to circulate a copy of that which was intended for the use of Members, if it contained matter of an injurious tendency to the character of an individual, was legitimate, or that which could not be made the ground of prosecution. He would hesitate to pronounce it a proceeding in Parliament in the terms given by some of the judges in that case.' Such was the opinion expressed by Lord Ellenborough. The only other cases that bear upon the point, are that of "Rex v. Abingdon," and "Rex v. Creevy," in the latter of which, an action was brought against Mr. Creevy for the publication of his own speech after it had been delivered in this House. In that case, as the speech contained matter injurious to an individual, it was held that Creevy was liable to indictment for libel. That was a strong case. If the speech was published without malice, it was hard that he should have been held liable for publishing that which he had a perfect right to state in his place in Parliament; but so it was decided, and the decision was held to be law. A Member may make in this House what statement he pleases; but when he goes out of this House, and publishes his speeches delivered within its walls, he is liable to an indictment if he publishes what is injurious to individuals, but which he would yet have an undoubted right to state before the House.

This brings me to that part of the question which has reference to the authority of the House. Now my opinion is,—and I state it with all humility, and with a sincere desire to give every aid and assistance in my power in forming a right decision on this most important subject, my opinion is, that even in a court of common law, whenever a case, involving, as the present case does, a question of privilege, comes before them, the judges are bound, by their oath, to take cognisance of the privilege, and to come to the best conclusion they can upon the subject. I, therefore, Sir, cannot agree with the doctrine that a resolution of this House is binding upon a court of law. I am strongly impressed with the right of the judges of the Court of Queen's Bench to decide this case. I do not mean to pronounce whether those judges have decided it rightly or wrongly; but I am strong in the conviction that they were bound to decide the matter one way or the other. What, then, is this House to do? Are we to bring the judges to our bar? Are we to commit the judges? I say, distinctly, no; and I further say, that this House, by such an act, would entail a lasting disgrace upon its charac

ter. But suppose that you bring the sheriffs before you; you cannot stop there. If the sheriffs shall come to that bar tomorrow, what will be the result? The House will ask them if they have possession of the money their reply will be that they have. The House will then, perhaps, desire them, through its Speaker, not to part with it, and not to pay over one farthing of it to the plaintiff. What will be the consequence of such an order? Why, that the sheriffs will tell the House, that, within four days, they will be compelled, by the law of the land, to pay over the money, and that they are bound to obey that law. The sheriffs, by law, will be obliged to do that which this House expressly tells them they are not to do. What then? Why, the House will be bound to vindicate its privileges: and now let me ask whether Honourable Gentlemen are prepared to go the length of committing the sheriffs for doing their duty? If the sheriffs were not to pay over the money within four days, they would be committed by the Court of Queen's Bench for not obeying its orders, as they are in duty bound to do.

Thus, either the House of Commons or the Court of Queen's Bench will send these gentlemen to prison. What, then, are the sheriffs to do? Is this, let me ask the House, a position in which officers of justice ought to be placed? Will the House visit these innocent persons with the consequences of its own delay? Such a course would be most unjust, and could not fail to prove injurious to the character of the House itself. In the first action which was brought in this matter, the House allowed the proceedings to go on, and the judges were bound to decide on the question which was brought before them. In the next action, the House refused to appear, and judgment was allowed to go by default in consequence. I have always thought that an unwise proceeding, and I am persuaded that it has added much to our present embarrassments. By allowing judgment to go by default, we have confessed that there was a ground of action; and the consequence of that has been, in my opinion, very injurious. In the first instance, when the case was before a jury, it was pleaded that Stockdale was not the injured person he had been represented to be, and the jury found that that was true, and no damages were given. But the House did not appear in the second case, and other parties then became jealous of their privileges and authority as well as the House of Commons. The jury might, no doubt, have been offended that no appearance

had been made by the House; and, at all events, in the next case, they marked their sense of the proceedings of the House by giving 6007.; and I can tell Honourable Gentlemen that, if a similar question should have to be tried again, a jury may give 60007. damages :- in short, I know not where the consequences of such proceedings may end.

