1. After the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment in this case
were filed, two successive motions for a new trial were made on behalf
of defendant; whereupon the former findings were withdrawn, and new
and amended findings and opinion filed. Held, that as these amend-
ments were made at defendant's request, the existing conclusions of
law and judgment were not thereby disturbed. United States v. St.
Louis & Mississippi Valley Transportation Co., 247.
2. The evidence adduced shows that the facts found were sufficient to war.
rant the court below in holding that the collision in the Mississippi
River at New Orleans, whereby the Transportation Company lost a ves-
sel, was the result of the negligence of the officers in command of the
United States vessels. Ib.
3. There was also culpable negligence in the United States officers in an-
choring in an unusual and improper position. Ib.
4. Upon the findings made the Transportation Company was not charge-
able with contributory negligence. Ib.
See JURISDICTION OF THIS Court, 16, 17, 21, 22.
The Supreme Court of Missouri having necessarily decided that the Kansas
City Court of Appeals, in passing upon the claim of immunity in this
case, was the final court of Missouri where such question could be de-
cided, it follows that the writ of error properly ran to the Kansas City
Court of Appeals, and that the claim of absence of jurisdiction was
without foundation; and, for the reasons given in the opinion of the
court in Tullock v. Mulvane, ante, 497, that there was error committed
by the Kansas City Court of Appeals in affirming the action of the
trial court in allowing in the judgment rendered by it, attorneys' fees
as an element of damage upon the injunction bond, contrary to the con-
trolling rule on this subject enunciated by this court, by which the
courts of the United States are governed in requiring the execution of
such instruments. Missouri, Kansas and Texas Railway Company v.
Elliott, 530.
1. Referees in bankruptcy exercise much of the judicial authority of the
court of bankruptcy, and may enter orders to show cause subject to
revision by the District Court. Muller v. Nugent, 1.
2. Commitment until assets of a bankrupt are surrendered pursuant to or-
der does not constitute imprisonment for debt. Ib.
3. The bankruptcy court has power to compel the surrender of money or
other assets of the bankrupt in his possession, or that of some one for
him, on the petition and rule to show cause. Ib.
4. The filing of a petition in bankruptcy is a caveat to all the world, and in
effect an attachment and injunction, and on adjudication and qualifica-
tion of trustee, the bankrupt's property is placed in the custody of the
bankruptcy court, and title becomes vested in the trustee. Ib.
5. The refusal to surrender property of the bankrupt does not in itself create
an adverse claim at the time the petition is filed. Ib.
6. A general assignment for the benefit of creditors had been made under
the statutes of Kentucky in that behalf and a suit involving the admin-
istration and settlement of the assigned estate was pending in the state
Circuit Court, when a petition in bankruptcy was filed against the as-
signors, to which the assignee was made defendant, although no spe-
cial relief was prayed for as against him, but an injunction was granted
restraining all the defendants from taking any steps affecting the estate,
and especially in the suit pending in the state court. The assignee had
paid into court in that suit a considerable amount of money, which, on
the trustee in bankruptcy becoming a party to the suit, had been paid
over to him by order of the state court. Louisville Trust Co. v. Com-
ingor, 18.
7. Rules were laid on the assignee by the referee in the bankruptcy pro-
ceedings to show cause why he should not pay over the sums of $3398.90
and of $3200, alleged to belong to the bankrupt's estate, in response to
which the assignee showed as cause that he had paid the $3200 to coun-
sel for services rendered to him as assignee, and had retained and ex-
pended the $3398.90 as his own commissions as such, all before the
petition was filed, and he also, prior to the final order of the District
Court, objected before the referee, and before the District Court, that
he could not be proceeded against by summary process for want of
jurisdiction. The rules were made absolute by the referee and the
assignee ordered to pay over the two sums in question, and that action
was affirmed by the District Court. Held: (1) That as to these sums
the assignee asserted adverse claims existing at the time the petition
was filed, which could not be disposed of on summary proceeding.
(2) That the bare fact that the assignee was named as one of the de-
fendants to the petition in bankruptcy did not make him a party to the
bankruptcy proceedings for all purposes. (3) That in responding to
the rules laid on him, the assignee did not voluntarily consent that he
might be proceeded against in that manner, and that jurisdiction to
do so could not be maintained. Ib.
BOND OF A CLERK OF A CIRCUIT COURT.
1. Congress, by the statutes referred to in the opinion of the court, intended
the bond of a clerk of a Circuit Court should be for the protection of
all suitors, public or private. Howard v. United States, 676.
2. As the clerk had the right to receive the money in question: as he failed,
to the injury of the suitor from whom he received it, with the sanction
of the court in a pending cause, to deposit it as required by law, and ap-
propriated it to his own use; and as his bond was for the protectior of
private suitors as well as for the Government, there in no sound reason
why the plaintiff could not enforce his rights by a suit in the name of
the United States for his benefit. Ib.
