rule touching the right of free speech, such an unintentional inclusion or incidental reference is too uncertain a support upon which to rest a deprivation of this vital privilege.

Fourth. There is no state statute upon which either this Court or the Supreme Court of Illinois could have relied in sustaining the injunction. Assuming that the Supreme Court of Illinois did declare the rule which this Court has adopted, in doing so it has not marked the limits of the rule with that clarity which should be a prerequisite to an abridgment of free speech. Nor do I believe that this Court, even if it should, has supplied that essential definiteness. What we are here dealing with is an injunction, and not a "statute narrowly drawn" to cover a situation threatening "imminent and aggravated danger." Speaking of a similar abridgment of constitutional rights where there was no guiding legislative act, we said in Cantwell v. Connecticut: "Violation of an Act exhibiting such a legislative judgment and narrowly drawn to prevent the supposed evil, would pose a question differing from that we must here answer. Such a declaration of the state's policy would weigh heavily in any challenge of the law as infringing constitutional limitations. Here, however, the judgment is based on a common law concept of the most general and undefined nature. . . . Here we have a situation analogous to a conviction under a statute sweeping in a great variety

'Illinois has an anti-injunction statute relating to matters involving labor disputes (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, chap. 48, § 2 (a)). The Supreme Court said that this statute was modeled on the federal Clayton Act (38 Stat. 738, 29 U. S. C. § 52). But the court held that the facts here did not constitute the type of "labor dispute" to which the act applied. 371 Ill. at 383-386; 21 N. E. 2d 308. Cf. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union v. Lake Valley Farm Products, 311 U. S. 91.

of conduct under a general and indefinite characterization, and leaving to the executive and judicial branches too wide a discretion in its application."" In the present case, the prohibition against the dissemination of information through peaceful picketing was but one of the many restraints imposed by the sweeping injunction. As to this one single element of the prohibitions a number of statements appear in the rule now formulated. On the one hand it is said that "dissociated acts of past violence" are not enough to forfeit the right of free speech. On the other hand a "background of violence" appears to be sufficient. Nor are any more definite standards or guides to be found in such clauses as "context of violence"; "entanglement with violence"; "coercive effect"; "taint of force"; and "coercive thrust." It is my apprehension that a rule embodying such broad generalizations opens up new possibilities for invasion of the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment.

Fifth. In my opinion the sweeping injunction here approved is justified by neither of the rules, and is not supported by the record.

For our purposes, in order to reach a proper conclusion as to just what is the sweep of the injunction, we must necessarily turn to the complaint, the answer, the evidence, the findings, and the decision and judgment of the Illinois courts. And whether the injunction will restrain the exercise of constitutional rights depends upon the effect it will have upon the minds of those whose freedom of expression might be abridged by its mandate. This effect in turn depends upon the language appearing upon the face of the injunction. By that language we must judge it. For this injunction does not run merely against lawyers who might give it a legalistic interpretation, but against laymen as well. Our question then '310 U. S. 296, 307–308.

becomes: To what extent will the layman who might wish to write about or discuss the prohibited subjects feel that he cannot do so without subjecting himself to the possibility of a jail sentence under a summary punishment for contempt? This injunction, like a criminal statute, prohibits conduct under fear of punishment. There is every reason why we should look at the injunction as we would a statute, and if upon its face it abridges the constitutional guaranties of freedom of expression, it should be stricken down. This is especially true because we must deal only with the federal question presented, which is whether petitioners have been denied their rights under the First Amendment. The injunction, like a statute, stands as an overhanging threat of future punishment. The law of Illinois has been declared by its highest court in such manner as to infringe upon constitutional guaranties. And by this injunction that law as actually applied abridges freedom of expression. Looking at the injunction, we find that under pain of future punishment by a trial judge all of the members of the petitioning union (about six thousand) are prohibited "From interfering, hindering or otherwise discouraging or diverting, or attempting to interfere with, hinder, discourage or divert persons desirous of or contemplating purchasing milk and cream or other products aforesaid, including the use of said signs, banners or placards, and walking up and down in front of said stores as aforesaid, and further preventing the deliveries to said stores of other articles which said stores sell through retail; [or] From threatening in any manner to do the foregoing acts; . . . ." It surely cannot be doubted that an act of the Illinois legislature, couched in this sweeping language, would be held invalid on its face.10 For this

