as to the best course to pursue, and a warning to reach port at dawn. These advices were followed or disregarded by the captain as he saw fit. The ship was sunk without warning by a submarine and in a petition to determine liability, held, that the petitioner was not liable as not negligent, or if negligent, such negligence was not the proximate cause of the injury. The Lusitania, 251 Fed. 715.

As the existence of the submarine zone was known to all, the passengers could expect no more of the petitioner than that he use due care under the circumstances, the submarine menace being a circumstance. See 31 HARV. L. REV. 306. The disregard of the advices, based on observations and submarine activities, can scarcely be justified on the grounds that the commanding officer of a merchantman be left free to exercise his own judgment. The advices and previous sinkings showed the menace to be at its height off the immediate south coast of Ireland, and the reasonableness of a course around the north of Ireland or one farther south, putting in at a different port, seems to have been overlooked. See Express Co. v. Kountze Bros., 8 Wall. (U.S.) 342; The George Nicholaus, Fed. Cas., No. 13,578; The Union Insurance Co. v. Dexter, 52 Fed. 152. In order to reach port at dawn, why slacken speed in the danger zone instead of farther out at sea? Again it is not so clear that the crew was free from negligence, as negligence is not to be measured by poise of temperament, excitability, or the reverse. See Bessemer Land Co. v. Campbell, 121 Ala. 50, 60. The illegal intervening act, as any other intervening act, would break the chain of causation only if it could not have been anticipated. Filson v. Pacific Express Co., 84 Kan. 614, 114 Pac. 863, 29 HARV. L. REV. 453. See J. SMITH, "Legal Cause in Actions of Tort," 25 HARV. L. REV. 103, 121. That the Lusitania did not anticipate the sinking is not so clear as the court seems to think. On the two previous voyages, the Lusitania hoisted the American flag and their act was justified on the grounds that Germany had announced her intention to sink British merchantmen on sight. It is unfortunate that the decision was not confined more strictly to the facts and a proper application of the law thereto.

REFORMATION OF INSTRUMENTS

REFORMATION FOR MISTAKE OF LAW. A written contract contained, after the description of the estates and specified properties to be conveyed, the words, "and all other improvements. The parties had previously agreed, orally, that certain sugar mills and machinery should be excepted, but no mention of this was made in the contract. The defendant by his answer, in effect a bill in equity, seeks reformation of the contract. Held, that equity will reform for mutual mistake of law where the contract fails to express the intention of the parties. Philippine Sugar, etc. Co. v. Philippine Islands, 247 U. S. 385.

For a general discussion of the principles involved, see NOTES, page 283.

SALES CONDITIONAL SALES RIGHT OF VENDOR Versus SUBVENDEE. Plaintiff sold an automobile to X. The title thereto was to remain in the plaintiff until the note, given for the residue of the purchase price, had been paid. X sold the automobile to the defendant, a bona fide purchaser without notice. Plaintiff sues the defendant in replevin. Held, the plaintiff can recover. Gamble v. Shingler, 96 S. W. 705 (Ga.).

If a vendor transfers possession of the goods to the vendee, but retains legal title as security, the sale is conditional. Sumner v. Woods, 67 Ala. 139; WILLISTON, SALES, 87. The vendee may transfer his beneficial interest to a third person. Nat'l Cash Register Co. v. Wapples, 52 Wash. 657, 101 Pac. 227. If he assumes to transfer more, it is a conversion, and the vendor, at common law, is not estopped, despite the deceptive situation created by conditional sales, from immediately pursuing his rights against a bona fide subvendee.

Lorain Steel Co. v. Norfolk & Bristol Street Ry. Co., 187 Mass. 500, 73 N. E. 646; Riley v. Dillon, 148 Ala. 283, 41 So. 768. At the present time Factors' Acts, Recording Statutes, or judicial legislation operate to give a bonâ fide subvendee an absolute title if the conditional sale is not recorded. Lee v. Butler, (1893) 2 Q. B. 318; Gartrell v. Clay, 81 Ga. 327, 7 S. E. 161; Lincoln v. Quynn, 68 Md. 299. In these jurisdictions if the conditional sale is recorded, and if there is a tortious resale, the vendor's right of action, as at common law, comes into being the instant the vendee assumes to treat the property as his

own.

