BLACKLISTING.

The order under which the committee has acted made no specific reference to the subject of blacklisting, but the committee believes that the general scope of its instructions includes it.

Blacklist is defined as "a list of delinquents or defaulters, or of persons stigmatized as untrustworthy."

Evidence was offered showing that at certain times blacklisting has existed, and the committee believes that such methods are un-American and contrary to the spirit of fairness and justice, and should not be tolerated.

The committee therefore recommends the passage of the following law:

Whoever, in pursuance of a vote or agreement, designates a person, firm or corporation as one not to work for or employ, or as one from whom not to purchase an article made or sold by, or give credit to, shall be deemed guilty of blacklisting, and for each offence shall be punished by a fine not exceeding one hundred dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding six months or by both such fine and imprisonment.

WILLIAM H. FEIKER.

WILLIAM OTIS FAXON.

WILLIAM TURTLE.

ELMER C. POTTER.

CHARLES D. B. FISK.

THOMAS PATTISON.

SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT AS TO BLACK-
LISTING.

This matter has not been submitted to the committee for consideration in any of the bills presented. The undersigned do not feel that the far-reaching consequences of such an act have been sufficiently considered. We cannot say that it is good public policy to make it a criminal offence for A to advise B not to trade with C, or to punish an association of employers for refusing to employ certain individuals. Certainly if boycotting is to be made a crime, blacklisting should be placed in the same category; but such an act ought only to be placed on the statute books when the Legislature feels confident that public policy demands it.

WILLIAM W. CLARKE.
WILLIAM E. WEEKS.

SAMUEL ROSS.

DANIEL J. McDONALD.

FRANCIS J. FENNELLY.

SUBJECTS OTHER THAN INJUNCTIONS AND COMPENSATION.

SENATE, No. 116.

Section 72 of chapter 106 of the Revised Laws provides for the recovery of damages for the death of an employee where the death is not instantaneous or preceded by conscious suffering. Such action to be brought by the legal representatives.

Section 73 of said act provides for the recovery of the damages for the death of an employee where the death is instantaneous or is not preceded by conscious suffering. Such action to be brought by the widow or dependent next of kin.

Some difficulty has been experienced in the past in the bringing of actions under these two sections, for the reason that in some cases it is doubtful whether the deceased employee did or not consciously suffer as a result of the accident. Actions have been brought under one of these sections when the evidence at the trial showed that they should have been brought under the other. An action brought under one of these sections cannot be amended into an action under the other. It is to remedy this difficulty that Senate, No. 116, was offered. Under the present law, if the party bringing the action has doubt as to whether the action should be brought under one or the other of these sections, he may bring an action under each, making the allegations in each action according to the requirements of the section under which it is brought, and in careful practice this is now done. If an action is brought under one of these sections, and no action is brought under the other, and the time for bringing action under the other expires before it is ascertained that action has been brought under the wrong section, the parties' rights are gone. This is just the difficulty that is experienced

under any statute of limitations, when care is not taken in reference to the bringing of an action.

The proposed bill seeks to amend section 73 by adding thereto the following words: The widow or the next of kin who shall have such right of action may authorize the legal representatives of said employee to bring such action for her or their benefit, and said action may be brought by the legal representatives of said employee in conjunction with any action brought under the preceding section, whenever it is uncertain whether the said employee was instantly killed, or died without conscious suffering.

Were it thought necessary to enact a law which would make it more sure that the rights of a party dependent upon the death of an employee would not be lost because of the statute of limitations, this bill would seem to furnish no remedy. The widow or dependent next of kin would not authorize the legal representative of the deceased employee to bring an action for her benefit in addition to the action brought by the representative under section 72, except in cases where there was doubt as to which section the action should be brought under. If these doubts do arise, her rights may be easily secured now by bringing separate action. Under the bill, even though she should authorize such representative to bring such separate action for her, her rights would be lost if that action were not brought, just the same as they are lost now if action in her behalf is not brought. If it were deemed advisable to legislate in reference to the matter, it would be far better to provide in such legislation that if an action brought under one of these sections failed. upon the sole ground that it should have been brought under the other, that action under that other might be brought within a certain specified time after the failure of such first action; or to provide that an action brought under one of such sections, upon such failure, might, by leave of court, be amended into an action under the other of such sections. It seems to us that under existing law all her rights can be easily protected, and that no legislation is necessary.

HOUSE, No. 266.

House, No. 266, provides that in actions brought by employees against their employers to recover damages for personal injuries received in the course of the employment arising from defects or want of repair in the ways, works and machinery used in the business, the question whether the employee voluntarily assumed the risk incident to such defects or want of repair shall be one of fact, and not of law.

This is the law to-day. The passage of this act would not change in any particular the existing law or the conduct of trials under it. What the proposer of the legislation had in mind evidently was, that judges in the trials of such actions sometimes take the case from the jury on the ground. that the evidence in the case shows that the plaintiff did assume that risk. This is just what happens when in the trial of any issue the evidence leaves it clear that the fact is one way or the other; i.e., if the evidence clearly shows the existence of a fact upon the existence of which the rights of the parties depend, and there is no evidence which would warrant a finding by the jury or by the court that it did not exist, the court rules accordingly. For example, suppose that, in an action to recover on a note, in which the defendant denies that the signature to the note is his, the plaintiff introduces no evidence as to such signature. The court rules, of course, that the plaintiff cannot recover. The court's ruling, however, does not make the question "whether the defendant signed the note" one of law. It is and must be a question of law whether the evidence will sustain a finding that he did sign it. What amounts in law to a signing of a note must be a question of law, and it is upon this question that the court passes, and not on the question of fact whether the defendant did sign it. So, in a trial of an action for injuries such as is described in the bill, if the evidence shows that the plaintiff did assume the risk, and there is no evidence which would sustain a contrary finding, the court rules, of course, that he cannot recover. But the court's ruling does not make the question "whether the defendant assumed the risk" one of law. It is and must be a question of law