formerly used, he endeavoured on this occasion, by a temperate view of European politics, to convince his countrymen of the real danger of their independence, if they neglected to profit by the advantages which they might obtain by a great and manly effort, in conjunction with the succours expected from France. The resolutions of congress for this purpose were slowly executed. The quotas assigned to the several states, were, by their respective legislatures, apportioned on the several counties and towns. These divisions were again subdivided into classes, and each class was called upon to furnish a man. This predominance of state systems, over those which were national, was foreseen and lamented by the commander-in-chief. In a letter to a member of the na tional legislature, he observed, "that, unless congress speak in a more decisive tone; unless they are vested with powers by the several states, competent to the great purposes of the war, or assume them as matter of right, and they and the states respectively act with more energy than hitherto they have done, our cause is lost.-We can no longer drudge on in the old way. By ill-timing the adoption of measures; by delays in the execution of them, or by unwarrantable jealous ies, we incur enormous expenses, and derive no benefit. One state will comply with a requisition from congress another neglects to do it; a third executes it by halves, and all differ in the manner, the matter, or so much in point of time, that we are always working up hill; and while such a system as the present one, or rather want of one, prevails, we never shall be unable to apply our strength or resources to any advantage.

"This, my dear sir, is plain language to a member of congress; but it is the language of truth and friendship. It is the result of long thinking, elose application, and strict observation. I see one head gradually changing into thirteen; I see one army branching into thirteen; and, instead of looking up to congress as the supreme controlling power of the United States, considering themselves as dependent on their respective states. In a word, I see the power of congress declining too fast for the consequence and respect. which are due to them as the great representative body of America, and am fearful of the consequences."

From the embarrassments which cramped the operations of Washington, a partial temporary relief was obtained from

private sources. When congress could command neither money nor credit for the subsistence of their army, the citizens of Philadelphia formed an association to procure a supply of necessary articles for their suffering soldiers. The sum of three hundred thousand dollars was subscribed in a few days, and converted into a bank, the principal design of which was to purchase provisions for the troops in the most prompt and efficacious manner. The advantages of this institution were great, and particularly enhanced by the critical time in which it was instituted.

The ladies of Philadelphia, about the same time, gave large donations for the immediate relief of the suffering soldiers. These supplies, though liberal, were far short of a sufficiency for the army. So late as the 20th of June, General Washington informed congress, that he still laboured under the painful and humiliating embarrassment of having no shirts to deliver to the troops, many of whom were absolutely destitute of that necessary article; nor were they much better supplied with summer overalls. "For the troops to be without clothing at any time, he added, is highly injurious to the service, and distressing to our feelings; but the want will be more peculiarly mortifying when they come to act with those of our allies. If it be possible, I have no doubt immediate measures will be taken to relieve their distress.

"It is also most sincerely to be wished, that there could be some supplies of clothing furnished to the officers. There are a great many whose condition is miserable. This is, in some instances, the case with whole lines. It would be well for their own sakes, and for the public good, if they could be furnished. They will not be able, when our friends come to co-operate with us, to go on a common routine of duty; and if they should, they must from their appearance be held in low estimation."

The complicated arrangements for raising and supporting the American army which was voted for the campaign, were so tardily executed, that when the summer was far advanced, Washington was uninformed of the force on which he might rely; and of course could not fix on any certain plan of operations for the combined armies. In a letter to congress, he expressed his embarrassment in the following words:

The season is come, when we have every reason to ex

pect the arrival of the fleet; and yet, for want of this point of primary consequence, it is impossible for me to form a system of co-operation.--I have no basis to act upon, and of course, were this generous succour of our ally now to arrive, I should find myself in the most awkward, embarrassing, and painful situation. The general and the admiral, as soon as they approach our coast, will require of me a plan of the measures to be pursued, and there ought of right to be one prepared; but circumstanced as I am, I cannot even give them conjectures. From these considerations, I yesterday suggested to the committee the indispensable necessity of their writing again to the states, urging them to give immediate and precise information of the measures they have taken; and of the result.--The interest of the states; the honour and reputation of our councils; the justice and gratitude due to our allies; all require that I should, without delay, be enabled to ascertain and inform them what we can or cannot undertake. There is a point which ought now to be determined, on the success of which all our future operations may depend; on which, for want of knowing our prospects, I can make no decision. For fear of involving the fleet and army of our allies in circumstances which would expose them, if not seconded by us, to material inconvenience and hazard, I shall be compelled to suspend it, and the delay may be fatal to our hopes."

