common carriers upon their canals, and to make equal charges accordingly.

The proprietors of docks have also a power, under various acts of Parliament, to enforce the payment of duties in consideration of the benefits which those easements confer upon the public. The same observation is here again applicable, as in the case of canal tolls, namely, that the particular statute must be consulted upon each occasion, in order to settle disputes as to the duties. And as they impose a rate upon the subject, the principle is, that they shall receive a strict construction. A ship cleared outwards from Liverpool to St. Domingo; she discharged her cargo at the latter place, and reloaded for London; there she discharged that cargo also, and sailed for Liverpool with a third cargo, loaden at London. Upon her arrival at Liverpool, the question was, whether she should pay dockage duties according to the St. Domingo or the London rate. The action was brought to recover 241. 8s. 9d., being the difference between the two rates, and the clauses upon which the Court had occasion to form their judgment, were the sixth and seventh sections of the Liverpool Dock Act.(k) By the sixth section, all vessels arriving at the port of Liverpool, and trading inwards, were declared liable to pay the dockage rates, according to the rates payable from the most distant port, or place, from which they should so trade, to Liverpool.

The seventh section, regulating the tonnage rate for one *arrival

[*314] and one departure of each ship, ordained, that such payment

should take place "without any regard to any intermediate ports between which she may have traded whilst absent from Liverpool; but that such tonnage rate should, in every such case, be charged upon every such ship, upon the most distant voyage to which such ship should have traded."

The Court, after considering the effect of these sections, in connection with others relating to the subject, were of opinion, that no other than the London duty was payable. They thought that the provision respecting the most distant port, was applicable to cases where the ship traded from more places than one in the same voyage, as if the ship in question had brought goods to Liverpool from St. Domingo as well as London. There would have then been a means of comparing the distance between different ports. Then, with reference to the seventh clause, it will be best understood by comparing it with the preceding; and the meaning of both combined is, that where a vessel trades from different places, by loading partly at one place, and partly at another, and bringing home the aggregate produce of these distinct ladings, the rate is payable according to the most distant of these places. The entire cargo was from London, and the London duty could only be demanded.(7)

(k) 51 G. 3, c. 143. (Local and Personal).

(7) 5 M. & S. 323, The Trustees of the Liverpool Docks v. Gladstone and another.

If a duty be imposed in respect of the same voyage out and home, and a ship come home from another port, and then sail again to a foreign port, the duty is payable on both occasions, because there are two distinct voyages. Thus, a ship was built in Devonshire, and registered at Liverpool. She cleared out from Bristol to St. Vincent, and arrived from thence at the port of Liverpool. This was her first arrival there, and she paid the duties inwards. After making several voyages, she at length cleared outwards, with a cargo for Madeira and Jamaica; and the collector of the dock duties, against whom the action was brought, demanded and received the duty, upon her so clearing outwards. When she returned, the duty in wards was not demanded; but upon the next outward voyage it was again demanded, and paid under protest. The questions were, whether any duty were payable, except upon ships coming inwards; and then, whether the voyage out were not to be connected with the last preceding voyage inwards. The clause of the statute was, that the duties were to be paid at the time of the ship's discharge either inwards or outwards, so as no ship should be subject or liable to pay the duty but once for the same voyage both out and home, notwithstanding such ship* may [*315] go out and return back with a lading of any goods or merchandize. The Court of King's Bench held, upon error from the Common Pleas, that the duty was demandable in respect of the outward voyage, and the preceding inward voyage could not be united with the next outward, as it had been contended, and, indeed, decided, in the Court below. To be sure, there should be only one payment for each voyage; for a Liverpool ship might carry a cargo out, and bring another home, and other ships might bring a cargo in, and take another out; but here were two distinct voyages. Equally so it was, that the ship, although she used the port only inwards, was liable to pay whole duties upon one voyage; whereas, had she used it outwards and inwards, no more payment would have been demanded. The act imposed one entire duty upon each voyage if there were either an inward or outward cargo; and if both, there was to be no advance; and if one, still the ship was to pay full duty. The judgment of the Common Pleas was reversed. (m) In point of fact, therefore, the ship in question, which was a Liverpool ship, being registered there, had made one entire voyage when she returned from St. Vincent; and the duties outwards might have been legally demanded from her, upon her next voyage outwards. These duties, when assigned by virtue of the act of Parliament, are not mere chattels, but charges upon the docks; and it was accordingly held, that the auctioneer could not be called upon to pay the duty upon them, when sold in any other light than as interests in land.(n)

A vessel cleared out at Hull, with a cargo of goods for Mogadore. There she took in another cargo for London. She discharged this cargo at London, and took in a third cargo for Hull. Here the vessel was

(m) 11 East, 675, Gildhart v. Gladstone and others, in error. Taunt. 97. S. C. in C. P.

