without regard to any legislative assertion on that subject," but without the addition of these words the attitude of the courts, in our opinion, must be the same. It will be the duty of the courts to determine the question without reference to anything the Legislature has declared, either in the act in question or in other acts. It is obvious that the amendment has the effect to destroy the force of some of the former decisions of this court as precedents. The general canon of statutory construction, which makes it the duty of courts to uphold the validity of a law if it is possible to do so, can have no application in the future, where an act is assailed as repugnant to this provision, however much that principle may apply to objections falling under other provisions of the Constitution. The Constitution expressly forbids special laws where a general law can be made to apply. When a special law is passed, therefore, the Legislature necessarily determines, in the first instance, that a general law can not be made to apply. But their determination is not final. There is, of course, a presumption that public officers have discharged their duties properly, and every act of the Legislature is presumed to be valid until there is a judicial determination to the contrary. But when a special law has been enacted, and its validity is assailed in the courts, the question is to be finally determined by the courts as a judicial question, uncontrolled by the determination of the Legislature. The courts must determine the question, as other purely judicial questions are determined, by reference to the nature of the subject, not upon proof of facts or conditions, but upon the theory that judicial notice supplies the proof of what courts are bound to know, and that courts must be aware of those things which are within the common knowledge, observation, and experience of men generally. Discussion Notes 1. In Anderson, the Kansas Supreme court stated that, with respect to the constitutional ban on special laws, the presumption in favor of a statute's constitutionality should not be applied. 95 P. at 587. Why does the court make this point? Are The first clause of this section of the Constitution involves the question of classification, which it is apparent does not enter into the present case. Here there will doubtless remain in the future an ample field, upon which lawyers may contend and courts and judges differ. It may be said in passing, however, that it will be the duty of the courts, when the question arises, to apply the established tests to determine whether an attempted classification of the Legislature is a proper one, based upon some apparently natural reason, suggested by necessity and occasioned by a real difference in the situation and circumstances of the class to which it applies, or whether it is arbitrary or capricious, and excludes from its provisions some persons, localities, or things to which it would naturally apply except for its own limitations. It may be said, however, that it will not become the duty of the courts to invent reasons for upholding a law which is repugnant to either clause of this provision. It requires no argument or discussion to demonstrate that the special act in question violates the Constitution. To enact a general law on the subject, giving to boards of commissioners in every county in the state authority to build or remove bridges, appropriate funds, and issue bonds to meet the expense thereof, under such restrictions and limitations, upon their authority in the premises as the legislature may deem wise and salutary, would not require more than ordinary skill in the science of legislation. We are not concluded either way by the fact that a general law on the subject was in existence when a special act was passed. That fact, however, serves as an apt illustration of the adaptability of a general law upon the subject, and as an argument against the necessity for a special law.... there other situations where it might apply? 2. In what way was the law involved in Anderson "special"? Are there other ways in which laws can be special? Read the next case with this in mind. Grace v. Howlett 51 III. 2d 478, 283 N.E.2d 474 (1972) SCHAEFER, Justice. By Public Act 77-1430, which became effective January 1, 1972, the General Assembly added article XXXV to the Illinois Insurance Code. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. 73, pars. 1065.150 through 1065.163.) This action was instituted in the circuit court of Cook County by the plaintiff, Michael J. Grace, against Michael J. Howlett, Auditor of Public Accounts, and other State officers, to enjoin them from expending funds appropriated for the enforcement of the new article. Evidence was heard, and the court found that certain provisions of the new article violated the constitution of the United States and the constitution of the State of Illinois. An injunction was issued and the defendants appealed directly to this court under Rule 302(a) (1). Ill.Rev.Stat. 1971, ch. 110A, par. 302(a) (1). Article XXXV is entitled "Compensation of Automobile Accident Victims." Section 608 is a key provision of the article. In the severability clause (section 613), the General Assembly has provided that “Section 608, or any part thereof, of this Article is expressly made inseverable." Section 608 relates to the amount of damages which may be recovered in actions for accidental injuries arising out of the use of motor vehicles. In essence it provides that (except in cases of death, dismemberment, permanent disability or serious disfigurement) the amount recoverable for pain, suffering, mental anguish and inconvenience “may not exceed the total of a sum equal to 50 percent of the reasonable medical treatment expenses of the claimant if and to the extent that the total of such reasonable expenses is $500 or less, and a sum equal to the amount of such reasonable expenses if any, in excess of $500." The defendants describe article XXXV as "the culmination in Illinois of a growing