484

Opinion of the Court.

proper construction of the Federal Safety Appliance Acts required the ruling that Miller had a cause of action under the Safety Appliance Acts, cognizable in a court of law but not within the purview of the Compensation Law." Reliance was placed upon the Tipton case and Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co.15 which support the principle that interpretation of state statutes by state courts under compulsion of federal law erroneously understood does not bind federal courts.

16

It is not apparent to us, however, that the Miller opinion depends upon the compulsion of a misunderstanding of the Safety Appliance Acts. In McMahan v. Montour Railroad Co., it is true, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held the Compensation Act was the exclusive remedy for injuries to employees of interstate railroad highways, when the employees at the time of the injury were engaged in an intrastate movement. But that case was predicated upon an erroneous conception of the relation of the employee to interstate commerce. It was thought that only employees who were engaged in that commerce at the time of the accident were covered by the Safety Appliance Acts.17 Nothing was said as to the tribunal which might award relief in employments covered by the Safety Appliance Acts. This Court's citations on reversal dealt only with the scope of the federal acts, not with remedies under them.18 When the question next arose, in the Miller case, the Pennsylvania court undertook an interpretation of the scope of the coverage of the Workmen's Compensation Act. That act provides in § 302:

"(a) In every contract of hiring made after December thirty-first, one thousand nine hundred and fifteen, and

15 264 U. S. 109, 120.

16

17

283 Pa. 274; 128 A. 918.

Tipton v. Atchison Ry. Co., 298 U. S. 141, 148.

18 McMahon v. Montour Railroad Co., 270 U. S. 628.

Opinion of the Court.

312 U.S.

in every contract of hiring renewed or extended by mutual consent, expressed or implied, after said date, it shall be conclusively presumed that the parties have accepted the provisions of article three of this act, and have agreed to be bound thereby, unless there be . . ." (Article three is the compensation schedule.) There are no exceptions to this except the customary exemptions of domestic service or agriculture.19 In the Miller case, compensation coverage was refused employees of interstate roads engaged in intrastate activities in these words:

"Our Workmen's Compensation Act gave to a board exclusive jurisdiction of proceedings to adjudicate claims of employees, which, by consent, express or implied, it was agreed should be so disposed of, and, as to such cases, jurisdiction of the courts to try and determine is ousted. But as to demands, not arising from the ordinary relation of employer and employee, such as the enforcement of rights fixed by federal statute, their powers remain as if no such state legislation was in force." 20

Though there undoubtedly were other statements in the course of the opinion which reflect a misconception of the state's authority over procedure for recovery under the Safety Appliance Acts, we conclude that such misconception is not enough to call for a refusal to follow the Supreme Court's definite ruling that the state courts were open for redress for accidents covered by the Safety Appliance Acts.

21

State Tax Commission v. Van Cott, relied upon to support the conclusion reached below, is not controlling. In that case a direct review of the question decided by the state court was sought here on the ground that the state's conclusion on a matter of construction of a state

income tax statute was controlled by the decisions of this Court on the taxability by states of salaries of federal employees. It was not clear to us whether the state decision was controlled by the state court's view of our decisions or not. And, as our decisions at the time of review here permitted a decision by the state court on the state statute, free from federal constraint, we returned the case for state action. In the Van Cott case we were reviewing an application of federal law by a state court to a solution of a state's problems. Here we have a federal court's interpretation of a long-standing state decision. Uncompleted state action, probably influenced by decisions of this Court subsequently overruled, calls for an opportunity for the state to adjudicate the question for itself, while a fixed interpretation of a state statute should be accepted by the federal courts when it does not obviously depend altogether on a misconception of federal law.

There are other factors which forbid the conclusion below. A Pennsylvania statute, derived from the state's common law,22 provides "That when a court of last resort has construed the language used in a law, the Legislature in subsequent laws on the same subject matter intend the same construction to be placed upon such language. Since the Miller case the compensation act has been amended several times,24 but the Legislature has never attempted to override the limitations read into it by the Miller opinion. There were comprehensive amendments in the 1937 reënactment,25 more than a year

"23

22 Buhl's Estate, 300 Pa. 29; 150 A. 86.

"Pa. Laws 1937, Act No. 282, § 52 (4).

"Pa. Laws 1929, Acts No. 311, 358, 361, 372; Laws 1931, Acts No. 151, 205; Laws 1933, Acts No. 68, 324, 328; Laws, Special Session 1933-34, Acts No. 55, 56; Laws 1935, Act No. 412; Laws 1937, Act No. 323.

after this Court's decision in the Tipton case established that the compensation remedy could be made exclusive, but still the Legislature took no action. Under these circumstances we are of the opinion that the interpretation of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania of its own Workmen's Compensation Act and of the jurisdiction of its courts over claims arising under the Safety Appliance Act is binding upon the federal courts and should be followed.

The judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals is reversed and that of the District Court is affirmed.

Reversed.

MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS is of the opinion that the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals should be affirmed.

CONWAY v. O'BRIEN.

CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.

No. 344. Argued February 4, 5, 1941.-Decided March 3, 1941. Evidence held sufficient to go to the jury on the issue of gross negligence as defined by the law of Vermont, in an action against the owner of an automobile for personal injuries suffered by one riding in it as his guest who alleged that the accident was caused by the gross negligence of the owner in driving the vehicle. P. 493. 111 F. 2d 611, reversed.

CERTIORARI, 311 U. S. 634, to review the reversal of a judgment for damages recovered under a Vermont "guest occupant" law. Jurisdiction of the District Court was founded on diversity of citizenship.

Mr. Paul E. Lesh, with whom Messrs. Herbert G. Garber and Jerome F. Barnard were on the brief, for petitioner.

Mr. Edwin W. Lawrence for respondent.

MR. JUSTICE REED delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioner, a citizen of New Hampshire, was injured when the respondent's car, in which she was a passenger, collided with another on a country road in Vermont. Diversity of citizenship gave jurisdiction to the District Court and petitioner recovered a verdict under the Vermont guest occupant law,' which required her to prove gross negligence on the part of the respondent. The Circuit Court of Appeals, however, considering the evidence of gross negligence insufficient to go to the jury, reversed and dismissed the complaint. We granted certiorari to examine whether there had been sufficient compliance with Rule 50 (b) to authorize dismissal of the complaint, but our view of the merits makes it unnecessary to discuss this question.

3

The result is determined by a consideration of the facts in the light of the Vermont law. The accident occurred in broad daylight in the late morning of an August day. If the facts most favorable to the petitioner were accepted, the jury might have concluded properly that the defendant's car approached from the south a covered bridge on a little-used country road at a speed of fifteen miles per hour. Respondent who was the driver and owner sat on the front seat with another. The petitioner and another lady occupied the rear seat. The bridge spanned Williams River which at that point

3 As in Berry v. United States, ante, p. 450, the District Court denied respondent's motion for a directed verdict at the close of the case. After verdict, however, the respondent did not make a motion for judgment n. o. v.