preventing race conflicts. Desirable as appeal from a decision of the Board of Genthis is, and important as is the preserva- | eral Appraisers overruling a protest against the refusal of the Secretary of the Treasury tion of the public peace, this aim canto reliquidate the entries of imported goods, not be accomplished by laws or oris final, does not broaden the authority of dinances which deny rights created or the United States Supreme Court to issue protected by the Federal Constitution. a writ of mandamus to compel it to take [82] It is said that such acquisitions jurisdiction of such case and decide the same by colored persons depreciate property on its merits. owned in the neighborhood by white per- [For other cases, Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] But property may be acquired by undesirable white neighbors, or put to disagreeable though lawful uses with Argued October 15 and 16, 1917. sons. like results. We think this attempt to prevent the alienation of the property in question to see Mandamus, 39-46, in [No. 24, Original.] November 5, 1917. Decided a person of color was not a legitimate ORIGINAL PETITION for a Writ of exercise of the police power of the state, and is in direct violation of the fundamental law enacted in the 14th Amendment of the Constitution preventing state interference with property rights except by due process of law. That being the case, the ordinance cannot stand. Booth v. Illinois, 184 U. S. 425, 429, 46 L. ed. 623, 626, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 425; Otis v. Parker, 187 U. S. 606, 609, 47 L. ed. 323, 327, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 168. Reaching this conclusion it follows that the judgment of the Kentucky Court of Appeals must be reversed, and the cause remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Reversed. Mandamus to the judges of the United States Court of Customs Appeals to require them to take jurisdiction of a certain cause and to consider and decide the same upon its merits. Rule discharged. The facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. Vincent P. Donihee argued the cause, and, with Mr. Edward S. Hatch, filed a brief for petitioner. Assistant Attorney General Warren argued the cause, and, with Solicitor General Davis, filed a brief for respondents. Mr. Justice Day delivered the opinion of the court: This is a petition for a writ of mandamus to require the judges of the United States court of customs appeals to take jurisdiction of a certain cause, IN THE MATTER OF PARK & TILFORD, and to consider and decide the same Petitioner. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 82-86.) Mandamus jurisdiction. to compel court to take 1. Mandamus will not lie to compel the United States court of customs appeals to take jurisdiction of an appeal from a decision of the Board of General Appraisers overruling a protest against the refusal of the Secretary of the Treasury to reliquidate entries of goods imported, and to consider and decide the case upon its merits, where such court has already taken jurisdiction of the case on such appeal and decided it according to its interpretation of the Federal statutes, and its decision would be merely repeated if the mandamus were is sued. upon its merits. The rule to show cause having issued, the judges made return, and set forth the proceedings in the court of customs appeals, and averred that the court had decided the case of damus issued, it would only require the the petitioner, and if the writ of mancourt to do that which it had already done. From the return and the record attached to the petition it appears: Park & Tilford, petitioner, imported certain merchandse at the port of New York under the Tariff Act of 1913 [38 Stat. at L. 114, chap. 16, Comp. Stat. 1916, $ 5291]. The collector of customs assessed and liquidated the duties at the entered value. The importer claimed assessment at the value decided upon on final reappraisement, which was less than the amount of the [84] entered value. This claim was made under ¶ I. of § III. of the Act of 1913, which provides: "The duty shall not, however, be assessed in any case upon an amount less than the entered value, unless by direetion of the Secretary of the Treasury An inspection of the opinion of the court, which accompanies the petition, makes it apparent that the court did take jurisdiction of the case and decided it, placing its decision upon the ground that the statute requires the assessment made by the collector in the absence of a direction of the Secretary of the Treasury to the contrary. The court held that the Secretary's refusal to so direct the collector was not reviewable by the Board of General Appraisers nor by