Opinion of the Court.

3880.

206 U.S.

2282. Sec. 43. Said Board (Sec. 50.) The said shall ascertain whether the board shall ascertain whether valuation of real estate in the valuation of property in each county bears a fair re- each county bears a fair relation or proportion to the lation or proportion to the valuation in all other counties valuation in all other counties of the State, and on such ex- in the territory, and on such amination they may increase examination they may inor diminish the aggregate val- crease or diminish the valuauation of real estate in any tion of property in any county, county, as much as in their as much as in their judgment judgment may be necessary may be necessary to produce to produce a just relation be- a just relation between all the tween all the valuations of valuations of property in the real estate in the State; but territory; but in no instance in no instance shall they re- shall they reduce the aggreduce the aggregate valuation gate valuation of all the counof all the counties below the ties below the aggregate valuaaggregate valuation as re- tion as returned by the boards turned by the clerks of the of supervisors of the several several counties.

counties. And said board shall at the same time fix the rate of taxes for territorial purposes which is to be levied and collected in each county.

For convenience we take up the second of the alleged errors first. It will be seen that the word "property" takes the place of "real estate" at the beginning, and that the power given, instead being only a power to increase or diminish the aggregate valuation of real estate in any county, is to increase or diminish the valuation of property (not the property) in (not of) any county. The word "aggregate" is left out, and the fact that it was left out favors the construction that apart from that fact would be reasonable, that the power extends to the valuation of any property, and is not confined to the valuation of all the property as one whole. This construction

is further favored by the purpose of the changes in valuation, which is to "produce a just relation between all the valuations of property in the Territory." This phrase is interstitial in its working. It does not confine the equality to the valuations by county, but extends it to all the valuations of property. Yet a further argument may be drawn from the language of 3874: "No assessor, board of supervisors, or the territorial board of equalization shall assess any real estate at a less valuation than seventy-five cents per acre." This recognizes the power of the Board to deal with a special class of property, and we may add, by way of anticipation, by also recognizing a function of assessment, does much to make inapplicable the reasoning of the Colorado decision upon the other point.

It seems to have been argued below that at least the Board was confined to dealing with property by the classes mentioned in other sections of the statutes, especially §§ 3849, 3861, 3877. But the classifications and specifications provided for in those sections do not affect the power expressly given by § 3880 as we have construed the latter, and further, by § 3877 the Territorial Board is given power in very broad terms to change the list. It is not necessary to rely on this power to change the list for the power of the Board to change valuations of a particular class of property. It is mentioned simply to show that the powers given by § 3880 are not diminished by other provisions.

The first contention of the petitioner needs but a few words in addition to what we have said. The power to increase the valuation of property in any county is as power to increase it in all, or, at least, to increase the valuation of some kinds of property in all, so as to produce a just relation between them and the other valuations left undisturbed. We find nothing in the statute that requires the increase to be so adjusted that the total valuation shall be unchanged. On the contrary, the prohibition against reducing it implies that the Board has the power of change and, but for the prohibition, might reduce VOL. COVI-31

the total. Therefore it may add to the total since the law does not forbid that. The Colorado decision to the contrary turned partly on the notion, which has been shown to be inapplicable to Arizona, that the Board of Equalization had no function of assessment. It also turned in part at least on the constitution of the State, to which, of course, the statute was subject. There was no Constitution to be conformed to in Arizona and therefore the construction of the statute depends on the meaning of the words alone, and the Supreme Court of the Territory in construing them was left at large.

Judgment affirmed.

IOWA RAILROAD LAND COMPANY v. BLUMER.

IN ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IOWA.

No. 207. Argued February 26, 27, 1907.-Decided May 27, 1907.

Under the act of Congress of May 15, 1856, 11 Stat. 9, and the act of the legislature of Iowa of July 14, 1856, the grant to the Dubuque & Pacific Railroad Co. was in præsenti and the title passed from the United States and vested in the State of Iowa when the map of definite location was lodged in the General Land Office, and the right of the company then attached. Iowa Falls Land Co. v. Griffey, 143 U. S. 32. Where a grant is in præsenti and nothing remains to be done for the administration of the grant in the Land Office, and the conditions have been complied with and the grant fully earned, the company has such a title, notwithstanding the want of final certificate and the issue of the patent, as will enable it to maintain ejectment against one wrongfully on the lands, and prescription will run in favor of one in adverse possession under color of title. Deseret Salt Co. v. Tarpey, 142 U. S. 421; Toltec Ranch Co. v. Cook, 191 U. S. 532.

