that there was nothing in it. Aside from this, the question was at the very root of the cause, and was considered and decided, and it is the exact question in the case at bar, except that this case is somewhat stronger in favor of the power than the case decided.

"By section 3 of the act of February 29, 1888, the Jackson board was 'hereby authorized and empowered to contract,' etc., while by the Vicksburg charter act, the board was authorized to so contract 'at any regular or special meeting.' We presume that no charter then existent 'otherwise provided' by an express prohibition of electric lighting without vote. The grant of the power without restriction is to 'otherwise provide.''

And the court held that under this power the municipal authorities had the right to make the contract for electric lights without advertising for bids and without submitting the matter to a popular vote, and the power was not taken away by the act of March, 1888.

In this case the learned judge, speaking for the court, further said:

"Within its charter powers, the board has a discretion independent of courts, and no exercise of it will be held void for unreasonableness, unless so gross as to strongly suggest fraud or corruption. The people elect their council, and the courts are not chosen members of it."

In the light of these decisions, and others might be cited, we reach the conclusion that, under a broad grant of power, conferring, without restriction or limitation, upon the city of Vicksburg the right to make a contract for a supply of water, it was within the right of the city council, in the exercise of this power, to make a binding contract, fixing a maximum rate at which water should be supplied to the inhabitants of the city for a limited term of years, and, in the absence of a showing of unreasonableness "so gross," as the court of Mississippi has said, "as to strongly suggest fraud or corruption," this action of the council is binding, and for the time limited puts the

right beyond legislative or municipal alteration to the prejudice of the other contracting party.

While we, therefore, reach the conclusion that the former case did not adjudicate the matter, we think the contract in this respect was within the power of the council and cannot be violated consistently with the contract rights of the company by the subsequent ordinances of the city.

In this case the Circuit Court rendered a final decree practically upon the bill and answer. No testimony was taken, and all that was before the court was the bill, answer and exhibits. We think the decree goes too far in enjoining the city from interfering with the contract right of the company to charge the rates fixed thereby, in view of the allegations of the answer, that the rates charged by the company exceeded those named in section 13 of the ordinance of 1886.

The decree should be modified, so as to enjoin interference on the part of the city during the term of this contract, with the right of the company to charge rates not in excess of fifty cents a thousand gallons to private consumers, as set forth in the ordinance.

With this modification, the decree will be

Affirmed.

BERNHEIMER v. CONVERSE.

DREY AND BERNHEIMER v. CONVERSE.

IN ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.

Nos. 278, 279. Argued April 25, 26, 1907.-Decided May 27, 1907.

This court in this case followed the judgment of the highest court of the State in determining that a corporation was not within the exception, constitutional and statutory, as to stockholders' liability in favor of certain classes of corporations. Where, as in Minnesota, stockholders' liability is fixed and measured by the Constitution, a stockholder upon

206 U. S.

Statement of the Case.

acquiring his stock incurs an obligation arising from the constitutional provisions, and as such capable of being enforced in the courts not only of that State but of another State and of the United States.

There is a broad distinction between laws impairing the obligation of contracts and those which simply give a more efficient remedy to enforce a contract already given, and the statute of Minnesota of 1899 for the enforcement of stockholders' liability, under which the constitutional liability can be enforced by the receiver without the State, is not void under the impairment of obligation clause of the Constitution of the United States because it repealed a prior act under which the stockholders' liability could not be so enforced.

An act intended to make effectual a liability which is incurred by stockholders under the constitution of the State and which operates equally upon all stockholders and assesses all by a uniform rule should not, in the absence of substantial reasons, be rendered nugatory, and the Minnesota act of 1899 will not be declared void as violating the constitutional rights of stockholders either because it provides for fixing the liability in a proceeding within the State to which non-resident stockholders are not parties, or because it changes the procedure for collecting the assessment, and gives the receiver the right to maintain actions without the State. One who becomes a member of a corporation assumes the liability attaching to such membership and becomes subject to such regulations as the State may lawfully make to render the liability effectual. While a chancery receiver, having no authority other than that arising from his appointment, may not maintain an action in another jurisdiction, a receiver may sue in a foreign jurisdiction to collect statutory liability of stockholders where the statute confers the right upon the receiver as quasiassignee.