the court of customs appeals; that neither the board nor the court could control the discretion lodged by the statute in the Secretary, and affirmed the decision of the board. in cases in which the importer certifies, tested, and the protest was submitted at the time of entry that the entered to the Board of General Appraisers, value is higher than the foreign market and was overruled, and the importer apvalue and that the goods are so entered pealed to the court of customs appeals. in order to meet advances by the appraiser in similar cases then pending on appeal for reappraisement, and the importer's contention shall subsequently be sustained by a final decision on reappraisement, and it shall appear that the action of the importer on entry was taken in good faith, after due diligence and inquiry on his part, and the Secretary of the Treasury shall accompany his directions with a statement of his conclusions and his reasons therefor." The importers entered the goods upon an invoice which stated the gross price and allowed 15 per cent deduction therefrom; at entry the importers advanced the value by reducing the deduction to 6 per cent. At the time of entry the importer, in each case, made an addition to the invoice value to make market value, stating the additions were made to meet advances in similar cases then pending upon appeal for reappraise ment. On appeal for reappraisement the goods were appraised at a value which differed from the invoice value, being 23 per cent more than invoice price of the goods, and 6 per cent less than the entered value. The petitioner requested the Secretary of the Treasury to reliquidate the entries; this the Secretary refused to do, stating his reasons as follows: "You are advised that in all cases where the importer has failed to make a specific contention as to market value, the Department regards the contention as being for the invoice value; and where the final reappraised value is below the entered value, but not as low as the value [85] contended for by the importer, it is the practice of the Department to decline to authorize a reduction of the entered value, on the ground that the importer's contention has not been sustained. This practice is based upon the Department's knowledge of the purpose and intent of the law, and is of such long standing that it will not make any change therein. "You are advised, therefore, that if the entries enumerated within your petition come within the class mentioned above, the Department's final action with reference thereto would necessarily be in accordance with its practice outlined above." In a subsequent letter the Secretary reiterated this view, the petitioner pro It is elementary that the writ of mandamus will not issue to require the court to make a particular decision, and may only be invoked where the purpose is to require action of a court of competent jurisdiction, where such court has refused to exercise the power of decision with which it is invested by law. We think it clear that the court of customs appeals did take jurisdiction of the [86] case of the petitioner on appeal from the order of the Board of General Appraisers, and decided it according to its interpretation of the statutes of the United States. These facts warrant the statements of the respondents in their return, that if the writ should issue, requiring a decision of the case, they could only repeat the decision which they have already made. The fact that the law makes the decision of the United States court of customs appeals final in this class of cases does not broaden the authority of this court to issue writs of the character now invoked; it follows that the rule must be discharged. And it is so ordered. 1. A writ of error is the proper method of bringing up to the United States Supreme Court for review a judgment of the supreme court of the Philippine Islands, modifying [For other cases, see Appeal and Error, II. b, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] Appeal dismissal. 2. An appeal to the United States Supreme Court will be dismissed in a case brought up by both appeal and writ of error, where writ of error is the proper method of bringing up the case. [For other cases, see Appeal and Error, VII. i, 1, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] Appeal review of facts. 3. The United States Supreme Court, in a case decided on issues of fact by the supreme court of the Philippine Islands, will not, in reaching its judgment, reconsider conclusions of the lower court which find support in the record. [For other cases, see Appeal and Error, 48894891, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] Courts rules of decision Federal courts following decisions of insular courts. 