liance thereon the deed was accepted from the seller and the consideration paid to him. The check was not paid, and thereafter the entry of payment upon the books of the collector was canceled. The action was by the purchaser of the property to restrain the defendants from asserting as against him, who was a bona fide purchaser, that the taxes and assessments had not been paid. It was there held that the defendants were not estopped, because, in issuing the receipt, the tax collector had no intention to influence the conduct of anyone by it, and it was not apparent to him that the issuing of the receipt might operate as a representation that the taxes had been paid. It was said that, before there will be an estoppel, "there must be such intention, or that it must be so apparent that the representation will have that effect, that the intention must be presumed." The rule there stated is the same rule which is applied in this state where a public or municipal corporation is acting in a proprietary capacity as distinguished from a governmental. There is no discussion in the opinion as to the difference in the two capacities in which a municipal corporation may act.

In Franklin County v. Carstens, 68 Wash. 176, 122 Pac. 999, it was held that the defendant, which, by declaration and conduct of its officers, had induced certain conduct, would be estopped.

The basis of the Kuhl Case, which deals with a corporation acting in a governmental capacity, and that of Franklin County, which deals with a municipal corporation acting in a private capacity, are the same. If the same rule is to be applied by the court deciding the Kuhl Case when the question is one involving a governmental function as when a municipal corporation is acting in a proprietary capacity, then the view of that court would not be in harmony with the doctrine of the Franklin County Case.

In Philadelphia Mortg. & T. Co. v. Omaha, 65 Neb. 93, 57 L.R.A. 154,

90 N. W. 1005, the view was first expressed, though the question was not involved in the case, which was to the effect that estoppel would not operate against a municipal corporation acting in a governmental capacity. Upon a rehearing a second opinion was written in which that question was reserved. The language of the opinion upon rehearing, so far as it has any bearing at all, would seem to indicate that the court was leaning in the opposite direction from that indicated in the first opinion. It is of the essence of justice to have a fixed standard, and that there should not be one for the state or its municipal corporations and another for the citizen. If it should be held that the county was not estopped in a case like the present, it would seriously interfere with the facility with which real estate transactions are conducted. It is a well-known fact that it is a common occurrence for the purchaser of property, before he pays over the purchase price, to have exhibited to him receipts showing the payment of taxes, and in reliance upon these the purchase price is paid. If the purchaser cannot rely upon the official receipt of the proper officer, it would lead to endless inconvenience. It is said, however, if the doctrine of estoppel be applied, then it will interfere with the convenient practice which is now adopted by county treasurers in accepting checks in payment of the taxes and issuing a receipt therefor. receipt therefor. It can hardly be assumed that a county treasurer makes it the invariable practice to issue a receipt upon the presentation and acceptance of every check presented in the payment of taxes. In issuing the receipt a county treasurer could hardly be ignorant of the fact that it does constitute a representation, or may be relied upon by a party purchasing the property therein described, that the taxes are in fact paid. It seems to us that the better rule is that announced in Curnen v. New York, 79 N. Y. 511.

The questions whether Mrs. Seward, the respondent, would have

had a right to maintain an action against the county treasurer and his bondsmen, and whether or not the county will now have a right to maintain such action, are not now before us, and we express no opinion thereon.

The judgment will be affirmed.

Parker, Ch. J., and Holcomb, Mackintosh, and Hovey, JJ., concur. Petition for rehearing denied December 22, 1922.

The reported case (SEWARD V. FISKEN, ante, 1208) stands alone in holding that a county is estopped to dispute a tax receipt as against one dealing with the property in reliance thereon. It appeared that the county treasurer accepted a check from the owner of the land as payment of the taxes due, and delivered to him a tax receipt showing that the taxes were properly paid. The check given in payment of the taxes was dishonored for lack of sufficient funds. Subsequently the land was conveyed to the plaintiff, who purchased relying on the tax receipt exhibited by the owner, and the county is held to be estopped to dispute his title.

The case finds support, however, in several analogous cases. Thus in Philadelphia v. Anderson (Philadelphia v. Baxter) (1891) 142 Pa. 357, 12 L.R.A. 751, 21 Atl. 976, a city was held to be estopped by a certificate of a search for taxes, signed and issued by the receiver of taxes. The court said: "The law makes it the duty of the receiver of taxes to certify the liens against any particular piece of real estate.

.

