tion of the U. States, brings the question of the constitutionality of the Tariff within the narrowest limits.

The regulation of domestic industry, so far as Government may rightfully interfere therewith, belonged to the several States before the Constitution was adopted, or the Union sprang into existence; and it still remains exclusively with them, unless it has been expressly granted to the Federal Government. If such a granı has been made, it is incumbent on those claiming, under it, to point out the provision in the Constitution which embraces it. It must be admitted that there is not a clause or article in that instrument, which has the slightest allusion, either to manufactures or to agriculture: while, therefore, the "regulation of commerce" is expressly conferred on the General Government, the regulation of every branch of domestic industry is reserved to the several States, exclusively, who may afford them encouragement, by pecuniary bounties, and by all other means, not inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States. To say that the power to regulate commerce, embraces the regulation of agriculture, and manufactures, and all the other pursuits of industry, (for they all stand upon the same footing,) is to confound the plainest distinctions, and to lose sight of the true meaning and intent of the grant in question. Commerce is, in general, regulated by treaties with foreign Nations; and, therefore, it was deemed necessary, that this power should be confided to the General Government; but agriculture, manufactures, and the mechanic arts can only be wisely ordered by municipal regulation. Commerce is one object of legislation, manufactures another, agriculture a third; and if the regulation of commerce implies an unlimited control over every thing which constitutes the object of commerce, it would follow, as a matter of course, that the Federal Government may exert a supreme dominion over the whole labour and capital of the country. This would transform our confederated Government, with strictly limited powers, into an absolute despotism, and of the worst sort, where, under the forms of a free Government, we should have the spirit of a despotic one. This view of the subject, we should deem perfectly conclusive, even if it could not be shewn that the power in question, so far from being granted, was purposely withheld from the Federal Government, by the framers of the Constitution; and that there are provisions of the Constitution, from which it may be fairly inferred, that it was intended to be reserved to the States respectively. It appears from the history of the proceedings of the Convention which framed the Constitution, that the subject of the PROTECTION of manufactures, was several times brought distinctly to the view of that body, and that they did not see fit to grant to the Federal Government the power in question. In the original proposition, to confer on Congress the power to impose "duties, imposts and excises," was embraced "prohibitions and restraints," which may well be supposed to be intended to embrace the protection of manufactures; but it is remarkable, that these words were omitted in the Report of the Committee, on that clause. On the 18th of August a motion was made, "to establish rewards

and immunities, for the promotion of agriculture, commerce, trades and manufactures;" but this position also failed. On a subsequent day, it was moved, that there should be "a Secretary of Domestic Affairs, &c., whose duty it should be to attend to matters of general police, the state of agriculture and manufactures, the opening of roads and navigation, and facilitating of intercourse through the United States; and that he shall, from time to time, recommend such measures and establishments as may tend to promote these objects." This proposition likewise failed, the Constitution containing no provision in conformity therewith.

Now, as it is utterly impossible that these several propositions, embracing imposts, duties, prohibitions and restraints, and the encouragement of manufactures, could have been disposed of, without bringing the whole question of domestic manufactures fully into view, it must follow, that, as no power was given to Congress over manufactures, while the power to regulate commerce is expressly conferred, it was not the intention of the framers of the Constitution, to entrust this power to Congress. Although repeatedly urged to confer such a power, they constantly refused it; and the Constitution, as finally ratified, contains no provision whatever upon the subject. In the report of Luther Martin, a delegate from Maryland, made to the Legislature of his State, an explanation is given of the proceedings of the Convention in relation to this matter, which removes every shadow of doubt with regard to the true meaning and intent of the framers of the Constitution, in relation to the protection of manufactures. It appears from this statement, that, as the encouragement of manufactures had been refused to be conferred upon the Federal Government, it was the desire of Mr. Martin and others, to reserve to the states all the means which they supposed to be necessary for affording effectual encouragement to manufactures within their own limits. Among those, it was presumed "that there might be cases in which it would be proper for the purpose of encouraging manufactures to lay duties to prohibit the exportation of raw materials, and even in addition to the duties laid by Congress on imports for the sake of revenue, to lay a duty to DISCOURAGE THE IMPORTATION Of parTICULAR ARTICLES into a State, or to enable the manufacturer here to supply us on as good terms as could be obtained from a foreign market."* Here it will be seen that it is positively stated by Mr. Martin, that the power given to Congress to impose duties upon imports, was given expressly "for the sake of revenue," and was not considered as extending to any duty "to discourage the importation of particular articles, for the purpose of encouraging manufactures," and that it was considered that unless the several States should possess this power as well as that of prohibiting the exportation of certain raw materials, they would not be enabled to extend that complete protection to their own manufactures which might be deemed indispensable to their success. "The most, however," says Mr. Martin, "which we could obtain was, that this