1. Section 218 of the constitution of the State of Kentucky reads as fol-
lows: "It shall be unlawful for any person or corporation, owning or
operating a railroad in this State, or any common carrier, to charge or
receive any greater compensation in the aggregate for the transporta-
tion of passengers, or of property of like kind, under substantially
similar circumstances and conditions, for a shorter than for a longer
distance over the same line, in the same direction, the shorter being
included within the longer distance; but this shall not be construed as
authorizing any common carrier, or person or corporation, owning or
operating a railroad in this State, to receive as great compensation for
a shorter as for a longer distance: Provided, That upon application to
the Railroad Commission, such common carrier, or person, or corpora-
tion owning or operating a railroad in this State, may in special cases,
after investigation by the Commission, be authorized to charge less for
longer than for shorter distances for the transportation of passengers
or property; and the Commission may, from time to time, prescribe
the extent to which such common carrier, or person, or corporation
owning or operating a railroad in this State, may be relieved from the
operation of this section," as construed by the courts of that State,
and so far as it is made applicable to or affects interstate commerce, it
is invalid. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Eubank, 27.
2. Under the facts of this case, and the interpretation given of the charter
of the city of Portland by the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon,
this court is of opinion that the plaintiffs in error have not been de-
prived of their property without due process of law. King v. Portland
City, 61.
3. The city government of Titusville, in Pennsylvania, imposed a license
tax upon persons carrying on certain occupations in that city. This
court holds that it was a tax on the privilege of doing business, regu-
lated by the amount of the sales, and was not repugnant to the Con-
stitution of the United States. Clark v. Titusville, 329.
4. If, looking at all the circumstances which attend, or may ordinarily at-
tend the pursuit of a particular calling, a State thinks that certain
admitted evils cannot be successfully reached unless that calling be actu-
ally prohibited, the courts cannot interfere unless, looking through
mere forms and at the substance of the matter, they can say that the
statute, enacted professedly to protect the public morals, has no real
or substantial relation to that object, but is a clear, unmistakable in-
fringement of rights secured by the fundamental law. Booth v. Illi-
nois, 425.
5. It must be assumed with regard to section 130 of the Criminal Code of
Illinois touching options to sell or buy grain or other property at a
future time, that the legislature of the State was of opinion that an
effectual mode to suppress gambling grain contracts was to declare
illegal all options to sell or buy at a future time; and this court cannot
say that the means employed were not appropriate to the end sought
to be attained and which it was competent for the State to accom-
plish.
6. This court cannot adjudge that the legislature of Illinois transcended
the limits of constitutional authority, when it enacted the statute in
question. Ib.
7. Where a statute providing for the opening of streets requires notice to
the parties whose land is to be taken for the street, the fact that it makes
no provision for giving notice to the owners of land liable to be assessed
for the improvement, does not deprive such owners of their property
without due process of law, and is not otherwise obnoxious to the
Fourteenth Amendment. Goodrich v. Detroit, 432.
8. The interest of neighboring property owners, who may possibly there-
after be assessed for the benefit to their property accruing from open-
ing a street, is too remote to require notice of such improvement, in
which they have no direct interest. Ib.
9. No notice is required to be given to individual property owners of a res-
olution fixing an assessment district and levying a gross amount there-
on for benefits, where the statute provides for a hearing in relation to
the proportion each piece of property shall bear to the whole cost of
the improvement, and an opportunity is given to the owner of the land
to be heard upon the question of the benefit derived by him from the
improvement. Ib.
10. The fact that certain parcels of land condemned for the improvement
are defectively described, is no defence to a proceeding to assess bene-
fits upon other property. Ib.
11. An unconstitutional law cannot be held valid as to particular parties on
the ground of estoppel, and executed as a law. O'Brien v. Wheelock,
12. In accordance with a certain act of the General Assembly of Illinois,
bonds had been issued by commissioners appointed for the purpose of
constructing a levee, and assessments had been made to pay for them
against lands alleged to have been benefited; some of the land owners
contested judgment on the assessments, and the act was adjudged by
the Supreme Court of the State to be unconstitutional; the bonds and
the assessments fell with the act, and the land owners were not estopped
from denying its validity. Ib.
13. A party who has received the full benefit of proceedings under a law
found to be unconstitutional may, on occasion, be compelled to respond
on the theory of implied contract. Ib.
14. But in this case the land owners had not received and could not receive
the benefits contemplated. The scheme embraced not only the con-
struction but the maintenance of the levee, and its maintenance by com-
pulsory process failed with the law; the consideration was indivisible
and incapable of apportionment, and the evidence showed that by the
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