consisted of those in the house of the prince, and about eight or ten staff-officers. (December 13th.) The next day, in going out from Kowno, we found the same tumult which we had experienced at the gate of Wilna; the crowd was pressing on the bridge, although the Niemen was frozen hard enough to have borne the weight of artillery. Colonel Vidman was here among the dead. He was one of the small number of the Italian guards of honor, who had hitherto sustained the fatigues of the campaign. He now fell while going to the bridge, and immediately expired.

"The imperial-guard shared our sufferings. I saw one man worthy of the most distinct record. He was lying on the bridge of Kowno. The crowd, in passing him, respected his decoration of the legion of honor. He disdained to make any useless supplications. "Comrades," said he, "I ask only that you will not suffer the enemy to profane these distinctions. Carry them to my colonel, and let him know that I know how to value them even at the last."

"On the morning of the 13th of December, out of all that remained of 400,000 warriors, who had crossed the Niemen, on the opening of the campaign, scarcely 20,000 men repassed it; among whom, two-thirds, at least, had not seen the Kremlin. When arrived at the opposite bank, we looked behind us with horror, and trembled anew as we beheld the as we beheld the savage countries where we had so severely suffered.

"We now continued our march to Koningsberg, and reached it without further loss except that the cossacks, having likewise passed the Niemen, destroyed all those who wandered from their ranks. The king of Naples was coldly received when we came to Koningsberg. The viceroy made a visit to the fields of battle of Friedland, Eylau, and Heilsberg. At Marienwerder, on the 27th of December, he collected the sad remains of his army. Of 48,000 men 800 were all that now remained. These he directed upon

France and Italy, and reached his point of destination without further disaster."

Descriptions like these might be de spised as the effusions of a warm imagination, or of deliberate falsehood, were they not confirmed by the statements of every individual of celebrity engaged in the campaign, and by the fact, as striking as it is incontestible, that in the progress of future hostilities, only 18,000 of the army which invaded Russia survived to support the operations of their emperor.

There remained but little to be done by the Russians. The grand army was annihilated. When Buonaparte reached Smeymo he made his flight known to the world; he had before abandoned his soldiers, and he now formally appointed Murat to the command of the armies. On the 7th, he reached Wilna accompanied by Caulaincourt, who was worthy of the honor conferred upon him. The Russians did not relax the pursuit. Platof, at the village of Orchniani fell in with a small reinforcement, advancing under Loison, and cut it to pieces. Tchaplitz, after destroying the remains of the rear-guard in the neighbourhood of Wilna, on the 27th of December, attacked and carried the suburbs of that city, and on the following day entered its gates, at the moment when the French were retiring. The enemy had no leisure to destroy his baggage or his remaining booty, and his whole stores and ammunition fell into the hands of the Russians. Strong detachments of cossacks and light troops were spread along the shores of the Niemen to prevent the escape of Macdonald, and ensure the destruction of his army. On the 11th of December Tchichagof addressed a report to the emperor Alexander in the neighhood of Wilna, in which he estimated the loss of the enemy from his late passage of the Beresyna to amount to 30,000 men. On the 12th the head-quarters of Kutusof were established in the capital of Russian Poland. Such was the striking and. instructive result of this eventful campaign in which a greater number of sanguinary

battles were fought than had ever been crowded into so small a space. Never was Never was any enterprise more disastrous than the invasion of Russia, never were persevering virtue and patriotism crowned with a more signal triumph. The bands of the cruel and desperate invaders strewed the roads and discoloured the rivers of their injured

and exasperated enemy; while the ven geance of an insulted people was gratified to the utmost by the sufferings of their ruthless foes; an awful retribution, by which the hand of Providence was stretched forth to chastise a cruel and profligate ambition, which dared to meditate the slavery of the human race.

