The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury; and such trial shall be held in the state where the said crimes shall have been committed; but

between citizens of Kentucky, claiming lands exceeding the value of five hundred dollars, under different grants, the one issued by the state of Kentucky, and the other by the state of Virginia, upon warrants issued by Virginia, and locations founded thereon, prior to the separation of Kentucky from Virginia. It is the grant which passes the legal title to the land, and if the controversy is founded upon the conflicting grants of different states, the judicial power of the courts of the United States extends to the case, whatever may have been the equitable title of the parties prior to the grant.-Colson et al vs. Lewis, 2 Wheaton,

377.

Under the judiciary of 1789, chap. 20, sect. 25, giving appellate jurisdiction to the supreme court of the United States, from the final judgment or decree of the highest court of law or equity of a state, in certain cases the writ of error may be directed to any court in which the record and judgment on which it is to act may be found; and if the record has been remitted by the highest court, &c., to another court of the state, it may be brought by the writ of error from that court.-Gelston vs. Hoyt, 3 Wheaton, 246, 303.

The remedies in the courts of the United States at common law and in equity are to be, not according to the practice of state courts, but according to the principles of common law and equity as defined in England. This doctrine reconciled with the decisions of the courts of Tennessee, permitting an equitable title to be asserted in an action at law.-Robinson vs. Campbell, 3 Wheaton, 221. Remedies in respect to real property, are to be pursued according to the lez loci rei sitae.-Id., 2, 9.

The courts of the United States have exclusive cognizance of questions of forfeitures upon all seizures made under the laws of the United States, and it is not competent for a state court to entertain or decide such question of forfeiture. If a sentence of condemnation be definitively pronounced by the proper court of the United States, it is conclusive that a forfeiture is incurred; if a sentence of acquittal, it is equally conclusive against the forfeiture, and in either case the question cannot be again litigated in any common law for ever.-Gelston vs. Hoyt, 3 Wheaton, 246, 311.

Where a seizure is made for a supposed forfeiture under a law of the United States, no action of trespass lies in any common-law tribunal, until a final decree is pronounced upon the proceeding in rem to enforce such forfeiture: for it depends upon the final decree of the court proceeding in rem, whether such seizure is to be deemed rightful or tortuous, and the action, if brought before such decree is made, is brought too soon.-Id., 313.

If a suit be brought against the seizing officer for the supposed trespass while the suit for the forfeiture is depending, the fact of such pending may be pleaded in abatement, or as a temporary bar of the action. If after a decree of condemnation, then that fact may be pleaded as a bar: if after an acquittal with a certificate of reasonable cause of seizure, then that may be pleaded as a bar. If after an acquittal without such certificate, then the officer is without any justification for the seizure, and it is definitively settled to be a tortuous act. If to an action of trespass in a state court for a seizure, the seizing officer plead the fact of for

when not committed within any state, the trial shall be at such place or places as the Congress may by law have directed.*

feiture in his defence without averring a lis pendens, or a condemnation, or an acquittal, with a certificate of reasonable cause of seizure, the plea is bad: for it attempts to put in issue the question of forfeiture in a state court.-Id., 314. Supposing that the third article of the constitution of the United States which declares, that "the judicial power shall extend to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction" vested in the United States exclusive jurisdiction of all such cases, and that a murder committed in the waters of a state where the tide ebbs and flows, is a case of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; yet Congress have not, in the 8th section of the act of 1790, chap. 9, "for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States," so exercised this power, as to confer on the courts of the United States jurisdiction over such murder.-United States vs. Bevans, 3 Wheaton, 336, 387.

Quere.-Whether courts of common law have concurrent jurisdiction with the admiralty over murder committed in bays, &c., which are enclosed parts of the sea?-Id., 387.

The grant to the United States in the constitution of all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, does not extend to a cession of the waters in which those cases may arise, or of general jurisdiction over the same. Congress may pass all laws which are necessary for giving the most complete effect to the exercise of the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction granted to the government of the Union; but the general jurisdiction over the place subject to this grant, adheres to the territory as a portion of territory not yet given away, and the residuary powers of legislation still remain in the state.-Id., 389.

The supreme court of the United States has constitutionally appellate jurisdiction under the judiciary act of 1789, chap. 20, sect. 25, from the final judgment or decree of the highest court of law or equity of a state having jurisdiction of the subject matter of the suit, where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of, or an authority exercised under, the United States, and the decision is against their validity or where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised under any state, on the ground of their being repugnant to the constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, and the decision is in favor of such their validity: or of the constitution, or of a treaty, or statute of, or commission held under the United States, and the decision is against the title, right, privilege, or exemption, specially set up or claimed by either party under such clause of the constitution, treaty, statute, or commission.-Cohens vs. Virginia, 6 Wheaton, 264, 375.

