from assessment. The order of session quashing the rate was confirmed.(g) The Hull Dock Company were empowered to make a basin or dock, wharves, &c., and to take tolls, in respect of the same. The Port of Hull consists of the River Hull or harbour, and part of the Humber, neither being the property of the dock company, and of three docks and a basin, the property of the company. All vessels frequenting the port, pass through that portion of the Humber which is within the Port of Hull. They pay tonnage and are divided into:-1. Those vessels which discharge their cargo in the Humber, without entering the River Hull, basin, or docks. 2 Those which discharge their cargo in the Hull without entering the basin or docks. 3. Those using the basin without using the docks. 4. Those passing through the Hull into the docks. 5. Those passing through the basin into the docks. All the tonnage dues are collected at the custom house. The Court held the company not rateable upon the 1st and 2nd classes, but that they were liable in respect of the rest. (r) It was contended that a company were liable to be rated in regard of the improved value of their land under the following circumstances. There were two acts applicable to their canal. The first declared, that the lands and buildings they occupied should be rated as if they were the property of individuals in their natural capacity. The second directed the imposi tion of assessments in each parish through which the canal flowed, in proportion to the length of the canal and cuts respectively. The session confirmed a rate assessing the company at the improved value, notwithstanding the first statute; and upon appeal, the counsel in support of the rate contended that 1st, as land is rated according to its improved value when in the hands of individuals, and as the improved value in the present case was the toll, the company could not be otherwise rated; 2ndly, that as the rates were to be levied according to the length of the canal in each parish, the distribution must be with reference to the tolls. But the Court were against the rate; they thought the statutes quite intelligible per se, the first meaning, that the land should be rated as if it remained in the hands of individual farmers for the ordinary purposes of agriculture; *and the second, that the rate should be apportioned between [*326] the different parishes, without varying the extent of the company's liability.(s) Mr. Justice Abbott said too, that there was another objec (g) 2 Ad. & El. 551, R. v. Barneby Dun. S. C. 4 Nev. & M. 436. (s) 1 B. & A. 289, The King against The Company of Proprietors of the Grand Junction Canal. S. P. 5 East, 325, The King against The Leeds and Liverpool Canal Company. S. P. 6 B. & C. 720, Rex v. The Regent's Canal Company. By the act of Parliament regulating this latter canal, wharfs were ordered to be rated to the relief of the poor. The company had a piece of land adjoining the private yard of a timber merchant. It was merely natural ground, and there was no building or erection made there so as to constitute a wharf in the ordinary sense. Upon this land the timber merchant landed his timber. He paid no rent of any sort for it, but the rates and duties of the company were increased by the use of the easement of landing. The court held, that this was not a wharf within the meaning of the act, and so not liable to be rated. tion to the rate, inasmuch as it was imposed on the canal, and not on the rates, duties, and personal estate of the company, as provided by the act. But although they might impose rates in an amended form, the learned Judge added, that they could not ultimately succeed, for the reasons above referred to.(t) Again, a canal act directed, that the company should be rated to all parochial taxes in respect of their lands, in the same proportion as other lands lying near the same should be rated, if in the hands of individuals in their natural capacity. And a subsequent act relating to the same canal, after re-enacting the above provisions, went on to say, that the company might agree with any owner of lands adjoining their lands, taken for the purpose of the navigation, for an exemption from all rates in respect of such last-mentioned lands, so as to charge the same upon the adjoining lands; in which case the rates should be charged upon the adjoining lands, according to the agreement, and then the lands belonging to the navigation were to be held exempted and discharged. Upon this it was contended, notwithstanding the former decision, that the tolls were to be taken into consideration in fixing the rate, the first statute being only confirmatory of what the common law would have directed, namely, that the rate should be equally laid upon all the property assessed. It was further argued, that the latter statute repealed the first, inasmuch as the words "as the same would be rateable if they were the property of individuals in their natural capacity," were there omitted. The first point was merely to call for a revision of the former opinion of the Court, and they declare themselves satisfied, as to that, with their original decision which we have just cited. As to the second, the Court observed, that had the Legislature intended any repeal, it would have been expressed in unambiguous language. The power given was to make specific bargains for the purchase of lands exempt from rates, and to shift the rates from lands taken by the company, placing them upon other lands in the hand of individual *proprietors. Then the value at [*327] the time of the sale would remain the rateable value, and there was no reason for supposing that a different rate would be payable in the absence of any such bargain.