T

HE war in Spain exhibited at its commencement a favorable view of the Spanish character, and seemed to open the most brilliant prospects to the continent of Europe. When the power of France over the surrounding nations appeared to mock all resistance, when her armies had humbled the greatest monarchies, and blotted others from the list of independent states, when a general feeling of submissive terror impressed the minds of the contiHental rulers, the patriots of Spain dissolved the charm and bade defiance to their invaders. The folly of Buonaparte in provoking this resistance, has been generally acknowledged. Spain he already retained in real vassalage; her fleets, her armies, her resources of all kinds, were at his disposal; and the decrepit and pusillanimous despotism of the monarch admitted no motive but his will. While he co-operated with such a government, he was safe; but, by an undisguised outrage on the laws of nations, he made his criminal views manifest to Europe, and excited in the Spanish people a spirit of patriotism of which the other continental nations were at this moment destitute. By appointing the lowest minion of his tyranny to govern pain, he could not have

expected more entire submission than he already received from the government which he resolved at every hazard to supersede, while by an act of violence so palpable, he could not fail to alarm the pride and excite the indignation of the meanest Spaniard. He preferred, however, the gratification of his arrogance to the stability of his power; he insulted and oppressed the people of Spain beyond all endurance, and called forth, in a bold but undisciplined peasantry, an enthusiasm which in the first instance overthrew the finest of his legions.

The enthusiasm of the Spaniards was warmly seconded by the generosity of the British nation. It is scarcely too much to say, that a determination to support this honorable strugglewas universal among Englishmen, since the few who hesitated were, if we except Mr. Whitbread, of a character which deprived their opinions of every claim to regard. To what extent our support might be required, and in what shape it might be prudent to afford it, were questions upon which some difference of opinion might justly exist, and which it was dif ficult to resolve till the character and prospects of the war should be developed. But that every nerve should be strained

to promote the glorious contest and to take advantage of the spirit which the indiscretion of the enemy had created, was the sentiment of every British statesman of eminence, and the enthusiastic desire of the British people. The English saw with indignation, scarcely inferior to that of the sufferers, the base and profligate schemes by which the enemy endeavored to subject a great nation; they recognised, in the triumph of the Spanish cause, that of justice and morality throughout Europe; they looked forward to the deliverance of Spain as the emancipation of a fine people from foreign and domestic tyranny, and as the re-establishment of a powerful state which might restrain the ambition of its formidable enemy. Such were the views, equally magnanimous and solid, which created in this country a deeper interest respecting Spanish affairs than had before been felt in the transactions of any foreign state. Great reliance 1812. had been placed on the efforts of the Spaniards themselves, and the events of the first campaign were calculated to justify this confidence. But the lapse of time disappointed our expectations. No vigorous or efficient system was pursued by the Spanish authorities, no individuals of exalted talents appeared to guide the destinies of the peninsula. The Spanish armies have.never borne any proportion to the population and resources of the country, and were uniformly defective in discipline, while their officers were generally deficient in all the qualities of the military character except courage. The armies hastily enlisted, were too often led by their inexperienced officers into battle long before they had been prepared by a previous course of discipline. Down to the period of which I am about to detail the events, the regular forces had done little towards the expulsion of the enemy, while the government discovered but a slender portion of that wisdom and vigor which were so loudly demanded by the circumstances of so important and critical

a moment.

