Opinion of the court. case, as neither the original nor the reissued patent is made a part of the record. Clear proof is exhibited that the agreement to arbitrate and the submission in form were both executed before the original patent was surrendered, and that the submission had been signed and delivered before the complainant made any effort to revoke the instru ment. Sufficient has already appeared to show that the arbitrator examined the question submitted to him, and made an award that the machine manufactured by the respondent did not infringe the invention secured to the complainant in his original patent, and that he gave his reasons for the conclusion, which appear to be satisfactory as far as can be ascertained without the means of comparing the patent of the complainant with the machine of the respondent. Such a comparison cannot be made without such means, nor can the court look out of the record for means to make the comparison. Attempt is made to avoid the force and effect of the award of the arbitrator, upon the ground that the complainant was misled in signing the agreement and that he was deprived of the opportunity to summon witnesses and to be heard in person or by counsel, but it will be sufficient to say in response to those suggestions that the proofs exhibited do not satisfactorily sustain the charges. On the contrary, enough appears to convince the court that the agreement is obliga tory and that the complainant is bound to execute the agreement and to dismiss his bill of complaint and not to molest the respondent in the manufacture of his machine. Substantial doubt cannot be entertained that the rule of decision adopted by the arbitrator is correct if he properly construed the patents. He found that the patent of the complainant was a combination of old ingredients, and that the machine manufactured by the respondent did not contain all of the ingredients embodied in the combination patented by the complainant. Nothing is exhibited in the record to show that the arbitrator erred in the construction of the patent, and if he did not, and his finding as to the Opinion of the court. character of the machine manufactured by the respondent is correct, it is settled law that his decision is correct.* Arbitrators as well as courts are presumed to decide correctly until the contrary appears, and if the party desires that the decision of such a tribunal shall be re-examined by an appellate court he must see that the means for such a review is embodied in the record. Neither the patent of the complainant nor any authentic description of the machine manufactured by the respondent is contained in the record, and in the absence of such it must be presumed that the arbitrator construed the patent correctly, and that his finding in respect to the construction and mode of operation of the machine manufactured by the respondent is also correct. Judging from the character of the assignment of errors it is presumed that none of these views as applied to the matters alleged in the original bill are controverted, and the court here is of the opinion, in view of the previous explanations, that they are equally applicable to the matters alleged in the supplemental bill, for several reasons: 1st. Because the agreement to arbitrate and the submission in form were duly executed before the original patent was surrendered. 2d. Because the arbitrator proceeded to examine and to decide the question submitted without any objection from either party growing out of the surrender or reissue. 3d. Because the subsequent pleadings and proceedings in the suit show that the surrender and reissue did not have the effect to change the substantial issue in the litigation. 4th. Because the complainant alleged in his supplemental bill that the reissued patent was for the same invention as that embodied in the original. 5th. Because the agreement to dismiss the bill of complaint, if executed by a proper decree, must include all the subsequent appendages to it and would be of itself a decision adverse to the complainant. DECREE AFFIRMED. * Gill v. Wells, 22 Wallace, 1; Gould v. Rees, 15 Id. 194; Vance v. Campbell, 1 Black, 428; Prouty v. Ruggles, 16 Peters, 341; Carver v. Hyde, Ib. 514; Brooks v. Fiske, 15 Howard, 212; Stimpson v. Railroad, 10 Id. 329. Statement of the case.-The old case. SMITH V. ADSIT. Where a complainant alleging himself to be a bona fide purchaser, and setting out a case in the highest State court for equitable relief against a sale to other parties which an owner of land had undertaken to make, alleged that the party in making such second sale had violated an act of Congress which made such sale void, and that the purchaser knew this; and alleged also that the sale was made through fraud and imposition on the vendor, with a prayer that the purchaser at such second sale might be held a trustee for the complainant-if, in such case, the court, holding that there was no fraud and no trust proved, dismiss the bill in consequence of that want of proof, and consequently for want of equitable jurisdiction, the fact that it says: "The most that can be said is that the transaction was in violation of an act of Congress, but that would not give a court of chancery jurisdiction to hold the second purchaser a trustee and make him accountable as such," does not show that there has been drawn in question the construction of a statute of the United States, and that the decision has been against the title or right set up or claimed by the complainant under such statute. The case rested on the fact of a trust proved, and