(n) 8 Price, 180, Rex v. Winstanley.

held to have made two distinct voyages, and she did not fall within the exemption "from the payment of the same port or toll duties more than once for the same voyage out and home, notwithstanding such ship or vessel might go out and return with a lading of goods or merchandize."(0)

If the act of Parliament which regulates the amount of duty should not apply to all the services which are rendered by a dock company, there may be an extra compensation agreed on by convention between the parties. This is consistent with the principle, that persons who have done acts for the benefit of *commercial men should be recom[*316] pensed for so doing; and the compensation is in the nature of a toll traverse. Two actions for money had and received were brought against the defendant, as treasurer of the West India Company. The money had been paid to the officers of the company, for the wharfage, and shipping goods into lighters sent into the docks by the plaintiffs, for that purpose. The company contended, on the one hand, that they were only bound, in consideration of the rates and duties received upon importation of the goods, to deliver them, free of further charge, from their warehouses, into inland carriages. The plaintiffs insisted that they had a right, for the same compensation, to receive the goods from their warehouses, across the quays, and by means of the cranes, then into their lighters, and thus to remove them by water as well as land carriage. The clause of the statute had these words:- -"Which rates or duties, &c., shall be accepted and taken for and in respect of the use and conveniency of the said docks, &c., and all charges of delivering the same from the said warehouses." The Court gave judgment for the plaintiffs, observing, that the mode of delivery should be left to the election of the owner of the goods. With respect to any extraordinary trouble being incurred by the company, in the case of water carriage rather than by land conveyance, it did not appear that the Legislature looked particularly, much less solely, to the delivery by land, when the compensation came to be considered. More, however, than the mere act of safe delivery, the Court added, could not be claimed at the hands of the company; the owner of the goods was not warranted in prolonging or interrupting their passage from the warehouse to the lighter, nor need the company, after such delay, again proceed with the goods. In such a case, the company might be entitled to an ulterior compensation.(p) Upon another occasion, an action was brought against the treasurer of the West India Dock Company, for wharfage and porterage of certain rope and tar. The ship of the plaintiffs, the owners, had arrived in the docks from the West Indies, and had paid her tonnage duty, pursuant to the statute. Having unloaded her cargo, she entered the company's dock for light ships. The rope and tar were sent to the docks, for the use of the ship, and placed upon the company's wharf, and thence they were shipped by the plaintiffs servants. Previously, however, to their being shipped, demands of 2d. and 6d. respectively, for wharfage and porterage, in respect of the rope and tar,

(0) 2 Chit. Rep. 597, Kingston-upon-Hull Dock Company v. Huntington. (p) 8 East, 16, Harden v. Smith, Schroeder v. the same.

