lation, but deprives a party of the use of his property without regard to the public good, under the pretense of the preservation of health, when it is manifest that such is not the object and purpose of the regulation, will be set aside as a clear and direct infringement of the right of property without any compensating advantages." Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 561, 50 L. ed. 596, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 341, 4 Ann. Cas. 1175, is cited by relator. Mr. Justice Harlan wrote the opinion for the court. At page 592 of 200 U. S., this is said: "And the validity of a police regulation, whether established directly by the state or by some public body acting under its sanction, must depend upon the circumstances of each case and the character of the regulation, whether arbitrary or reasonable, and whether really designed to accomplish a legitimate public purpose. Private property cannot be taken without compensation for public use under a police regulation relating strictly to the public health, the public morals, or the public safety, any more than under a police regulation having no relation to such matters, but only to the general welfare. The foundations upon which the power rests are in every case the same. This power, as said in Carthage v. Frederick, 122 N. Y. 268, 10 L.R.A. 178, 19 Am. St. Rep. 490, 25 N. E. 480, has always been exercised by municipal corporations 'by making regulations to preserve order, to promote freedom of communication, and to facilitate the transaction of business in crowded communities."" See Haller Sign Works v. Physical Culture Training School, 34 L.R.A. (N.S.) 998 and note (249 Ill. 436, 94 N. E. 920); Re Opinion of Justices, 234 Mass. 597, 127 N. E. 525. It clearly appears to us that the ordinance goes be-extent of statu- yond the scope of authority conferred by the legislature. That part of the tory authority. validity. ordinance which confines the building area to 25 per cent of the lot is SO restrictive that -denial of perit is an unreason- mit for churchable exercise of the power granted by the legislature, and for that reason that part of the ordinance must be held to be invalid. The objection of the city engineer having been based solely on the requirement of that part of an ordinance which we hold to be invalid, it follows that the judgment of the District Court must be, and it hereby is, in all things, affirmed. Rose, J., dissenting: The ordinance prohibiting the owner of a lot from covering more than one fourth of it with buildings in a residential district had its origin in an exalted conception of civic life. The goal of the city council was public improvement, leading to better, healthier, more comfortable and happier conditions. The rich were not to have a monopoly of beautiful surroundings, with their wholesome effect on health, morality, and usefulness. By means of the ordinance condemned the city council meant to touch the pulse of municipal power for the general welfare. Parents and children of all classes, without regard to former environments, were to breathe pure air, at least in the streets, and see flowering shrubs around private dwellings, and listen to the fluted notes of birds in hedges. To some extent these privileges are already enjoyed in public parks. The esthetic features of municipal activity for the good of the public ought to be recognized and respected. Individual rights and private property must be protected, but they are not gods of government. Ownership and control of lots among urban homes are limited by the proper exercise of police power for the general welfare. Private rights are menaced when the good of society is neglected. When courts interfere with municipal legislation to improve prove conditions generally, they should point out a limitation of pow (108 Neb. 859, 189 N. W. 617.) er fixed by the supreme law, and find facts showing an unmistakable usurpation. In my opinion the reasoning and conclusion of the majority do not meet the proper tests. When the regulatory power of the city to enact laws for the public good is considered with the individual rights of relator, the ordinance does not seem to me to be unreasonable. ANNOTATION. Validity of regulations as to relative area of parcel that may be covered by building. 547, the regulation provided that "no dwelling house shall be erected within" certain "building lines In 9 A.L.R. at page 1040, the Md. 202, L.R.A.1917A, 1216, 98 Atl. validity of a building regulation requiring an area or open space for light and air is exhaustively discussed. A closely related question, that of the constitutionality of a city or town planning statute or ordinance, including the constitutionality of building-line statutes, is treated in 12 A.L.R. 679. The present annotation is confined to the validity of a statute or ordinance de-. signed to prevent the construction of a building covering more than a specified percentage of the area of the lot or parcel. The reported case (STATE EX REL. WESTMINSTER PRESBY. CHURCH V. EDGCOMB, ante, 437) holds that a statute empowering cities of a certain class to impose regulations "designed to secure the safety from fire and other dangers, and to promote the public health and welfare, including, so far as conditions may permit, provisions for adequate light, air, and convenience of access," does not permit a city of the class mentioned to impose unreasonable regulations on the owners of real property with respect to the proportion of the area thereof that they may cover by a proposed building. The court says that the part of an ordinance confining the building area to 25 per cent of the lot is so restrictive that it is an unreasonable exercise of the power granted to it by the legislature. One other case has passed on the validity of a regulation designed to prevent the construction of a building covering more than a certain area of the lot. In that case, Byrne v. Maryland Realty Co. (1916) 129 . . unless the same is constructed as a separate and unattached building; and if such dwellings are of frame construction they shall be at least 20 feet apart, and if of stone or brick construction they shall be at least 10 feet apart." It