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French entered the city, where they found eight standards and 200 pieces of cannon. The capture of this fortress was regarded by the people of Spain as the climax of their misfortunes, and the junta, intimidated by the strong expression of popular resentment, issued a proclamation for the meeting of the Cortes, a measure which at an earlier period might have rendered effectual the patriotism and resources 1808. of the country, and effected the expulsion of its insolent and merciless invaders.

The Spanish government expressed its sense of the services of sir Arthur Wellesley by nominating him one of the captains general, (or field-marshals,) of the army, and presenting him in the name or Ferdi

nand with a number of the finest Anda.usian horses. Sir Arthur accepted the present and the appointment, but he declined the pay attached to his new dignity, unwilling to burden the finances of Spain during such a contest. In England also he was rewarded by new honors. As soon as the news of his victory arrived, he was raised to the peerage by the titles of baron Douro of Wellesley, and viscount Welling ton of Talavera, and of Wellington in the county of Somerset. His conduct, how ever, both in Portugal and Spain, was severely scrutinized, and his operations were condemned with all the asperity of party malice, and all the insolence of presump tuous ignorance.

HISTORY OF THE WAR.

CHAP. LVIIL

Operations in Italy-EXPEDITION TO WALCHEREN-Capture of Flushing-Abandonment of the further objects of the Expedition-Disease among the troops-Evacuation of the Island.

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HE secresy and celerity by which game." At a moment when the fate of Napoleon defeated the plans and the continent might have been decided rendered ineffectual the hostile prepara- by the diversion of a powerful British force tions of his enemies, were strikingly conon the shores of the German ocean, the trasted by the tardiness, indecision, and British army in Sicily was ordered to emimprudence of the English cabinet. In- bark for the south of Italy, to effect the dolence and parsimony were the only faults capture of Naples, and the reduction of of which they could not be accused. For Calabria. At the end of June, Ischia and the last few years, the bustle of our dock- Procida surrendered to the British, and yards had been dreadful; the press-gang the reduction of the latter place led to the never ceased from troubling; the marches capture of 40 gun-boats in their attempt to and counter-marches of troops gave every pass from Gaeta to Naples. In the course outward appearance of war; the loans of the operations, 1500 of the enemy's and taxes were doubled; recruiting, draft- troops were made prisoners, and 100 pieces ing, and balloting followed each other in of ordnance were taken or rendered unperpetual succession. Scarcely a session serviceable. On the first appearance, elapsed without producing some military however, of the English on the coast of plan, and the time of the house of com- Naples, Joachim Napoleon formed and mons was occupied for several months in embodied a corps of national guards, in each year on systems of finance. But these addition to the regular force which he preparations, imposing as they were, ter- had assembled for the protection of his minated in no important and permanent capitals and his dominions. After several object. We exhausted our strength in attempts to capture the castle of Scylla, petty and divided expeditions, when the which was taken and retaken several times, devotion of our resources to one great ob- the British were obliged to abandon their ject might have effected the deliverance of petty and transient conquests, and return Europe, and instead of directing a mighty to Sicily. As a diversion, this expedition force against the chief strength of the ene- was contemptible in its force, too distant my wherever that strength might be found, from the principal scene of conquest, and sent forth our vessels and our armies against too late in its equipment; as intended the points where the ministers conceived for the conquest of the kingdom of Nathe enemy to be weakest. "When they ples, it was utterly inadequate to its have the trumps in their hands," said lord object. Stanhope, "they lead from their weak suit, and while they retain the honors, lose the

When the news of the battle of Wagram and the fatal armistice by which it was

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unaware that a boom had been thrown across the Scheldt, and that ships in going up must pass five batteries, four forts, and the temporary batteries on the banks. The expedition had been suggested to Mr. Pitt in 1798, to Lord Hobart in 1803, and to lord Grenville in 1806, and rejected by them all as impracticable and desperate. Nor was the rashness of its present projectors more conspicuous than their utter incapacity for its management and direction. The fleet was furnished by government with one person acquainted with the navigation of the Scheldt, and with no plans of Antwerp, Lillo, or Liefenshock. The government (says sir R. Strachan, from whose evidence these facts are taken,) could supply us with none and appeared to be utterly ignorant whether or not ships could get up above Antwerp." The commander-in-chief himself declared in evidence that he did not know before he left England whether the arsenals at Antwerp were commanded by the citadel, nor had he any distinct knowledge where the arsenals were situated. No plan in detail was ever concerted for the attack of Antwerp, nor had he ever seen or received from government any plan of the present state of that town. He was ignorant of the number of fortified towns, within two days' march of Antwerp, and knew little or nothing of the state of the fortresses on the Scheldt before his sailing. He never called for any explanation of their military opinions from the commander-inchief, general Calvert, general Brownrigg, or colonel Gordon, though these opinions had been confided to his perusal by the secretary of state. He was never asked by the ministers after his return for any account of his proceedings corroborative or explanatory of his despatches. These particulars appear in the evidence of lord Chatham himself. No suggestion whatever was made by any of the responsible individuals of the worst danger which threatened the armament, the known and certain consequences of sending an army to the most unwholesome part of the globe, precisely in the midst of the sickly months. At seven in the evening of the day in which it sailed from the Downs the first