were made; they were the usual charges, and they were reasonable, if any liability to pay them at all existed. The words of the statute,(g) which gave ships in the light *docks permission to remain there [*317] for six months, were these :-"Together with the use of the light dock, for any time not exceeding six months, from the time of unloading such ship." The plaintiffs contended, that they could not be said to have the use of the light dock for their ship, if they, were liable to be charged, under the name of wharfage and porterage, for all the necessary stores passed over the quays and wharfs, for the use of the ship; without which she could not be kept in repair, or fitted out for any other voyage. The Court took the distinction to lie between stores shipped as necessaries, for the present use and security of the ship, while lying in the dock, and such as were for her future use, as part of her outfit. With regard to the former, the ship would be entitled to receive them on board, free from any additional charge beyond the tonnage rate; but if the stores were intended as part of the outfit, the Court expressed themselves satisfied that the company were not restrained from charging wharfage and porterage, as for other merchandize shipped for the outward-bound voyage.(r) Another dispute arose subsequently between the same parties. It was tried in assumpsit against the treasurer, for 1697. Os. 6d., incurred in pumping the ship and unloading the cargo, and in coopering and providing hoops and nails in the course of the unloading. It appeared, that when the ship entered the basin she was so leaky, that it was necessary to keep the pumps at work, for the preservation of the cargo; and for that purpose, either to retain the crew on board, or to hire labourers to work the pumps. The ship thus not being in a condition to wait her turn to be quayed and unloaded by rotation in the import dock, the cargo was unloaded into lighters in the outward dock; in doing which, certain cooperage was required. The cargo was subsequently unladen from the lighters, upon the proper quays, by the dock company. For the expenses of hiring labourers at the pumps, the hire of the lighters, and the cooperage, and for delivering the cargo, the crew having been discharged, the action in question was brought, the company having refused to bear such expenses. The Court was so clear in favour of the defendants, that Lord Ellenborough called upon the plaintiff's counsel, and asked if he could contend, that a ship in such a leaky condition as this was, was to be nursed by the company, as though the docks were an hospital for infirm ships. The Court considered that the company had made a very fair defence. In extreme cases, three commissioners of the customs were empowered to enable ships coming with cargoes of West India produce to *unload elsewhere than in the docks; but that alleviation does not [*318] enable the company to break it upon the rotation required by the act in the unloading of ships within the docks. Besides, to permit the present action would be to open a door to great frauds.

delivered to the defendant.(s)

(g) 39 G. 3, c. 69, s. 137.

(r) 11 East, 533, Blackett and another v. Smith.

The postea was

12 East, 518, Blackett and another v. Smith, Treasurer of the West Indea Dock Company.

The term "port," is used in its popular sense when the limits of a place liable to the burden of dock duties require a legal construction. Therefore, Goole, which is without the port of Hull, was held not liable to such duties, although Goole and Hull might be considered as a district for the purposes of revenue.(t) But a vessel proceeding with a cargo, taken in at Goole, to Hull, is liable at Hull for tonnage. (u)

Having now shewn that rights of water may be occasionally liable to tolls, we proceed to mention some other rates or charges to which they are also subject. The principal of these are, rates for the relief of the poor, and tithes,—or, more properly speaking, the rent-charge now payable in lieu of tithes. Canal, and other such tolls, are included in this summary, because they spring from the enjoyment of water. But inasmuch as the principle upon which rating proceeds, is the contribution of the visible profits of land to the service of the poor, a mere passage over water cannot, necessarily, be obnoxious to such a demand; and therefore, rights of navigation may be laid out of the present inquiry.(v) But this exemption will not extend to fisheries which the owner of the soil possesses, nor to canal tolls, nor to waterworks, or dock companies; for profits may be derivable from each of these properties, as connected with a right of soil; and they have been, consequently, to a certain extent, deemed rateable. Now again, to watercourses; for their value, as connected with the occupation of mills, is self-evident; and, independently of that, they may be rated for the #advantages which they confer upon [*319] their owners, as so much land covered with water: the legal subject of the rate being the soil itself.

Insomuch, that in a case where no money profit was derived from a reservoir, the commissioners were, nevertheless, held to have been properly rated. Certain commissioners of reservoirs, at Huddersfield had power given them to borrow money, in order to compensate the owners of mills, and for taking water. One reservoir was for the mill owners, and one for the town of H. The water rents were applied to the expenses, though it did not appear that the mill owners paid any thing, and no profit was derivable from the reservoirs. The sessions quashed the rate, but the Court discerned a visible advantage in this property,

Gold and silver were held not to be included under the head of " metals," where duties were imposed on copper, brass, pewter and tin, and other metals. 2 B. & Adol. 592, Casker v. Holmes.

(t) 2 B. & Adol. 43, Kingston-upon-Hull Dock Company v. Brown.

(u) 4 Id. 178, Hull Dock Company v. Priestley. S. C. 1 Nev. & M. 85; under 42 G. 3, c. xci. s. 44. Secus, if a vessel come from Leeds, above Goole, and only pass the entrance into Goole. S. C.

(v) However, the owners of the ships are rateable to that parish in which the ships lie, if the port be their home. 4 T. R. 771, Rex v. White; and see 8 East, 451, R. v. Jones. But if the ship is never locally within the parish, the rate does not attach. 1 B. & Adol. 109, R. v. Shepherd.