A few days later, November 25th, a similar telegram from the Hutukhtu himself was received by the President. President Yuan had reminded the Mongolian ruler that his country was weak and that the course she was taking would be likely to end for her in a fate similar to that of Korea and Formosa. He replied that he realized the weakness of Mongolia, but that China was a long way off and her whip, however long, could scarcely reach to Outer Mongolia to drive off Mongolia's enemies. He begs the President not to take a severe course lest he drive the Mongols to desperate measures.

The President replied in a conciliatory telegram, calling attention to the fact that many of the Chinese provinces had in 1911 declared their independence, but that all had reunited and were working together, and that it was the aim of the Republic to unite the five races, destroy all racial prejudice and seek to promote the welfare of each and all. He informed the Hutukhtu that he was sending a special envoy to Urga to discuss matters with him.

The Hutukhtu replied promptly on November 26th that it would be better not to send an envoy, but to use the mediation of their common neighbor-Russia. Having failed in his efforts to deal directly with the Government of Outer Mongolia, President Yuan on March 8, 1913, turned once more to Russia.

The writer was in Peking in 1911, 1912, and 1913, and had opportunity therefore to note the keen interest in this question taken by the Chinese people. Their feeling against Mongolia and Russia grew very bitter during 1913. The Chinese newspapers were particularly active in trying to arouse a warlike sentiment. The situation indeed in Inner Mongolia near the Chinese border became quite serious. Additional troops were sent there by the Chinese Government and a number of encounters with bands of armed Mongols occurred but without any noticeable advantage to either side.

This feeling of hostility towards Russia was no doubt due in great measure to a misunderstanding of terms. The word "autonomy" was taken to mean "independence." When, therefore, on November 5, 1913, a little more than a year after the signing of the Russo-Mongolian Convention, an agreement between China and Russia was signed, in the first article of which Russia acknowledges the suzerainty of China

over Outer Mongolia, this feeling was very much allayed. Russia had never denied China's suzerainty over Mongolia, but this express acknowledgment of it at once silenced the false report that Russia had asked China to recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia.

China on her part acknowledged the autonomy of Outer Mongolia. This, too, was no more than a recognition of the status quo ante, but it served to reassure the Mongols, since it guaranteed that there would be no interference by China with the internal administration of the country and pledged China not to send troops into Outer Mongolia and not to colonize there. The Mongols, however, were somewhat disappointed by this agreement, since they, too, had been under the impression that their "autonomy" meant "independence.'

Russia could not but be gratified, since the convention expressly agrees to the principles set forth in the Russo-Mongolian Agreement of 1912 and assents to all the stipulations regarding Russian commercial privileges contained in the protocol to that agreement.

The notes accompanying this agreement bind both Russia and China to hold a conference, in which Outer Mongolia shall participate, for the settlement of questions of a political and territorial nature.

Before that conference was held, Russia entered into another agreement with Mongolia, dated September 30, 1914, which practically gave to the former control of the railway policy of the latter. This was a matter of considerable importance to Russia, since it still further safeguarded her frontier. By this agreement Russia obtained the right to advise Outer Mongolia in deciding what railway lines to build and the method of procedure, which was required to be beneficial to both parties. Since the gauge of the Russian railways is different from that adopted in China, this practically assures the building of lines that can connect with Russian rather than Chinese railways. Russia recognizes Mongolia's right to build the railways within its own boundaries if the funds can be raised there, but Mongolia is pledged to consult Russia before making concessions for railway construction to other nationals.

Russia having thus come into agreement separately with China and with Mongolia, representatives of the three Powers met in conference and entered into the tripartite agreement of June 7, 1915, which is the

keystone to the whole arrangement. In it Outer Mongolia is made to recognize the Sino-Russian Convention of 1913, which establishes China's suzerainty over Outer Mongolia, and expressly agrees not to negotiate treaties with foreign Powers respecting political and territorial matters, although treaties respecting commercial and industrial matters are permissible. Both China and Russia agree to abstain from all interference with the internal administration of Outer Mongolia. Chinese imports into Outer Mongolia are to be free of all duties, and goods of foreign origin are to be imported into China from Outer Mongolia on payment of the reduced tariff provided in the treaty of 1881. Thus Russia's right to free trade in Outer Mongolia is confirmed, the customs stations being removed from the Siberian frontier to that between China and Outer Mongolia.

Chinese jurisdiction over Chinese residents of Outer Mongolia is retained, but Chinese-Mongol mixed cases are to be adjudicated by Chinese and Mongol authorities acting conjointly. In Russo-Chinese mixed cases the Russian authorities take part in deciding and in drafting the judgment, even in actions heard in the Chinese court and in which a Chinese is defendant. The Chinese authorities also have the right to be present in Russian courts when Chinese are plaintiffs and Russians are defendants, but do not appear to be allowed to participate in the judgment.

The Ruler of "Autonomous Outer Mongolia" is confirmed in his title by Article IV, which provides that the President of China shall confer such title upon the Hutukhtu.

All the provisions of the several agreements between Russia and Mongolia and between Russia and China are ratified by Article XXI of the tripartite convention, and thus become incorporated in the tripartite convention.

One of the most significant articles is the third, the second paragraph of which binds China, in accordance with Article II of the notes exchanged between China and Russia on November 5, 1913, to consult Russia and Outer Mongolia in regard to all questions of a political or territorial nature. Thus, while China nominally is acknowledged as suzerain, practically Outer Mongolia is under the joint protection of Russia and China.

These agreements, then, have considerably increased the political and commercial rights of Russia in Mongolia, and they thus tend to restore, if not to enhance, Russian prestige in the Far East which had been somewhat lessened by the result of the Russo-Japanese War.

E. T. WILLIAMS.

THE CASE OF THE APPAM

On July 29, 1916, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia entered a decree to restore to the British claimants the steamer Appam, formerly an English merchant vessel, captured by the German cruiser Moewe upon the high seas and sent into Newport News to be laid up pending the war between Great Britain and Germany. In a very elaborate opinion, the court held that the Appam had no right under international law or the treaty with Prussia of May 1, 1828, to use an American port as an asylum; that it did not have a right under the circumstances to enter an American port at all; that by so doing it violated the neutrality of the United States, and was therefore, with the proceeds of the cargo, to be restored, according to the American practice, to the British owners at the date of capture. The case is a very interesting one from the standpoint of international law, and by reason of its importance, it is to be appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States in order that, as far as the United States is concerned, a definite decision may be reached upon the points of law involved. The facts of the case and the reasoning of the District Court will, however, be set forth at this time and in this place.

Judge Waddill tells us that the facts were not disputed, and from his statement of them it appears that on January 15, 1916, the British steamship Appam was captured by the German cruiser Moewe in latitude 33.19 N. longitude 14.24 W. It also appears that "at the time of capture; the Appam was approximately distant 1,590 miles from Emden, the nearest German port, and from the nearest available port, namely, Punchello, in the Madeiras, 130 miles; from Liverpool, 1,450 miles, and from Hampton Roads, 3,051 miles."

One Berg, a lieutenant in the German Navy, was placed on board the Appam as prize master, with instructions from his superior officer of the capturing vessel, the Moewe, to "take her to the nearest American port and there to lay her up." This he did. The Appam under his charge arrived at Newport News, Virginia, on February 1, 1916, and Lieutenant Berg duly notified the collector of the port of his arrival.