Yates' Secret Debates in the Convention, p. 71.

power might be exercised by the States, by and with the consent of Congress, and subject to its control." Thus, then, it manifestly appears, that in relation to manufactures, the framers of the Constitution positively refused to confer upon the Federal Government, any power whatever; that the power to lay duties, &c. was conferred for the sake of revenue alone, and was not intended to embrace the power to lay duties "to discourage the importation of particular articles to enable the manufacturers here to supply us on as good terms as could be obtained from a foreign market;" and, finally, that the whole subject was left in the hands of the several States, with the restriction, "that no State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any impost or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing their inspection laws." This power, it appears, was expressly inserted for the purpose of enabling the States to protect their own manufactures; and this, it seems, was the only provision which the friends of domestic industry could obtain. It is vain to allege that the powers retained by the States on this subject, are inadequate to the effectual accomplishment of the object. If this were so, it would only shew the necessity of some further provision on this subject; but surely it will not be pretended that it would justify the usurpation, by Congress, of a power, not only not granted by the Constitution, but purposely withheld.

We think, however, that this exposition of the Constitution places the protection of manufactures on the true foundation, on which it should stand in such a government as ours. Nothing can be more monstrous, than that the industry of one or more States in this confederacy, should be made profitable at the expense of others, and this must be the inevitable result of any scheme of legislation by the General Government, calculated to promote manufactures by restrictions upon commerce or agriculture. But leave manufactures where agriculture and other domestic pursuits have been wisely left by the Constitution-with the several Statesand ample security is furnished that no preference will be given to one pursuit over another, and if it should be deemed advisable in any particular State, to extend encouragement to manufactures, either by direct appropriations of money, or in the way pointed out in the article of the Constitution above quoted, that this will be done, not at the expense of the rest of the Union, but of the particular State whose citizens are to derive the advantages of those pursuits. Should Massachusetts, for instance, find it to her advantage to engage in the manufacture of woollens or cottons, or Pennsylvania be desirous of encouraging the working of her iron mines, let those States grant bounties out of their own treasuries, to the persons engaged in these pursuits; and should it be deemed advisable to encourage their manufactures by duties, "discouraging the importation of similar articles" in these respective States, let them make an application to Congress, whose consent would doubtless be readily given to any acts of those States, having these objects in view. The manufacturers of Massachusetts and Pennsylvania would thus be encouraged at the expense of the people of