public demand for a change in the way society deals with the enormous legal, social and economic problems spawned by motor vehicle crashes." They say that "one of the major evils of the present system of compensating auto accident victims is the small personal injury suit," and that “[w]hile opinions may differ on solutions, those who have studied the problem generally agree that there are three major defects in the existing system of compensating victims of auto crashes: (1) it results in inequitable distribution of compensation among personal injury claimants; (2) it is excessively and needlessly expensive and inefficient; and (3) it makes excessively burdensome demands upon the limited resources of the judicial system." These are the evils that article XXXV is said to have been intended to eliminate. We have been referred by both parties to numerous statistical analyses as well as to literature concerning relationships between court congestion and litigation stemming from automobile accidents. See, e. g., Motor Vehicle Crash Losses and Their Compensation in the United States, a study by the United States Department of Transportation; James and Law, Compensation for Auto Accident Victims (1952), 26 Conn. Bar Journal 70; Morris and Paul, The Financial Impact of Automobile Accidents (1962), 110 U.Pa.L.Rev. 913; Conard et al. Automobile Accident Costs and Payments-Studies in the Economics Of Injury Reparation (1964); R. Keeton and J. O'Connell, Basic Protection for the Traffic Victim (1965). We assume that the problems described by the defendant do exist. But as has been pointed out, the fact that a problem "does exist does not permit arbitrary or unrelated means of meeting it to be adopted." (Heimgaertner v. Benjamin Electric Manufacturing Co (1955), 6 Ill.2d 152, 128 N.E.2d 691.) We turn therefore to a consideration of the numerous constitutional objections that have been leveled at article XXXV. Violations of due process and equal protection under both State and Federal constitutions are asserted, as well as violations of the jury trial provisions of section 13 of article I, the separation of powers provision of section 1 of article II, and the provisions of section 8 and 13 of article IV of the constitution of Illinois. It is important to note at the outset that section 600 and 608 are both aimed at a single problem. They are part of a single act directed toward evils in the existing method of disposing of personal injury claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents. That singleness of purpose is emphasized by the severability section (section 613), the effect of which is a legislative declaration that without the limitations upon recovery established in section 608, the other provisions of article XXXV would not have been enacted. Despite the unified purpose of the two provisions, the limitations placed by section 608 upon the amounts recoverable for pain, suffering, and the like apply to all persons who are injured by automobiles, and not just to those injured persons who are covered by a "first party" policy under section 600. In other words, article XXXV requires that only "private passenger automobiles" must be covered by the polices issued under section 600, but it prohibits the award of general damages in excess of section 608 limitations, to all persons injured by any kind of motor vehicle, whether covered by such a policy or not. The category of private passenger vehicles, with respect to which coverage is required to be extended under section 600, is not clearly defined. The exclusion of rented cars and livery vehicles is specific, but the statutory definition also apparently excludes any 4-wheel motor vehicle which is "used primarily in the occupation, profession or business of the insured." The extent to which the automobiles of doctors, lawyers, engineers, architects and salesmen, for example, are included in the provisions of section 600 is uncertain. The effect of the classifications created by article XXXV may be visualized if we assume that two pedestrians each suffer an identical injury when struck by a negligently operated automobile: A, who is struck by a car which is included within the first party coverage category of section 600 gets prompt payment of his medical and other expenses as provided by section 600; B, who is struck by a car which is not included within the enumerated categories in section 600 does not receive any payment under section 600. In addition, the opportunity to recover damages in an action at law which B had prior to the enactment of article XXXV is sharply curtailed by the restrictions upon recovery which are contained in section 608. Furthermore, his right to have his case tried before a jury may be clogged by the mandatory arbitration provisions of section 609, a matter which will subsequently be discussed in detail. Section 22 of article IV of the 1870 constitution of Illinois prohibited the enactment of a special law in many enumerated instances, and concluded: "In all other cases where a general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted." The 1970 constitution includes, for the first time, an equal-protection clause in article I, section 2. The 1970 constitution also provides, in article IV, section 13: "The General Assembly shall pass no special or local law when a general law is or can be made applicable. Whether a general law is or can be made applicable shall be a matter for judicial determination." While these two provisions of the 1970 constitution cover much of the same terrain, they are not duplicates, as the commentary to section 13 of article IV points out: “In many cases, the protection provided by Section 13 is also provided by the equal protection clause of Article I, Section 2." (S.H.A., Const. of 1970, Art. IV, sec. 13, at 244.) Indeed, as pointed out in the consolidated cases reported as Bridgewater v. Hotz (1972), 51 Ill.2d 103, 281 N.E.2d 317, the new section 13 of article IV has increased judicial responsibility for determining whether a general law "is or can be made applicable." Unless this court is to abdicate its constitutional responsibility to determine whether a general law can be made applicable, the available scope for legislative experimentation with special legislation is limited, Discussion Notes 1. The court in Grace v. Howlett notes that the special law and equal protection provisions of the state constitution "cover much of the same terrain." What is the relationship of the two provisions? Do they both reflect concerns about equality before the law? See Robert F. Williams, “Equality Guarantees in State Constitutional Law," Texas Law Review 63 (March/April 1985): 1209-10. 