body proposed a substitute, in his judgment infinitely better calculated to retrieve the honor and promote the interest of the nation, than the embargo itself. It was done too against the known and anxious opposition of the executive, acting, he believed under the same unhappy influence. This measure consisted in presenting to the aggressing belligerents an impartial and honorable proposition for accommodation; and in the event of its rejec tion, to issue letters of marque and reprisal against the refusing nation. This measure was so strongly and obviously recommended by the peculiar circumstances under which we were coercively placed by both the belligerents, that he was astonished at the anxious opposition it received; and to the success of that opposition, after the embargo was abandoned, may clearly be traced all our present sufferings and degradations. Both the belligerents had determined, that we should be no longer neutral; and had adopted the most injurious measures in relation to us, to coerce us into the war; each urging us to war against its enemy. What is the proper and manly reply to these aggressing nations? Here is a proposition of accommodation to each of you; if either accepts, we pledge ourselves to issue letters of marque and reprisal against the other, if refusing the