206 U. S. Argument for Appellees. rights without violating the provision common to both state and Federal constitutions—that no man shall be deprived of his property without due process of law. Kennett's Petition, 24 N. H. 139; Alter's Appeal, 67 Pa. St. 341; Norman v. Heist, 5 W. & S. 171; Donovan v. Pitcher, 53 Alabama, 411; Palairet's Appeal, 67 Pa. St. 479; State v. Warren, 28 Maryland, 338. Congress cannot validate the illegal action of the officers of the Government in exacting moneys from these claimants under the guise of duties but without any warrant of law, after, as in the case at bar, suit has been instituted for their recovery. "The supposition that the Government will not pay its debts, or will not do justice is not to be indulged." Gibbons v. United States, 8 Wall. 274. The act of 1906 must not be interpreted as in conflict with De Lima v. Bidwell and Warner, Barnes & Co. v. United States, unless no other construction can be adopted. If the court cannot adopt the construction suggested, then the decisions of this court in De Lima v. Bidwell and the Lincoln and Warner Barnes. case on this point are conclusive and require this court to hold that with respect to the rights of these claimants and of others similarly situated, the act of June 30, 1906, is of no effect. In view of the findings of fact in the case at bar, the decision of this court in Dooley v. United States, and Lincoln and Warner Barnes v. United States, are conclusive upon the question of voluntary payment. The facts as found by the Court of Claims in this case establish the legal conclusion that the payment of the duties was involuntary. The final fact to be ascertained by the court must be not what was the actual state of mind of the plaintiff but what, under the circumstances of the particular case was his "legal state of mind;" whether a volunteer or a victim of overweening necessity. Maxwell v. Griswold, 10 How. 242, 256; Robertson v. Frank Brothers, 132 U. S. 17, 22, 23; 1 Wharton on Argument for Appellees. 206 U.S. Contracts, § 147; Hackley v. Headley, 45 Michigan, 569, 574, 576. The rule of law being thus clearly settled, what were the admitted, unquestioned facts in this case from which the court must conclude that the payment was involuntary? When the complainants' vessel arrived from the domestic port of New York at the equally domestic port of Manilla she found herself and her cargo in possession of Federal troops, whose presence, however otherwise desirable, was designed to and very effectually did prevent claimants from taking possession of their goods and plying their trade. This situation, so obviously detrimental to plaintiff's property and business, could only be effectually determined by his paying the ransom demanded, i. e., the alleged duties or military contributions— admittedly illegal exactions. It is true they might have relinquished the goods to the military guard and abandoned their business and property, or again they might have sailed away, but as this court has said this was only a choice of evils and one which they were not bound to make. It was in fact no choice at all since the theory of free will cannot hold its own against the doctrine of inevitable necessity in the form of imminent and potentially persuasive bayonets. The importer whose goods are in the safe-keeping of Krag Jorgensens over whose action he has no control, cannot be successfully likened to the man who buys a revenue stamp from the peaceful apothecary and then sues the Government on the ground that he feared the law if he did not stamp his manifest. The act of June 30, 1906, in so far as it attempts to deprive claimants here of their right to the moneys which the United States have in their hands justly and equitably belonging to claimants is unconstitutional and void. The Constitution is everywhere applicable to the actions of the Government, the only open question being as to which clauses extend to governmental operation in the new and as yet "unincorporated" possessions acquired from Spain by the Treaty of Paris. Dorr v. United States, 195 U. S. 138. The right to property is fundamental and Congress can no more resort to confiscation in the new lands than elsewhere in our broad domain. United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196; Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 710, 738; Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114, 124. It is immaterial that the taking of property assumes the guise of taxation: in determining what is due process of law regard must be had to substance, not to form. Chicago R. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 235; Union Transit Co. v. Ky., 199 U. S. 194; Angle v. Chicago R. R. Co., 151 U. S. 1, Sturgis v. Carter, 114 U. S. 511, 519; United States v. Burr, 159 U. S. 78, 84, 85. 