CONWAY v. THE TOWNSHIP BOARD OF WAVERLY. the amounts assessed against them respectively, which was done accordingly. Defendants demurred for misjoinder of complainants, and for want of equity. The demurrer was sustained, and the bill dismissed. The court also ordered the money deposited to be paid over to the town treasurer. We think the demurrer was well taken. If it should be assumed that complainants can thus join their several causes of individual grievance in one bill, they have entirely failed to point out any tangible grievance of such a specific nature as to enable a court to relieve it. The bill cannot be maintained to remove a cloud upon land without showing what the land is, and there is no averment giving either description, quantity or value. It is not asserted that any part of the tax is illegal except a part of the town tax. As the state and county taxes are separately charged, it was, at least, possible to distinguish the town taxes from the rest, whether the bounty tax was or was not put by itself. No illegality in a town tax could, before the land should be actually sold, affect the other taxes. And complainants, if entitled to relief at all, could only be relieved against the tax which included the illegal charge. It was, therefore, incumbent on them to show distinctly the grievance to be remedied. The bill must be certain enough to furnish the means of giving the precise relief needed. No court can give assistance to a party who does not show what he is entitled to demand. The bill asks relief against what must be presumed to be legal as well as illegal taxes, and the court has no means of ascertaining one from the other, while complainants could have given the means, but have neglected to do so. Without passing upon the several other questions discussed, we think the demurrer properly sustained for want of equity, and the decree thus far must be affirmed, with costs. CONWAY . THE TOWNSHIP BOARD OF WAVERLY. We think, however, that the court could not properly direct the money deposited to be paid over by the register to the township treasurer. The tax for bounty purposes was manifestly illegal, and even if it were not so, there had been no issue or hearing which could enable the court to determine that the parties had no defense against the enforcement of collection in whole or in part. The dismissal of this bill could not affect any legal defenses which any of them might set up against the levy of any of the taxes. And the case being out of court, there is no way now to reach the facts, as there is nothing on record to show the true amount of lawful charges. This portion of the decree must be vacated. But as the decree is affirmed on the merits of the cause, and this has formed no main part of the controversy, the defendants are entitled to their costs in this court. CHRISTIANCY J. and COOLEY J. concurred. MARTIN Ch. J. did not sit. APRIL TERM, 1867, AT DETROIT. 15 265 83 526 15 265 118 629 15 265 Henry Warren v. Hiram F. Cole and another. Repudiation of contract, for fraud: Action for damages. Where a contract has been repudiated on the ground of fraud, the party defrauded may bring an action for the damages sustained. Actions of tort: Rule of damages. In an action of tort, where, from the circumstances, no certain pecuniary standard can be obtained by which to ascertain the amount of damages, the jury have a wide range of discretion, and no absolute rule can be laid down; but where, from the nature of the case, a rule can be discovered by which adequate compensation can be given, the rule should be applied to actions of tort, as well as upon contract. Held, further, that the expenses of litigation can not be considered in estimating the damages. Patent right: Construction of deed. A agreed to sell to B an interest in two inventions, for the former of which only a patent had been issued. A deed was duly executed by A, conveying his interest in said patent to B. Subsequently, A received a patent for the second invention. Held, that inasmuch as the conveyance from A referred only to the description in the first patent, it could not be construed so as to include the invention in the second. Heard January 12th. Decided April 3d. Error to Lenawee Circuit. This was an action to recover damages for an alleged deceit practiced by plaintiff in error upon defendant in error, in the sale of two patent rights for the making of soap. Judgment was rendered for the plaintiff below. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion. The following are the assignments of error, covered by the opinion: 1. That the court erred in charging and instructing the jury that if the fraud was proved on the part of the 15 Mich. -8. 265 122 480 15 265 123 73 WARREN Y. COLE. defendant to be a gross one or aggravated, they will be justified in imposing exemplary or punitive damages. 2. That the court erred in charging and instructing the jury that they might also, in estimating the plaintiff's damages, take into consideration his expenses of carrying on and prosecuting his suit, including counsel fees. 3. That the court erred in refusing to instruct and charge the jury, as requested by the defendant's counsel, that if the jury believed from the evidence that the plaintiffs had disaffirmed the contract, that then the plaintiffs could not recover in this form of action; and also erred in charging and instructing the jury that unless such disaffirmance was acceded to or acted upon by the defendant, or the consideration money restored on request, any act of disaffirmance in evidence in this case, on the part of the plaintiffs, would not preclude the plaintiffs from maintaining this action. 4. That the court erred in refusing to charge and instruct the jury, as requested by the counsel for the defendant, that the conveyance of the 17th October, 1863, conveyed to the plaintiff's all the rights of the defendant. to his patent of February 9th, 1864, to the washing and jelly soap for the county of Cuyahoga, and invested the plaintiffs with all the rights they would have had if the patent had been granted before the sale to the plaintiffs. C. A. Stacy, for plaintiff in error. 1. In all cases of contract where fraud is charged or has been committed, the contract is voidable, at the election of the injured party.-1 Doug. 330. a. If the defrauded party elects to affirm the contract, he is bound by it in all respects. If he elects to rescind it, from that moment it becomes void, and neither party can maintain any rights under it. -4 Mich. 508; 2 Parsons on Con. 780. WARREN v. COLE. b. The party defrauded must rescind as soon as circumstances permit after the discovery of the fraud. -1 Denio, 69; 24 Wend. 74. c. Generally an offer to return the property received is as effectual as actually returning it. -5 Black. 225; 9 Porter, 420. d. When instead of paying money for an article, one delivers some other article in exchange, if the one of whom he purchases be guilty of fraud, he may return, or offer to return, the whole consideration which he received, and maintain trover for the chattels he gave; otherwise, his remedy is by action on the case for the deceit, and not trover for the consideration. - 4 Mass. 502; 3 Esp. 83; Sedg. on Dam. 562; 3 Hill, 333; 8 Barb. 9, 18; 1 Hill, 484; 4 Denio, 584. 2. The court erred in charging the jury that they might, in addition to punitive or exemplary damages, also, in estimating the plaintiff's damages, take into consideration his expenses of carrying on and prosecuting his suit, including counsel fees. In the theory of the law, the taxed costs are full indemnity for the expenses of a suit.-13 M. & W. 47; 5 Wend. 535; 23 Id. 425; 11 Pick. 378; 4 Black. 277; 13 How. 363. This erroneous direction in cases where, like this, the jury had the right to give compensatory damages, will require the court to reverse the judgment, as they can not assume that the intention of the jury was to give vindictive damages rather than compensatory.-Sedg. on Dam. 529, 563; 3 Sandf. 628; 8 Wend. 505. 3. The court erred in charging the jury that in this case the plaintiff could recover punitory or vindictive damages. If the defendant was guilty, he was also liable to a criminal prosecution and punishment, and if damages as a punishment, over and above the actual damages sustained |