Major General Brydges, were to penetrate through the village of Mallavelly towards the centre of the enemy's line; and Major General Popham, with the left wing and the rear guard, was to remain at the fort end of the village of Mallavelly, for the protection of the battering train and the baggage; the five regiments of cavalry being formed on the left of the road, with orders to support Colonel Wellesley's attack.

The colonel no sooner put his force in motion, and his manœuvre was perceived by the Sultaun, than the guns were drawn off to a ridge beyond that which they at first occupied. Here the main body of the enemy's infantry was drawn up, but at so great a distance, that it was at first imagined they were about to retire; and at this period General Harris, who had led the piquets and the right wing in person, arrived at the fort of Mallavelly, while Lieutenant Colonel Richardson, the quartermastergeneral, having advanced to reconnoitre the ground on the western side of the fort, now waited for instructions.

The general, indeed, was of opinion, from the enemy remaining at so great a distance, that he did not mean to advance; he, therefore, gave orders to Colonel Richardson to mark out the ground for a new encampment, which he performed under the protection of Colonel Sherbrooke with the piquets, reinforced by the 25th light dragoons, and the second regiment of native cavalry. He had scarcely, however, marked out this new ground, when twelve or fourteen guns were opened from different parts of the enemy's line, at a distance of two thousand yards. Though at this distance they soon got the range, and did some execution; but our advanced troops were soon in motion, for Colonel Sherbrooke immediately pushed forward with the piquets to a village in front of the left of the hostile army, from which he soon drove off a party of their cavalry and rocket men. This position was of such consequence that a body of the enemy's horse soon began to hover on our right flank; but they were kept in check by the 25th dragoons, under Colonel Cotton, who still maintained their position. The piquets were, indeed, now the most advanced part of the army, and had been most ju

diciously posted by Colonel Sherbrooke with their right to the village; but they were now considerably annoyed by the cannonade and rockets; and, the cannonade increasing, the 5th, 1st, and 3d brigades were ordered to advance and form upon his left.

At this juncture Colonel Wellesley, supported by Major General Floyd, with the three remaining regiments of cavalry, advanced en échellon of battalions; and the whole line thus moving slowly and steadily, time was given for the whole to act together, the enemy's cannonade being answered by as many of the fieldpieces as could be brought up; the action thus becoming general along the whole front. At this moment a desperate attempt was made on the part of Tippoo, by moving forward a column to the number of two thousand men, in excellent order, towards the 33d regiment, but this gallant corps, reserving its fire with the utmost steadiness, received that of the enemy at the distance of sixty yards; and, continuing to advance, the column gave way and were thrown into disorder, at which critical moment General Floyd making a rapid charge completed the rout with great slaughter.

The enemy's first line, with the whole of its guns, was nov forced, by the advance of the whole British line, to retire to the next height, where their second line was formed. They were at this time almost beyond the reach of our guns, and the cannonade, which had lasted three hours, having ceased on both sides, on account of the distance, the enemy retreated: indeed, it may be said that the action, properly speaking, was of very short duration; for, although some corps of their infantry, as well as cavalry, exhibited the strongest proofs of courage, yet it was totally impossible for them to withstand the determined valour and steadiness of the British force.

The British loss was inconsiderable, three officers only being wounded, six Europeans killed, and thirty-four wounded; the loss of our native troops amounting to only about half that number; but though the enemy appeared to suffer severely, yet it was impossible to ascertain the extent of their loss, as they car

ried off both killed and wounded, which were afterwards understood to have amounted to upwards of one thousand; and it was afterwards accurately known, that of the column which attacked Colonel Wellesley, and was afterwards charged by General Floyd, only two hundred and thirty remained on the field, in a state for service, after the action was over. It has also been mentioned that some of the prisoners asserted that the infantry were driven on by the horse, and ordered to attack the British; a fact further corroborated by an eyewitness, who adds, that the firmness of those corps which opposed his majesty's 33d regiment, as well as the gallantry of a party of horse that charged the European brigade, was perhaps never exceeded by the Sultaun's troops on any former occasion.

On the approach towards Seringapatam Colonel Wellesley, with his division, accompanied by the cavalry, and the right wing of the army, encamped on the north side of the river Cauvery, whilst the left wing crossed that river at a very prac ticable ford, a movement which tended much to defeat the proposed plans of the enemy against their advance.

