and thus the machine of justice moved with a constant and equal celerity, while his regulating influence operated on all its parts.

But if the assiduity and diligence of judges, in studying the causes that come before them, is the first requisite towards the dispatch of business, the next essential concern is, that these causes shall be decided with brevity, and that the time which is appropriated to giving judgment be not consumed in superfluous reasonings, or that species of wavering debate, which equally retards procedure, and diminishes the respect and dignity of the court. There is no doubt that the reasoning of judges upon the bench, is of excellent effect, when seasoned by that discretion which is fitted to impress an audience with reverence for the wisdom and solemnity of the tribunal. And of this we have daily examples in the supreme court of this country. The arguments of the judges are often replete with instruction to the bar. In many cases, to which, from their circumstantiate nature, neither the written nor the consuetudinary law is directly appli cable, these are the Responsa Prudentum which supply that unavoidable deficiency. They are, moreover, a criterion to the public, both of the abilities of judges, and of their attention to the duties of their office. But, still, it must be admitted, that there is much danger in allowing too great latitude to judicial reasonings. Besides the delay of business, there is a hazard that that warmth of argument, against which even the wisest and most dispassionate of men cannot at all times guard themselves, should diminish the reverence due to the court, and even the authority of its decisions; for those judgments can assuredly have but little. weight which are known to be the result of a war of contradictory ideas. In a tribunal composed of many judges, there must of course be a frequent diversity of opinion; but it is not always desirable that the grounds of those different opinions should be publicly canvassed. It is with the wisdom of a court, as it is with personal beauty, (the observation of one of the ablest judges of human nature), the form upon the whole, when surveyed at its proper distance, may be consummately graceful: but it is not expedient to examine it by too near an approach, or to analyse too minutely its particular features.

Such were known to be the sentiments of that great judge, whose character we are now attempting to delineate; and corresponding to these sentiments was his own conduct upon the

k Clarendon.

bench. He very rarely entered into a laboured argument on the whole grounds of a cause; much less into an examination or confutation of the opinions delivered by his brethren. He limited himself to a short and solemn enunciation of his own opinion, which he generally supported by a very few reasons, on which he apprehended the decision ought to rest. His manner of speaking was firm and authoritative; his language forcible though unadorned in its structure; and, seeking not to please, but to convince, he disregarded those graces of elocution which the orator may frequently find of use to palliate error, but which the judge needs seldom to employ, who is desirous only of inculcating truth.

He maintained, with great strictness, all the forms of the court in the conduct of business. These he wisely considered as essential, both to the equal administration of justice, and as the outworks which guard the law against those too common, but most unworthy artifices which are employed to prostitute and abuse it.

To the bar, he conducted himself with uniform attention and respect. He listened with patience to the reasonings of the counsel. He never anticipated the arguments of the pleader, nor interrupted him with questions to shew his own acuteness; but left every man to state his cause in his own way; nor did he ever interfere, unless to restrain what was either manifestly foreign to the subject, or what wounded, in his apprehension, the dignity of the court. In this last respect he was most laudably punctilious. He never suffered an improper word to escape, either from the tongue or pen of a counsel, without the severest animadversion : and so acute was that feeling which he was known to possess of the respect that was due to the bench, that there were but few occasions when it became necessary for him to express it.

There were indeed other occasions, on which his feelings were most keenly awakened, and on which he gave vent to a becoming spirit of indignation He treated with the greatest severity every instance, either of malversation in the officers of the law, or of chicanery in the inferior practitioners of the court. No calumnious or iniquitous prosecution, no attempt to pervert the forms of law to the purposes of oppression, ever eluded his penetration, or escaped his just resentment.

Thus, perpetually watchful, and earnestly solicitous to maintain both the dignity and the rectitude of that supreme tribunal over which he presided, the influence of these endeavours ex

tended itself to every inferior court of judicature; as the motion of the heart is felt in the remotest artery. In reviewing the sentences of inferior judges, he constantly expressed his desire of supporting the just authority of every rank and order of Magistrates; but these were taught, at the same time, to walk with circumspection, to guard their conduct with the most scrupulous exactness, and to dread the slightest deviation from the narrow path of their duty.

With these endowments of mind, and high sense of the duties of his office, it is not surprising, that amidst all the differences of sentiment which the jarring interests of individuals, or the more powerful influence of political faction, give rise to, there should be but one opinion of the character of this eminent man, which is, that from the period of the institution of that court over which he presided, however conspicuous in particular departments might have been the merit of some of his predecessors, no man ever occupied the President's chair, who combined in himself so many of the essential requisites for the discharge of that important office.

But it is not the intention of the writer of this account to present a faultless picture. Nothing, in fact, is of so little value as indiscriminate panegyric; nothing so empty and insignificant as his praise who shews that he is blind to imperfections. If we allow the merits of this great man, in possessing, in their utmost extent, the most essential requisites for the station which he filled, it is but a small derogatiou from the confessed eminence of his character, when we acknowledge a deficiency in some subordinate qualities.