Although one who in good faith enters and occupies lands within the place limits of a railway grant in præsenti may not obtain any adverse title against the Government, if, as in this case, his possession is open, notorious, continuous and adverse, it may, if the railway company fails to assert its rights, ripen into full title as against the latter, notwithstanding the entry in the Land Office was cancelled without notice as having been improperly made and allowed.

THIS is a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the State of Iowa, seeking reversal of its judgment affirming the decree of the District Court of Woodbury County, quieting the land title of Claude F. Blumer, defendant in error, as against the Iowa Railroad Land Company, plaintiff in error. 129 Iowa, 32. The record discloses that Blumer brought his action by a petition in equity under the Iowa Code, claiming to be owner in fee simple of forty acres of land in Woodbury County, Iowa, being the N. E. of the N. E. of section 1, township 89 north, range 46 west, containing about forty acres; averring that the plaintiff and his immediate grantor had been in open, notorious, continuous and adverse possession for more than ten years under a claim of title and that the plaintiff was then in the possession of the same; and that defendant made some claim to the said estate, and prayed that he be quieted in his title and that defendant be estopped from setting up any claim adverse to his own.

Defendant answered and set up general denials and that the defendant was the owner of the premises by virtue of an act of Congress of May 15, 1856, making a grant of lands to the State of Iowa in alternate sections in aid of the construction of certain railways in that State, whereby the lands were granted to the State of Iowa in trust for the railway companies; that the act and trust were duly accepted by the State of Iowa, by act of its legislature, approved July 14, 1856; that thereafter, by the act of April 7, 1868, of the same state legislature, the Iowa Falls & Sioux City Railroad Company was designated to construct and complete the portion of the railroad west of Iowa Falls, and the State granted, on conditions contained in said act, the unearned portions of said lands west of Iowa Falls to the said Iowa Falls & Sioux City Railroad Company, and that all the terms of the act had been complied with and that the same were rightfully subject to the certification and conveyance to the said railway company, which was the grantor of the defendant.

A reply and amendment were filed, and also a supplemental

answer setting forth that the lands on the twenty-fourth of January, 1903, since the former answer in the case, had been duly certified to the State of Iowa in trust for the Iowa Falls and Sioux City Railroad Company, and had been subsequently patented to the railroad company by the Governor of the State on February 2, 1903, and that all the rights and title of the railway company had been succeeded to by the defendant, the Iowa Railroad Land Company, and prayed to be quieted in its title as against the plaintiff. By an amended reply the plaintiff reiterated that for more than ten years prior to the commencement of the suit, plaintiff and his immediate grantor had been in open, notorious, continuous and adverse possession of the premises under a claim of right and color of title, and that plaintiff was then in possession of the same.

The lands in question are within the place limits of the grant to the State of Iowa by the act of May 15, 1856. 11 Stat. 9. By the act of the legislature of Iowa, passed July 14, 1856, the lands were granted to the Dubuque & Pacific Railroad Company. The map of definite location of the line of the road was filed in the office of the Commissioner of the General Land Office of the United States on October 11, 1856, and accepted on October 13, 1856.

The legislature of Iowa, on April 7, 1868, passed a statute (Iowa Laws, 1868, chap. 124, pp. 164–167), designating the Iowa Falls & Sioux City Railroad Company (grantor of the plaintiff in error) to construct and complete the uncompleted portion of the road west of Iowa Falls. Sec. 1 of the act legalized and confirmed the contract between the Dubuque and Sioux City Railroad Company and the Iowa Falls & Sioux City Railroad Company "transferring so much of the Dubuque and Sioux City [successor of the Dubuque and Pacific] Railroad as remains to be constructed, together with the franchises, right of way, depot grounds, and other appurtenances of said road to be completed, also transferring all right and title of the said Dubuque and Sioux City Railroad Company to so much of the lands granted by Congress to aid