(u) To the same effect is R. v. the Chelmer and Blackwater Navigation Company.(v) By an act for making a navigable communication between two places therein mentioned, a company was formed, and authorized to purchase lands, &c., for the use of the navigation, and to make and maintain the same. The act then directed, that the company should be rated and charged to all Parliamentary and parochial taxes, rates, and assessments for any lands to be purchased or taken, or warehouses or other buildings to be erected by them, in pursuance of that act, in the same proportion as other lands and buildings adjoining to or lying near the same, were or should be rated or charged. It was held, that the com (t) 1 B. & A. 298. (u) 5 B. & C. 476. The King against The Inhabitants of St. Peter the Great, in the county of Worcester. S. C. 3 D. & R. 331. (v) 2 B. & Adol. 14. To the same effect. 7 Ad. & El. 671, R. v. Leeds and Liverpool Canal Company. S. C. 2 Nev. & P. 540. MAY, 1853.-20 pany were liable to be rated for their lands and buildings at the same value as other adjacent lands and buildings, and not according to the improved value derived from their being used for the purposes of navigation. So where there were similar provisions in a canal act, followed by a local and personal act, which directed a fair and equal assessment generally, and then the County Rate Act directed that a fair and equal county rate should be made according to the full and fair annual value of property; it was held, that the county rate was a parochial tax within the first act; that the first act was not repealed by either of the others, and, therefore, that the company were not liable to be assessed at an increased value. There was no power to make a distinct rate. (w) The land occupied by the original line of the canal is to be rated as land, without reference to its use as a canal. The lands mean the land of the canal covered with water. And the branches of the canal are to to be considered as part of the whole navigation.(x) Wharfs erected by a company are to be rated according to their annual letting value.(y) ̧ The London Dock Company were assessed for property in the sum of 9757.; it was a rate of 1s. 3d. in the pound upon 15,600 annual value. The sessions reduced the rate to 1397. 88. 7d. *In pursuance of [*328] an act of Parliament, a basin, a large dock, quay, &c., had been erected by the company, and had been so far completed, as to be fit and proper for the reception of certain goods. Works were also proceeding so as to complete the undertaking with the greatest possible expedition. The company had paid from Midsummer, 1801, until the making of the rate appealed against, 1397. 8s. 7d. quarterly, being calculated on the old premises which the company had destroyed, and being at the rate of 84d. in the pound per quarter upon 3,9667., the average rental calculated upon the ten years preceding the act of Parliament, and the rate appealed against being at the rate of 1s. 3d. in the pound upon a rental of 15,6007. The Court, held, that the assessment appealed against was bad, being at a higher rate than the Legislature had warranted, but that the sessions were also wrong, because they had reduced the sum to what a rate of 8d. in the pound would produce upon a rental of 3,9667., instead of reducing it to what a rate of 8d. in the pound would produce on a rental of 15,600. This latter sum the Court assumed to be the fair rental of the productive work.(z) If a canal be used, the profits arising therefrom are rateable; a compensation duty was, therefore, considered as liable, where one company permitted another to have the enjoyment of their water. The Oxford Canal Company were authorized to take a certain mileage duty. The Grand (w) 4 Railw. Ca. 315, R. v. Aylesbury Inhabitants. (x) R. v. Leeds and Liverpool Canal Company, ut supra. (z) 9 East, 127, Rex v. St. George, Middlesex Inhabitants. question, 39 & 40 G. 3, c. 47. (y) S. C. See the statute in Junction Canal was created by a subsequent act, and as the proprietors of the Oxford Canal considered that the new company would be prejudicial to them, it was arranged, that an indemnity should be made them as a compensation for the supposed injury. Instead of the mileage duty payable to the Oxford Canal Proprietors, they were authorized to take so much per ton for coals and other goods which should pass from the Oxford into the intended new canal, or visa versa, or from any other navigable canal through the Oxford into the new canal, without any regard to the distance the same should pass upon the Oxford Canal. The Oxford Canal Company were rated in respect of this compensation rate, and the court held, that they were not liable to be assessed. It was attempted, in argument on their behalf, to shew, that the compensation was merely for passing in and out of the canal, that the tolls became due for the use of the sluice, and so rateable only in the parish of Braunston where the sluice is situate. But Mr. Justice Bayley said, that there was a fallacy in those premises, for the compensation was given in regard of the use of the canal, not for passing into it or out of it. In point of fact, although called a compensation duty, this was a rate for coals passing along the canal.