employed two years later by the N. A. M. at a salary of $40 a week and $100 for expenses, and instructed, as one of his duties, to continue the formation of similar associations elsewhere for the benefit of his new employers. These Workingmen's Protective Associations were made up of groups of workingmen assembled into loose, ephemeral organizations just before a political campaign, dissolving when the campaign was over. In the Mulhall expense accounts submitted to the N. A. M. and paid by it are numerous items such as these: "Paid to one member of the Retail Clerks' Union, $40"; "Paid to one member of the Silk Weavers' Union, $30." Apparently it was Mulhall's policy to seek out trade union men whom he judged to possess the right qualities of heart and mind and induce them for a substantial consideration to organize their fellow workmen into these temporary political clubs. Just what arguments they were to use with their fellows does not appear. The name suggests that the ostensible purpose may have been the maintenance of the protective tariff. But whatever the ostensible purpose, the real purpose was to secure the election of the candidate - usually Republican whose economic views, especially in regard to labor matters, were known to be in harmony with those of the N. A. M.

"Usually Republican," I say. The N. A. M. was not partisan. If the Democratic candidate was more fully committed to its views than the Republican, he received its active support. Indeed, on one occasion it secretly supported one Hubschmit, a Socialist, in the hope of drawing away Democratic votes. Nevertheless, admitting exceptions, the Republican party was felt by the association to represent its position more cheerfully and whole-souledly than the Democratic, and hence there was a growing tendency for the lines of political

cleavage to coincide with the lines of economic cleavage. Mr. Taft was frankly the candidate of the N. A. M. and Mr. Wilson that of the A. F. L. in the presidential campaign of 1912.

He

In

Mr. Mulhall's activities in behalf of the N. A. M. were not confined to the "field work "above described. was also employed as a lobbyist in Washington. this capacity he was under the direct supervision of Mr. James A. Emery, counsel for the National Council for Industrial Defense - an organization whose relation to the N. A. M. will presently be described. He procured bills, documents, reports; secured the dissemination of campaign literature under the franks of friendly congressmen; and professed to obtain advance information on all matters pertaining to labor legislation. He was assisted in these activities by I. H. McMichael, the chief page of the House, whom he paid under the authority of his employers $50 a month for his services. He also obtained a room in the Capitol building to assist him in carrying on his lobbying activities; but this was his own venture, and apparently was not approved by his employers.

If one were to take the Mulhall letters at their face value, one would suppose him to have been a person of influence and consequence with congressmen. He professes to have dictated for his employers the appointment of friendly congressmen on committees and subcommittees, to have secured the reference of undesired bills to "safe" committees (i. e., committees which could be trusted not to report them), to have induced members of Congress to absent themselves both from the floor of the House and from committees when important votes were to be taken, and so on. The evidence clearly shows that Mr. Mulhall entertained an exaggerated opinion of his own powers in these respects.

But the evidence also shows that his employers believed him to exercise these cryptic influences and held him in high esteem precisely because they so believed.1 He was retained in the employ of the association until the close of 1911. During the fall of that year he fell from grace because of a political indiscretion and was consequently discharged.

The political activities of the N. A M. were not all of the subterranean character suggested by the Mulhall and Cushing campaigns. It used the Chautauqua platforms for disseminating its philosophy and appeared by counsel before congressional committees when public hearings were granted. Its magazine, American Industries, was of course circulated as widely as possible. It endeavored to interest the college world in its propaganda. Its secretary, Mr. Schwedtman, made a carefully prepared address before the joint session of the American Association for Labor Legislation and the American Economic Association at the St. Louis meeting in 1910, and after the address endeavored to indoctrinate a number of college professors with his views.