The House, then, is in this difficultyif the House of Lords should pass a resolution, they, themselves, being the judges in the last resort, they could decide upon it; but if this House pass a resolution, and the judges of the courts of law should overrule it, the House of Lords must decide upon it. I believe that the course for the House to pursue is this, namely, to have a conference with the House of Lords upon the subject, with a view of ascertaining the opinion of that body. By so doing, this House will not subject itself to any degradation, - it will not be submitting its privileges to a concurrent branch of the Legislature, but it will be taking the opinion on a point of law of the highest tribunal known in this country. With respect to the sale of the proceedings, that is not essentially necessary to constitute a publication. But, at the same time, no one can possibly read the judgments of the learned judges without observing that the character of the publication complained of has been materially affected by the sale of our proceedings in the manner in which they have been sold. The House, in fact, have become booksellers, and, considered in that capacity, are just as amenable to the law as any others. Before the House permitted its papers to be sold, no person, not being a Member of the House, could obtain any particular part of those papers at his own will and pleasure. But, now, every one may go to the paper-selling office, and, for a shilling or ninepence, obtain as many copies as he pleases, of a paper containing, perhaps, a libel against him. Does any one doubt that Stockdale has availed himself of the opportunity, thus opened to him, of multiplying his action? Does any one doubt that he has purchased many copies of the paper containing the libel against him, and that for each copy, at every fresh purchase, he will continue to bring his fresh action? Has he not already embarked in this course? Under these circumstances, my humble advice to the House will be, to rescind the resolution which now permits the sale of its printed papers; and, having thus briefly stated my views upon the subject, I will now merely add, that, if the Noble Lord

persists in his motion, I shall feel it to be my duty to meet it by a direct negative. [Cheers.]

I had cer

SIR ROBERT INGLIS. tainly hoped, Sir, that the Attorney General, or some other legal adviser of the Government, would have risen to answer, or attempt to answer, the speech of my Right Honourable and Learned Friend. The Attorney General, by not having done so, has absolutely suffered judgment to go by default, as well in this House as in the Court of Queen's Bench. He has not pleaded a single word in reply to the speech of the Right Honourable and Learned Member for Ripon (Sir E. Sugden), a speech which I believe to be altogether unanswerable. On a former occasion, those who supported the views of the Noble Lord the Secretary for the Colonies were not so silent. I have not forgotten the very memorable speech which Mr. Serjeant Wilde on that occasion addressed to the House upon the subject

[Cries of "Hear, hear!" from the Ministerial benches.]

I suppose that the Honourable Members who cheer, think that everything which is memorable must necessarily be good.

[Cries of "Hear, hear!" and laughter.]

But when I call Mr. Serjeant Wilde's speech a memorable speech, I do not wish it to be understood that I regard it as a convincing speech. Mr. Serjeant Wilde stated, that the question at issue was not so much a question of law, as one of general constitutional principles. Sir, such, also, is my view of the subject. Had it been otherwise, not being myself

lawyer, I should not have ventured to obtrude my views upon the attention of the House. No one, Sir, in my opinion, could have urged more forcibly than my Right Honourable and Learned Friend has done, the proper course for this House to pursue. No one could have more impressively shown how imperatively it is the duty of the House to look, not merely to the motion now before it, but to the ulterior motions by which it will most probably be followed. I own I am surprised that the Noble Lord has not moral and political courage enough to include in his motion two other parties in addition to those which he has recited, in propounding

that motion to the House. I am surprised that the Noble Lord did not propose to call to the bar of this House the jurors who gave the verdict, and the Noble and Learned Judge who presided at the trial. The Noble Lord has not dared to take that course. He is content, on the contrary, to move for the attendance of the ministerial officers of the court of law. He has not dared to move for the attendance of the twelve honest men who gave the verdict; neither has he dared to move for the attendance of the Lord Chief Justice of England—

-

[Cries of "Hear, hear!"]

-nor of Mr. Justice Littledale, who gave the last decision, in the case of Chambers, nor of any of the other judges who have given opinions against the authority of the resolution of the House. Sir, if I am asked why I have ventured to make this observation, my reply will be,- because it was the Noble Lord's duty to have added these other names to the list of persons to be summoned to the bar, and not to have seized merely upon the inferior ministerial officers, whom, as my Right Honourable and Learned Friend has well remarked, the Noble Lord proposes to punish for doing a thing which the Court of Queen's Bench would punish them for not doing. By the Noble Lord's motion, the sheriffs and other ministerial officers are placed in this dilemma: - on the one hand, if they do not execute the judgment of the court, the court will commit them for contempt; on the other hand, if they do execute the judgment of the court, the House of Commons will commit them for a breach of its privileges. In such a position, how are these officers to act? Commitment, one way or the other, is certain; and they have only to choose between the authorities by which they will be committed. Is the Noble Lord aware (the Attorney General, at all events, must be aware) that the writ which the sheriff is obliged to execute is a writ issued by our common mistress, the Queen? By all the principles of the constitution-by all the principles upon which the legal jurisprudence of the country is based the sheriff, as soon as a writ is placed in his hands, has nothing to do but to carry it into execution. For the performance of this duty, it is now proposed to call the sheriff to the bar of this House. And why is this course resorted to? Have all other means of vindicating the privileges of the House been exhausted? The House has been content with one trial in one court. Now, I ask the AtNo. I.SESS. 1840.