The character of the Spanish revolution will account in some measure for this

deplorable inactivity.. The Spaniards were not roused to action by the des.re of enjoying more liberty than they already possessed under their antient government; they were not animated by those extravagant aspirations which had communicated a character of ferocious energy to the revolutionary career of their enemies. An attachment to their hereditary rulers, and to the independence of their country, formed the basis of their revolution; and the wild enthusiasm of individual ambition had little or no influence on their exertions. Fighting for the restoration of a government which systematically checked the growth of talent, the Spanish patriot could entertain no hope that his most distinguished services would ever procure for him the higher rewards. The ultimate triumph of the cause for which so many exertions were required, must have at once reduced the aspiring to their original obscurity, and have defrauded them of the honors to which they would naturally look forward. Had the revolution in Spain resembled that of France, had the convulsion been so great as to resolve society into its elements, and cast the chance of future rank and pre-eminence on the decision of the sword, the military genius of Spain might have been developed, and that country might have passed through a scene of horrors to a more exalted rank among the states of Europe. The actual circumstances, however, under which she was called upon to resist a powerful invader, were unpropitious to the evolution of her natural energies; and though the Spanish peasantry are both brave and patriotic, they were too often doomed to perish by the ignorance and the folly of their leaders. It was in the irregular warfare now carried on by the guerillas, that the national qualities of the Spaniards were displayed to the greatest advantage. This species of warfare required only a moderate degree of talent to condict it: it demanded but the local knowledge, the courage and constancy of the peasantry, and the resolute and daring spirit of enterprise which prevailed among their chiefs. Formidable indeed were these unexpected

and invisible enemies to the French, of whom incredible numbers became victims to their fury. It has been said with truth, that if the defence of Spain had been committed to the guerillas alone, although they might have been unable to expel the invader, they would never have ceased to disturb him; and Spain by their irregular efforts made the only compensation in her power for the want of system and of genius, which was to be supplied by the generosity of her allies.

In the marquis of Wellington, who had already become illustrious by his talents and renowned for his exploits, the Spanish nation were destined to find their deliverer. This great man, before his appointment to the command of the British armies in the peninsula, had been distinguished as an able and enterprizing officer; but the field on which he acted was narrow in comparison, and the events in which he bore so conspicuous a part were not much regarded in Europe. His friends, to whom the extent and fertility of his genius were in some measure known, predicted the splendor of his future career. Little was it imagined, however, with what brilliance and rapidity these favorable anticipations were to be fulfilled. The judgment of lord Wellington, equally solid and comprehensive, his genius, at once profound and daring, were destined to find ample scope in the affairs of Spain. He was sent out, with a handful of men, to defend Portugal against the overwhelming host of the enemy. With unexampled sagacity he seized and fortified a position which saved the country, while time was afforded for further preparations, and he calmly waited for an opportunity, which must sooner or later occur, to make the enemy repent of his usurpation. When he took the command in the peninsula he found the economy of the army in a state of great confusion, he instantaneously corrected the existing abuses, and raised the discipline of his troops to a superiority commensurate with their valor. He discovered, through the mist of prejudice, the true character of the Portuguese people, he saw

that they were endued with the materials of military excellence, and in defiance of clamor and of faction, he converted them into soldiers, and rendered them worthy of fighting by the side of British troops. He comprehended at once the character of the Spanish war in all its bearings; he observed that the numbers of the French armies, must in circumstances that he himself could create, only ensure their speedy destruction; he drew them round him in a country which famine compelled them to abandon, and seized the opportunity to destroy them in their retreat. Undismayed by the prodigious advantages over him which the enemy possessed, in the number of his troops, in his rapid and unlimited resources, and in the possession of all the strong places of Spain, he seems, at an early period, to have formed the gigantic project of destroying the French power, and expelling the invader from the peninsula. The battles which he had won had hitherto been highly brilliant, and it was not the fault of his character, but his situation, that they were not decisive. He had acted with boldness and resolution, and had displayed a quality which seems essential to British commanders, a just and perfect confidence in the valor of his troops. He entered upon the present year with greater advantages than he had ever before possessed; his army was more numerous and in a higher state of discipline; the irregular efforts of the Spaniards promised a more active co-operation than they had hitherto afforded, and a prospect began to open that the strength of France and her tributary states might find employment in the north of Europe. The dif ficulties opposed to his designs were of a magnitude calculated to appal any other general. Three large armies were stationed in the north, south, centre, and east of Spain, and several of the fortresses were numerously garrisoned, and strengthened by all the ingenious resources of art. But this great commander was not to be dismayed. He formed the bold design of advancing into the centre of Spain, with an army to which even one of the enemy's