on the extent of the State court's equitable jurisdiction; matters not the subject of review under section 709 of the Revised Statutes, the 25th section of the Judiciary Act of 1789. The case, which was between the same persons as those mentioned in Smith v. Adsit (16 Wallace, 185), held to be undistinguishable from that one. ON motion to dismiss, for want of jurisdiction, a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois; the case being thus: An act of Congress of February 11th, 1847, providing for raising a military force for a limited time, enacted that a bounty in the form of one hundred and sixty acres of land, to be located by the warrantee, should be given to soldiers honorably discharged, but provided "that all sales, mortgages, powers, or other instruments of writing going to affect the title or claim to any such bounty right, made or executed prior to the issue of the warrant or certificate, should be null and void to all intents and purposes whatever." With this statute in force Smith filed a bill in one of the inferior State courts of Illinois, against Adsit, Wright, Rourk, and certain trustees of schools, charging that in Statement of the case.-The old case. 1850, by conveyance from one Holmes, he, Smith, became the owner of certain lands described. The bill averred that Holmes had been a soldier in the Mexican war, that he received a certificate of service and of honorable discharge, entitling him, under the acts of Congress, to a land warrant, and that he applied to Adsit to procure the warrant for him; that Adsit prepared the necessary papers, and at the same time made out a power of attorney for Holmes, authorizing the assignment of the land warrant about to be obtained, with blank spaces for its date, for the number and date of the warrant, and for the name of the attorney, and that he fraudulently induced Holmes to sign it; that this power of attorney was filled up subsequently, and after the land warrant was obtained, with the name of one Hoard as the attorney, with the number and date of the warrant issued (No. 23,129, date August 18th, 1848), and with August 30th, 1848, as the date of the power. The bill further charged that Adsit then procured the attorney to assign the warrant to him, that he located it and obtained for the land a patent in his own name, as assignee of Holmes; that at the date of the power Holmes was a minor, and that the defendants, Wright, Rourk, and the school trustees, hold the land under conveyances from Adsit, with notice of the plaintiff's rights; that the power of attorney was a nullity because obtained by fraud, and because of the minority of Holmes; and it averred that if any sale was made by him to Adsit of the land warrant, it was in fact made before the warrant was issued, that it was therefore null by force of the act of Congress, and that consequently Adsit held and located the warrant as a trustee for Holmes, and that the purchasers from him were chargeable with the same trust. The prayer of the bill was that Adsit might be decreed to have acquired the lands in trust for IIolmes; that the other defendants might be decreed to have purchased them, and to hold them charged with the same trust; that an account should be directed, and also a conveyance to the plaintiff as assignee of Holmes. There was also a prayer for general relief. Statement of the case.-The old case. The answer of Adsit, responsive to the bill, fully denied the fraud charged, and averred that he purchased the land warraut from Holmes, without any agreement to act as his agent; and the other defendants set up that they were bona fide purchasers from Adsit, without notice of any equity in Holmes. Both Holmes and Adsit were examined as witnesses. Holmes swore to matters showing a trust; Adsit swore that the matters thus sworn to were false. The court in which the bill had been filed entered a decree against Adsit for $6829, and dismissed the bill as to the other defendants. Adsit then appealed to the Supreme Court of the State, where the decree against him was reversed, and the bill dismissed as to him, for want of jurisdiction; nothing further appearing-that is to say, no reason or exfoliation of the grounds of the decree being given. From that decree Smith, the complainant, appealed to this court, under an assumption that the case came within section 709 of the Revised Statutee (the 25th section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, or the act of February 5th, 1867, amendatory of it), and that a title, right, or privilege under a statute of the United States, had been specially set up and claimed by him and decided against by the Supreme Court of the State.* But this court dismissed the writ. It said: "We do not perceive that we have any authority to review the judgment of the State court. Plainly, if there be any Federal question in the case it is because the plaintiff claimed some title, right, privilege, or immunity under the act of Congress to which reference was made in his bill, and because the decision of the court was against the title, right, privilege, or immunity thus set up or claimed. Such a claim and such a decision must appear in the record. But we think this does not appear. It must be admitted that the question whether the sale of the land warrant by Holmes to Adsit, if made before the warrant issued, as charged in the bill, was not a nullity, may have been presented, but it does not appear that such a question was de *For the exact language of the acts referred to, and in the main sufficiently familiar to the profession, see Appendix. |