torney General whether it would not have been in his power to move for a new trial, or for a writ of error; whether it was not in his power to have had the opinion of all the judges, and even, if such a necessity arose, the opinion of the House of Lords, the supreme legal tribunal of the country? My Right Honourable and Learned Friend would have told the Attorney General that if the case had been referred to the judges, he (the Attorney General) could not have been in a worse position than he is at present, whilst he might, possibly, have been in a better one. Does the Attorney General believe that the sixteen judges of England are all against him? If he does, what a strange thing would it be to state, in the face of the House of Commons, that the course which the Attorney General had recommended this House to pursue was one which the whole of the judges had pronounced to be illegal. If, on the other hand, the Attorney General should say that he is confident that the majority of the judges would decide in his favour, (and, indeed, I very well remember that he did once tell us that all the lawyers in Westminster Hall were in his favour, a position, happily, since contradicted by many very eminent legal authorities with whom I have the honour to be acquainted), -if the Attorney General believe this, then it must be evident that his position would have been infinitely improved if he had taken steps to obtain the opinion of those learned authorities. Instead of this, however, when he had already suffered judgment to go by default, when, in point of fact, he had compelled the defendant to admit that there was a ground of action (that an injury had been sustained),— he turned round-not upon the judges by whom the law had been expounded - not upon the jurors by whom the damages were assessed, but upon the unhappy sheriffs and their deputies, who merely executed the ministerial office of carrying the verdict into effect. Sir, I cannot conceive anything more shabby-anything more unworthy of the House of Commons - than the adoption of such a course of proceeding towards the inferior officers of a court of justice. How will it redound, hereafter, to the honour of the House, to have it said that it has allowed the popular branch of the legal administration of the country the jury to escape, and the highest branch of the legal administration

but under the direction of an authority which, right or wrong, they were bound to obey? And why is this course, this undignified and unbecoming course, adopted? I do not wish to use a harsh term, but I must say that the only reason that could have suggested itself to the Attorney General for the adoption of such a course, must have been, that there was a hope of frightening the sheriff and his deputies, whilst there could be no hope of frightening either the jurors or the judges. Holding, then, as I do, that we have entered into a contest in which we can gain no honour, and in which every successive step tends only to plunge us deeper in degradation, I once more call upon the House to pause before it assents to such a proposition as that now made by the Noble Lord.

--

I

If the House be prepared to persist to the last extremity, · and the Honourable and Learned Member for Dublin, upon a former occasion, stated that he, for one, was prepared to do so, if the House be prepared to persist to the last extremity, implore it well to consider what that extremity may be. In the first place, the great mass of the people, who are attached, and justly attached, to the institution of juries, will be against us on that point; all those who are attached to the judicial bench, and anxious to defend the authority of the judges, will be against us upon that point; and, finally, all those who are attached to the House of Lords, as a coordinate branch of the Legislature, will be against us upon that point. There have been instances, within the last seven years, in which some, even of the immediate supporters of the Noble Lord opposite, would have cheered on the House of Commons to a collision with the House of Lords. That time, happily, has passed away. But the Noble Lord must not expect that a question like the present can be so determined without such a collision. I accuse the Noble Lord, then, of want of courage for not attacking the Lord Chief Justice. Will the House summon the Chief Justice of England to its bar? No. The House well knows that the utmost it could do in an emergency of this kind, would be, to send up a message to the House of Lords, praying their Lordships to give leave to one of their Members (naming him), to attend at the bar of the House of Commons. Suppose the Lords should refuse; does the House mean to say, does the Noble Lord (Lord John Russell) mean to say, that a vote of the House of Commons could pass, authorising the Speaker to issue his warrant, to compel the attendance of the Lord Chief Justice

of England? I wish that Honourable Gentlemen would only consider for a moment how far they are prepared to follow up this resolution. Is the Noble Lord prepared to move that the Speaker do issue his warrant to the Sergeant-at-Arms to seize Lord Denman upon the bench, and to bring him to the bar of this House? It is vain for the House to endeavour to disguise from itself that it stands at this moment on the brink of a proceeding, in which further advance will serve only to plunge it deeper in degradation. I trust, therefore, that before the House shall consent to go further, it will seriously consider, not merely the motion now before it, but the means by which that motion is to be followed up. With this feeling, Sir, I shall support my Right Honourable and Learned Friend, in meeting the Noble Lord's motion by a direct negative.