If this certificate is false and misleading, one who acts upon it in good faith has a right to insist that the city is bound by it. The city is not above the duty to deal fairly and justly with its citizens, and to speak the truth of them when the duty to speak for their information rests clearly on it. . . . It was the proper and the only reliable source of information open to the interested inquirer. It was kept by and in the custody of the receiver, whose duty it was to certify liens appearing upon it. When ap

plied to, it was his duty, as the representative of the city, to state truly the liens against the real estate inquired about. The purchaser

applied for and had a right to receive a certificate in proper form, informing him of the exact amount of the demands of the city for unpaid taxes. A certificate intended to convey the needed information was furnished, and, relying on the truth of its statement, the title was taken and the purchase money paid over. Having thus led the purchaser to pay the amount of the taxes of 1875 to his vendor as purchase money, the city cannot now be permitted to set up the mistake of its officers as a reason for compelling the payment of the money a second time. If it was a mistake, as it was acted upon in good faith by the purchaser, the city cannot now assert a lien for the taxes of 1875, or deny the facts which the certificate asserted."

So, in Curnen v. New York (1880) 79 N. Y. 511, it was held that the act of a city officer in making a tax on the records as paid creates an estoppel as against a purchaser of the land relying on the record.

But the opposite view was held in Kuhl v. Jersey City (1872) 23 N. J. Eq. 84. In that case it appeared that the collector of taxes, on receiving a check from the owner of the land, signed and delivered a tax receipt. On the same day the land was conveyed to the plaintiff, who accepted the deed, relying on the receipt. Subsequently, when the check given to the tax collector was not paid, the defendants, who had entered the taxes as paid on the proper tax records,

lar v. Kellar, 142 Tenn. 524, 221 S. W. 189; Parlow v. Turner, 132 Tenn. 339, 178 S. W. 766; Hux v. Russell, 138 Tenn. 272, 197 S. W. 865.

Hall, J., delivered the opinion of the court:

An action of damages brought by Mrs. Anna Foster, who will hereinafter be referred to as plaintiff, against James M. Ingle and wife, Mrs. James M. Ingle, who will hereinafter be referred to as defendants, to recover for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff growing out of defendant Mrs. Ingle driving an automobile over and against her on Market street in the city of Chattanooga, on March 13, 1921.

On the trial of the case in the circuit court of Hamilton county, before the court and a jury, at the conclusion of all the evidence, defendants moved the court for a directed verdict in their favor. This motion was overruled, and the case was given to the jury, who returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff against defendants for the sum of $2,500.

Defendant James M. Ingle made a separate motion for a new trial, assigning, among other grounds, that there was no material evidence offered on the trial showing that he was liable for plaintiff's injuries, and that the trial court erred in refusing to direct a verdict in his favor at the conclusion of all the evidence; and moved the court for a directed verdict in his favor, notwithstanding the verdict of the jury.

The court, after consideration of said motion, granted the same, and directed a verdict in favor of defendant James M. Ingle, and plaintiff's suit, as to him, was dismissed.

Mrs. James M. Ingle also made a motion for a new trial, which was overruled, and judgment was entered against her in accordance with the verdict of the jury for the sum of $2,500, from which she did not appeal. Plaintiff also made a motion for a new trial, challenging the action of the trial judge directing a verdict in favor of defendant

James M. Ingle, notwithstanding the verdict of the jury, which was overruled, and she appealed from the court's judgment dismissing her suit as to said defendant to the court of civil appeals. That court affirmed the judgment, and the case is now before this court upon Mrs. Foster's petition for writ of certiorari, and for review.

The evidence shows that the automobile mobile which collided with the plaintiff, and caused her injuries, belonged to Mrs. Ingle, and was being operated or driven by her along Market street in the city of Chattanooga, for her own pleasure. There was also evidence which tended to show that the collision with the plaintiff was due to the negligence of the defendant Mrs. Ingle. Mr. Ingle was not in the car, nor was he present when the accident occurred.

The question presented by the assignments of error for determination is whether or not the defendant James M. Ingle is liable for a tort committed by his wife while in the control and management of her separate property.

"That

Chapter 126, Public Acts of 1919, § 1, provides as follows: married women be, and are, hereby fully emancipated from all disability on account of coverture, and the common law as to the disability of married women and its effects on the rights of property of the wife, is totally abrogated, except as set out in § 2 of this act and subsequent section hereof; and marriage shall not impose any disability or incapacity on a woman as to the ownership, acquisition, or disposition of property of any sort, or as to her capacity to make contracts and to do all acts in reference to property which she could lawfully do if she were not married; but every woman now married, or hereafter to be married shall have the same capacity to acquire, hold, manage, control, use, enjoy, and dispose of, all property, real and personal, in possession and to make any contract in reference to it, and to bind herself