frank recognition of human brotherhood, irrespec- kind. With the prophet of old they feel though TRACTS — CORPORATE FRANCHISES. An accepted act of incorporation of a private corporation is a contract between the State and the corporation, and any law of a State which destroys or impairs any valuable franchise granted by such an act violates $ 10, art. 1 of the Constitution of the United States, which provides that no State shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts, and is ineffective, unless the right so to destroy or impair the franchise is reserved by the State before or at the time the charter is granted. (Pearsall v. Great Northern Ry. Co. [U. S. C. C. Minn.], 73 Fed. Rep. 933.) ESTOPPEL. A CORPORATIONS ULTRA VIRES bank which causes property owned by it to be conveyed by a deed regular in form to a worthless corporation, organized by its own directors, and then loans such corporation money, takes its notes, and discounts them with strangers, by representing them as prime paper and on the strength of such cor Who can doubt the influence they possess for ensuring the healthy progress and the peace of mankind? But if this influence is to be fully felt, they must work together in cordial friendship, each people in its own sphere of action. If they have great power, they also have great responsibility. No cause they espouse can fail; no cause they oppose can triumph. The future is, in large part,poration's apparent ownership of such property, is theirs. They have the meking of history in the times that are to come. The greatest calamity that could befall would be strife which should divide them. TAXATION OF RAILROADS-LEASE OF ROAD.-The acquisition by one railroad company of the control and operation of the road and property of another under a lease, after the expiration of seven months of the current fiscal year, and after an assessment and levy, which subjects such property to a lien for taxes from the beginning of such fiscal year, does not of itself render the former company primarily liable as a debtor of the State, for the amount of such tax. (Cleveland v. Spencer, [U. S. C. C. of App.] 73 Fed. Rep. 559.) thereafter estopped, as against the holders of the notes, to assert that the conveyance was ultra vires. (Butler v. Cockrill [U. S. C. C. of App.], 73 Fed. Rep. 946.) CRIMINAL PRACTICE HOMICIDE FORMER ACQUITTAL.-A general verdict of acquittal upon the issue of not guilty to an indictment undertaking to charge murder, and not objected to before the verdict as insufficient in that respect, is a bar to a second indictment for the same killing. (Ball v. United States [U. S. S. C.], 16 S. C. Rep. 1192.) DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT-ACTION BY WIDOW.Revised Statutes, Arizona, 1887, Title 36, §§ 2145, 2155, providing that an action for wrongful death may be brought, for the benefit of the husband, wife, children and parents of deceased, by one of them for the benefit of all, and that the jury shall divide the recovery among the persons entitled to the benefit of the action, does not authorize one of such persons, suing for the benefit of all, to remit damages allotted to some of the persons entitled, awarded to them, and defendant may complain of such remittitur. (Southern Pac. Co. v. Tomlinson [U. S. S. C.], 16 S. C. Rep. 1171.) RESCISSION OF CON ELECTION OF REMEDIES TRACT.— A vendee who has been induced by the fraud of his vendor to make a contract of purchase, which contains warranties made by the vendor, has a choice of remedies. He may rescind the contract, restore what he has received, and recover back what he has paid, or he may affirm the contract, recover the damages he has sustained for the fraud, and also those resulting from a breach of the warranties of the vendor, but he cannot do both. (Wilson v. New United States Cattle Ranch Co. [U. S. C. C. of App.], 73 Fed. Rep. 994.) -- STATE AS A PARTY. on FEDERAL COURTS A Federal court has no jurisdiction, on the ground of citizenship, of a suit brought by a State against either its own citizens or citizens of other States. (State of Minnesota v. Guaranty Trust and Safe Deposit Co. [U. S. C. C. Minn.], 73 Fed. Rep. 914.) JUDGMENT REVIVAL SCIRE FACIAS. It is proper to render judgment of "fiat executio" the return of "Nihil" to two successive writs of scire facias on the original judgment. After the original owner of a judgment had been declared a bankrupt, his executrix revived the judgment by scire facias proceedings: Held, that the assignee in bankruptcy having ratified the action of the executrix, by making himself a party to the proceedings and procuring a decree compelling the transfer of the judgment to him, the judgment defendant could not complain that the executrix had no power to revive the judgment. (Brown v. Wygant [U. S. S. C.], 16 S. C. Rep. 1159.) SERVANT FELLOW-SERVANTS. MASTER AND Where a firm of general contractors had taken a contract to grade a street, and had two gangs of laborers at work thereon, each under the charge of a foreman having no control over the other, but