2. With respect to restrictions on special legislation, see also, Vreeland v. Byrne, 72 N.J. 292, 370 A.2d 825 (1977). 3. For a criticism of state constitutional provisions such as the one involved in Grace v. Howlett, and this court cannot rule that the legislature is free to enact special legislation simply because "reform may take one step at a time." (See, Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc. (1955), 348 U.S. 483, 75 S.Ct. 461, 99 L.Ed. 563.) The constitutional test under section 13 of article IV is whether a general law can be made applicable, and in this case that question must receive an affirmative answer. There are many purposes for which the obvious differences between private passenger automobiles, buses, taxicabs, trucks and other vehicles would justify different legislative treatment. But the determination of the amount to be recovered by persons injured by those vehicles and the conditions governing the recovery is not one of those purposes. What was true of the municipal tort liability statutes involved in Harvey v. Clyde Park District (1964), 32 Ill.2d 60, 203 N.E.2d 573, is true here; those classified are those who suffer the accidental injuries as well as those who inflict them. There we said: "Many of the activities that frequently give rise to tort liability are common to all governmental units. The operation of automobiles is an obvious example. From the perspective of the injured party, or from the point of view of ability to insure against liability for negligent operation, there is no reason why one who is injured by a park district truck should be barred from recovery, while one who is injured by a city or village truck is allowed to recover, and one injured by a school district truck is allowed to recover only within a prescribed limit. And to the extent that recovery is permitted or denied on an arbitrary basis, a special privilege is granted in violation of section 22 of article IV." 32 Ill.2d at 65, 203 N.E.2d at 576. See also, Grasse v. Dealer's Transport Co. (1952), 412 III. 179, 106 N.E.2d 124. see Thomas F. Green, Jr., "A Malapropian Provision of State Constitutions," Washington University Law Quarterly 24 (April 1939): 359. As to legislation which applies in "classes" of localities, see John M. Winters, "Classification of Municipalities," Northwestern University Law Review 57 (July-August 1962): 279; Farrington v. Pinckney, 1 N.Y.2d 74, 133 N.E.2d 817 (1956). 4. See also Frank E. Horack, "Special Legislation: Another Twilight Zone," Indiana Law Journal 12 (December 1936): 109, 183; Note, “General and Special Laws in Texas," Texas Tech Law Review 2 (Spring 1971): 336; W.T. Mallison, Jr., "General Versus Special Statutes in Ohio," Ohio State Law Journal 11 (Autumn 1950): 462. Housing Authority of the City of St. Petersburg v. City of St. Petersburg 287 So.2d 307 (Fla. 1973) BOYD, Justice. This cause is before us on appeal from the Circuit Court, Pinellas County. The trial court, in its final judgment, passed upon the validity of Chapters 63-557 and 72-270, Laws of Florida, giving this Court jurisdiction of the direct appeal under sec. 3 of Article V of the Constitution of the State of Florida, F.S.A. The facts of the case are as follows: In 1937, the legislature enacted Chapter 421 of the Florida Statutes, F.S.A., creating housing authorities in all municipalities having a population in excess of five thousand people. In 1941, this statute was amended by reducing the population requirement to 2,500. Also, in 1941, similar housing authorities were created in all counties in the state. These housing authorities were given the power to "prepare, carry out, acquire, lease and operate housing projects to provide for the construction or re-construction, improvement, alteration, or repair of any housing project or part thereof." The 1937 Act, as amended, provided that the housing authority could not transact any business or exercise any of its powers until or unless the governing body of the respective city, by proper resolution, declared that there was a need for such an authority to function in said city. In November of 1937, the St. Petersburg City Council issued such a resolution. The Florida Legislature enacted Chapter 63-557 and 72-270 Laws of Florida, both of which acts, by their language, were applicable only to Pinellas County, and restricted the operation of the 1937 law, as amended, by providing that the housing authority within Pinellas County could construct or contract to construct housing projects only upon the approval of a majority vote in a referendum election to be held in the area for which the housing authority is created. It was stipulated that notice of intention to enact Chapter 63-557 was not published, and that notice of intention to enact Chapter 72-270 was also not published.? "In addition, the following certification by the Secretary of State appears in the Record: I, RICHARD (DICK) STONE, Secretary of State of the State of Florida, do hereby certify that there are no Proofs of Publication or Affidavits attached to the following original laws on file in this office: "Chapter 63-557 (Senate Bill No. 1401), Acts of 1963, and Chapter 72-270 (Senate Bill No. 1099), Acts of 1972. Appellant contends that if this Court finds, as it urges, that these two laws were special laws, such notice of intention to enact and subsequent