469 Opinion of the Court. N. R. A. Work Materials Div. (1936) Bulletin No. 53. Nystrom, Fashion Merchandising, p. 223. The plan is not monopolistic in character. There is no attempt to obtain the exclusive right or power to sell millinery in any market or part of a market. There is no attempt to concentrate the millinery industry or any part of it in the hands of a few. Everyone, whether a member of the Guild or not, may obtain the protection it affords. Anyone who can design a hat may compete for the common prize; and they do compete vigorously. All that the Guild asks is that they compete by their own skill and organization rather than by merely appropriating the skill and organization of others. XX Boston Law Rev. 365. The record shows no tendency to crowd anyone out of the industry. Our clients merely attempt to see to it that their own designs, and those of firms registering with them, be not filched and thereby ruined and that their competitors enjoy no unfair and unearned advantage. Solicitor General Biddle, with whom Assistant Attorney General Arnold and Messrs. Charles H. Weston and W. T. Kelley were on the brief, for respondent. MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents virtually the same issues as Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. Federal Trade Comm'n, ante, p. 457. Here, as in that case, the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a Federal Trade Commission decree ordering the petitioners to cease and desist from certain practices found to have been done in combination and to constitute "unfair methods of competition" tending to monopoly.1 1109 F. 2d 175. The members of the Guild involved in this case are designers and manufacturers of women's hats. Their Guild operates a plan modelled after that of the Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. It was stipulated by the parties that "The capacity, tendency, purpose, and result of the plan . . . and the acts and practices performed thereunder . . . have been, and now are, to restrain commerce by eliminating manufacturers of stylish hats . . . as to the outlets of their products and by limiting the retail dealers . . . as to their source of supply, and to deprive the public of the benefits, if any, of competition as to price or otherwise. among retailers of stylish hats in this respect . . ." Pursuant to the evidence and to the stipulation containing this statement, the Commission found that the effect of the plan was "unduly to hinder competition and to create monopoly in the sale of women's hats in interstate commerce." The respects in which the plan of the Millinery Creator's Guild differs from that of the Fashion Originators' Guild are not material, and need not be set out in detail. Nor need the findings of the Commission be enumerated here. The Commission did find that the Millinery Creator's Guild had tended to hinder competition and create monopoly "By depriving the public of the benefits of normal price competition among retailers of stylish hats for women," a finding not made in the other case, but the presence or absence of such a finding is not determinative here. On the authority of Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. Federal Trade Comm'n, the decision below is Affirmed. Syllabus. EDWARDS v. UNITED STATES. CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT. No. 377. Argued February 12, 1941.-Decided March 3, 1941. 1. To an indictment under the Securities and Mail Fraud Acts, and for conspiracy, based upon sales of securities issued by organizations alleged to have been created by the defendant as part of a fraudulent scheme, a plea in bar claiming immunity under the Securities Act sufficiently shows the incriminating character of the evidence produced under subpoena of the Securities and Exchange Commission by alleging that it concerned the identity of the accused and his relationship to the organizations "which are the subject matter of this prosecution" and concerned his personal entries, books and records "which are a part of the subject matter of this prosecution." P. 479. 2. The overruling of a plea in bar claiming immunity under the Securities Act because of testimony given before the Securities and Exchange Commission can not be justified upon the ground that the defendant failed to prove its allegations where the plea was accompanied by a motion for the production of the transcript of the testimony and both plea and motion showed that application for such transcript had been refused by the Commission. P. 480. It rested in the discretion of the trial court in this case to issue an order to show cause why the complete transcript should not be produced, if it deemed all of it necessary, or only so much of it as would fairly make it appear whether the testimony of the accused before the Commission was a proper foundation for the amnesty claimed. 3. Error of a trial court in overruling a plea of immunity under the Securities Act without ordering production of a transcript of testimony delivered by the defendant before the Securities and Exchange Commission, was not cured by an offer of the Government to produce the transcript at the trial, which the court declined, or by its subsequent production by the Government in the Circuit Court of Appeals. P. 481. 4. An appeal in a criminal case is to be heard on the record certified to the Circuit Court of Appeals. Criminal Appeals Rules VIII and IX. P. 482. 5. An objection to an indictment because in its endorsement as a true bill the foreman of the grand jury described himself as "Foreman" instead of "Foreman of the Grand Jury," held frivolous. P. 482. 6. A count charging sale of unregistered securities in violation of the Securities Act need not allege that they were not of the class exempted from registration by § 3 of the Act and the rules and regulations thereunder. P. 482. 7. The indictment in this case sufficiently showed the materiality of facts withheld from purchasers of the securities, in violation of the Securities Act, 15 U. S. C. 77q (a) (2). P. 483. 113 F.2d 286, reversed. CERTIORARI, 311 U. S. 632, to review a judgment affirming a sentence which was entered on a plea of nolo contendere after a demurrer and a plea in bar had been overruled. Mr. J. Forrest McCutcheon for petitioner. Mr. Richard H. Demuth, with whom Solicitor General Biddle and Messrs. Wendell Berge and M. Joseph Matan were on the brief, for the United States. MR. JUSTICE REED delivered the opinion of the Court. This case is here upon affirmance by the Circuit Court of Appeals of a sentence imposed after a plea of nolo contendere.' We granted certiorari because there were involved certain important questions of criminal procedure, especially with respect to a plea in bar filed by petitioner. That plea claimed immunity from prosecution because of prior incriminating testimony given under compulsion by the petitioner at an investigation conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission. The indictment against petitioner, in eleven counts, arose out of an alleged fraudulent scheme for selling in'113 F.2d 286. 473 Opinion of the Court. terests, created by him as a part of the device, in various oil and gas leases in Oklahoma and Texas. The first three counts charged violations of the fraud provisions of the Securities Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77q (a); the fourth and fifth, violations of the registration provisions of that Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77e; counts six to ten, violations of the mail fraud statute, 18 U. S. C. § 338; and the eleventh count, a conspiracy to commit the offenses previously set forth. On December 16, 1938, petitioner filed a demurrer, attacking the legal sufficiency of the indictment on a number of grounds. At the same time he filed a "Plea in Bar and Application for Production of Transcript of Evidence." The substance of this plea was the following: That on April 14, 1938, and two successive dates, pursuant to subpoenas duces tecum, petitioner had appeared before an officer of the Securities and Exchange Commission with the books and records called for, and "after having claimed his immunity against self incrimination, as provided by law and the Constitution of the United States, under compulsion, testified under oath, pursuant to various questions propounded and asked him by said officer of said Commission, said testimony concerning said defendant's identity and relationship to various trusts and organizations which are the subject matter of this prosecution and concerning divers and sundry other matters pertaining to the matters which are the subject of this prosecution, and particularly to the personal entries, books and records of said defendant, which are a part of the subject matter of this prosecution." The pleading goes on to state, upon information and belief, that the evidence adduced by the Commission in the course of its investigation was transmitted to the Attorney General for criminal prosecution; that petitioner was compelled to give information and testimony "which |