these States respectively. But when they claim to do more than this to encourage their industry at the expense of the industry of the people of the other States, to promote the Manufactures of the North, at the expense of the Agriculture of the South, by restrictions upon Commerce-in a word, to secure a monopoly for their manufactures, not only in their own market, but throughout the United States, then we say, that the claim is unjust, and cannot be granted consistently with the principles of the Constitution, or the great ends of a Confederated Government. We shall not stop to inquire whether, as has been urged with great force, that provision of the Constitution which confers the power upon Congress "to promote the progress of science and the useful arts, by securing for limited times, to authors and inventors, the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries," does not, by a necessary implication, deny to Congress the power of promoting the useful arts, (which include both agriculture and manufactures) by any other means than those here specified. It is sufficient for our purpose to shew, that the power of promoting manufactures as a distinct substantive object of legislation has no where been granted to Congress. As to the incidental protection that may be derived from the rightful exercise of the power, either of regulating commerce, or of imposing taxes, duties and imposts, for the legitimate purposes of government-this certainly may be as freely enjoyed by manufactures as it must be by every other branch of domestic industry. But as the power to regulate commerce, conferred expressly for its security, cannot be fairly exerted for its destruction, so neither can it be perverted to the purpose of building up manufacturing establishments-an object entirely beyond the jurisdiction of the Federal Government-so also the power to levy taxes, duties, imposts and excises, expressly given for the purpose of raising revenue, cannot be used for the discouragement of importations, for the purpose of promoting manufactures, without a gross and palpable violation of the plain meaning and intent of the federal compact. Acts may be passed on these subjects, falsely purporting, on their face, to have been enacted for the purposes of raising revenue and regulating commerce; but if in truth they are designed, (as the acts of 1824, 1828, and 1832, confessedly and avowedly have been,) for an entirely different purpose, viz: for the encouragement and promotion of manufactures, the violation of the Constitution is not less gross, deliberate and palpable, because it assumes the most dangerous of all forms, a violation by perversion, the use of a power granted for one purpose, for another and a dif ferent purpose, in relation to which Congress has no power to act at all. On the whole, even from the very brief and imperfect view which we have here taken of this subject, we think we have demonstrated that the protecting system is as GROSS and PALPABLE a VIOLATION of the CONSTITUTION, according to its true spirit, intent and meaning, as it is unquestionably UNEQUAL, OPPRESSIVE and UNJUST in its bearing upon the great interests of the country, and the several sections of the Union.

But great as are the evils of the American System, fatal as it assuredly must be to the prosperity of a large portion of the Union, and gross as is the violation of the letter and spirit of the Constitution which it perpetrates, the consequences which must inevitably result from the establishment of the pernicious principles on which it is founded, are evils of still greater magnitude. An entire change in the character of the government is the natural and necessary consequences of the application to the Constitution of those latitudinous rules of construction, from which this system derives its existence, and which must "consolidate the States by degress into one sovereignty; the obvious tendency and inevitable result of which would be to transform the present representative system of the United States into a monarchy."*

We fearlessly appeal to all considerate men, whether it be, in the nature of things, possible to hold together such a confederacy as ours, by any means short of a military despotism, after it has degenerated into a CONSOLIDATED GOVERNMENT-that is to say, after it shall come to be its established policy to exercise a general legislative control over the interests and pursuits of the whole American people.

Can any man be so infatuated as to believe, that Congress could regulate wisely the whole labor and capital of this vast confederacy? Would it not be a burden too grievous to be borne, that a great central government, necessarily ignorant of the condition of the remote parts of the country, and regardless perhaps of their prosperity, should undertake to interfere with their domestic pursuits, to control their labor, to regulate their property, and to treat them in all respects as DEPENDANT COLONIES, governed not with referance to their own interests, but the interests of others? If such a state of things must be admitted to be altogether intolerable, we confidently appeal to the sober judgment and patriotic feelings of every man who values our free institutions and desires to preserve them-whether the progress of the government towards this result has not of late years been rapid and alarming? and whether, if the downward course of our affairs cannot be at once arrested the consummation of this system is not at hand? No sooner had Congress assumed the power of building up manufactures, by successive tariffs-calculated and intended to drive men from agriculture and commerce into more favored pursuits-than internal improvements sprung at once into vigorous existence. Pensions have been enlarged to an extent not only before unknown in any civilized country, but they have been established on such principles, as manifest the settled purpose of bestowing the public treasure in gratuities to particular classes of persons and particular sections of country. Roads and canals have been commenced and surveys made in certain quarters of the Union, on a scale of magnificence, which evinces a like determination to distribute the public wealth into new and favored channels; and it is in entire accordance both with the theory and practice of this new system,

* Madison's_Report.