VENDOR AND PURCHASER- RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES - FORFEITURE OF PAYMENTS-DEFECTIVE NOTICE OF INTENT TO FORFEIT. A statute allowed a vendor of land to take advantage of a provision in a contract providing for a forfeiture of all money paid, on default of the vendee. A notice to the vendee indicating an intent to forfeit the contract in thirty days was required. Though the parties had agreed on the land to be sold, the contract misdescribed the location of the land, and the notice to forfeit after the default of the vendee contained the same mistake. Held, that the notice is ineffectual to forfeit the payments. Liewen v. Blau, 168 N. W. 811 (Ia.).

The vendee in a contract to purchase land on which part of the price has been paid is, by virtue of his equitable ownership, practically in the position of a mortgagor, the vendor holding the legal title as security only for the payment of the balance. See POMEROY, EQUITY, 3 ed., § 1260, note 3; 29 HARV. L. REV. 791. After a default by the vendee, a foreclosure, strict or by sale, is usually necessary to deprive the vendee of his equitable ownership. Bruce v. Tilson, 25 N. Y. 194; Button v. Schroyer, 5 Wis. 598. See 28 HARV. L. REV. 641. Where a power is given to the vendor to forfeit the equitable ownership, the situation resembles that of a mortgagee with a power of sale. In the exercise of a power of sale, a material misdescription in the notice is fatal. See 2 JONES, MORTGAGES, 6 ed., § 1840. Further, there will be no reformation of the defective exercise of the power. Haly v. Bagley, 37 Mo. 363. The principal case follows out the analogy to the mortgage, and is another indication that the vendee has a property interest as a consequence of his right to specific performance.

-

WAR - PRIZE COURT-NEUTRAL OR ENEMY CHARACTER ORDER IN COUNCIL. - An Order in Council adopting Article 57 of the Declaration of London provided that "the neutral or enemy character of a vessel is determined by the flag which she is entitled to fly." A vessel, in fact, owned by the German government, but entitled to fly the Greek flag, was claimed by her registered owner, a Greek. Held, that the registered owner was not entitled to the vessel, the prize court not being bound by the Order in Council. The Proton, [1918] A. C. 578.

Prize courts ordinarily proceed in accordance with the principles of international law. The Divina Pastora, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 52; Mitchell_v. Rodney, 2 Bro. P. C. 423. See LAWRENCE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 4 ed., 478; 7 MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST, § 1229. But, where municipal law clearly conflicts with international law, prize courts are bound by municipal law. The Amy Warwick, 2 Sprague, 123; Mortensen v. Peters, 14 Scots. L. T. R. 227. See The Queen v. Keyn, [1876] 2 Ex. D. 63, 160; PICCIOTTO, RELATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW TO THE LAW OF ENGLAND AND OF THE UNITED STATES, 48-58. According to international law the neutral or enemy character of a vessel is determined by an examination of all the relevant circumstances. Rogers v. The Amado, 20 Fed. Cas. No. 12005; Batten v. The Queen, 11 Moore P. C. 271. See WHEATON, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 8 ed., 425, note; LUSHINGTON, MANUAL OF NAVAL PRIZE LAW, 54; 7 MOORE, INTER

NATIONAL LAW DIGEST, §§ 1237, 1238. By limiting such determination to the single circumstance of the flag she is entitled to fly, Article 57 of the Declaration of London, therefore, purported to change the law of nations; but the neutral and belligerent powers in the present war have not considered that declaration as binding. See "Diplomatic Correspondence between the United States and the Belligerent Governments" in SUP. TO 9 AMER. JOUR. OF INT. LAW, July, 1915, 1-8; Declaration of London Order in Council, No. 2, 1914, Ibid., 14. However, the Order in Council adopting Article 57 itself purported to preclude the prize court from going behind the flag a vessel is entitled to fly to ascertain its actual ownership. But an Order in Council is executive not legislative in character and so, unlike an Act of Parliament, cannot change municipal law. The Zamora, [1916] 2 A. C. 77. See 3 PHILLIMORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 3 ed., 654. In holding the prize court not bound by the Order in Council and in adhering rather to international law, the decision in the principal case, therefore, seems sound.