It is no objection to the exercise of this appellate jurisdiction, that one of the parties is a state, and the other a citizen of that state.-Id.

The circuit courts of the Union have chancery jurisdiction in every state; they have the same chancery powers, and the same rules of decision in equity cases, in all the states.-United States vs. Howland, 4 Wheaton, 108, 115.

Resolutions of the legislature of Virginia of 1810, upon the proposition from Pennsylvania to amend the constitution, so as to provide an impartial tribunal to

* See amendments, art. vi.

SECTION 3. Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort.

No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court.

The Congress shall have power to declare the punishment of treason, but no attainder of treason shall work

decide disputes between the State and federal judiciaries.-Note to Cohens vs. Virginia. Note 6 Wheaton, 358.

Where a cause is brought to this court by writ of error, or appeal from the highest court of law, or equity of a state, under the 25th section of the judiciary act of 1789, chap. 20, upon the ground that the validity of a statute of the United States was drawn in question, and that the decision of the state court was against its validity, &c., or that the validity of the statute of a state was drawn in question as repugnant to the constitution of the United States, and the decision was in favor of its validity, it must appear from the record, that the act of Congress, or the constitutionality of the state law, was drawn in question.-Miller vs. Nicholls, 4 Wheaton, 311, 315.

But it is not required that the record should in terms state a misconstruction of the act of Congress, or that it was drawn into question. It is sufficient to give this court jurisdiction of the cause, that the record should show that an act of Congress was applicable to the case.-Id., 315.

The supreme court of the United States has no jurisdiction under the 25th section of the judiciary act of 1789, chap. 20, unless the judgment or decree of the state court be a final judgment or decree. A judgment reversing that of an inferior court, and awarding a venire facias de novo, is not a final judgment.-Houston vs. Moore, 3 Wheaton, 433.

By the compact of 1802, settling the boundary line between Virginia and Tennessee, and the laws made in pursuance thereof, it is declared that all claims and titles to land derived from Virginia, or North Carolina, or Tennessee, which have fallen into the respective states, shall remain as secure to the owners thereof, as if derived from the government within whose boundary they have fallen, and shall not be prejudiced or affected by the establishment of the line. Where the titles of both the plaintiff and defendant in ejectment were derived under grant from Virginia to lands which fell within the limits of Tennessee, it was held that a prior settlement right thereto, which would in equity give the party a title, could not be asserted as a sufficient title in an action of ejectment brought in the circuit court of Tennessee.-Robinson vs. Campbell, 3 Wheaton, 212.

Although the state courts of Tennessee have decided that, under their statutes (declaring an elder grant founded on a junior entry to be void), a junior patent, founded on a prior entry, shall prevail at law against a senior patent founded on a junior entry, this doctrine has never been extended beyond cases within the express provision of the statute of Tennessee, and could not apply to titles deriving all their validity from the laws of Virginia, and confirmed by the compact between the two states.-Id., 212.

corruption of blood, or forfeiture except during the life of the person attainted.*

ARTICLE IV.

SECTION 1. Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state. And the Congress may by general laws prescribe the manner in which such acts, records and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof.

SECTION 2. The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several

states.

A person charged in any state with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another state, shall on demand of the executive authority of the state from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime.

No person held to service or labor in one state, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due.

SECTION 3. New states may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new state shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other state; nor any state be formed by the junction of two or more states,

* See laws of the United States, vol. ii., chap. 36.

† A judgment of a state court has the same credit, validity, and effect, in every other court within the United States, which it had in the court where it was rendered; and whatever pleas would be good to a suit thereon in such state, and none others can be pleaded in any other court within the United States.-Hampton vs. McConnell, 3 Wheaton, 234.

The record of a judgment in one state is conclusive evidence in another, although it appears that the suit in which it was rendered, was commenced by an attachment of property, the defendant having afterward appeared and taken defence.-Mayhew vs. Thacher, 6 Wheaton, 129.

See laws United States, vol. ii., chap, 38; and vol. iii., chap. 409.

or parts of states, without the consent of the legislatures of the states concerned as well as of the Congress.

The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this constitution shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims of the United States, or of any particular state.

SECTION 4. The United States shall guaranty to every state in this Union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion; and on application of the legislature, or of the executive (when the legislature can not be convened) against domestic violence.

ARTICLE V.

The Congress, whenever two thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose amendments to this constitution, or, on the application of the legislatures of two thirds of the several states, shall call a convention for proposing amendments, which, in either case, shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of this constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of three fourths of the several states, or by conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the Congress; provided that no amendment which may be made prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any manner affect the first and fourth clauses in the ninth section of the first article; and that no state, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the senate.*

ARTICLE VI.

All debts contracted and engagements entered into, before the adoption of this constitution, shall be as valid

* See ante art. i., sect. 3, clause 1.