having power to hire and discharge his own men and control their operations; held, that the foreman of one gang was a fellow-servant of the laborers under him, so that the master was not liable for an injury caused to one of them by his negligence. (Balch v. Haas [U. S. C. C. of App.], 73 Fed. Rep. 974.) MASTER AND SERVANT--FELLOW-SERVANTS. —A foreman of a railroad bridge gang, who is a subordinate of the superintendent of bridges, but has authority to hire and discharge the men under him, and sole power to direct and control them in their work, is their fellow-servant, with respect to injuries caused to one of them by his negligence in adopting and pursuing a dangerous method of doing a given piece of work, such as throwing down a rail way transfer shed, and the company is not liable therefor. (Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Brown [U. S. C. C. of App.], 73 Fed. Rep. 970.) E. Rep. 31.) SALE-TRANSFER OF TITLE-DELIVERY. -As between the parties, delivery is not essential to the transfer of title in a chattel. The title passes when the bargain it complete, unless, by the terms of the contract, it is not to pass until the happening of some future event. (Sutherland v. Brace [U. S. C. C. of App.], 73 Fed. Rep. 623.) SLANDER-ACTIONABLE WORDS. Every repetition of a slander originated by a third person is a willful publication of it, rendering the person so repeating it liable to an action in damages for slander and defamation of character. "Talebearers are as bad as talemakers." And it is no defense that the speaker did not originate the scandal, but repeated what he had heard from another, even as a rumor, and he in good faith believed it to be true. Nor is it any defence that such person gave the name of the author. (Harris v. Minvielle, La. 19 South Rep. 925.) New Books and New Editions. AMERICAN ELECTRICAL CASES. The fifth volume of this valuable series has just been issued, covering the year 1894-5, and embracing the cases from all the different Federal and State courts arising from the practical use of electricity. The volume reports in full one hundred and thirty-one cases, and gives, in addition, in the notes, memoranda of over one hundred more. This series of cases has been, in the past, published at irregular intervals; but hereafter, one volume, commencing with Volume VI, is to be published each year, on September 1st. The cases form a practical and complete compendium of the law of a constantly increasing subject of litigation. Published by Matthew Bender, Albany, N. Y. POOR, INSANITY AND STATE CHARITIES LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK. Messrs. Cumming and Gilbert of the Albany Bar have added to their present enviable reputation as compilers of our statute law by the above volume. These important laws of the State of New York are thoroughly annotated and supplied with all the requisite forms, the laws themselves being presented in a convenient and accessible form. The whole is supplemented by a complete index. This book is of value not only to the lawyer but to physicians, magistrates, overseers of the poor and others interested in the care of the poor, insane and other incompetents. Published by Matthew Bender, Albany, N. Y. peared in print, and seem at once important because of the subject matter as well as interesting because of the number of distinguished jurists who were in attendance. This conference was the most important of its kind ever held in the United States. The circular sent out from Chicago in February, suggesting arbitration meetings on Washington's birthday, perhaps prepared the way. Chicago would not accept the "perhaps." That wind swept city of the lake is ever ready to believe herself in the van of the world's progress; with the result, says the envious east, that she is sometimes, in her own dialect, a little "previous." But in this case her circular, now embalmed with its signatures in this volume, was soon followed by another from Philadelphia, local in character, like that from Chicago, and this in turn by a third from New York. Ultimately a call was issued for a conference in Washington, signed by the chief justice of the United States, by the general commanding the army, by Cardinal Gibbons, by President Dwight, of Yale College, and Eliot, of Harvard College, and by such eminent New Yorkers as Mr. Abram Hewitt, Judge Daly, Mr. William E. Dodge and President Low of Columbia college. pages and scan the debates and the addresses and reflect on the nature of the conference, an element of unreality in its proceedings. It does not seem, as we say colloquially, to have got a grip on public attention, or to have accomplished much toward the establishment of international arbitration, whether as a principle to be affirmed or a scheme to be put in working order. We commonly expect to find the sense of such a conference expressed in its resolutions. The sense, and also the sentiment, of this conference are expressed in that way; so fully expressed that the preamble and resolutions might themselves be called sentimental. The