WILLS REVOCABILITY OF JOINT WILLS. - Husband and wife made a joint will. The property devised was certain land of the husband's, certain land of the wife's and ten acres in which each owned a moiety. All of the wife's interest was devised to the defendants, the grandchildren; while all of the husband's interest, excepting a small fraction, was devised to the complainant and another daughter. The wife died and her devises were probated. The husband then conveyed his interest, contrary to the will, to the grandchildren by deed to take effect upon his death. On the death of the husband, complainant brings suit in the nature of specific performance to enforce the provisions in her favor. Held, equity will grant the relief. Williams et al. v. Williams, 96 S. E. 749 (Va.).

A joint will is revocable by either party as to that respective party's disposition. See SCHOULER, WILLS, 5 ed., 458 a. But equity will act to prevent the surviving testator of a joint or a mutual will from defeating the object of the will, providing there was a contractual relation and sufficient consideration between the cotestators. Dufour v. Pareia, 1 Dick. 419; Edson v. Parsons, 155 N. Y. 555, 50 N. E. 265; Deseumeur v. Rondel, 76 N. J. Eq. 394, 74 Atl. 703. See 28 HARV. L. REV. 248-50. Such prevention is, however, purely an equitable defense and does not affect the legal relationship. See Sumner v. Crane, 155 Mass. 483, 29 N. E. 1151; Albery v. Sessions, 2 Ohio N. P. 237; Peoria Humane Society v. McMurtrie, 229 Ill. 519, 82 N. E. 319; Buchannan v. Anderson, 70 S. C. 454, 50 S. E. 12. See also 28 HARV. L. REV. 248. The test of consideration is no different from that of ordinary contracts. The question, however, often arises as to what evidence is necessary to establish the contractual relation between the testators. As shown by the principal case direct evidence is unnecessary. The instrument itself presumptively favors this view inasmuch as it has all the earmarks of a contract. And where a husband and wife devise to near of kin, the devise of itself may be sufficiently indicative since the co-testators have an obviously mutual interest in such reciprocal or joint devises. Frazier v. Patterson, 243 Ill. 80, 90 N. E. 216. See Bower v. Daniel, 198 Mo. 289, 95 S. W. 347, 359; Campbell v. Dunkel-berger, 153 N. W. 56, 58 (Ia.). See contra, Ginn v. Edmundson, 173 N. C. 85, 91 S. E. 696.

BOOK REVIEWS

A MANUAL ON LAND REGISTRATION. With a full, complete annotated copy of the Land Registration Act of the state of Georgia. By Arthur Gray Powell. Atlanta: The Harrison Company. 1917. pp. xv, 449. 8vo. The Torrens System of land registration would seem to be an ideal method of securing stability in ownership of realty. The old system of recording merely transfers left, as every conveyancer knows, the security of land transactions often in doubt, and the purchaser at the mercy of some forgotten heir or neglected dower interest. All this is done away with by the decree of court, after due notice and other formalities, declaring title to be in the registrant, and all other claims barred forever. The state, to be sure, ordinarily guarantees out of funds supplied by fees that claimants barred through negligence or omission of the registrar shall be indemnified. But such mistakes do not affect the title.

The expense of the system, however, renders resort to it by no means universal, and indeed for many titles it is unnecessary. It seems to be most serviceable in three classes of cases. First: Certain classes of city property which change hands frequently or are often mortgaged. The registered title passes easily from hand to hand, and also may be as liquid a security as a stock certificate. These titles it is cheaper and more expedient to register, and thus to avoid the expense and delay of a new search by each careful purchaser who is unwilling to rely on any lawyer but his own. Second: Land constantly the prey of vague, shadowy claims of easements, such as the familiar local assertion of rights of way over seashore property to the ocean. By registration these incumbrances are dismissed or at least well defined. Third: Certain country property where it is desirable accurately to fix boundaries. Much of the work of the registrar lies here where, owing to the introduction of new lines of street railways or other improvements, land hitherto vacant and of little value has begun to sell by the foot instead of by the acre. Nevertheless, much land will not find its way to the registrar,—for instance, residential rural or urban property which seldom changes hands. Here it is cheaper and often as safe to rely on one's own lawyer.