appeared that the Maryland Realty Company, a body corporate, owned a lot in fee, for which it paid $15,000, lying within the limits described in the act. The lot had a frontage of 259 feet and an average depth of from 100 feet to 167 feet and 3 inches to a 10-foot alley. The appellee desired to improve its lot by the erection thereon of semidetached, two-story, slag-roof, brick dwellings; and, after securing a permit from the appeal tax court, it filed with the inspector of buildings of Baltimore city plans and specifications showing the character of buildings it proposed to erect, subject to the supervision of the building inspector, and in conformity with the building laws of Baltimore city. The inspector of buildings refused to issue a permit for the erection of the proposed buildings. The appellee thereupon filed a petition for mandamus to compel the issuing of the permit for the erection of the buildings shown on the plans and specifications filed with him. The regulation was held to be unconstitutional, the court saying: "The character of houses which the the appellee is asking to build upon his property is described by the witnesses as twostory brick semidetached houses with front and rear porches, bay windows on the front, heated by steam, and to cost about $2,500 each to build. It is stated that they would have ornamental fronts and would make attractive houses, thoroughly modern and up to date, and would have a ten years' guaranteed slag roof, and that they would be equal to, if not better than, the same character of houses already erected in the neighborhood. The houses would be semidetached, that is, would be built in pairs, with a distance of 8 feet between each pair of houses, and would front on Garrison avenue. The record shows that, because of the class of buildings surrounding the lot and in close proximity thereto on the south, west, and north, the only businesslike method of improving the lot is by the class of improvements proposed, and that it would be financial suicide to erect cottages on the lot with a view of selling them. There was some suggestion in the testimony that houses such as it is proposed to erect upon this lot would be a menace to the public health, and, therefore, their erection might be prohibited under the police power for these reasons. But there is no substantial support for this contention on the There is nothing inherently dangerous to the public safety or the public health in properly constructed semidetached brick houses, and to prohibit their construction upon this ground would be carrying the police power to an extent that would alarm the public. There is no authority for such a proposition in this facts. state, and we have found no American case to support it. So far as fire risk is concerned, the facts show that the proposed houses would be less dangerous than the frame cottages in the neighborhood. Garrison avenue and the character of the improvements along that avenue from Walbrook junction are fairly accurately described in the resolution of the Forest Park Improvement Association. It is a fine avenue, and the houses fronting on it are attractive and beautiful, and there can be no doubt that a majority of the residents there are opposed to the building of these proposed houses. It would appear, however, that the extent of depreciation to property on the avenue has been very much exaggerated. It is doubtful if the proposed construction would have any appreciably injurious effect upon the property on either side of the avenue, lying between Walbrook junction and Clayton road. It would undoubtedly be objectionable to some residents in close proximity to it, and it would undoubtedly depreciate to some extent the value of some property. But this court has no power, under the plain and settled rules of law, to prevent the construction of the houses. The legislature has no power to pass the act. The act does not relate to the police power, and its enforcement would deprive the appellee of property rights guaranteed by the Constitution, which cannot be invaded for purely esthetic purposes under the guise of police power." A. S. M. SECURITY INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW HAVEN, CONNECTICUT, Plff. in Err., (85 Okla. 171, 205 Pac. 151.) Insurance delay in issuing policy - liability. 1. An insurance company may be held liable in damages to an applicant (85 Okla. 171, 205 Pac. 151.) for insurance where there has been unreasonable delay in perfecting and forwarding an application to the company for acceptance or rejection, by the soliciting agent of the company or other agent who has authority to supervise the solicitation and preparation of applications, and the question of the unreasonableness of the delay is one for the trier of the facts in each particular case, under proper instruction of the court. [See note on this question beginning on page 463.] -power of agent. 2. Agents representing insurance companies in soliciting insurance can bind the company with regard to matters within the limited and restricted scope of their authority; that is to say, matters pertaining to the taking and preparation of applications for insurance for submission to the company; and an insurance company is chargeable with the negligence of such agent in failing, for an unreasonable length of time, to forward an application of insurance for acceptance or rejection to the company. [See 14 R. C. L. 871, 896; 3 R. C. L. Supp. 305, 310.] -liability of insurers. 3. Insurance companies are held, in law, to a broader legal responsibility than are parties to purely private contracts or transactions. This is based upon the fact that those companies act under franchise from the state, and the policy of the state in granting such franchises proceeds upon the theory that it is in the interest of the public, to the end that indemnity upon specific contingencies should be provided those who are eligible and desire it, and for their protection the state regulates, inspects, and supervises their business. An insurance company having solicited and obtained applications for insurance, and having received payment of the fees or premiums exacted, they are bound either to furnish the indemnity the state has authorized them to furnish, or decline so to do within such reasonable time as will enable them to act intelligently and advisedly thereon, or suffer the consequences flowing from their neglect so to do. [See 14 R. C. L. 896.] -soliciting agent as agent of company. 