See JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT, 12, 13.
1. It is the settled doctrine of this court that the concurrent decisions of
two courts upon a question of fact will be followed, unless shown to
be clearly erroneous; and in this case, after examining the evidence,
it seems to this court that the findings of the court below were justi-
fied by it. Brainard v. Buck, 99.
2. It is contended by appellants that the decree in the Circuit Court against
them ought to be set aside because they have not had the hearing in
that court to which they were entitled by law; that they were not
served with process; that counsel unauthorized by them entered their
appearance, and after having wrongfully entered their appearance
failed to take the proper steps for the protection of their rights. It
is also contended by other parties than the appellants, that there was
no real controversy between the parties nominally opposed to each
other, and that the litigation was in fact carried on under the direc-
tion and control of the plaintiff. Held, that questions of this kind
may be examined, upon motion supported by affidavits, and that it is
the duty of a court to make such inquiry. Hatfield v. King, 162.
3. Before any proceedings could rightfully be taken against the defend-
ants, it was essential that they be brought into court by service of
process, or that a lawful appearance be made in their behalf; and, in
this case, it is quite clear that the counsel was not authorized to appear
for Mr. Browning. Ib.
4. It is fitting that this investigation should be had, in the first place, in
the court where the wrong is charged to have been done, and before
the judge who, if the charges are correct, has been imposed upon by
counsel; and it may be wise that both examination and cross-examina-
tion be had in his presence. Ib.
5. The motion made in the court below on behalf of the United States for
a continuance of this cause and the application for a rehearing were
addressed to the discretion of the trial court, and this court cannot
reverse the decree below merely upon the ground that the trial court
erred in its denial of those motions; but, as it is quite clear that the
record does not contain evidence of a material character, and that the
absence of such evidence is due to the action of the trial court in not
giving sufficient time to the Government to prepare its case, this court
cannot resist the conviction that if it proceeds to a final decree upon
the present record great wrong may be done; and it reverses the de-
cree below, without considering the merits, and remands the case with
orders that leave should be granted to both sides to adduce further
evidence. United States v. Rio Grande Irrigation Company, 416.
See TAXATION, 3.
1. This case is a continuation of Southern Pacific Railroad Company v.
United States, 168 U. S. 1, brought to quiet the title of the Government
to lands within the limits of the forfeited grant to the Atlantic and
Pacific Railroad Company. The questions in this case arise between
the United States and parties holding title or claiming rights to lands
by deed from or contract with the railroad company. The title of the
company having been adjudged void, the acts of March 3, 1887, 24 Stat.
556; of February 12, 1896, 29 Stat. 6; of March 2, 1896, 28 Stat. 42, were
passed for the purpose of upholding the titles of parties who, in good
faith, had purchased lands from railroad companies which, though
supposed to be part of their grants, proved not to be so. The first
section of the act of March 2, 1896, reads: "But no patent to any
lands held by a bona fide purchaser shall be vacated or annulled, but
the right and title of such purchaser is hereby confirmed." Held:
1. That the facts bring this case within the provisions of that section;
and that the Circuit Court rightly confirmed the title to lands patented
under it; 2. That the unpatented lands were so situated with reference
to the constructed road of the Southern Pacific, as to be within the scope
of its grant, and that the act was not intended to be limited to cases of
purchases from the railroad company prior to its date; 3. That while
the act was remedial, and to be liberally construed, yet to sustain the
purchase in controversy in this case as one made in good faith, would
ignore the plainest provisions of law in respect to bona fide purchasers,
and would uphold almost any kind of speculative purchase. United
States v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co., 49.
2. It having been settled by Lomax v. Pickering, 173 U. S. 26, that when
the consent of the Secretary of the Interior is necessary to give effect
to a deed of public land, that approval may be retroactive, and take
effect by way of relation as of the date of the deed, and it appearing
from the fact of the approval by the Secretary in this case that the In-
dian grantor received full payment for his land, and was in no manner
imposed upon in the conveyance, and as the plaintiffs have no equitable
rights superior to those of the grantee in that deed, Held that the title
conveyed by the deed must be upheld. Lykins v. McGrath, 169.