4. The judgment of the supreme court of the Philippine Islands construing local laws with respect to the registration of property under the Torrens system, and announcing a rule applicable to the Islands, will not be disturbed by the Federal Supreme Court. For other cases, see Courts, VII. in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] [No. 437.] Cal. 392; Stout v. Macy, 22 Cal. 647; Reynolds v. London & L. F. Ins. Co. 128 Cal. 16, 79 Am. St. Rep. 17, 60 Pac. 467; Duff v. Randall, 116 Cal. 226, 58 Am. St. Rep. 158, 48 Pac. 66; Stone v. Bassett, 4 Minn. 298, Gil. 215; 27 Cyc. 1800; Farrell v. Parlier, 50 Ill. 274; Henderson v. Lowry, 5 Yerg. 240; Donovan Higbee v. Higbee, 4 Utah, 19, 5 Pac. 693; v. Territory, 3 Wyo. 91, 2 Pac. 532; Reynolds v. London & L. F. Ins. Co. 128 Cal. 20, 79 Am. St. Rep. 17, 60 Pac. 467; Jones, Mortg. §§ 1322 et seq.; Montinola v. Tuason (Oct. 23, 1916; Philippines Sup. Ct.). The memorandum of sale on foreclosure, granting a mortgage debtor one year from date of sale within which to redeem, constituted a contract of purchase and sale conclusive upon the purchaser. Mathews v. Starr, 68 Ga. 521; Moye v. Clarke, 69 Ga. 750; Horne v. Mullis, 119 Ga. 534, 46 S. E. 663; Board of Education v. Day, 128 Ga. 161, 57 S. E. 359; 24 Cyc. 69. The attachment of the right of redemption had other legal effect independent of its creating an estoppel to deny the existence of the right. It op erated as a ratification of the reservation of that right as set forth in the sheriff's certificate of sale; it amounted Submitted October 15, 1917. Decided No to an election between denying and at vember 5, 1917. APPEAL from and IN ERROR to the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands to review a judgment modifying a judgment of the Court of Land Registration so as to provide for the registration under the Torrens system of all the lands described in the petition. Appeal dismissed. Judgment affirmed on writ of error. Messrs. F. W. Clements, Evans Browne, and Alexander Britton submitted the cause for appellant and plaintiff in error: The mortgagor has a year in which to redeem after sale under foreclosure proceedings. Kent v. Laffan, 2 Cal. 595; Harlan v. Smith, 6 Cal. 173; McMillan v. Richards, 9 Cal. 412, 70 Am. Dec. 655; Gross v. Fowler, 21 Cal. 392; Guy v. Middleton, 5 Note. On distinction between appeal and writ of error-see note to Miners' Bank v. Iowa, 13 L. ed. U. S. 867. As to appellate jurisdiction of Federal Supreme Court over supreme court of Philippine Islands-see note to Martinez v. International Bkg. Corp. 55 L. ed. U. S. 438. tacking the validity of the reservation and accepting and ratifying its validity by levying an attachment upon it. Dolvin v. American Harrow Co. 125 Ga. 707, 28 L.R.A. (N.S.) 785, 54 S. E. 706; Board of Education v. Day, 128 Ga. Pl. & Pr. 363, 364, 368; Re Garver, 176 161, 57 S. E. 359; 15 Cyc. 259, 7 Enc. N. Y. 386, 68 N. E. 667; Van Winkle v. Crowell, 146 U. S. 42, 36 L. ed. 880, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 18. No tender was necessary. 19 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 216; Braun v. Sauerwein, 10 Wall. 218, 19 L. ed. 895; Hills v. National Albany Exch. Bank, 105 U. S. 319, 26 L. ed. 1052; United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196, 27 L. ed. 171, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 240; 38 Cyc. 134, 136. Mr. F. C. Fisher submitted the cause for appellee and defendant in error: An appeal will not lie to review a judgment of the supreme court of the Philippine Islands, rendered in a proceeding originating in the Philippine court of land registration. Behn v. Campbell, 205 U. S. 403, 51 L. ed. 857, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 502; Cariño v. Philippine Islands, 212 U. S. 449, 53 L. ed. 594, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 334; Jover y Costas v. Philippine Islands, 221 U. S. 623, 55 L. ed. 884, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 664; | Tiglao v. Philippine Islands, 215 U. S. 410, 54 L. ed. 257, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 129. The jurisdictional amount of $25,000 is not involved. Red River Cattle Co. v. Needham, 137 U. S. 632, 34 L. ed. 799, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 208; Street v. Ferry, 119 U. S. 385, 30 L. ed. 439, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 231. After foreclosure of a mortgage under the procedure prescribed by Act 190 of the Philippine Commission, no further right of redemption exists. Benedict v. Yulo, 26 Philippine, 166; Coote, Mortg. 10; Clark v. Reyburn, 8 Wall. 318, 19 L. ed. 354; 2 Hilliard, Mortg. 