same air of sentiment is everywhere, and except for the express recommendation to our government to negotiate a treaty, there is not much else. The imperfectly practical spirit of the conference was plainly indicated in the first resolution, which was this: "That, in the judgment of the conference, religion, humanity and justice, as well as the material interests of civilized society, demand the immediate establishment between the United States and Great Britain of a permanent system of arbitration, and the earliest possible extension of such a system to embrace all civilized nations." The immediate establishment of a permanent Senator Ed-system! Can the men who framed and the men who approved that phrase really have considered what they were saying? Had they given to themselves any full account of the enormous difficulties in the way of immediate action? Did they appreciate the force of the word "permanent?" The word "immediate" suggests hurry, and hurry is not the road to permanence or stability. There is evidence enough of ineffectual efforts toward general arbitration, shown in instances of the success of specific When the conference assembled many other men of distinction were present. munds of Vermont presided, and the list of addresses published in this volume include the names of Mr. Carl Schurz, Mr. Edward Atkinson of Boston, President Angell of the University of Michigan, Mr. Moor, professor of international law at Columbia, Dr. Gates, president of Amherst College, Massachusetts, and others. There will be found, moreover, letters of sympathy and adhesion, long or short, from President Cleveland, from the chief jusVOL. 54 No. 9. The two governments of Great Britain and the United States meantime have been engaged in a correspondence having for its object the establishment of a system of international arbitration. The correspondence has lately been published. It shows good will on both sides, and it does not show much more except that the two governments are as far apart as when Lord Salisbury wrote his first despatch, and that the obstacles to the agreement come out in clearer light than ever they did before. It is not a little remarkable that Lord Salisbury should have been the first to renew these negotiations. The word renew is used because their origin goes back to a despatch of last year, signed by Mr. Gresham, then Secretary of State. That despatch was pigeon-holed in Downing street. A formal acknowledgment was sent, and nothing more. It did not interest the Foreign Office. Lord Salisbury, it is true, was not at the time in office, but Lord Rosebery was, and he is supposed to be at least as anxious for good relations with this country as the present Prime Minister. But Mr. Gresham's despatch slumbered in its Downing street pigeon-hole a long time after Lord Salisbury took office. What roused Lord Salisbury's interest in the subject all at once? Heretofore he has never been supposed to care overmuch for arbitration, whether specific or general. He preferred diplomacy. It was Venezuela. The negotiations about Venezuela had come practically to a standstill. There was in England, as here, much comment on Lord Salisbury's stubbornness and on the dilatory nature of his diplomacy. He seems to have taken up the question of general arbitration, in order to escape the application of specific arbitration to the boundary question between Venezuela and British Guiana, It was, at any rate, not long after his rejection of the very large proposal of our government, that Lord Salisbury entered upon the question of general arbitration. It was very sudden, as the dates show. Anybody who has read his despatch of March 5th will agree that what chiefly impressed Lord Salisbury, when he applied his mind to this branch of the subject, was the immense difficulty of it, and still more, the necessity of proposing a scheme, hedged about with precautions. The precautions were, in truth, of a nature to make his proposal, in effect, though not in intention, illusory. Mr. Olney has examined Lord Salisbury's suggestion in one of the despatches now published. His criticisms are acute and ingenious, and, on some points at least, seem to me decisive. There is, however, one extremely im- : portant matter, with reference to which the two foreign ministers not only disagree but appear to be in conflict as to a matter of fact. Lord Salisbury would withdraw from arbitration questions of national honor and of territorial integrity. He understands Mr. Olney to agree with him in that, but the latter describes his counter-proposal as one the effect of which would be to make all questions prima facie arbitral. There can be no doubt that the British position is, in this instance, the sound one. Neither the United States nor any other great power is going to submit to the decision of any tribunal whatever its honor or the integrity of its national domain. Mr. Carl Schurz uses language in his address which seems to make light of questions of honor, as if they were something feudal or antiquated. If that be his