The ATTORNEY GENERAL. — If I had taken no part in this debate, I think I might have been excused by the House, seeing that I am within an hour of my return from the discharge of very important official duties duties which for the last three weeks have entirely absorbed my attention - duties which must have come within the knowledge of every Member of the House, and which I have performed to the best of my ability,-endeavouring, on the one hand, to protect the interests of the Crown, and, on the other, to preserve the interests of the public. Thus engaged, I was ignorant of what had been done in the case of "Stockdale v. Hansard." I was even ignorant of the course which my Noble Friend proposed to pursue, until I entered the House this evening. I have, however, not the slightest hesitation in rising in my place, and saying that I entirely approve of the motion of my Noble Friend."

[Cheers.]

And unless that motion be carried, I think that the privileges of this House will be for ever lost! I think that our usefulness will be at an end if we abandon our privileges; and that, if we succumb upon this occasion, I think we shall be guilty of treason to those who have sent us here. We are bound to defend our privileges, and, in defending them, to follow up the precedents which have been set us by those who formerly represented the people of England, and were the defenders of their liberties. Has the Honourable Baronet, the Member for the University of Oxford, or has the Right Honourable and Learned Mem

ber for Ripon, made any proposition as to what ought to be done? Some course of action is imperatively necessary. The question is, what course shall be adopted -what course is most likely to prove beneficial? Will the House allow the damages to be paid, by the sheriff, to Stockdale? Will the House allow a fourth action to be brought by Stockdale against its own officers, in which, as has been stated, the damages may be laid at 10,000l.? Will the House allow any person to bring an action against its own officers for what has been done in obedience to its own orders? Mr. Hansard is the printer to the House of Commons. He has acted under the orders of the House of Commons. An action has been brought against him for what he has done in pursuance of the orders which the House has given him. Will the House allow the damages awarded in that action to be levied upon his goods? Will the House allow the money to come out of Mr. Hansard's pocket, or will it say that the sum shall be included in the estimates for the year, to be paid out of the revenue of the country? If you do that, you not only abandon the right of publishing that which you conceive to be necessary for the public good, but you totally alter the position in which you have hitherto stood. You subject yourselves not only to the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench, but to the judgment of every other inferior tribunal throughout the whole of the country. A similar action to that brought by Stockdale in the Court of Queen's Bench, might be brought in a court of requests, in a borough court, or in any of the manor courts in any part of the country, and each of these courts would have an equal right with the Court of Queen's Bench, to decide upon your privileges.

If the position assumed by the Right Honourable and Learned Gentleman opposite (Sir Edward Sugden) be correct, then an action may be brought against any officer of this House; and, if he pleads privilege, it is competent to any of the inferior tribunals to which I have referred to overrule the point of privilege, and to execute judgment. It is to be remembered, too, that the question does not confine itself to civil proceedings, but extends to criminal; and Mr. Hansard, instead of having an action brought against him in the Queen's Bench, may be indicted, either at the Central Criminal Court, or at any court of quarter sessions in the kingdom. According to the doctrine of the Right Honourable Gentlemen who have just addressed the House, it

would be no defence to say that he had acted in obedience to the orders of the House; he may be found guilty of libel, and be subject either to fine or imprisonment. If you abandon this privilege, you will allow every other privilege you possess to be brought, in a similar way, under the judgment of another tribunal. Your messenger, who enters a house for the purpose of obtaining the attendance of a witness, may have an action of trespass brought against him, or may be indicted for an assault; and if, at the trial, the question of privilege be raised, the court may overrule it in precisely the same manner as it has been overruled in the present instance. It is said that the judges in the case of "Stockdale v. Hansard," although they decided against that particular part of your privileges which relates to the publication of papers, were nevertheless disposed to respect your other privileges. But do you know how long they will continue to respect them? Lord Denman, in this very case, cast a doubt upon your power of commitment, and has reserved to himself the right of inquiry whether that power, which may, in some cases belong to you, ought always to be exercised. The majority of the other judges, it is true, differ from Lord Denman upon that point; but how do I know that, in the course of a few years, a majority of them may not concur with him, and overrule your power of commitment, just as they have now overruled your power of printing? The Right Honourable and Learned Gentleman (Sir Edward Sugden) says that, in this particular instance, he thinks the right of publication did belong to the House. Then the judg ment of the court must be wrong. I admit that the Honourable Baronet the Member for the University of Oxford, who thinks the judgment of the court right, -who thinks that the House of Commons does not possess this power of publication, who thinks that the Court of Queen's Bench, and every other court in the kingdom, has a right to overrule our claim of privilege upon the point; - I admit that he may be justified in saying that we ought not to proceed further. The Honourable Baronet, with his views upon the subject, is undoubtedly quite right in saying that the further we go the worse we shall fare. But I appeal to those Members of the House who think that the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench is wrong, who think that the power of publication is essentially necessary to the Commons of England, who think that this House ought to be the judge of its own privileges,- to them I appeal; and I

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