part of the expedition with the commanderin-chief anchored in the Steen Diep, with in three leagues of the west coast of Walcheren. It was arranged that sir Edward Coote should occupy Walcheren with his left wing, and that the marquis of Huntley with 5000 men should land upon the island of Cadsandt and entrench himself there to cut off the enemy's communication with Flushing. The latter of these measures was regarded by sir Richard Strachan as the first object. A misunderstanding.between him, the marquis of Huntley, and commodore Owen, combined with the inclemency of the weather, prevented this design. The weather became more and more tempestuous; the flotilla was en dangered, and sir Richard took refuge in the Roompot off the south-west end of the island of Schouwen. Finding that the roadstead was at a safe distance from the island, general Hope and sir Richard Keats, after being for awhile detained, were ordered to proceed with their division of the armament, according to their original instructions.

The left wing of the army destined for the reduction of Walcheren, bombarded Ter Veer, which on our entrance was made the place of debarkation for our ordnance and stores in the siege of Flushing; it being found impossible to land them in Zoutland bay, as was at first intended.` During these operations, the sailors displayed their characteristic zeal and activity. Owing to the strength of the tide, it was for some time extremely difficult to land the horses, and the advance of the army must have been much delayed if these indefatigable men had not drawn great part of the artillery through a heavy sand.

Lord Chatham established his headquarters at Middleburgh, and on the same day the army moved forward in three columns for the investment of Flushing; general Graham on the right to reduce the batteries of Zoutland, Dykeshock, and Vyocter; lord Paget, in the centre, by Hoogeland and Coudekirke to West Zoubourgh; general Houston on the left to East Zoubourgh, to communicate with lord Paget, and to observe Ramakins,

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Their advance on all these points was sharply but unsuccessfully opposed, and the enemy's light troops, favored by a country which is very much intersected with hedges and ditches, kept up a continual fire upon the British outposts. Flushing, however, was invested; the commanding officers of artillery and engineers were directed to use the utmost exertions in preparing for the attack of that place; heavy artillery was disembarked, depôts of entrenching tools were formed, and every arrangement made for immediate operations. But the failure of the plan against Cadsandt was now felt; the enemy might easily be reinforced from thence, and lord Chatham urged the admiral to bring in the ships of war without a moment's loss of time, that this communication might be cut off. Nine schuyts full of troops pushed across, and got into Flushing on the night of the first. Several others effected their passage afterwards, some of which were seen to cross, and reached the harbor within seventeen minutes from the time when they set their sails. When these reinforcements pushed over, none of the fleet was in a situation to pass up and prevent them, except commodore Owen's division; but he was employed in hovering off the shore of Cadsandt for a purpose which never was effected, and if this had not prevented him, he must have suffered much from the Cadsandt batteries while that island was in the enemy's possession. The strength of the garrison being thus increased, it was thought expedient to reinforce the besieging army; and general Grosvenor's division, (which would have been disembarked on the island of Schouwen, if the shores of the east Scheldt had not unexpectedly been found defenceless,) was landed in Walcheren to assist in the operations (August 2nd,) against Flushing. A battery was formed against Ramakins, as soon as it was ready to open, and the garrison, consisting of 127 men, surrendered. The approach to Flushing was now was now open to our troops on the north, and to our naval force on the east and west, but on the south the movement was not yet VOL. II.

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completed, and this was especially necessary to the success of the siege.

