tion of that part of the principle at the head of this chapter, which refers to liberty and security, any further than to claim admission for the obvious fact that their theoretic perfection is not necessary to ensure the free and unimpeded progress of society. The history of our own country is more than sufficient to show, that where the government and laws are founded, in the main, upon the principles of liberty, partial deviations and individual exceptions will not impede the general march of the commonwealth in its career of happiness and prosperity.

The religious and moral part of the principle, which forms the title of this chapter, not having incidentally fallen under discussion to the same extent, we shall now proceed to investigate and apply it.

It has been already shown that the progress of society depends upon the spontaneous operations of mankind, in the pursuit of that course, which Providence has chalked out as leading to general happiness and prosperity, and that any deviation from it is always accompanied with proportionate difficulties and disorders in the machinery of the commonwealth.

But men's spontaneous operations are of course dependant upon their wills; and as the will of man is naturally liable to be perverted by selfishness, by short-sighted views of immediate interest, and by the external temptations which surround him, all of which are continually soliciting him, with a view to his individual interest, to depart from the course which leads to the general wealth of the community, it is obvious that some higher principle is required than those usually presented to our notice by writers on political economy. Now it is not easy to discover where a principle is to be found sufficiently powerful

to counteract this natural bent towards evil in human society, except in the department of morals.

Again, as the healthy progress of society depends upon the pursuit of that course which Providence has chalked out as leading to general happiness and prosperity, the question of expediency is of course involved in it. But if there is one fact more fully established than another, to the satisfaction of every candid investigator of human actions and opinions, it is the uncertainty of the conclusions drawn from mere political expediency, which, as an excellent writer has observed, are the result merely of man's "judgment of probabilities." But as no two men ever formed the same judgment of probabilities, some further rule of reference is of course required for the regulation of men's actions and opinions. And it may be asked, with some confidence, where is a rule of reference to be found sufficiently capacious to include all the debateable points respecting the will of Providence in the government of human society, and sufficiently incontrovertible or authoritative to bring the debates to a conclusion, except the rule given by the great Architect of society for the preservation of his own work? This rule, it will not I apprehend be denied, is that of moral expediency, not always as it may be deduced from the law and the light of nature, (which only removes the difficulty one step, and still leaves the conclusion as open to debate as before,) but as it is plainly expressed in the precepts of Revelation, which, as Dr. Paley observes, are as much intended to regulate the conduct of men as members of the community, and as citizens of the world, as in their capacity of private individuals. Indeed, although this truth has been too frequently

overlooked, I can never bring myself to believe that it was ever really doubted by any one who seriously reflected upon the subject. There is scarcely a Christian precept which does not refer to man as a member of society. To suppose then that the constitution and progress of society was no part of the design of him who gave the precepts, is about as reasonable as to deny that the British parliament in passing the Mutiny Act has any view to the stability and discipline of the army. The truth seems to be, that men, even very honest and well-intentioned men, have found the principle rather more difficult in its application to public than to private affairs. Moral integrity is sometimes accompanied with present sacrifice, and frequently with apparent risk; and conscientious persons, not fully impressed with the prac tical conviction of God's particular superintendance, may doubt how far they are justified in incurring that risk, and making that sacrifice on the part of the public, at which they would not hesitate in their own individual case. It requires, in short, a stronger conviction of the ultimate expediency of moral conduct, than many public men have the good fortune to acquire, to induce them, as trustees for the public, to forego the temptation of an apparent political advantage, although of doubtful aspect as to moral expediency. They too often acquiesce therefore in the radical separation attempted to be set up between morals and politics in affairs of legislation.

The object then of this third book is to show that, in so far as the questions discussed in this treatise are concerned, a reference to moral expediency, where the express commands of God cannot be discovered, and to Revelation, where its commands are ex

pressly intimated, is a perfectly safe principle upon which to determine the choice of any particular alternative in political conduct; and that moral calculations are in no respect to be postponed in favour of those which have a more immediate reference to the science of government. I trust that the result of this inquiry will prove, that there is no moral incapacity inherent in the constitution of society which impedes its regular and successful progress in improvement up to the remotest period in which the community will abide by the rules projected and divulged by Providence for the regulation of their conduct. For if the progress of society depend upon a regular and legitimate increase of population, industry, and civilization, and these again are derived from a reasonable adherence among the mass of the people to the laws of religion and morality, then it seems undeniable that religion and morals are more sufficient to secure the progress of society, than the dry results of political economy; that these without the other are like false reckonings at sea, by which the ship is liable to be wrecked on the first rock which lies in its track. In truth, what dependance can be placed upon a political calculation with respect to the general conduct of individuals, when there is no security that those individuals will guide their conduct by any general rules? And what security is it possible to obtain that individuals will so guide their conduct but that which is derived from moral and religious sanctions—that is, from sound principles leading them to a knowledge of their duty to their fellow creatures and to society, and infusing a hearty desire to fulfil it? These, therefore, and these only, are the key stones in the arch of civil society; till they are inserted the fabric is in

danger, and the work of the architect is incomplete. If they are removed, no symmetry of proportion nor the nicest calculations of science can preserve the fabric from destruction.

Upon the whole then I think myself justified in arguing as a general truth that, as the natural course of human society depends upon an adherence to such principles as have been deduced from an observation of the best constituted commonwealths, so these principles are themselves discovered, established, and confirmed, not so much by a scientific investigation into the grounds of political expediency, as by a due inquiry into, and regard to, the demands of religion and morals upon the conduct of the people and the government. Thus guided the people will spontaneously arrange themselves as the true principles of political economy would suggest, and indeed must so have arranged themselves before any principles at all could have been deduced from an observation of their political condition. Without a due regard to morals and religion, I am perfectly ready to admit that the selfishness of mankind will be so far from leading to such an arrangement as I have contemplated, that it is the main cause of all the deviations from what I presume to call the Providential course of society; that it lies at the bottom of all that vice and misery which, in the system I am desirous to oppose, has been ascribed to the progress of society as its necessary consequence. It is here, indeed, that the foundation of my argument may be said to rest. I assert that Providence has placed a fallen but rational creature in a world where a constant resistance to his evil propensities, and to the temptations which foster them,