1st ed. 1; Jickling, Analogy, between Leg. & Equitable Estates, 66; 4 Kent, Com. 133; Parker v. Dacres, 130 U. S. 47, 32 L. ed. 850, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 433. Had the right to redeem after foreclosure ever existed, it has long since expired. The record fails to disclose any tender of the amount of the judgment within the alleged term of the period of redemption. Burley v. Flint, 105 U. S. 247, 26 L. ed. 986. Memorandum opinion by direction of the court, by Mr. Justice Day: In this case, submitted upon motion to dismiss or affirm, the present appellee and defendant in error, herein called the Company, made application in the Philippine court of land registration for registration of certain property under the Torrens system. As described and claimed by the Company the hacienda contained 611 hectares, 33 ares, and 82 centares. The case was twice in the supreme eourt of the Philippines. After its first judgment that court granted a rehearing, and ordered a new trial, and we are concerned now with the writ of error and appeal to this court from the second judgment of the supreme court of the Philippines. [88] The supreme court states that, so far as Romana Gauzon was concerned, the hacienda was made up of two portions, one consisting of 465 hectares, 33 ares, and 82 centares, by royal grant, while the remaining portion was made up of 146 hectares obtained from other sources. Romana Gauzon had mortgaged the hacienda, and the same was bought by the Company at sheriff's sale; some time thereafter it made the application for registration. On the retrial, after the first judgment of the supreme court, Romana Gauzon claimed to be the owner of the 146 hectares, alleging that they were not included in the mortgage. The court of land registration refused registration of the 146 hectares. That court held that while Romana Gauzon had not shown herself to be the owner of the 146 hectares, the Company had not clearly demonstrated that it was the owner thereof. The supreme court, in the judgment now under review, held that the Company had, as between itself and Romana Gauzon, shown title to the 146 hectares, and modified the judgment of the court of land registration so as to decree the registration of all the land described in the application. This judgment evidently proceeded upon the determination of questions of fact. The writ of error was the proper method by which to review the judgment of the supreme court of the Philippines. Cariño v. Philippine Islands, 212 U. S. 449, 53 L. ed. 594, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 334; Tiglao v. Philippine Islands, 215 U. S. 410, 54 L. ed. 257, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 129; Jover y Costas v. Philippine Islands, 221 U. S. 623, 55 L. ed. 884, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 664. The case being properly here upon writ of error, the appeal must be dismissed. Upon such writ, the case having been decided upon issues of fact, this court will not reconsider the conclusions of the lower court, which find support in the record, in reaching its judgment. Whether 4 of the Act of September 6, 1916 (39 Stat. at L. 726, chap. 448, Comp. Stat. 1916, § 1649a), applies to this action in view of the fact that the appeal and writ of error were taken December 5, 1916, [89] it is unnecessary to decide, as the section does not change the result. Section 4 provides that the reviewing court shall not dismiss a writ of error because an appeal should have been taken, or dismiss an appeal because a writ of error should have been sued out, but shall disregard such mistakes and take the action appropriate if the proper appellate procedure had been followed. This section does not abolish the distinction between writs of error and appeals, but only requires that the party seeking review shall have it in the appropriate way notwithstanding a mistake in choosing the mode of review. Upon petition for rehearing in the supreme court the plaintiff in error contended that she should have been allowed the right of redemption. Upon that question the court adhered to its first judgment denying the right, and affirmed the doctrine announced in Benedicto v. Yulo, 26 Philippine, 160. We are not, disposed to disturb this judgment of the supreme court construing local laws and announcing a rule applicable in the Islands. The judgment of the Supreme Court of the Philippines is affirmed. anteed the possession and would hold the title in trust for the exclusive use and benefit of such assignee and his heirs so long as such occupancy should continue, and an act was subsequently passed by Congress, at the request of several of the assignees, providing for the allotment of land in such reservation, with a preferential right on the part of assignees to select for allotment the tract embracing improvements made by him, to which act the tribe in open council gave UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, as Trus- its consent, the plan being carried to com tee and Guardian, etc., V. HIRAM CHASE. