elements that go to make up behavior. By a brilliant anticipation of Mr. Thorndike's results, he points out that the concept would disintegrate in psychology also, if it undertook a similarly searching analysis of the mental elements in human activity. But his own task is neither biological investigation nor exhaustive psychological analysis: it is "inquiry into the nature and causes of the growth of institutions." For certain factors of unquestioned importance in this process of institutional growth, he thinks that “ no better designation than the time-worn instinct' is available" (pp. 1-3).

What then are instincts as factors in the evolution of culture? Mr. Veblen describes them as "innate and persistent propensities of human nature," constituted by the "composite functional groups " into which the "simple and irreducible psychological elements of human nature fall." For their peculiar purposes the social sciences are warranted in handling these clusters of quasi-tropismatic impulses as themselves "irreducible traits of human nature." For, "it is in the particular grouping and concatenation of these ultimate psychological elements into characteristic lines of interest and propensity that the nature of man is finally to be distinguished from that of the lower animals " (p. 3).

Mr. Veblen's concept of instincts, then, as composite functional groups "into which the "simple and irreducible elements of human nature fall" seems to be nearly identical with Mr. Wallas's concept of "complex dispositions." And like Mr. Wallas, but unlike Mr. Thorndike and Mr. Parmelee, he lays stress upon the functioning rather than upon the structure of instincts. Moreover the functioning which concerns him is not the early manifestation of instincts in the life of the individual, but the mature role which instincts play in social

life.

When studied from this viewpoint, each instinct is found to propose "an objective end of endeavor "; and it is by this "purpose to which it drives" that we identify a given instinct and distinguish it from its brethren. That is, "Instinctive action is teleological, consciously so" (pp. 3, 4). Hence "all instinctive action is intelligent in some degree. That is what marks it off from the tropisms and takes it out of the category of automatism" (p. 31). "When instinct enjoins little else than the end of endeavor, leaving the sequence of acts by which this end is to be approached somewhat a matter of open alternatives, the share of reflection, discretion, and deliberate adaptation will be correspondingly large " (p. 38). In short " for present use, [instinct] denotes the conscious pursuit of an objective end which the instinct in question makes worth while" (p. 5).

Now instincts as they function " in the give and take of cultural growth," which is Veblen's business, differ from instincts as parts of the original nature of man, which is Thorndike's business, and from instincts as a feature in the evolution of the nervous system, which is Parmelee's business. It is confusing to have the same term used to cover these three concepts, because statements which hold true of one concept become false when another concept is considered. For example, Mr. Thorndike protests vigorously against teleological interpretations of instinct (p. 15); for, by original nature, it seems clear that the individual does not at first appreciate the ends of his muscular responses to stimulating situations. But it seems equally clear that in the course of experience man does find out what his ends are, so that, as factors in social life, the instincts become consciously teleological, as Veblen says they

are.

Again, as preformed connections between certain

neurones the instincts are doubtless highly specific, as Mr. Parmelee holds; but in the course of experience so many new connections are formed among the neurones that the common run of instincts lose their putative sharpness of outline and take on that "vagueness or generality" which Veblen, the student of culture, finds characteristic of them (p. 13). Thus, by taking considerable pains to remember just what concept each of our three writers has in mind, the reader can reconcile their seemingly inconsistent statements. As future discussions increase our knowledge of these entities, we shall probably agree upon appropriate terms for discriminating among them. Mr. Wallas's adoption of the term "complex dispositions " is a step in this direction. But, as matters stand, we can scarcely chide Mr. Veblen for not entitling his book " The Complex Disposition of Workmanship."

There is one point, however, at which we may fairly ask Mr. Veblen to modify his language. Just as Mr. Wallas seems mistaken in saying that complex dispositions (in his usage) are free from acquired elements, so Mr. Veblen seems mistaken in saying that instincts (in his usage) are "hereditary traits." In making this statement I suspect that he has momentarily reverted from his own meaning of instinct to Mr. Thorndike's meaning. As parts of the original nature of man, instincts are inherited; but instincts "as they take effect in the give and take of cultural growth" have important acquired elements in addition to the elements which are inherited. Perhaps Mr. Veblen's explanatory clause, that instincts are inherited "as spiritual traits emerging from a certain concurrence of physiological unit characters" is a sufficient defense against this criticism. But Mr. Veblen would surely admit that certain characteristics of instincts on which he

lays stress their consciously teleological quality, their infusion by intelligence emerge from experience. Doubtless, these characteristics could never appear unless the capacity to develop them were inherited; but the same remark holds true of every acquisition of man-for example, his knowledge of this year's fashions. Mr. Veblen's statement as it stands contains, as he remarks in a different connection, "rather a modicum of truth than an inclusive presentation of the facts relevant to the case (p. 115).

Human nature to Mr. Veblen, then, is essentially "the complement of instinctive dispositions." This complement fluctuates widely from one individual to another, and these fluctuations are particularly marked among such hybrids as are practically all individuals among the peoples of the Western culture. "Yet, even through these hybrid populations there runs a generically human type of spiritual endowment, prevalent as a general average of human nature" (p. 15). And this typical human endowment of instincts" is conceived to have "been transmitted intact from the beginning of humanity, except so far as subsequent mutations have given rise to new racial stocks" (p. 18). Such differences of racial endowment are not considerable, but "a slight bias of this kind, distinctive of any given race, may come to have decisive weight when it works out cumulatively through a system of institutions. . ." (p. 24).

Among all the instincts with which man is endowed, Mr. Veblen ascribes the highest survival value to the instinct of workmanship. For the primary factor in deciding which shall survive among competing racial stocks is" their relative fitness to meet the material requisites of life" (p. 17). And "chief among those instinctive dispositions that conduce directly to the

material well-being of the race. . . is perhaps the instinctive . . . sense of workmanship." Its primacy is disputed only by the closely-related " parental bent (p. 25).

The instinct of workmanship is "an animus for economy and efficiency" (p. 27). "Efficient use of the means at hand and adequate management of the resources available for the purposes of life is itself an end of endeavor, and accomplishment of this kind is a source of gratification" (pp. 31, 32). This instinct is peculiar in that it is an auxiliary to all the other instincts, rather than an independent force. "The generality of instinctive dispositions prompt simply to the direct and unambiguous attainment of their specific ends " (p. 32). But the functional content of the instinct of workmanship" is serviceability for the ends of life," and these ends are " at least in the main, appointed and made worth while by the various other instinctive dispositions (p. 31). The best . . . outcome of this disposition is not had under stress of great excitement or under extreme urgency from any of the instinctive propensities . . . whose ends it serves (p. 33). It does "not commonly run to passionate excess," and "yields ground somewhat readily" when brought into competition with "more elemental instinctive propensities" (p. 34). It is also readily bent in various directions, according "as one or another of the instinctive dispositions is predominant in the community's scheme of life" (p. 35). "The grave importance that attaches to it is a matter of its ubiquitous subservience to the ends of life, and not a matter of vehemence" (p. 34).

As the instincts constitute the first great factor in culture, so modifications of instinctive behavior through intelligence and habits constitute the second. Tho secondary in origin, these modifications attain decisive