of complaint, would be recreant to the trust imposed in him. He who would falsely create a feeling among the masses that those in power are heedless of their rights and interests is recreant indeed to the highest duties of citizenship. He who would falsely create a feeling among the masses of our people that our courts, which are the embodiment of the love for law, order and justice found in the hearts of our people, and made part of our government and clothed with power to see to it that justice and equity shall be done by and be granted to all, are occupied by judges who are recreant to the duties of that high office, and partial to one class of our people as against the other, is, if possible, worse than either.

The whole body of the law is one thing. It matters not whether a provision of law be found in the express declaration of the Legislature in the form of a statute, commanding, forbidding or allowing a certain thing, or whether it be found in the general powers of the court or in that great body of our laws known as the common law or in the Constitution. All of the provisions of law, wherever found, are binding upon all. And in this body of our laws is found the power, and likewise the duty, of a court which is approached by a petitioner with certain evidence, asking for certain rights, which has compelled the courts to act as they have in the issuance of injunctions. When the property rights of any person who has the right to resort to the jurisdiction of the courts of Massachusetts are being injured and seriously threatened, it is the right of that person to petition the court for relief. When that person presents to the justice of the court evidence upon which the court finds as a fact that such property rights are being injured and seriously threatened and are in imminent danger of being violated and injured in a manner which leaves no adequate remedy, it is not discretionary with that justice, in the sense that he may do as he pleases, to issue or not to issue an injunction restraining such injury. It may be his duty as much to issue that injunction, under such circumstances, as it is the duty of a soldier, when properly commanded by his superior, to level his gun at his fellow-man, and it may be very distasteful. In the law

today is as plainly written as is possible: It is the duty of the judge who, having determined, upon the evidence presented before him, that such rights as the law says it is the duty of the courts to guard have been violated and are being violated, and irreparable injury thereto is imminent, to issue the court's injunction restraining the wrongdoing. It is in no sense discretionary with him, whether he will use the power given him to protect the rights of our citizens from irreparable injury in such case. It is his duty. Any possible discretion which the judge has in this matter is not a whimsical discretion in the sense that he can, after determining what the rights of the parties are, and what his duty to them is, do as he pleases about performing that duty. To fail to do his duty would of course be misconduct. His likes and dislikes ought not influence his actions. His discretion is so circumscribed by law and rules of procedure that he is not at liberty to do else than that which he shall determine is the duty of any judge under the law and all the circumstances.

It is impossible, and it would be unwise, to cover the whole field of wrongdoing by criminal statutes and provisions. In that field of wrongdoing not so covered it is made the duty of the justices of the courts of equity to as far protect against wrongdoing as it is the intention of the criminal law to prevent wrongdoing within its field. Our courts have been set up with that thought in mind; upon the judge has been put that burden and duty, and he has no choice in the matter when the facts call for the use of the court's power. A justice sitting on the bench may personally lament that our divorce laws are as they are; but when a petition for a divorce is presented, and a case made out upon the evidence, he has no discretion as to whether he will or will not issue a decree for divorce. And so in the petition for an injunction; duty, not discretion, must be and is his line of conduct.

Therefore, the judges cannot honestly, if they would, change the law in reference to the issuance of injunctions, nor prevent their issuance on the presentation of certain evidence. The Legislature alone can remedy the situation if it needs remedying.

The equity power has existed in our courts since they were

first established. The right of the individual to ask and receive the aid of the court to protect him in his rights when they are being violated has been co-existent. Yet no case is shown or known to the committee in which the courts have issued injunctions when the evidence presented did not warrant the issuance of an injunction under the law as it is; nor has any case been testified of in which, for the violation of the injunction, punishment has been imposed such, as men would generally agree was too severe; nor has any case been presented in which a judge has found a violation of the injunction to have been committed, in which a jury would not probably have so found.

The question involved is in no sense a question of the personnel of our judges, of which Massachusetts has now, as it has always had, just cause to be proud.

Should the Legislature do anything about it, and, if so, what may it do wisely to limit the scope or use of the injunction, that conditions may be bettered, and to prevent the growth of any possible existing feeling on the part of a class of our citizens, whose rights stand equal to all others before the law, that the courts are set against them?