Of these, what was chiefly to be regretted, and was alone wanting to the perfection of his mental accomplishments, was, that he appeared to give too little weight or value to those studies which are properly termed literary. This was the more remarkable in him, that in the early period of his life he had prosecuted himself those studies with advantage and success. In his youth, he had made great proficiency in classical learning; and his memory retaining faithfully whatever he had once acquired, it was not unusual with him, even in his speeches on the bench, to cite, and to apply with much propriety, the most striking passages of the ancient authors. But for these studies, though qualified to succeed in them, it does not appear that he ever possessed a strong bent or inclination. If he ever felt it, the weightier duties of active life, which he was early called to exercise, precluded the

opportunity of frequently indulging it; and perhaps even a knowledge of the fascinating power of those pursuits, in alienating the mind from the severer, but more necessary occupations, might have inclined him at last to disrelish from habit, what it had taught him at first to resist from principle.

That this principle was erroneous, it is unnecessary to consume time in proving. It is sufficient to say, that as jurisprudence can never hope for any material advancement as a science, if separated from the spirit of philosophy, so that spirit cannot exist, independent of the cultivation of literature.

That the studies of polite literature, and an acquaintance with the principles of general erudition, while they improve the science, add lustre and dignity to the profession of the law, cannot be denied. So thought all the greatest lawyers of antiquity. So thought, among the moderns, that able judge and most accomplished man, of whose character we have traced some imperfect features, Lord Arniston, the father of the late Lord President; of which his inaugural oration, as it stands upon the records of the Faculty of Advocates, bears ample testimony.'

His son, it is true, afforded a strong proof, that the force of natural talents alone may conduct to eminence and celebrity. He was rich in native genius, and therefore felt not the want of acquired endowments. But in this he left an example to be admired, not imitated. Few inherit from nature equal powers with his; and even of himself it must be allowed, that if he was a great man without the aids of general literature, or of cultivated taste, he must have been still a greater, had he availed himself of those lights which they furnish, and that improvement which they bestow.

1 "From his first entry into the Faculty, he could say he knew, and observed it with pleasure, as it tended greatly to their honour, that there was no science, or part of polite and useful learning, for the knowledge of which some in the Faculty were not distinguished, perhaps equally with those who made the several parts of those sciences their principal and particular profession. And he hoped he would be excused for recommending to them, and to all young gentlemen that might afterwards enter among them, to be at pains to maintain and preserve that character and reputation they had long held, and still possessed, not only for the knowledge of the Civil or Roman and Municipal Laws, and the constitution of their country, but of the other valuable branches of learning, that are requisite to accomplish and adorn the character of gentlemen, and were indeed necessary to render them completely qualified for the exercise of their profession." Records of the Faculty of Advocates, Nov. 3, 1748.

This most useful and valuable life was terminated on the 13th of December 1787. His last illness, which though of short continuance was violent in its nature, he bore with the greatest magnanimity. He died in the seventy-fifth year of his age, in the perfect enjoyment of all his faculties; at a time, when his long services might have justly entitled him to ease and repose, but which the strong sense of his duty would not permit him to seek while his power of usefulness continued; at that period, in short, when a wise man would wish to finish his course; too soon indeed for the public good, but not too late for his own repu

tation.

The Right Hon. Robert Dundas, Lord President of the Court of Session in Scotland, and member of parliament for the county of Mid-Lothian, married twice; first, Elizabeth Watson, by whom he had issue,

The Right Honourable Robert Dundas, Lord President of the Court of Session, m and member of parliament for the county of Edinburgh, who, by his first marriage with Henrietta, daughter of Sir James Carmichael, Baillie of Lamington, had issue four daughters, viz. first, Elizabeth, married to Sir John Lockhart Ross, Bart.; second, Henrietta, married Adam, first Viscount Duncan, deceased, leaving issue the present Viscount Duncan, and other issue; third, Margaret, married General John Scott, of Balcomie; and, fourth, Anne, married George Buchan, of Kello, Esq.

By his second wife, Jane, daughter of William Grant, Esq. he had,

First, the present Right Hon. Robert Dundas, Lord Chief Baron of the Court of Exchequer in Scotland; married Elizabeth, daughter of Viscount Melville.

Second, Francis, a lieutenant-general in the army, and governor of Carrickfergus, married, and has issue.

Third, the Right Hon. William Dundas, one of the commissioners for the affairs of India.

m He was appointed his Majesty's Advocate for Scotland, October 31, 1789. The late Lord President Dundas was succeeded in that office by Sir Thomas Miller, of Glenlee, who, to the eminent loss of the public, and the sincere regret of all who knew him, died on September 27th, 1789. Upon that event Ilay Campbell, Esq. then Lord Advocate, was promoted to the Presidency of the Court of Session, and was succeeded in the office of Lord Advocate by Mr. Dundas,