meaning, he cannot be accepted as an authority, nor does he express the views or feeling of his adopted country. A third qualification should be added to Lord Salisbury's two: vital interests should be excluded from arbitration. It is, however, clearly Mr. Olney's intention to arrive indirectly at a conclusion similar to that which Lord Salisbury would lay down as a condition precedent to any agreement on the whole subject. The important part of Mr. Olney's counter proposal is as follows: "Provided, however, that either the Congress of the United States on the one hand, or the Parliament of Great Britain on the other, at any time before the Arbitral Tribunal, shall have convened for the consideration of any particular subject matter, may, by act or resolution declaring such particular subject matter to involve the national honor or integrity, withdraw the same from the operation of this treaty." Or, if Congress or Parliament be not in session, either executive may withhold any matter from arbitration till the Legislature has had an opportunity to take action thereon. This is, in substance if not in words, the proposal addressed at the beginning of last year by the United States to Great Britain, and by the latter put aside without reply, or perhaps replied to informally. The conception of it is due to the President; perhaps with some hint from Mr. Gresham. Lord Salisbury, perhaps from a desire to avoid needless controversy, appears to pass over the fundamental objections to the proposal. They ought, nevertheless, to be plainly stated, for the proposal contains probably the most futile and mischievous suggestion ever made in good faith in connection with the subject of general arbitration. It posal. All kinds of violent things would be The plain effect of such a debate and such an agitation would be to incite war and warlike passions, not to promote peace, which is the true end of arbitration. If it ended in a resolution of Congress that the subject ought not to go to arbitration, that would be equivalent to a declaration that, should diplomacy fail to settle it, we must fight. But arbitration is not resorted to till diplomacy has already failed, and the President's proposal is, therefore, simply a proposal to invite Congress to say whether we ought to go to war. Congress has already the power of declaring war. What is to be gained by multiplying its opportunities or by precipitating a hostile solution while yet there was a chance of peace? But that is the inevitable effect of the proposal for arbitration which has gone forth with the sanction of this It is, first of all, nothing less than a request to the English government to modify the system in which they conduct the foreign affairs of the empire. It has never been the English custom to submit these affairs to Parliament in the first instance, nor until the completion or failure of negotiation on any given subject. It has never been done in any single instance. Neither House of Parliament has any power of objection or of ratification. A treaty is complete without the sanction of either. If a Ministry makes a bad treaty, or a treaty of which Parliament or the nation disapproves, it may be turned out and a new Ministry be put in. But the treaty stands. Yet, with a knowledge of these facts, the President proposes that Parliament shall take jurisdiction of a grave international matter while still under negotiation, and declare whether or not it ought to be withdrawn from arbitration. This is to be done, apparently, upon the initiative of the Ministry. It is not too much to say that it would be an un-tration it might be well to quote a part of the constitutional act, and that no Ministry would do it. But if this weighty objection could be obviated, many others not less weighty remain, and they apply to Congress with even greater force than to Parliament. If both houses were as fit as they should be for such a discussion the effects would still be disastrous. A foreign dispute would inevitably be complicated with domestic politics. Who believes that the Senate and House would have voted unanimously last December for the President's Venezuelan Commission - which was in effect unanimously affirming his policyif home politics had not been considered? There would be debates on any arbitration pro government. While on the subject of International Arbi address of the Hon. Walter S. Logan, VicePresident of the New York State Bar Association, on a working plan for a Permanent International Tribunal, which he delivered at the Lake Mohonk Arbitration Conference. Mr. Logan, in discussing the subject, said: "The first great question that our race had to meet was how to settle individual quarrels, to avoid the necessity of recourse to the fist, the club and the sword, when settling controversies with our neighbors. That question the race has solved. We have effected a practical disarmament of the individual. Life and property are tolerably secure throughout the civilized world, and one can go where he will and do what he will without serious danger of in |