In this state of uncertainty, Washington meditated by night and day on the various contingencies which were probable. He revolved the possible situations in which the con tending armies might be placed, and endeavoured to prepare for every plan of combined operations which future events might render advisable.

On the 10th of July, the expected French fleet and army appeared on the coast of Rhode Island. The former consisted of seven sail of the line, five frigates, and five smaller vessels; the latter, of six thousand men. The chevalier Terney and count Rochambeau, who commanded the fleet and army, immediately transmittted to General Washington an account of their arrival, of their strength, their expectations, and orders. At that time, not more than one thousand men had joined the American army. A commander of no more than common firmness would have resigned his conmission in disgust, for want of support from his country. Very different was the

line of conduct adopted by Washington. Trusting that the promised support would be forwarded with all possible despatch, he sent to the French commanders, by the marquis de la Fayette, definite proposals for commencing the siege of New York. Of this, he gave information to congress, in a letter, in the following words; "Pressed on all sides by a choice of difficulties, in a to ent which required decision, I have adopted that line of con et which comported with the dignity and faith of congress, the reputation of these states, and the honour of our ains. I have sent on definitive proposals of co-operation to the French general and admiral. Neither the period of the season, nor a regard to decency, would permit delay. The die is cast; and it remains with the states, either to fulfil their engagements, preserve their credit, and support their independence, or to involve us in disgrace and defeat.-Notwithstanding the failures pointed out by the committee, I shall proceed on the supposition that they will ultimately consult their own interest and honour, and not suffer us to fail for the want of means, which it is evidently in their power to afford. What has been done, and is doing by some of the states, confirms the opinion I have entertained of sufficient resources in the country. Of the disposition of the people to submit to any arrangement for bringing them forth, I see no reasonable ground to doubt. If we fail for want of proper exertions in any of the governments, I trust the responsibility will fall where it ought, and that I shall stand justified to congress, my country, and the world."

The fifth of the next month, August, was named as the day when the French troops should embark; and the American army assembled at Morrisania, for the purpose of commencing their combined operations. Very soon after the arrival of the French fleet, admiral Greaves reinforced the British naval force in the harbour of New York, with six ships of the line. Hitherto, the French had a naval superiority, Without it, all prospects of success in the proposed attack on New York was visionary, but this being suddenly and unexpectedly reversed, the plan for combined operations became eventual.-The British admiral having now the superiority, proceeded to Rhode Island, to attack the French. He soon discovered, that they were perfectly secure from any attack by sea. Sir Henry Clinton, who had returned in the pre

ceding month with his victorious troops from Charleston, embarked about eight thousand of his best men, and proceeded as far as Huntingdon Bay, on Long Island, with the apparent design of concurring with the British fleet in attacking the French force at Rhode Island. When this movement occurred, Washington set his army in motion, and proceeded to Peekskill. Had sir Henry Clinton prosecuted what appeared to be his design, Washington intended to attack New York in his absence. Preparations were made for this purpose, but sir Henry Clinton instantly turned about from Huntingdon Bay towards New York.

In the mean time, the French fleet and army being blocked up at Rhode Island, were prevented from co-operating with the Americans. Hopes were nevertheless indulged, that, by the arrival of another fleet of his most Christian Majesty, then in the West Indies, under the command of count de Guichen, the superiority would be so much in favour of the allies, as to enable them to prosecute their original intention of attacking New York. When the expectations of the Americans were raised to the highest pitch, and when they were in great forwardness of preparation to act in concert with their allies, intelligence arrived, that count de Guichen had sailed for France. This disappointment was extremely mortifying.

Washington still adhered to his purpose of attacking New York, at some future and more favourable period. On this subject, he corresponded with the French commanders, and had a personal interview with them, on the twenty-first of September, at Hartford. The arrival of admiral Rodney on the American coast, a short time afterwards, with eleven ships of the line, disconcerted, for that season, all the plans of the allies. Washington felt, with infinite regret, a succession of abortive projects throughout the campaign of 1780. In that year, and not before, he had indulged the hope of happily terminating the war. In a letter to a friend, he wrote as follows: We are now drawing to a close an inactive campaign, the beginning of which appeared pregnant with events of a very favourable complexion. I hoped, but I hoped in vain, that a prospect was opening, which would enable me to fix a period to my military pursuits, and restore me to domestic life. The favourable disposition of Spain; the promised succour from France; the combined force in the West

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