19; The section of the act of June 30, 1906, under consideration is in substance and effect an ex post facto law prohibited by Art. 1, 9 of the Constitution. It deprives claimants and others similarly situated of their property, of their money held by the United States. The term ex post facto has reference to crimes and penalties, but the question is not of the form of the enactment but of its substance and effect. The substance and effect of this act is to deprive claimants of their property. That is a penalty, a punishment in substance as much as though it were a fine. A fine would have been ex post facto, a penalty for having done an act innocent at the time it was done. There is no difference in substance and effect between such a fine and this act now before us. The substance and effect are the same; the difference is in form and verbiage only. The prohibitions in the Constitution are not to be evaded by mere matter of form. These prohibitions annul every act by which the result which they were intended to prevent might be accomplished. Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 325. MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the court. In an endeavor to clarify the consideration of this contro versy we invert somewhat the order in which the facts have been stated in the findings below and refer to previous rulings of this court pertinent to the subject in hand, besides supplementing the same by a reference to relevant matters of public history, of which we take judicial notice. After the Philippine Islands came under the military control of the United States the President, on July 12, 1898, issued an order providing for the enforcement by the military power in those islands of a system of tariff duties. This order, promulgated by the Secretary of War, was accompanied with an enumeration of the tariff proposed and regulations for the collection of the same. However, for causes which need not be referred to, the tariff in question was subsequently modified and did not go into operation until November, 1898. The duties imposed by this tariff were levied on goods coming into the Philippine Islands, whether from the United States or other countries. This tariff was in force when the treaty of peace was signed (December 10, 1898), when the treaty was ratified (April 11, 1899), and was continued by the Philippine Commission appointed by the President in April, 1900. Indeed, the civil government, as established in the islands by the President, either in virtue of his inherent authority or as a result of the power recognized and conferred by the act of Congress, approved March 2, 1901 (31 Stat. L. 910), continued the original tariff in force, except as to some modifications not material to be noticed, and formulated its provisions in the shape of a legislative act entitled "An act to revise and amend the tariff laws of the Philippine Archipelago." And this tariff was in force in March, 1902, when it was expressly approved and continued by Congress. 32 Stat. 54. In December, 1901, the cases of De Lima v. Bidwell and Dooley v. United States were, by this court, decided. 182 U. S. 1, 222. The first case involved the right to recover duties paid under protest to the collector of the port of New York upon sugar brought into the United States from the island of Porto Rico during the autumn of 1899 and subsequent to the cession of the island. The second case involved the right to recover the amount of certain duties on goods carried into Porto Rico from the United States between July 6, 1898, and May 1, 1900, the duties in question having been levied by authority of the general in command of the army of occupation or subsequently by order of the President as commanderin-chief. In the first case (De Lima v. Bidwell) it was decided that, as the effect of the ratification of the treaty was to take the island of Porto Rico out of the category of foreign territory within the meaning of that word as used in existing tariff laws of the United States, no right remained to enforce, against goods coming from Porto Rico into the United States, the previously enacted tariff of duties, although, considering the terms of the treaty and the relation of the island to the United States, Congress had power to impose a tariff on goods coming from that island into the United States. As a corollary of the doctrine announced in De Lima v. Bidwell, in the second case (Dooley v. The United States) it was held that whilst the President, as commander-in-chief, had authority to impose tariff duties in Porto Rico on goods coming into that country from the United States prior to the ratification of the treaty, no such executive power existed after that ratification. It was consequently held that none of the duties paid prior to the ratification of the treaty could be recovered, whilst those paid subsequently could be. In the following year (December 2, 1901) another case, entitled Dooley v. The United States, was decided. 183 U. S. 151. That case involved the validity of tariff duties levied in Porto Rico on goods brought into that island from the United States, the duties in question having been imposed after the ratification of the treaty and in and by virtue of the act of Congress known as the Foraker Act. Applying the principles announced in the previous cases just referred to, it was held that the duties were lawful because, although collected after the ratification, they were imposed not simply by virtue of the authority of the President, acting under |