DETROIT AND MILWAUKEE R. W. Co. v. ADAMS. was evidence that the plaintiffs sent one hundred and two packages of wool to this depot, at different times between the 15th and 25th of October. (On which particular day the package subsequently lost was sent, did not clearly appear). That this wool was sent to the defendants' depot for the purpose of transportation over their road, consigned to H. Hollister, Hartford, Ct., which was plainly marked upon the packages, and that the freight agent in charge of the depot was notified of the purpose for which it was sent there, and of the wish of the plaintiffs. that the whole might be sent off together. That the agent told the plaintiffs where to leave the wool, and pointed out the place in the depot where it should be put, and defendants' men assisted in unloading the wool and putting it in. That after part of the wool had been thus delivered, the could not then get cars to send it all together, it was agreed that plaintiffs should not send up the balance, until notified by the agent that he could ship it, as he said they were considerably filled up then in the depot with produce; that in a few days after, and about the 24th or 25th of October, having received notice from the agent of his readiness to ship, the balance was sent to the depot. Part of the wool was shipped on the 26th of October, and part on the third of November, but the sack in question was not shipped, and could not be found. agent saying he We think this evidence tended strongly to show the delivery to, and acceptance by the defendants as carriers; that it was thus delivered and accepted as it came, and was placed in the depot, and that the delay in the shipment was for the convenience of the company, till the necessary cars could be got ready. But it is insisted by the company that the effect of this evidence was entirely destroyed by a notice to plaintiff's that the company would not be responsible, except upon certain conditions, presently to be mentioned. The only proof of such notice, and of the time and manner in which it is claimed to have been brought home DETROIT AND MILWAUKEE R. W. Co. บ. ADAMS. to the plaintiffs, is this: After the defendant's agent had given the notice that he was ready to ship, and the balance of the wool had been brought to the depot, the plaintiff's signed a shipping request in the following words: 66 The Detroit and Milwaukee Railroad Company will please receive the undermentioned property, addressed to H. Hollister, Hartford, Ct., and transport over its line, subject to its tariff, and forward under condition stated on the other side. 102 sacks wool. 20.300 lbs. "H. HOLLISTER, Hartford, Ct." The printed form was furnished by the company, and the blanks filled by the plaintiffs. On the opposite side of the same sheet, under the head of "GENERAL NOTICES AND CONDITIONS OF CARRIAGE," was, among others, the following printed notice: "That they will not be responsible for any article or articles conveyed upon their railroad, unless the same be signed for as received by a duly authorized agent, and a declaration or shipping note upon the regular printed form, as provided, presented to the agent, seting forth the description of the goods, and the parties to whom they are to be delivered. And when goods are intended, after being conveyed by this railroad, to be forwarded by some other company or conveyance to their final destination, the duplicate receipt furnished by the consignor must specify the same, and the articles marked accordingly." Whatever might have been the effect of this notice, if given in this manner before the property was delivered at the depot, it certainly came too late to affect the question of a prior delivery to and acceptance by the company, as carriers, or their liability for its safe keeping, while awaiting transportation. At this stage of the transaction, if the property had already been accepted by them as carriers, the plaintiffs had a right to treat the notice as only intended to affect the liability of the company in respect to the carriage of the property; if, in fact, it could have THE PEOPLE V. MAYNARD. been construed as anything more than this, if given before the property was received in the depot. The judgment of the Circuit Court, affirming that of the justice, must be affirmed, with costs to defendants in error, in the circuit and in this court. Washington County invalid. The organization of Washington county out of part of Marquette county, held invalid. County organization, what requisite. An act purporting to organize a new county out of territory detached from an old one, but which contains no organized townships, and makes provision for none, is inoperative and void; as without such townships there can be no legal elections, and no means of organizing. Such an act is not made effective by the subsequent passage of an act organizing a single township in the new territory, leaving the remainder not provided for. A county can not be organized without the means of exercising all its necessary functions, and requires more than one organized township, as the board of supervisors can not exist without more than one member, and there can be no county without such a board. Where townships have become organized under a statute and have acted for many years, and have been recognized by the various state and local authorities, it is too late to inquire into the validity of the law providing for their original creation, and their corporate existence can not be questioned. The legislature can not lawfully deprive qualified voters of a county of their right of suffrage, by organizing townships in only a portion of it; leaving the remainder unorganized. The division of a single county attached to an existing judicial district into two counties, will, unless otherwise provided, leave both counties within the same district. Heard May 16th. Decided May 25th. 108 143 Quo Warranto. The information in this case was filed by William L. Stoughton, the Attorney General, against the defendant for intruding into and usurping the office of county treasurer of Marquette county. THE PEOPLE V. MAYNARD. The defendant pleaded that by the organization of Washington county the residence of the treasurer of Marquette county was thrown into the new county, thereby creating a vacancy in the office, to fill which the board of supervisors of Marquette county appointed him treasurer. One of the pleas relied on the "act to organize the county of Washington," and the other on that act, and also an additional "act to organize the township of Negaunee, in the county of Washington." The replication to the first plea alleges that the county of Marquette consisted of but three townships, viz: Marquette, Negaunee and Chocolay, and that only parts of the former two were embraced in the new county, and that such parts contain 3,500 inhabitants and 700 electors. The replication to the second plea alleges the same facts as replied to the first, and also sets forth the portions of the parts of the two townships, which portions were included in the new township, and avers the number of inhabitants and electors of the portions of those parts, which portions were not included in the new township; and also sets forth the part of Negaunee remaining in Marquette county, and left, by the new township act, without any township organization; and avers the number of inhabitants and electors of that part. To these replications a demurrer was interposed, and the principal questions in the case relate to the validity of the acts aforesaid. A. W. Buel, A. Pond, C. I. Walker and G. V. N. Lothrop, for the People. 1. The act of 1867 substantially violates the constitution in its letter and spirit, on the following grounds: a. It undertakes to make the new county a corporation without giving it any corporate power to act, or accomplish any end or purpose whatever.- Const. Art. 10, § 1. b. It makes no provision for the election of county officers; nor for a judiciary; nor could a board of supervisors exist under its provisions. THE PEOPLE V. MAYNARD. C. The constitutional right of suffrage and voting in all elections, with power and means for exercising such right, is taken from the electors. The position that the county act is unconstitutional is fully sustained by the following cases.-2 Gray, 84; 20 N. Y. 447; 30 Barb. 349; 11 Mich. 63. d. It makes no provision for organized townships, and without which the new county can never act, or exercise or assert the smallest right or power. 2. The county act, if not unconstitutional, is, at least, inoperative and void. 3. The township act does not aid the county act, to render it constitutional or operative. Levi Bishop, for respondent. 1. The act of February 15, 1867, is not void, because it did not provide all the details for holding elections in the county of Washington. It is a general rule in this country that there are no limits upon the legislative power of a state, except such as are created by the federal or the state constitution. The legislative body represents the sovereign power of the people.-20 Wend. 381; 27 Barb. 593; Smith's Com. 236309; 1 Mich. 295, 306, 307; 5 Id. 251; 13 Id. 127, 481. A statute can not be declared void on the ground that it violates the fundamental principles of republican government, unless it comes clearly in conflict with some express constitutional provisions.-4 Mich. 244; 13 Id. 481. The act does not take away the elective franchise, or change the qualifications of voters. It simply creates or re-arranges the boundaries of certain municipal corporations. It does not violate any principles of free government, and it would not be void if it did.-4 Mich. 244; 13 Id. 481. A township which has not all the full details of an ordinary town organization may be still a body corporate |