income-producing property and gifts of income from property of which the donor remains the owner, for all substantial and practical purposes. Cf. Helvering v. Clifford, supra.

Reversed.

UNITED STATES v. SHERWOOD.

CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.

No. 500. Argued March 6, 7, 1941.-Decided March 31, 1941.

A New York court, acting under authority of § 795 of the New York Civil Practice Act, made an order authorizing a judgment creditor to sue under the Tucker Act, to recover damages from the United States for breach of its contract with the judgment debtor, the order directing that out of the recovery the judgment creditor should be entitled to a sum sufficient to satisfy his judgment with interest, costs, etc. The state law cited makes the judgment debtor a necessary party and authorizes him in any suit so brought to attack the validity of the order and of the judgment on which it is founded. Held:

1. That a suit brought accordingly against the United States and the judgment debtor was not within the jurisdiction of the federal court. P. 588.

2. A court has no jurisdiction of a suit against the United States. to which the United States has not consented. P. 587.

3. Jurisdiction of a federal court to award damages for breach of contract by the United States is defined by the Tucker Act and is restricted to suits against the Government alone; if adjudication of the plaintiff's right to maintain the suit as against a private party is prerequisite to its prosecution against the United States, the suit must be dismissed. P. 588.

4. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not authorize any suit against the United States to which it has not otherwise consented. P. 589.

5. The Act of June 19, 1934, 48 Stat. 1064, 28 U. S. C. 723, authorizing this Court to prescribe rules of procedure in civil actions gave it no authority to modify, abridge or enlarge the substantive

rights of litigants or to enlarge or diminish the jurisdiction of federal courts. P. 590.

6. The concurrent jurisdiction of the District Court under the Tucker Act does not extend to any suit which could not be litigated in the Court of Claims. P. 590.

7. Waivers of sovereign immunity from suit are strictly construed. P. 590.

CERTIORARI, 311 U. S. 640, to review the reversal of a judgment of the District Court dismissing for want of jurisdiction a suit against the United States and a private party.

Mr. Sidney J. Kaplan, with whom Solicitor General Biddle, Assistant Attorney General Shea, and Messrs. Melvin Siegel and Richard H. Demuth were on the brief, for the United States.

Mr. Milton U. Copland, with whom Mr. David Morgulas was on the brief, for respondent.

MR. JUSTICE STONE delivered the opinion of the Court.

The New York Supreme Court, acting under authority of § 795 of the New York Civil Practice Act, made an order authorizing respondent, as a judgment creditor, to maintain a suit under the Tucker Act of March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 505, § 24 (20) of the Judicial Code, 28 U. S. C. § 41 (20), to recover damages from the United States for breach of its contract with the judgment debtor. The question for decision is whether a United States District Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit.

The order authorized respondent, who had recovered a judgment against Kaiser in the New York Supreme Court for $5,567.22, to bring suit against the Government to recover for breach of its contract with Kaiser for the construction of a postoffice building. The order

directed that out of the amount recovered respondent should be entitled to a sum sufficient to satisfy his judgment with interest "as well as costs, disbursements and expenses which may be allowed by the court."

Respondent brought the present suit against the United States and Kaiser in the District Court for Eastern New York. By his complaint he set up the judgment and the order of the state court, the breach of contract by the United States, and the consequent damage to Kaiser in the sum of $14,448.49, and prayed judgment in the sum of $10,000. The order of the District Court dismissing the complaint for want of jurisdiction was reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 112 F. 2d 587, which held that under Rule 17 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure respondent's "capacity to sue" was governed by the law of New York, which was his domicile; and that the order of the state court had conferred authority upon respondent to maintain the suit, the United States being a "person indebted" within the meaning of § 795 of the Civil Practice Act, which sanctions orders by the state court authorizing a suit by a judgment creditor against a "person . . . indebted to the judgment debtor." We granted certiorari, 311 U. S. 640, the question of the jurisdiction of the District Court under the Tucker Act being of public importance.

The United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued, United States v. Thompson, 98 U. S. 486; United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196; Kansas v. United States, 204 U. S. 331; Minnesota v. United States, 305 U. S. 382, 387; Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., 306 U. S. 381, 388; United States v. Shaw, 309 U. S. 495 (see cases cited in The Pesaro, 277 F. 473, 474, et seq.), and the terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that court's jurisdiction to entertain the suit.

Minnesota v. United States, supra, 388 and cases cited; cf. Stanley v. Schwalby, 162 U. S. 255, 270. Jurisdiction to entertain suits against the United States to recover damages for breach of contract and certain other specified classes of claims was conferred on the Court of Claims by Act of February 24, 1855, 10 Stat. 612. With additions not now material, the jurisdiction was continued by paragraph First of the Tucker Act of March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 505, which, as supplemented and reënacted, is now § 145 of the Judicial Code, 28 U. S. C. § 250. Section 2, which, as supplemented and reënacted, is now § 24 (20) of the Judicial Code, 28 U. S. C. § 41 (20), confers jurisdiction on the district courts "Concurrent with the Court of Claims, of all claims not exceeding $10,000 founded . . . upon any contract, express or implied, with the Government of the United States, or for damages, liquidated or unliquidated, in cases not sounding in tort, in respect to which claims the party would be entitled to redress against the United States, either in a court of law, equity, or admiralty, if the United States were suable . . ."

The Court of Claims is a legislative, not a constitutional, court. Its judicial power is derived not from the Judiciary Article of the Constitution, but from the Congressional power "to pay the debts. . . of the United States," which it is free to exercise through judicial as well as non-judicial agencies. See Williams v. United States, 289 U. S. 553, 569, 579; Ex parte Bakelite Corporation, 279 U. S. 438, 452, et seq. It is for this reason, and because of the power of the sovereign to attach conditions to its consent to be sued, that Congress, despite the Seventh Amendment, may dispense with a jury trial in suits brought in the Court of Claims. McElrath v. United States, 102 U. S. 426; Williams v. United States, supra, 570, 571; Ex parte Bakelite Corporation, supra, 453.

Except as Congress has consented there is no juris

diction in the Court of Claims more than in any other court to entertain suits against the United States, or for the review of its decisions by appellate courts. Luckenbach Steamship Co. v. United States, 272 U. S. 533, 536, et seq. For that reason it has been uniformly held, upon a review of the statutes creating the court and defining its authority, that its jurisdiction is confined to the rendition of money judgments in suits brought for that relief against the United States, United States v. Alire, 6 Wall. 573; United States v. Jones, 131 U. S. 1, and if the relief sought is against others than the United States the suit as to them must be ignored as beyond the jurisdiction of the court, United States v. Jones, supra; Lynn v. United States, 110 F. 2d 586, 588; Leather & Leigh v. United States, 61 Ct. Cls. 388, or if its maintenance against private parties is prerequisite to prosecution of the suit against the United States the suit must be dismissed. Jackson v. United States, 27 Ct. Cls. 74, 84; Waite v. United States, 57 Ct. Cls. 546; Leather & Leigh v. United States, supra; cf. Turner v. United States, 248 U. S. 354; Green v. Menominee Tribe, 233 U. S. 558. See Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. United States, 44 F. 2d 887, 888.

We think it plain that the present suit could not have been maintained in the Court of Claims because that court is without jurisdiction of any suit brought against private parties and because adjudication of the right or capacity of respondent to proceed with the suit upon the contract of the judgment debtor with the United States is prerequisite to any recovery upon the Government contract. As the court below recognized, the judgment debtor, who is made a necessary party by § 795 of the Civil Practice Act, in any suit brought pursuant to the order of the state court is entitled to attack the validity of the order and of the judgment on which it