Term Limits for Members of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, One Hundred Third Congress, First and Second Sessions, November 18, 1993, and June 29, 1994U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994 - 357 sider |
Andre utgaver - Vis alle
Vanlige uttrykk og setninger
amateurs American politics anti-Federalists argue argument Articles of Confederation ballot believe bill California campaign finance campaign finance reform candidates career Chairman challengers committee competition CONGRESS THE LIBRARY congressional term limits constitutional amendment constitutionality debate delegates democratic EDWARDS elected officials electoral experience federal going hearings House of Representatives HYDE idea incumbents Inglis institution issue James Legislative Terms legislatures LIBRARY OF CONGRESS limit congressional terms MCCOLLUM Melancton Smith members of Congress Nelson W officeholders Op-Ed open seats Orange County Register Ornstein party percent Petracca Political Science polls president principle of rotation problems professional politicians proposed public office reelection reform representative democracy Republican rotation in office serve spoils system staff subcommittee support term limits Supreme Court tenure term limitations movement Thank tion turnover U.S. Congress U.S. representatives U.S. Senate U.S. Supreme Court U.S. Term Limits vote voter choice Washington York
Populære avsnitt
Side 102 - In order to prevent those who are vested with authority from becoming oppressors, the people have a right, at such periods and in such manner as they shall establish by their frame of government, to cause their public officers to return to private life; and to fill up vacant places by certain and regular elections and appointments.
Side 114 - But his unbiased opinion, his mature judgment, his enlightened conscience, he ought not to sacrifice to you, to any man, or to any set of men living.
Side 125 - There are, perhaps, few men who can for any great length of time enjoy office and power without being more or less under the influence of feelings unfavorable to the faithful discharge of their public duties. Their integrity may be proof against improper considerations immediately addressed to themselves, but they are apt to acquire a habit of looking with indifference upon the public interests and of tolerating conduct from which an unpracticed man would revolt.
Side 120 - That the legislative and executive powers of the state should be separate and distinct from the judiciary ; and that the members of the two first may be restrained from oppression, by feeling and participating the burthens of the people, they should, at fixed periods, be reduced to a private station, return into that body from which they were originally taken...
Side 93 - The duties of all public officers are, or at least admit of being made, so plain and simple that men of intelligence may readily qualify themselves for their performance...
Side 114 - Certainly, gentlemen, it ought to be the happiness and glory of a representative to live in the strictest union, the closest correspondence, and the most unreserved communication with his constituents.
Side 85 - No state shall be represented in congress by less than two nor by more than seven members; and no person shall be capable of being a delegate for more than three years in any term of six years; nor shall any person, being a delegate, be capable of holding any office under the United States, for which he, or another for his benefit, receives any salary, fees, or emolument of any kind.
Side 116 - It is a sound and important principle that the representative ought to be acquainted with the interests and circumstances of his constituents. But this principle can extend no further than to those circumstances and interests to which the authority and care of the representative relate. An ignorance of a variety of minute and particular objects, which do not lie within the compass of legislation, is consistent with every attribute necessary to a due performance of the legislative trust.
Side 121 - ... an interest separate from the electors, prudence will point out the propriety of having elections often ; because as the elected might by that means return and mix again with the general body of the electors in a few months, their fidelity to the public will be secured by the prudent reflection of not making a rod for themselves.
Side 114 - The meaning of representative government is, that the whole people, or some numerous portion of them, exercise through deputies periodically elected by themselves the ultimate controlling power, which, in every constitution, must reside somewhere.