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 89-102.) Indians Indian lands der treaty. title to, un 1. An apportionment of the tribal possessory right of occupancy to the assignees in severalty of land in the Omaha Indian Reservation, leaving the fee in the United States, was effected by the Treaty of March 6, 1865 (14 Stat. at L. 667), providing that, for the purpose of abolishing the tenure in common in such reservation, assignments should be made in severalty to members of the tribe, and that the assignment, when approved by the Secretary of the Interior, should be "final and conclusive," that certificates should be issued to the assignees, specifying their names, and that they were for the "exclusive use and benefit of themselves, their heirs and descendants," that such tracts should "not be alienated in fee, leased, or otherwise disposed of except to the United States or to other members of the tribe," and that the whole of the lands assigned or unassigned in severalty should remain an Indian reservation over which the Indian trade and intercourse laws of Congress should be in force, and upon which no white person not in the employment of the United States should be allowed to go without permission. pletion through the co-operation of the administrative officers and the tribe. [For other cases, see Indians, 107-110, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] Indians lottees. Indian lands rights of al 3. An assignee in severalty of land in the Omaha Indian Reservation who obtained thereby the tribal right of occupancy, but not the estate in fee, which remained in the United States, lost all rights in such assignment on selecting a full allotment in other land, under the Act of August 7, 1882 (22 Stat. at L. 341, chap. 434), to which the Indian tribe in council consented, providing for the allotment of specified amounts in severalty of all unsold lands in such reservation, including those assigned under the Treaty of March 6, 1865 (14 Stat. at L. 667), and giving a preferential right to assignees under such treaty of selecting the tract embracing his improvements. [For other cases, see Indians, V., in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] Indians lottees. Indian lands 4. The plan of allotment of land in the Omaha Indian Reservation, as defined in the Act of Congress of August 7, 1882 (22 Stat. at L. 341, chap. 434), § 5, providing that all unsold lands in such reservation, including those assigned in severalty under the Treaty of March 6, 1865 (14 Stat. at L. 667), which gave an Indian right of occupancy only, leaving the fee in the United States, should be allotted in specified amounts to the members of the tribe, is not title of In-interfered with or qualified by the provision in § 4 that "any right in severalty acquired by any Indian under existing treaties shall not be affected by this act," which was merely a saving clause in a part of the act providing for the sale of a distinct portion of [For other cases, see Indians, 107-110, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] Indians dians. Indian lands the reservation. 2. Only the right of occupancy, and not the fee to lands in the Omaha Reservation, passed to the assignees in severalty under the Treaty of March 6, 1865 (14 Stat. at L. 667), if the treaty is regarded as uncertain in that respect, where the certificates issued by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, provided for in such treaty, declared that the assignee was entitled to take immediate possession of the land and occupy the same, and that the United States guar-selected land in the Omaha Indian Reserva Note. As to titles derived from Indian sources-see note to Briggs v. Sample, 10 L.R.A. 132. As to construction and operation of treaties-see note to United States v. The Amistad, 10 L. ed. U. S. 826. [For other cases, see Indians, V., in Digest patent to Indian lands death of allottee before patent. 5. The fact that an Indian, who had tion for his allotment under the Act of August 7, 1882 (22 Stat. at L. 341, chap. 434), died before the issue of a patent in his name, renders the patent to his heirs voidable at most, and not void, and the only ones who can object to the right of his heirs thereunder are the United States and the Indian tribe. Sup. Ct. 1908.] As to rights and status of Indians [For other cases, see Indians, V., in Digest see note to Worcester v. Georgia, 8 L. ed. U. S. 484. [No. 146.] 245 U. S. |