By this time the operations in South Beveland were terminated. Sir John Hope's division weighed anchor early on the 31st of July, and proceeded towards Zierichzee. A strong wind from the west prevented the troops from getting into their boats that day. On the following day this was ef fected, and they advanced up the East Scheldt. Three of the enemy's line of battle ships which had been seen the preceding day at anchor towards the eastern extremity of South Beveland weighed anchor now and joined the rest of the hostile fleet above Lillo and Liefkenshock, About one in the afternoon 2000 men were landed on the dyke between Wemelding and Kattendyk, about five miles from Ter Goes, the capital of the island. No opposition was attempted, and the magistrates of Ter Goes, without requiring any terms, placed themselves under the protection of the of the English, and head-quarters were established in that town. A hundred men forming part of a detachment which, under general Bruce, had made their escape from Walcheren, ou the 31st, across the Sloe passage, were made prisoners, on the 2nd, by general Desney's advanced-guard. The enemy's batteries were abandoned as the English advanced; the means, indeed, of defending South Beveland were not very great, but the disposition was still less. It remained to obtain possession of fort Bathz; and in this some difficulty was apprehended, for sir John Hope was not provided with a single piece of heavy artillery, and it was universally believed that this work was placed on an insulated spot, built with masonry, flanked and well planted with cannon. Captain Squire of the engineers was directed to reconnoitre it, he found merely a square earth work, badly flanked and containing fourteen guns and four howitzers, with an open battery on the sea-dyke in its front. But as it was protected from an assault by a wide and deep wet ditch, some sort of battery must have been established against it, and its reduction would have occasioned delay,

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and not improbably some difficulty and loss; for, as it is situated precisely on the deep water channel of the west Scheldt, where our fleet had not yet advanced, in consequence of the failure of the plan upon Cadsandt, the garrison might have been supplied and reinforced, and the enemy's flotilla might have effectually cooperated in its defence. Accident and cowardice threw it more easily into our hands. A party of the guards, consisting of about 30, strolled from the army, and, finding no obstruction, proceeded along the dyke till they found themselves unexpectedly before the fort of Bathz. The governor, Bruce, taking them for a detachment from the main force, spiked the guns, destroyed the ammunition, and crossed over to Bergen-op-Zoom with the whole garrison. The English were surprised to hear that Bathz was evacuated, and could not understand why an officer, with 600 men under his command, should have nade no resistance in a fort so advantageously placed. Treachery was not imputed to him; but he was punished for misconduct, was degraded by Louis Buonaparte, and declared unworthy of holding any military rank. The English were welcomed on their way to Bathz, and in the place itself with evident sincerity. Unhappily, whatever good might have resulted from this disposition of the Dutch in their favor, was counteracted by the slowness and indecision with which the expedition was conducted. Sir John Hope's division remained from this 'time inactive in south Beveland, being considered merely as a corps of observation during the siege of Flushing. The enemy, on the other hand, at Antwerp and Bergenop-7oom, were active in collecting forces, and still more so in spreading exaggerated accounts of their strength, and of the reinforcements which were arriving. The Zealanders, therefore, anticipated the result of the contest. It became daily more difficult to obtain information; the higher ranks particularly kept aloof from the English, and the people dared not appear active in the behalf of those whom they

would joyfully have hailed as deliverers, if any permanent effect could possibly have resulted from the expedition. That the disposition of the people was in our favor could not be doubted. When a force was collected by the French in Walcheren, it was understood that the Dutch troops were inclined to come over to us if encouragement were held out; and it was known that the smugglers, and all those who were connected with them, would rejoice to see the French removed from their favorite post, which to their great annoyance, had been converted under this usurpation into a naval arsenal. But the manner in which the British commander procee 'ed against Flushing was equally impolitic and unskilful; and, by making war upon the people, instead of opposing the garrison, the very consequences which ought especially to have been avoided, were inevitably produced.

The works of Flushing were in a state of decay; for though an attack had long been apprehended, and Buonaparte, early in 1808, issued orders relative to the defence of the place, little had yet been done towards executing his projects; the French were in greater apprehension of a bombardment than of a regular land siege, and, therefore, their strongest batteries were placed towards the Deurlos channel and the anchorage in front of the town. Towards the land, Flushing was inclosed with a line of bastions, extending from one sea-dyke to the other; these works were of earth, generally without any support; the flanks of the bastions were perpendicular to the curtain, and their construction was in other respects also very defective. The rampart was low, commanded by the sea-dyke, and, except on the flanks. of the position, in great want of repair, without traverses or bomb-proof covers for the garrison. There was a respectable wet ditch in front of these fortifications, but without any sort of glacis. Where the sea-dyke meet the works, the bastions on the flanks were faced with a breast revetment in a very weak and neglected state, and so much exposed, that the bastion was

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