1 Mr. Bird, general manager of the N. A. M., was asked, "Would not you, as manager of your association, have been perfectly satisfied if Mr. Mulhall could have done what he was pretending to do?" He replied, "If he could have done it, he would have been a wonderful man and I would have been entirely satisfied.” — House hearings on the Lobby, page 2087. And later, the question being of Mr. Mulhall's having induced thirteen members of Congress who had previously voted with Hughes on the Hughes amendment (see page 256) either to absent themselves or vote against it, Mr. Bird, on being asked whether he thought that was the proper thing to do, replied: "On the Hughes amendment? I should say yes: absolutely right, and they ought to have monuments built to them if they stayed away.' "Whatever the inducements were?" "I do not care what the inducements were. It is a question of what is the manufacturer or the merchant or the consumer going to have in the way of legislation. And if those thirteen men saw the light of day from any effort by Colonel Mulhall, I will retract everything I have ever said about him, and God knows I have said enough." Ibid., p. 2090. There was at one time a proposition to elect Mr. Mulhall to Congress. The following is from a letter from Mr. Kirby to Mr. Bird: "Now, I have no doubt but that the Colonel not only could get the nomination, but also could be elected to Congress, and I am wondering where he would be useful to us. He certainly would be like the Thompson door plate,' a 'handy thing to have in the House,' but I should hate very much to lose his services and influence on the outside. Really, I do not know how we could replace him." — Ibid., p. 2222.

It exerted pressure to secure the appointment of President Butler of Columbia and Professor Laughlin of the University of Chicago on the Commission on Industrial Relations authorized by act of Congress in 1912. It also endeavored to secure the appointment of its secretary, Mr. Schwedtman, on the same commission. It used the "back-fire" method with effect. At the Republican National Convention in 1908, Mr. Gompers was on hand with a demand for labor planks in the platform. Mr. Van Cleave, president of the N. A. M. from 1906 to 1909, Mr. Emery, and Mr. Mulhall were also there to represent the interests of organized business. There was evidently some wavering on the part of the committee on resolutions. The arguments of Mr. Gompers were very persuasive. But the "back-fire" methods of the manufacturers proved more so. Van Cleave and his associates claim to have engineered the sending of 20,000 telegrams at the psychologic moment from employers all over the country, and the obnoxious labor planks demanded by Mr. Gompers were thrown out.

Mr.

All of this political activity on the part of the N. A. M. soon developed its logical result: it compelled its rival to do likewise. Hitherto the A. F. L. had " kept out of politics" or, to quote Mr. Gompers, political activity had been "sporadic rather than systematic." Politics and religion had been subjects tabu in all union meetings. But now in 1906, finding all of its attempts to secure legislation successfully baffled, and observing the growing power of the employers' associations, it deliberately resolved to go into politics and elect men pledged to its ideas. Several courses were open. It might have formed an independent labor party; it might have cast its lot with the rising Socialist party; it might follow the lead of its rival and play one of the

great parties against the other. The last named course was chosen.

...

A bill of grievances was drafted, signed by the full executive council, and addressed to President Roosevelt, Senator Frye (president pro tempore of the Senate), and Speaker Cannon. The document embodied specifically labor's demands for legislation, and closed with these significant words: "We present these grievances to your attention because we have long, patiently, and in vain waited for redress. . . . Labor brings these its grievances to your attention because you are the representatives responsible for legislation and failure of legislation. Labor now appeals to you and we trust that it may not be in vain. But if, perchance, you may not heed us, we shall appeal to the conscience and support of our fellow citizens." At this time also it adopted a form of words which it has used ever since as a slogan. "Let organized labor's slogan live in its deeds stand faithfully by our friends; oppose and defeat our enemies, whether they be candidates for President, for Congress or other office, whether executive, legislative, or judicial. Men of labor, stand true!"

The lines of action adopted by the A. F. L. to make its political policy practically effective were as follows. Its representatives appeared before the national party conventions, demanding " labor " planks in party platforms. Through its legislative committee (a standing committee appointed expressly for this purpose) and its official organ, the American Federationist, it kept all of its scattered members informed of the labor bills before Congress and of the votes of their Representatives in Congress on these bills. It endeavored, whenever possible, to secure the election to Congress of labor members, i. e., bona fide union men holding union cards.