The feeling does exist, and it is to be feared that it is growing. This is not to be wondered at, when we realize that among those high in authority are found persons who talk of the abuse of the injunction process by the courts in labor disputes, without any specification as to what is done wrongfully. The law as to injunctions is technical, and cannot be understood by untrained minds. Hence such statements from those who presumably have knowledge are inflammatory, and by reason of such statements all sorts of wrongs are imagined. Under the law as it is there is nothing which our courts can remedy. The Great and General Court should therefore afford such relief as is possible for any wrong or hardship which does exist. It is to the interest of the whole community that this should be done.

Labor Disputes should not preclude Injunctions.

Various methods of dealing with the subject may be proposed, and some have been suggested, by the bills before the committee.

Some of the bills purpose that no injunction shall issue in cases of labor disputes. No person has been found who will say that he believes that, when the rights of any of our citizens are being injured, and further injury is imminent and threatened by any one, or by any number of persons, the courts should be left helpless to stay the hand that would inflict the wrong. Then let us suppose a case: A presents to the court his petition, alleging that B, C, D and many others, by conspiracy, by threats, by intimidation, by annoyances, by wrongdoing in many ways are injuring the property and property rights of the petitioner and his rights to the free pursuit of life and happiness, and that further wrong and damage thereto is imminent and threatened. His attorney appears in court, presents his evidence, which if uncontradicted must and does convince beyond a doubt that the allegations of the petition are true. This is such a case, thus far, that no person would say that, under usual circumstances, the power of the court to stay the hand and prevent such conduct and injury should be taken away. Then, can any person with responsibility upon him say that he will recommend the passage of a law which would leave it in the power of the attorney who appears for the respondents to say to the court: "The respondents do not deny the facts as testified of by the witnesses for the petitioner; they are true. The property rights of the petitioner are being injured, and further damage is threatened and imminent. But, if the court please, our defence is in the nature of confession and avoidance; and, though all these things complained of are true, I suggest to your Honor and point out that there is a labor dispute between the petitioner and the respondents, or between the petitioner and other men in whose cause the respondents are by sympathy thus acting, and I would call your attention to the existence of a statute which provides that, since there is a labor dispute going on here, the court is absolutely helpless to prevent the wrong." Such a proposition, it seems to us, will not bear analysis, and no person will desire a law which would produce such results. When it is determined what shall be the scope of the injunction and upon the existence of what facts its use shall under the law be proper, whether it be by express statute or otherwise, it

ought not to be by statute provided that whoever wishes may push the law aside by creating a labor dispute. We must frame our laws so they will be just to all. But when the law is framed we must not provide by law, that when a labor dispute arises, the law must subside. One law for all citizens at all times is a principle which must not be abandoned. It would be the plainest violation of this principle to provide by law that when two cases are presented to court for injunctions, where the facts are otherwise identical, an injunction should be issued restraining those wrongfully injuring A, in whose establishment there is no labor dispute; but denying similar protection to B, where there is a labor dispute, which perhaps he could not prevent.

Reasonable Persuasion Permissible.

Organized labor complains that, when a labor dispute arises in which the laboring men are striving for what they believe to be their rights and in the interests of humanity and their own uplifting, their constitutional rights are being interfered with by the unwarranted use of the equity power of our

courts.

They do not intend that it should be provided that an injunction should not issue when there is a labor dispute under circumstances which would warrant its issuance if there were no labor dispute. The reading of some of the bills and some of the statements of persons arguing that some legislation should be enacted would create the impression that that was just what was desired, and some men may so intend; but the most thoughtful advocates of legislation have no such thing in mind. Their position is more truly stated, by saying that the facts and conditions existing in times of labor disputes, and on which and because of which injunctions do issue, ought not to be sufficient reasons for their issuance whether there is or is not a labor dispute; and that the scope of the injunctions issued at such times both in the things forbidden and the persons to be affected by it are too sweeping in their terms. Arguments along these lines have force. A reference to some injunctions which have been issued (for which see Appendix) will show that among the things for