to the public over the counters of the banks and the post offices, remained nevertheless in circulation. The question soon arose, therefore, as to what, within their unfettered discretion, the Treasury was to do with these credits at the Bank of England. At the date of issue of the first Currency Note return, £11,400,000 had been repaid in this way and was left standing, for the moment, to the credit of what was termed the "Currency Note Redemption Account" at the Bank of England. By the date of the next return, a week later, £11,000,000 was represented by "Government Securities," i. e. had been taken in aid of the Exchequer balances; but, as the repayments by the banks had continued, there was still £5,900,000 to the credit of the Redemption Account at the Bank of England. During the next week the important step was taken of “earmarking," i. e. removing from the Bank of England's reserve into a separate account, £3,000,000 in gold. On September 16 (the date of the latest return available at the time of writing) the balance sheet stood as follows: Notes outstanding, - £27,416,932. Advances to Bankers.. Advances to Post Office and Trustee Gold" earmarked " at the Bank. "Government Securities" Balance at Bank of England.. £1,514,200 3,600,000 3,500,000 10,923,546 7,879,186 £27,416,932 Probably more gold will be "earmarked " in the near future, and the fiduciary character of the issue gradually diminished. VII This completes a brief and necessarily incomplete account of the main factors influencing the relation of the Treasury and the Bank of England to the rest of the money market and the City of London generally. Much detail has been omitted and, in particular, the difficulties of the stock exchange have received but cursory notice. On the whole it may be fairly maintained that the financial system of the City has stood the shock to which it has been subjected. The errors which have been made have been due to over-timidity and a failure on the part of some, especially in the early days, to credit this system with the high degree of stability it has actually shown. The only real, substantial trouble has been the position of the bill market and the difficulties of the accepting houses. The main object of most of the other emergency measures has been to allay fears which, with more knowledge and more courage on the part of those who felt them, need not have arisen. Those who were most at fault in this respect were, in the opinion of many (tho they have their defenders), the joint stock bankers. I must not pause now to consider the root causes of this, which are to be sought in the play of personalities and factors of historical growth. We wanted, in the first week of August, some one of the calibre of the late Mr. Pierpont Morgan to bully the bankers and tell them where their duty (and at the same time their interest) truly lay. However, this was a passing phase. The staunchness of the Bank of England, the traditions of which have needed amazingly little adaptation to fit them to new circumstances, and the practical good sense and sanity of the Treasury, prevented permanent harm from being done. We in Great Britain look forward to the financial future with confidence. KING'S COLLEGE, CambridgE, ENGLAND. J. M. KEYNES. THE TRUST LEGISLATION OF 1914 SUMMARY Introduction. Attitude of the parties in Congress; general character of the legislation, 72. - I. Unfair competitive methods, 74. — General declaration of illegality, 74. - Method of enforcement; discretion of trade commission, 75. — Price discrimination, 77. — Sales and leases conditioned on exclusive patronage, 80. — II. New provisions as to combinations in restraint of trade, 81. - Adequacy of the Sherman act without amendment, 82. - Intercorporate stockholdings, 82. Interlocking directorates, 84. - Inadequacy of prohibition when community of stock interest is permitted, 85. - Provisions as to banks, 86.- Personal liability to penalties under anti-trust laws, 87.Private suits, 88. — III. Mismanagement of railroads. Relations to banking, supply and construction companies. Misappropriation of funds, 89. IV. The interstate trade commission, 90.- Powers of investigation; reports from corporations, 91.- Powers in enforcement and interpretation of law, 94. - Assistance of the commission to attorney general and courts; recommendations for future legislation, 95. Beneficial results to be anticipated, 97. Two important acts relating to trusts and corporations have just been adopted by Congress. They represent the fruition of the policy laid down in the last national platform of the Democratic party. They are "administration measures." In fact, it is doubtful whether without the persistent and forceful leadership of President Wilson the conflicting views in Congress could have been harmonized and the legislation passed in addition to the other important and long-debated measures which have occupied the attention of that body. The "administration" bills regarding trusts and corporations were introduced into Congress at the very beginning of 1914. They were under almost continuous consideration by the two houses and their committees for nine months before enactment. Many of the crudities of the original bills have been eliminated and in general the provisions as adopted are workable and understandable. In fact, if the destruction of trusts and the maintenance of competition be accepted as the proper policy, these acts must be approved for the most part as a valuable aid in carrying out that policy. The present writer has already expressed his opinion that this policy is on the whole the best for the American people. As might be expected, there were efforts in Congress, particularly on the part of the Progressive party, to turn the trust legislation in the direction of regulation rather than prohibition. The Democrats, however, stood with practically united front for the policy of suppressing combinations and many Republicans joined with them. The two acts are entitled respectively: "An Act to supplement existing laws against unlawful restraints and monopolies and for other purposes," and "An Act to create a federal trade commission, to define its powers and duties and for other purposes." We shall call them briefly the anti-trust act and the trade-commission act. The trade-commission bill, as it passed the House, was substantially confined to procedure, to machinery and methods for enforcing the laws. The Senate, however, inserted in this bill provisions with respect to unfair competitive methods, and these stand in the act as finally adopted, altho they more logically belong in the other act, which is chiefly concerned with prohibitions of unlawful practices. It is perhaps needless to call attention to the fact that both these acts are, of necessity, limited to fields over THE TRUST LEGISLATION OF 1914 SUMMARY Introduction. Attitude of the parties in Congress; general character of the legislation, 72. - I. Unfair competitive methods, 74. - General declaration of illegality, 74. Method of enforcement; discretion of trade commission, 75. Price discrimination, 77.- Sales and leases conditioned on exclusive patronage, 80. II. New provisions as to combinations in restraint of trade, 81. Adequacy of the Sherman act without amendment, 82. — Intercorporate stockholdings, 82. Interlocking directorates, 84. — Inadequacy of prohibition when community of stock interest is permitted, 85. Provisions as to banks, 86. - Personal liability to penalties under anti-trust laws, 87. Private suits, 88. — III. Mismanagement of railroads. Relations to banking, supply and construction companies. Misappropriation of funds, 89. — IV. The interstate trade commission, 90. — Powers of investigation; reports from corporations, 91. Powers in enforcement and interpretation of law, 94. — Assistance of the commission to attorney general and courts; recommendations for future legislation, 95. Beneficial results to be anticipated, 97. Two important acts relating to trusts and corporations have just been adopted by Congress. They represent the fruition of the policy laid down in the last national platform of the Democratic party. They are 66 administration measures." In fact, it is doubtful whether without the persistent and forceful leadership of President Wilson the conflicting views in Congress could have been harmonized and the legislation passed in addition to the other important and long-debated measures which have occupied the attention of that body. The "administration" bills regarding trusts and corporations were introduced into Congress at the very |