4. A soliciting agent of an insurance company, in all matters pertaining to the taking of applications for insurance, is the agent of the company, and not of the insured, and the Headnotes by ELTING, J. acts, wrongs, and neglect of the agent are the acts, wrongs, and neglect of the company, and the insurance company cannot limit their responsibility for the acts of said agents and avoid the relation of principal by placing provisions in applications and contracts of insurance limiting their liability, and responsibility, or disavowing said acts, and this is so since all such provisions are declared void by statute. Appeal — affirmance on facts. 5. Under the facts in this case, where a soliciting agent procured an application for insurance from the applicants, with a note covering the premium, the agent being duly authorized thereunto by the company, but failed to get the proper due date fixed in the note, and failed to put in the note the amount required by the company for deferred payment of the premium, and immediately after delivery of said note and application the general agent discovered the mistakes in drawing the note, and the soliciting agent notified the applicants, and the applicants instructed the soliciting agent to make the required alterations in the note, and the agents of the company retained said note and application without making further demands upon the applicants, and failed to make the alterations in said note and application as directed, and failed to forward the same to the company at the place designated, and a loss is sustained by the applicants of their property sought to be insured, and there being no contention that there was not a reasonable time to have gotten the application to the company before the loss was sustained, or reasonable time in which to inspect said risk, or that said risk was one that the company would not insure, and while this state of facts is not sufficient to constitute in a technical sense an express or implied contract of insurance, yet it is sufficient to constitute a breach of legal duty and actionable neglect for which the company is liable to the applicant for whatever damage he reasonably suffered as the proximate result thereof, and the action of the trial court, awarding damages upon such a state of facts, will not be disturbed upon appeal. ERROR to the District Court for Grant County (Bowles, J.) to review a judgment in favor of plaintiffs in an action brought to recover damages for failure of defendant's agent promptly to secure them a contract of insurance. Affirmed. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. Messrs. H. O. Glasser and W. J. Otjen for plaintiff in error. Messrs. Simons & McKnight, for defendants in error: U. G. Parker, as a soliciting agent of the defendant insurance company, was, in all matters and things connected with the taking of said application and the making out of the note and application, the agent of the defendant, and not of the plaintiffs. Liverpool & L. & G. Ins. Co. v. McLaughlin, Okla. 174 Pac. 248. Defendant was liable to plaintiffs for failure of its agent to procure the insurance. Boyer v. State Farmers' Mut. Hail Ins. Co. 86 Kan. 442, 40 L.R.A. (N.S.) 164, 121 Pac. 329, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 671; Pfiester v. Missouri State L. Ins. Co. 85 Kan. 97, 116 Pac. 245; Phipps v. Union Mut. Ins. Co. 50 Okla. 135, 150 Pac. 1083; State Mut. Ins. Co. v. Green, 62 Okla. 214, L.R.A.1917F, 663, 166 Pac. 105; W. B. Goode & Co. v. Georgia Home Ins. Co. 92 Va. 392, 30 L.R.A. 842, 53 Am. St. Rep. 817, 23 S. E. 744; Northwestern Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Neafus, 145 Ky. 563, 36 L.R.A. (N:S.) 1211, 140 S. W. 1026; Sullivan v. Phenix Ins. Co. 34 Kan. 174, 8 Pac. 112. in said petition the defendant company was a corporation, with its principal office and place of business at New Haven, Connecticut, and that said company maintained a western branch of its business with headquarters at Rockford, Illinois, and that said company was a corporation engaged in the business of insuring property against fire and other hazards; that plaintiffs were residents of the state of Oklahoma. That on or about June 5, 1917, the plaintiffs were the owners of separator, feeder, stacker, weigher, and main belt, which machinery was new and had just been purchased by plaintiffs. That at said time W. J. Otjen, of Enid, Oklahoma, was the general agent of defendant company in the state of Oklahoma, with office at the city of Enid, Garfield county, and that U. G. Parker, of Wichita, Kansas, was the duly authorized and acting agent of the defendant company for the purpose of soliciting and receiving applications for insurance for said company. That on the 5th day of June, 1917, Elting, J., delivered the opinion of U. G. Parker, soliciting agent, solicthe court: This suit was commenced in the district court of Grant county, Oklahoma, by O. F. Cameron and Lewis. Rion, plaintiffs below, defendants in error herein, against the Security Insurance Company of New Haven, Connecticut, defendant below, plaintiff in error herein, by filing a petition on the 30th day of November, 1917. The defendant below entered its appearance by and through its attorney, George W. Buckner. In said petition the plaintiffs alleged in substance the following: That at all times referred to ited these plaintiffs to insure the above-described threshing machinery and equipment in the said company, and which machinery had just been purchased by the plaintiffs, but had not yet been delivered to them. That the plaintiffs at such time agreed with U. G. Parker, as such soliciting agent for said company, to insure said property with said company as soon as the property had been received, and, in pursuance of said agreement, the said U. G. Parker filled out a written and printed application, addressed to said insurance company, for insurance on the above-described threshing machin |