On the 1st of April, 1799, the whole army was within thirteen miles of Seringapatam; on the 3d the army marched by the left, and Colonel Wellesley's division, keeping on the right, moved along the bank of the river, the whole encamping again upon the high road, at the distance of five miles from that fortress.

To go through all the details of this important siege would be far beyond our proposed limits; we shall, therefore, briefly state that on the 5th of April the whole British army took up its ground opposite the west face of the fort of Seringapatam, at the distance of only three thousand five hundred yards, the left being to the river Cauvery, whilst Colonel Wellesley, with his division, was encamped en potence, to the right of the whole.

In front of the British camp were several ruined villages, and rocky eminences, besides an aqueduct, which, passing from the left of the camp, takes there an easterly direction till it ap proaches within seventeen hundred yards of the fort, where it winds off to the right to a large grove of cocoa trees and bam

boos, called the Sultaunpettah Tope: and these positions afforded cover for the enemy's infantry and rocket mea so near to the camp, that many of the rockets thrown from these places fell among the tents.

In order to dislodge them from this cover, Colonel Wellesley had orders, on the evening of the 5th of April, to have the 33d regiment, and the 2d Bengal regiment, in readiness at sunset; whilst Colonel Shaw with the 12th, and two battalions of Sepoys with their guns, received similar orders: the former being destined to scour the Sultaunpettah Tope, whilst the latter was to attack the posts at the aqueduct. It was a little after sunset before these detachments advanced, which they did both at the same instant, the obscurity of the night being at the same time. rather unfavourable to their operations. Colonel Wellesley, immediately upon entering the Tope, was assailed from it on every side by a hot fire of musketry and rockets, which circumstance, added to the darkness of the night, the uncertainty of the enemy's force and position, and the badness of the ground, obliged him solely to confine his operations to the mere object of making a diversion, and to postpone the attack of the post until a more favourable opportunity, whilst Colonel Shaw was enabled to seize upon a ruined village within forty yards of the aqueduct, so as to secure his troops from the musketry of the enemy, who, however, still retained possession of the aqueduct itself.

The commander in chief the next morning (the 6th) observing that the village where Colonel Shaw was posted was still much galled by the enemy's musketry, a reinforcement during the night having arrived at the aqueduct, and feeling that the possession of the Sultaunpettah Tope was absolutely necessary not only for the support of Colonel Shaw's post, but also for the security of the camp against the annoyance of the enemy's rockets, he made a disposition to drive in the whole of the enemy's outpost extending from the Cauvery to the Tope, and ordered that three distinct, but simultaneous, attacks should be made under cover of some guns brought forward for that purpose.

The attack on the Sultaunpettah Tope was again intrusted to

Colonel Wellesley; Colonel Shaw was to advance from the ruined village which he occupied, and to dislodge the party posted in the aqueduct; whilst Colonel Wallace was to attack a village on the enemy's right flank, with the grenadiers of the 74th and two companies of Sepoys; and the whole was to take place exactly at nine o'clock.

At the appointed hour Colonel Wellesley advanced to the attack of the Tope with the Scotch brigade, two battalions of Sepoys, and four guns; and the enemy firing under cover of the bank of the aqueduct, their fire was returned by a few discharges from the fieldpieces, when the whole corps rushed on with great gallantry; and the colonel having judiciously detached parties to take the post in flank, the enemy were thereby immediately thrown into confusion, and forced to retire with great precipitation. At this precise moment Colonel Wallace took possession of the village, on the right flank, which commanded a considerable part of the aqueduct; and Colonel Shaw having quitted the ruined village, rushed upon the enemy, and drove them from that part of the aqueduct from which he had been so much annoyed during the night; the whole of the advanced line of posts was immediately occupied by our troops, the success of those brilliant attacks, so ably planned, and so gallantly executed, secu ring to the assailants a strong connected line of posts, extending from the river to the Tope, a distance of about two miles, forming, in some measure, by means of the aqueduct, a complete line of contravallation at a proper distance both from the camp and from the line of attack.

On the 26th, the enemy still retaining possession of parts of an entrenchment, at the distance of two hundred and thirty yards from the approaches, it was found necessary, in order to facilitate the further operations of the siege, that they should be dislodged from it to secure the working parties from the effects of musketry. It was settled that all the batteries should keep up a smart fire upon these works, and also on the entrenchments, for at least half an hour before the assailants advanced; but that as soon as they should be seen to approach the posts of the enemy,