3. Under the Court of Private Land Claims' Act a party holding from the
Spanish or Mexican Government a title that was complete and perfect
at the date of the treaty, may apply for a confirmation of such title
upon condition that, if any portion of such lands has been sold or
granted by the United States to any other person, such title from the
United States to such other person shall remain valid; and in such case
the grantee may obtain judgment against the United States for the
value of lands so granted. United States v. Martinez, 441.
4. Though the act requires that the petitioners shall set forth in their orig-
inal petition the names of such adverse patentees, or persons in posses-
sion, if it be admitted that such adverse possessors or claimants do
hold under grants from the United States, and there is no dispute as to
boundaries, they need not be made parties, as they could not be affected
by the decree. Ib.
5. So while the act contemplates that notice shall be given such adverse
holders, and the claim for a money judgment incorporated in the orig-
inal petition, relief would not be refused solely upon that ground, if
sufficient excuse were shown for the omission to make these grantees parties. Ib.
6 But where the original petition for confirmation alleged that there were no such adverse holders or claimants, and no effort appears to have been made to ascertain the facts for more than seven years after such petition was filed, although it appeared such facts were easily ascertainable, it was held that some excuse should be set forth for this long delay, and that a supplemental petition for the value of the lands patented would not be entertained. Ib.
7. Ainsa v. United States, 161 U. S. 208, reaffirmed. Reloj Cattle Co. v. United States, 624.
8. The grant asked to be confirmed was a grant by quantity according to the laws when it was made. Ib.
9. As the lawful area of the grant was south of the boundary line between the United States and Mexico, there could be no confirmation in this country, and moreover, the owners had obtained full satisfaction therefor from Mexico before this petition was filed, and no legal or equitable claim therefor existed against the United States. Ib.
10. Claims for demasias or overplus, in respect of which the conditions were unfulfilled, are imperfect claims, and such a claim as set up in this case was barred by limitation. Ib.
11. This case is governed by Reloj Cattle Company v. United States, just decided. Ainsa v. United States, 639.
12. The grant was a grant by quantity, and the lawful area was south of the international boundary line, and had been set off to the owners by Mexico. Ib.
13. The right to acquire demasias or overplus was not a vested right, and where the conditions were unfulfilled in accordance with the terms of the grant at the time of the cession, claims to demasias cannot be confirmed. Ib.
14. From its examination of the evidence in this case this court concurs in the view of the Court of Private Land Claims that a definite location and possession of the grant here in question, prior to the date of the Gadsden treaty, are shown with reasonable certainty, and affirms the decree of that court confirming the claim to the extent of the four sitios granted and paid for. United States v. Camou, 572.
15. The decree of the Court of Private Land Claims denying confirmation of the grant involved in this case, on the ground of uncertainty, affirmed. Arivaca Land & Cattle Co. v. United States, 649.
16. Claims to demasias, the conditions to acquiring, which were unperformed at the time of the date fixed in the Gadsden treaty, are not open to confirmation by the Court of Private Land Claims. Ib.
17. Under the act of Congress of March 3, 1891, c. 539, the Court of Private Land Claims has no jurisdiction to confirm or reject, or to pass upon the merits of a claim to any land, the right to which has been lawfully acted upon and decided by Congress. United States v. Baca, 653. 18. While a contest over a preemption entry was pending, Congress passed an act confirming the entry and directing the patent to issue, which was done. Held, That the act was within the power of Congress, and
that its operation could not be defeated by a contestant who had never
made an entry on the land, nor perfected the right to do so.
v. Lincoln Land Company, 660.
This was an action to recover from the railway company the value of plain-
tiffs' cotton destroyed by fire while in the company's cars on its tracks
near its terminal wharf. On the facts Held: 1. That the obvious dan-
ger resulting from the use of locomotives about so easily ignitible a
material as cotton was clear and the jury would have been reasonably
justified in drawing the inference that it had caused the fire; 2. That
the proof showed negligence in the care of the property; 3. That the
jury would have had reasonable ground to infer negligence from the
inadequacy of the fire apparatus, and from the want of instructions as
to its use, or competent men to handle it. Marande v. Texas & Pacific
Railway Co., 173.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1.
ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY.
The Detroit Citizens' Street Railway Company, at the time this action was
commenced, was operating upwards of one hundred and thirty-five
miles of street railways in Detroit, under grants and permissions made
by the city government of Detroit, and by the statutes of Michigan set
forth in the statement of facts and in the opinion of the court in this
This litigation arises out of the different constructions placed
by the parties upon the statutes of Michigan, called respectively the
Tram-railway Act, and the Street-railway Act, both in force when said
company acquired its powers. The provisions made by those statutes
are summed up in the statement of facts. Held: (1) That this was not
such a case as on its face equity could have no jurisdiction over, and
that, considering the public interests involved, a case is made out for
following the general rule that a defence of want of equity jurisdic-
tion will not be recognized where it has not been taken by answer,
or in any other manner, and is not insisted upon on the hearing before
the court; (2) That there can be no question in this court as to the
competency of a state legislature, unless prohibited by constitutional
provisions, to authorize a municipal corporation to contract with a
street railway company as to the rate of fares, and so to bind, during
the specified period, any future common council from altering or in
any way interfering with such contract; (3) That such a contract hav-
ing once been made, the power of the city over the subject, so far as
altering the rates of fare or other matters properly involved in and be-
ing a part of the contract, is suspended for the period of the running
of the contract; (4) That binding agreements had been made and en-
tered into, between the city on the one side and the companies on the
other, relating to rates of fare, and such agreements could not be al-
tered without the consent of both sides; (5) That those binding agree-
ments constituted a contract as to the rates, equally binding with that
in regard to taxes; (6) That the rate of fare having been fixed by posi
tive agreement, under express legislative authority, the subject was
not open to alteration thereafter by the common council alone, under
the right to prescribe from time to time the rules and regulations for
the running and operation of the road; (7) That the language of the
ordinance which provides that the rate of fare for one passenger shall
not be more than five cents does not give any right to the city to reduce
it below the rate of five cents established by the company; (8) That
the provisions in the Tram-railway Act and Street-railway Act referred
to are entirely harmonious, and may be fully carried out, so as to in-
volve neither incongruity nor inconsistency; (9) That the extension of
the terms of the city's consent beyond the limits of the corporate life
of the companies was not illegal and void; (10) That the fixing of rates,
being among the vital portions of the agreement between the parties,
it cannot be supposed that there was any intention to permit the com-
mon council, in its discretion, to make an alteration which might be
fatal to the pecuniary success of the company. Detroit v. Detroit Citi-
zens' Street Railway Company, 368.
1. What the constitution of the State of Ohio requires or what the statutes
of that State require as to taxation, must be left in this case to be de-
cided by the Supreme Court of the State, and its decision is not open
to review or objection here. Cleveland Trust Co. v. Lander, 111.
2. The manner of taxation in this case being legal under the statutes of
the United States, its effect cannot be complained of in Federal tribu-
nals. Ib.
3. The Supreme Court of the State of Michigan having decided that the
amount of taxes in a case like the present which may be assessed upon
a district, or upon any given parcel of land therein cannot exceed the
benefits, on a hearing given him the property owner could have shown
that there was a violation of that rule, if it had been violated, and such
violation would have relieved his land from the tax; but he was not en-
titled to a notice of every step in the proceeding. Voight v. Detroit
City, 115.
4. A State may adopt new remedies for the collection of taxes, and apply
those remedies to taxes already delinquent, without any violation of
the Federal Constitution. League v. Texas, 156.
5. That in the new remedy in the case at bar, as well as in the change from
the old to the new, there was no violation of the constitution of the
State of Texas, is settled for this court by the decisions of the highest
court of that State. Ib.
6. Whether the title on this case which passed by the sale was conditioned
or absolute, the State may waive the rights obtained by such sale and
prescribed the terms upon which it will waive them. Ib.
7. A delinquent taxpayer who fails to discharge his obligation to the State,
compelling it to go into court to enforce payment of the taxes due on
his land, has no ground of complaint because he is charged with the
ordinary fees and expenses of a law suit. Ib.
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