publication was required by Article III, Section 21, of the Constitution of 1885,8 and Article III, Section 10, of the Constitution of 1968,9 respectively. Appellant alleges that it desired to construct public housing in St. Petersburg, pursuant to powers granted to it by the 1937 law, but was unable to secure the necessary financing to acquire land, and the financing necessary to construct such public housing, until such time as the referendum concerning the same had been successfully held. The Appellee has failed to hold a referendum on any proposed construction of public housing in the City of St. Petersburg, and Appellant contends that if the Appellee had called such a referendum, it would be incumbent upon the Appellant to bring an action to enjoin the same; or, in the event a referendum was held and the proposed housing defeated, to bring an action to have the referendum declared null and void. As a result of the foregoing, Appellant alleges that it has been, and will be, completely frustrated in carrying out and performing the duties and responsibilities imposed upon it by the 1937 Law until there is an adjudication as to the constitutionality of Chapter 63-557 and 72-270. The position of the Appellee, succinctly stated, is that Chapter 63-557 and 72-270 are general laws 8"... [N]o local or special bill shall be passed, nor shall any local or special law establishing or abolishing municipalities, or providing for their government, jurisdiction and powers, or altering or amending the same, be passed, unless notice of intention to apply therefor shall have been published in the manner provided by law where the matter or thing to be affected may be situated, which notice shall be published in the manner provided by law at least thirty days prior to introduction into the Legislature of any such bill. The evidence that such notice has been published shall be established in the Legislature before such bill shall be passed, and such evidence shall be filed or preserved with the bill in the office of the Secretary of State in such manner as the Legislature shall provide, and the fact that such notice was established in the Legislature shall in every case be recited upon the Journals of the Senate and of the House of Representatives: Provided, however, no publication of any such law shall be required hereunder when such law contains a provision to the effect that the same shall not become operative or effective until ratified or approved at a referendum election to be called and held in the territory affected in accordance with a provision therefor contained in such bill, or provided by general law." 9"No special law shall be passed unless notice of intention to seek enactment thereof has been published in the manner provided by general law. Such notice shall not be necessary when the law, except the provision for referendum, is conditioned to become effective only upon approval by vote of the electors of the area affected." which were properly enacted by the Legislature. While the Appellee admits that notice of intention to enact was not published for either statute, the Appellee contends that since these were general laws, such was not required, and that, therefore, the laws are constitutional. The sole question on this appeal is whether these two Acts are special acts falling within the purview of the constitutional restrictions requiring publication of notice of intent to seek enactment. Neither the Constitution nor general law defines the term "special laws” as used in the Constitution and general law. This Court has, in the past, stated the basic reasons for the constitutional restriction, and has defined the type of law subject thereto. In Milner v. Hatton, 11 we set out the purpose of the constitutional restriction as follows: ... It therefore fails to comply with the re- In Carter v. Norman, 13 we defined local and special laws as: ... A statute relating to particular subdivi- There are numerous other cases holding specific acts subject to the constitutional restrictions on pas 11100 Fla. 210, 129 So. 593 (1930). 12129 So. at 596. 1338 So.2d 30 (Fla. 1948). 14Id. at 32. sage of special laws. The great bulk of these cases involved so-called population acts applicable to a single county which was not described by name, but instead by population bracket into which it alone fell. This Court has uniformly held these acts invalid where there obviously is no reasonable basis for the classification. When Chapters 63-557 and 72-270 are considered in the light of the purpose of the constitutional restriction and the definitions of special or local laws as determined by this Court, it is apparent that they are special laws falling within the constitutional restrictions and requiring publication of notice of intent to enact. They restrict, in Pinellas County only, the powers granted housing authorities throughout the entire state, thereby creating in Pinellas County housing authorities with powers different from all others. The people of Pinellas County were afforded no notice of the intent to enact these restrictions on housing authorities located within their county only. It makes no difference that said laws were purportedly enacted under the guise of being general laws. This was not a novel procedure by the legislature, but had been attempted on numerous other occasions, all of which ultimately failed when subjected to judicial scrutiny. In State ex rel. Baldwin v. Coleman, 15 we admonished: But even though a bill is introduced and It is apparent that if Chapters 63-557 and 72-270 are special laws and were purportedly enacted in a manner prohibited by the Constitution of Florida, they are a nullity. We have summarily so held in nu merous cases. Therefore, Chapters 63-557 and 72-270, without any notice of intention to apply therefor having been published as required by the Constitution, and not containing a referendum, these Acts are nullities. 15148 Fla. 155, 3 So.2d 802 (1941). 163 So.2d at 803. See also Carter v. Norman, supra, note 13, |