Section 55 of ch. 588, N. Y. Laws of 1892, limiting the time within which to bring an action against a stockholder for a debt of the corporation does not apply to an action brought by a receiver to enforce statutory liability of stockholder of a foreign corporation.

THESE are writs of error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.

The actions were brought (January 28, 29, 1904) by Theodore R. Converse as receiver of the Minnesota Thresher Manufacturing Company, a corporation of the State of Minnesota, to enforce an alleged stockholders' liability under the constitution and laws of the State of Minnesota. The court below held the executors of Simon Bernheimer and Isaac Bernheimer, both having died before the suits were brought, liable as such stockholders.

The record discloses that the Minnesota Thresher Manufacturing Company was incorporated under the laws of the State of Minnesota on the fifth of December, 1884, the objects for which the corporation was formed being the purchase of the capital stock, evidences of indebtedness and assets of the Northwestern Manufacturing and Car Company, also a corporation under the laws of the State of Minnesota, and for the further purpose of manufacturing and selling steam engines, farm implements, machinery, etc., and the manufacture and sale of articles, implements and machinery of which wood and iron form the principal parts.

The Northwestern Manufacturing and Car Company was in the hands of a receiver, carrying on its business under the orders of a court, and, on October 27, 1887, the property and plant of that company, including all its bills receivable, farmers' notes and assets were sold under decree and purchased by the Minnesota Thresher Manufacturing Company. The lastnamed company continued in business until December, 1900. On December 14 of that year the property and business of the thresher company were placed in the hands of a receiver by the order of the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Minnesota, in a suit for the foreclosure of a mortgage upon its property, and this receiver carried on the business until the mortgaged property was sold under a decree of foreclosure on May 25, 1901.

On May 6, 1901, the Merchants' National Bank of St. Paul obtained a judgment in the District Court of Ramsey County, Minnesota, against the thresher company, and executions thereon having been returned unsatisfied, the judgment creditor brought suit against the thresher company for the appointment of a receiver and the enforcement of the individual liability of its stockholders in the District Court of Washington County, Minnesota. In that suit Theodore R. Converse, defendant in error in these cases, was appointed receiver. On the petition of the receiver, for the purpose of providing funds for the payment of the expenses of the receiver

206 U.S.

Argument for Plaintiffs in Error.

ship in the enforcement of the stock liability and payment of indebtedness, an order was made, December 22, 1902, reciting, among other things, that copies of an order of April 16, 1902 (not in the record), had been published, mailed and served as therein required, and that due notice of the hearing had been given to the defendant company and to each stockholder of record as directed by the order, and, on a hearing duly had, an order of assessment of thirty-six per cent of the par value of each share of the capital stock of the thresher company, to wit, eighteen dollars per share, was assessed against each and every share of the capital stock and against each and every person, corporation or party liable as such stockholder, and each such person, corporation or party was directed to pay to the said receiver, at his office in the city of Stillwater, Minnesota, within thirty days after the date of the order, the said sum of eighteen dollars a share; and, further, upon failure to pay said sums, the receiver was authorized to prosecute actions or proceedings against the persons liable in any court having jurisdiction in the State of Minnesota or elsewhere. On appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Minnesota this order was affirmed. 90 Minnesota, 144. Subsequently, as stated, these actions were brought and judgment rendered against the executors of the Bernheimers.

Mr. Lawrence Arnold Tanzer for plaintiffs in error:

The statute of 1899, under which the proceedings for the assessment were taken, impairs the obligation of the contract between the stockholders and the creditors.

The liability is a contractual liability. Hanson v. Davison, 73 Minnesota, 454, 460; Flash v. Conn, 109 U. S. 371, 377; Hawthorne v. Calef, 2 Wall. 10; Whitman v. Oxford National Bank, 176 U. S. 559, 563; Knickerbocker Trust Co. v. Myers, 133 Fed. Rep. 764, affirmed Myers v. Knickerbocker Trust Co., 139 Fed. Rep. 111, 112, 114; Carroll v. Green, 92 U. S. 509, 513. The terms of the stockholders' contract are embodied in the constitution and statutes in force at the time when he ac