the very brief period of five days without the slightest loss or damage."

Admirable orders are framed for effecting a landing, but the mode of withdrawal, should such a course become imperative, does not appear to have always been sufficiently considered. Though much must evidently depend upon circumstances, yet no orders for a disembarkation on a hostile shore can be considered complete in default of some clear instructions on the course to be followed in the event of a repulse.

If a landing on the open beach has miscarried, the re-embarkation of the combatants cannot be effected without a certain amount of disorder. The course of the attack may have crowded the invading troops in special localities; more than probably they will have lost some of their most able leaders; the fire of the defenders will be unevenly concentrated, and telling on particular parts of the beach; and the troops must, more or less, be disheartened and shaken on account of the miscarriage of the enterprise. A number of boats may have been damaged, and, very likely, many of the officers who were to direct their movements, and of the crews who were to row them, may have been killed or disabled. These are all circumstances fruitful of much disorder. The situation will be full of difficulties, and in these dire circumstances nothing but the exertions of the officers will prevent a panic. The fleet by its fire must keep the enemy's forces

VOL. II.

2 D

from approaching too close to the beach, and, by checking the enemy, must try to render the reembarkation possible.

When a good base of operations has been established, the orderly and speedy re-embarkation of the army should present no serious difficulties. Once the probability of having to re-embark has been foreseen, dispositions can be made for conducting the operation with the necessary despatch. As measures should always be taken for the protection of the base, a chain of works will be thrown up to keep the enemy at a fitting distance. Under cover of these, the horses, waggons, stores, everything which takes time to embark, should be put on board. The infantry would hold the works until this has been completed, and then be gradually withdrawn and embarked. Possibly advantage would be taken of darkness to effect this withdrawal.

The transports should be directed to steam to sea as soon as they are ready, so that the harbour or roadstead may not be encumbered by a considerable amount of shipping. When there is no time to embark the whole of the warlike stores and provisions, the least valuable must be destroyed.

In cases in which the landing has been effected on the open beach, and in which there has been no time or opportunity to establish a convenient sea base, matters will not present the same facility. A retreat with the object of re-embarking will

probably have been rendered imperative by a lost battle, or by finding the enemy too strong or too strongly posted. The object of the retreat will be too well understood to keep the other party from assuming the offensive, or from harassing the invaders. If these have sustained a defeat, the line of retreat will not be left entirely to their option; the victorious forces, who in all probability will be superior in numbers, will strive to force them in the direction most unfavourable to their purpose. Every effort should be made to keep the foe at a distance, either by gaining on him through better marching, or by taking advantage of the nature of the ground. The pursuit can be checked by destroying the bridges and obstructing the roads. If the retiring army has the good fortune to come across defensible positions, the adversary's progress may be arrested, and time gained to attain the ships.

As there is always a chance of being thwarted by the weather, the plan for the re-embarkation of the army should, in such cases more than in any other, have been arranged beforehand. Every possible detail should have been diligently considered. The coast may have some bays or mouths of rivers favouring a re-embarkation; a timely reconnaissance of these must be made, so as to select the most advantageous, and there the transports can be ordered to rendezvous. If there is time, some defensive works can be thrown up in advance,

which will enable the retreating troops to hold the ground for a time against a superior force. The fire of the fleet might possibly be made to sweep the ground in front of the works.

As all disorderly retreats, made in the face of a conquering enemy cause serious losses, every possible effort must be made to conduct the movement in a creditable manner. Celerity can be secured by paying strict attention to the principles which regulate the march of large bodies of troops. One of these is not to keep too much of the impedimenta with the troops, and to start the baggage and the trains to the rear betimes, so that the roads may be left clear for the passage of the combatants; another is to turn to account all the roads which lead towards the locality selected for the re-embarkation. More than at any other time. strict discipline will be needed, for the depression of the troops will have a demoralizing effect, and may seriously retard the execution of the retreat.

INDEX.