(a) [*329] Having now shewn that canal, dock, and water companies are rateable, but that they may be exempted by acts of Parliament, having shewn the force and extent of these exemptions, together with the construction of the local statutes which apply to the subject, it remains to point out more particularly the place where the rate is to be made, and the proportions must be attended to in distributing it. There is this difference between a sluice and a navigation in the former case the proprietor must contribute to the relief of the poor in that parish where the sluice is situate, but in the latter the land is to be rated to the relief of the poor of that parish where it is productive of profit to the proprietor, and in proportion to that profit, which may be considered as in the nature of a rent received by the proprietor for the use of his land within the parish. (b) It was formerly holden, that the tolls of a canal navigation were assessable in the parish where they became due, upon the completion of the voyage.(c) But the decisions took place be (a) 4 B. & C. 76, The King against The Company of Proprietors of the Oxford Canal Navigation. See also 10 B. & C. 163, R. v. Oxford Canal Company, where the liabilities of the company were further settled. The trustees of the London Bridge Works were held liable under the Riot Act, 1 G. 1, st. 2, c. 5, s. 6, on the ground that all persons having personal property within the district assessed were rateable as inhabitants, whether resiants or not, and the Court of Exchequer Chamber, which reversed the judgment of the Court of King's Bench declared the construction of this statute to be widely different from that of the 43 Eliz. The Riot Act speaks of ability in general, and not of specified property as liable to the Caldec. 15, Atkins and others v. Davies. rate. (b) 1 B. & C. 550, by Abbott, C. J., Cowp. 581, Rex v. Cardington Inhabitants. The sluices were local and visible property, producing profit within the parish. (c) 2 T. R. 660, Rex v. Aire and Calder Navigation. 4 T. R. 543, Rex v. Page. 1 Nolan's Poor Laws, 107, S. C. 8 T. R. 340, Rex. v. Staffordshire and Worcestershire Canal Navigation. 5 East, 325, Rex v. Leeds and Liverpool Canal Com pany. fore the case of Rex v. Nicholson (d) was determined, and in which the Court resolved that tolls per se were not rateable. And R. v. Nicholson was recognised in a subsequent case, where the Court decided that tolls per se were not rateable. (e) It therefore became necessary to adopt a new rule, because, although some rateability must be incurred at the place where the voyage finishes, there being the use of the canal at that spot, yet the proportion would be highly unequal, estimating the rateability as arising from the occupation of land according to the modern cases. [*330] And therefore canal tolls are now deemed to be rateable in every parish through which the canal passes in respect of the land there situate, and so used for the canal. This was, in effect, only reconciling the principle of cases concerning canals with that which respects other rateable properties. For the difficulty originally was, how to rate tolls quà tolls; as soon as it was held that tolls per se were not rateable, the original principle of rateability in respect of land became extended. Thus it had been resolved, that the tolls arising from a sluice were rateable in the parish where it was erected, although the proprietor resided elsewhere, and the tolls were collected in another parish.(f) Some years afterwards, a barge-way and toll-gate in the Hamlet of Hampton Wick, which had been purchased by the City of London, were rated to the relief of the poor in that hamlet, for such part of the tolls as became due there, the tolls being collected in another parish; and it was contended, that the corporation were not rateable, on the ground that if so, they might be rated for the same tolls in each of the several districts through which the river passed; and it was added, that it would be impossible to ascertain the exact proportion which might become due in each. But the Court held, that the corporation was rateable; true it was, they were not called on to say how much the city should be taxed in one parish, or how much in another, for the city had, in fact, the ownership and inheritance of the soil, the subject-matter of the rate; and they confirmed the order of sessions.(g) Now, here the principle respecting land was clearly recognised, and the only difference between this and cases on canal navigation would be, that the canal is rateable in proportion along its whole line, as we shall proceed to prove. The principle was more clearly adopted in a case where the Corpora→ tion of Bath were assessed, as occupiers of certain springs and reservoirs. An act of Parliament gave them authority to convey water from the springs in the neighbourhood to the city. The Court held, that they were not only liable to be rated in respect to these springs, but also for the reservoirs made by them in the neighbouring parishes, as for land (d) 12 East, 330. (e) 6 M. & S. 400, R. v. St. Mary's Leicester. Nolan, 90, R. v. Canal Naviga tion. (f) Cowp. 581, Rex v. Cardington Inhabitants. (g) 4 T. R. 21, the King against The Mayor, &c. of London. |