northwest entry adjoining No. 11 and 12 panels. The mine manager was in this section of the mine at the time and succeeded in keeping the men in. (See fig. 13.) Later developments proved that a number of men would have been lost if he had not done this. All the men were led to safety about 2 hours later.

WOLF RUN MINE

A fire in the mine of the Warner Collieries Co., Wolf Run, Ohio, March 10, 1930, caused the death of 2 men and the imprisonment of 89 men for several hours. (See fig. 14.)

Andrew Schramo, a day man, was working in 17 east butt off the main north entries when the fire occurred. When smoke was first noticed he, with a number of men, tried to make his way out

of the mine. After they had proceeded almost to the main north entries the smoke became dense, and Schramo with others decided to retreat and erect a barricade. They were all successful in getting back to the 16 face entry off 17 east butt, except one man, who was not missed until after the barricade had been erected. He was overcome by smoke and fumes, his body being found later by the rescue parties at about No. 10 room on 17 west butt.

Some of the men with Schramo decided to retreat to the face of 16 face entry off 17 east butt and erect a barricade after opening a door on 17 east butt between 16 face entry and air course. The reason for retreating to the face was that they were uncertain whether or not some of the rooms inby the 16 face entry were cut into the entry. The only apparent mistake made by this party was with respect to the barricaded area, which contained only about 15,000 cubic feet of space; this was small for the 22 men behind the barricade, and they could not have survived if they had been

compelled to remain long; however, they were rescued within a few hours, and all survived.

The barricade erected by this party was constructed of a wall of coal and gob about 2 feet high, on top of which was placed brattice cloth about 3-ply in thickness.

FIGURE 14.-Wolf Run mine, showing where three groups of men were barricaded.

After Schramo had seen that this barricade was well under way, he traveled to 19 east butt by way of entries leading from 17 to 19 east butt. These were almost directly opposite the entries on which the barricade was being erected. Schramo's object in going to 19 east butt was to assist the men he knew were working in that section. When he arrived on 19 east butt he found and

collected about 27 men. These were then protected by tightening two doors and erecting canvas stoppings. This resulted in forming an air lock with smoke and fumes passing on all sides. The enclosed area contained approximately 50,000 cubic feet of space and would have been adequate for a considerable time.

After the work of tightening the doors and erecting necessary stoppings was completed, Schramo made several efforts to find a way out, but, encountering smoke and fumes on all sides, he decided to wait to be rescued.

The leadership and coolness of Schramo no doubt contributed materially to saving the lives of most, if not all, of the 22 men behind the barricade on 16 face entry and of the 27 men between the doors on 19 east butt. His action in this emergency is noteworthy.

Another outstanding example of leadership and coolness in an emergency is that of Frank Roeder, a "parting" boss. He was at 24 butt west when the power failed. He suspected a wreck and traveled down the main haulage road to a place where he found the wreck. Thinking that a trackman would be needed, he went back to 24 butt, west, where he knew the trackman was working, and he also knew the mine foreman was making his rounds. He found the mine foreman and trackman, and the foreman immediately started out. Had the mine foreman not been notified and acted promptly, many lives would have been lost.

Soon after the mine foreman left Roeder noticed smoke coming into the intake airway. He promptly opened a door at 24 west butt and short-circuited the air. He then notified and sent other men to notify all of the men (about 40) working on and inby 24 west butt. As the men came out to 24 east butt he collected them behind a door on this entry and kept them there until the smoke cleared as a result of short-circuiting by the mine foreman of the air around the fire. After all the men were collected, the door on 24 east butt was made tight with canvas.

The area occupied by this group of men contained about 150,000 cubic feet of open space in addition to a fairly large area of abandoned workings. This party had or easily could have obtained air enough to last several days if necessary. Here the parting boss and the mine foreman acted promptly and effectively and by so doing probably saved many lives, including their own.

STANDARD NOS. 1 AND 3 MINES

On February 20, 1930, an explosion occurred that involved Nos. 1 and 3 mines of the Standard Coal Co., Standardville, Utah, and caused the death of 20 men.

After the explosion, five men successfully barricaded themselves in a room. (See fig. 15.) The men left signs to direct rescuers to them. After the barricade was completed one of the men went outside, presumably to obtain more brattice cloth. He was found, overcome, by a rescue party about 12 hours after the explosion, but was revived by artificial respiration. The four men who remained behind the barricade were conducted to the surface little the worse for their experience. The barricade was constructed of boards, props, and brattice cloth and apparently was effective.

The leader of this group had seen a Bureau of Mines motion picture depicting barricading. After the rescue he said that he certainly was glad he had seen the picture, and that all the time they were getting material for the barricade he kept turning over in his mind the things he had seen in the film.

M'CLINTOCK MINE

In the gas explosion at the McClintock mine of the Crerar-Clinch Coal Co., Johnston City, Ill., which was started by open lights at 2:40 p. m., January 25, 1924, 47 men saved their lives by erecting a system of barricades. In this instance the men had telephonic communication with the outside and with the rescue crew inside, and

FIGURE 15-Section of Standard Nos. 1 and 3 mines, showing where five men were saved by a barricade.

when they began to be affected by leakage of afterdamp into the sealed-off area, about 6 hours later, the rescue crew released them. In brief, the story (see fig. 16) is as follows:

A shot firer was in the 9th and 10th north entries examining shots when the explosion occurred. He acted as leader and undoubtedly was responsible for suggesting the sealing. The men found that the stopping just inby the 2d stub between the 9th and 10th north had been blown out, thus short-circuiting the air and the great part of the smoke. They then retreated to the 3d and 4th stubs, partly opened a door in the crosscut between the 9th and 10th north just outby the 3d stub, and closed and made tight the door between the 3d and 4th stubs on the 9th north by stuffing clothing into the crevices. They then erected a brattice with lumber and canvas on the 10th north between the 4th and 5th stubs. Later they erected brattices in the mouths of the 5th

and 6th west stubs, where they could retire for a final wait if the air in the 9th and 10th became too bad. However, at the time they telephoned they had not retired to this last position.

FIGURE 16.-Section of McClintock mine, showing where 47 men saved themselves by barricading.

BARRICADES OF ROCK, COAL, AND OTHER MATERIALS

CHERRY MINE

Seven days after the outbreak of fire in the Cherry mine, Bureau County, Ill., on November 13, 1909, a rescue crew met a party of 8 men who had barricaded themselves, with 12 others (saved later,