10 Cf. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88; Carlson v. California, 310 U. S. 106. With a change of but one word, a passage from the Carlson case is directly applicable to the present case: "The sweep

language is capable of being construed to mean that none of those enjoined can, without subjecting themselves to summary punishment, speak, write or publish anything anywhere or at any time which the Illinois court-acting without a jury in the exercise of its broad power to punish for contempt "-might conclude would result in

ing and inexact terms of the [injunction] disclose the threat to freedom of speech inherent in its existence. It cannot be thought to differ in any material respect from the statute held void in Thornhill's case." 310 U. S. at 112.

And a comparison of the language of the statutes held invalid in the Thornhill and Carlson cases with that of the injunction here sustained is very revealing:

"go[ing] near to "walking up and down loiter [ing] in front of said stores about the prem- . . .; discouraging . . . ises or place of persons . . . contembusiness ...; in- plating purchasing ... fluencing . . . per- interfering, hindering, or sons not to trade

. . . divert[ing] . . . threatening or coercing

...

persons desirous of

.

. . .; picket [ing] any person. . .; the works or purchasing...; us[ing] display[ing] any banplace of business signs, banners or pla- ner . . . badge or sign cards . . . in front of in front of . . . any said stores . . .” place of business . . ."

"In Illinois, the power to punish summarily for contempt is said to be a broad "inherent" power of courts, "independent of statutory provisions" and of "constitutional grant." Schmidt v. Cooper, 274 Ill. 243, 250; 113 N. E. 641; People v. Peters, 305 Ill. 223, 226-227; 137 N. E. 118. And where a trial judge has ruled that conduct is or is not contempt, the appellate court will not interfere unless the trial judge's findings are "manifestly against the weight of the evidence" or "clearly and palpably contrary" to it. See Oehler v. Levy, 256 Ill. 178, 183; 99 N. E. 912; Boyden v. Boyden, 162 Ill. App. 77, 83; American Cigar Co. v. Berger, 221 Ill. App. 339, 341 (violation of injunction against picketing); id., 221 Ill. App. 332; Schmook v. Fane, 301 Ill. App. 626; 22 N. E. 2d 450 (violation of injunction against picketing). And where the trial court has determined the extent of

discouraging people from buying milk products of the complaining dairy. And more than that-if the language is so construed, those enjoined can be sent to jail if they even threaten to write, speak, or publish in such way as to discourage prospective milk purchasers. I find not even slight justification for an interpretation of this injunction so as to confine its prohibitions to conduct near stores dealing in respondent's milk. Neither the language of the injunction nor that of the complaint which sought the injunction indicates such a limitation. Mr. Justice Cardozo approved no such injunction as this in Nann v. Raimist, 255 N. Y. 307; 174 N. E. 690. In fact, he ordered expunged from the injunction those prohibitions which impaired "defendant's indubitable right to win converts over to its fold by recourse to peaceable persuasion, and to induce them by like methods to renounce allegiance to its rival."

now

But the injunction approved here does not stop at closing the mouths of the members of the petitioning union. It brings within its all-embracing sweep the spoken or written words of any other person "who may or hereafter. agree or arrange with them. So, if a newspaper should "agree or arrange" with all or some of those here enjoined to publish their side of the controversy, thereby necessarily tending to "discourage" the sale of cut-rate milk, the publishers might likewise be subject to punishment for contempt.2 Ordinarily the scope of the decree is cothe punishment to be inflicted, "courts of appellate jurisdiction will not interfere with the exercise of such discretion except for its abuse." Ash-Madden-Rae Co. v. International Ladies Garment Workers' Union, 290 Ill. 301, 306; 125 N. E. 258 (violation of injunction against picketing).

12 Cf. Cohen v. United States, 295 F. 633; Taliaferro v. United States, 290 F. 906, 214. Cohen, "the owner, editor, and publisher" of a newspaper, was convicted of contempt by the District Court under an injunction restraining "strikers and their sympathizers."