As late as 1917 fifteen states, Hawaii, and the Philippine Islands had acts based on the Torrens System. The Georgia act of that year has called forth the present volume by one mainly responsible for it. The book is purely local, except for the reprinting of the Uniform Land Registration Act with the notes of the commission. To Georgia lawyers Judge Powell has rendered a valuable service. The divergences in practice between the states, although the same spirit underlies all the statutes, renders it desirable that an equally public-spirited lawyer in each jurisdiction should emulate his example, rather than each bar should be obliged to wait for a magnum opus. Especially is this true in view of the limited acceptance of the Uniform Act.

JOSEPH WARREN.

THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF RECEIVERS. By Ralph E. Clark. Cincinnati: W. H. Anderson Company. 1918. Two volumes. pp. lxxxv, 2176. This is unquestionably the most satisfactory work for the practitioner's use at the present day on the subject with which it deals. Volume one treats of the law of receivers as laid down by the courts, from time to time. The opening chapter is devoted to the origin of receivers and the concluding chapter discusses the duration of receiverships, the removal and discharge of receivers. The various phases and subdivisions of the law of receivers as laid down by the courts are treated in the intervening chapters.

Volume two presents the law of receivers so far as it is controlled by statutes. Those which affect the procedure in receiverships are considered, and a chapter is devoted to those which affect not only the procedure in receivership cases, but also the substantive rights of litigants, claimants and receivers themselves; though limitations of space make it impossible to print the text of the numerous state statutes in full. Volume two also contains the important feature of a collection of about two hundred practical forms, which have been gathered from actual cases pending or adjudicated in the highest courts. A chapter is added on the subject of "Custodians of Alien Enemy Property"; and, in order to present the subject intelligently, the author has touched generally upon the subject of "Trading with the Enemy." He has printed and commented on the United States Trading with the Enemy Act, and referred to the several English Trading with the Enemy Acts, with the decisions under them.

The author's work has, on the whole, been well and thoroughly done, but the book does not entirely escape the besetting sins of modern American law writing, of which we can give only one illustration. At the end of section 507, speaking of contracts of service, the author says: "A specific performance by the receiver would be a form of satisfaction or payment which the receiver cannot be required to make. As well might he be decreed to satisfy the demand for specific performance by money as by the service sought to be enforced." These identical words are repeated as true of contracts generally, in section 517. A different authority is cited for the proposition in the two places where the statement occurs, and there is no cross-reference. The statement which is taken from a decision of the Supreme Court cited by the author under section 517, while true under the particular facts of that case, is not true as a general proposition, and was not stated as such by the court. There seems no doubt that a court might order its receiver to continue performance even of a contract to employ another; and if the contract in question related to property in the receiver's hands, and had created an equitable right therein, as in the typical case of a contract to sell land, it seems clear that it would be the duty of the court to order its receiver specifically to perform the contract.

The mechanical execution of the book leaves nothing to be desired.

A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF MUNICIPAL UTILITY REGULATION AND MUNICIPAL OWNERSHIP. By Don Lorenzo Stevens, M.B.A. Being Volume IV of "Harvard Business Studies." Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1918. pp. viii, 410.

This is an elaborate and thorough bibliography of a topic of the greatest contemporary interest. The regulation of public utilities and, as the only alternative, public ownership are the rival palliatives of high charges and poor service; and the considerations are much the same whether the contest is staged in nation or in city. The references here given will enable one to study the entire subject or any aspect of it from every point of view. To the statesman, the author, and the debator it will be invaluable; and to the lawyer it is indispensable, since his practice must sooner or later bring him into the thick of the discussion. That this is the case is shown by the large proportion of the titles here enumerated which represent the professional work of lawyers. The compiler has wisely decided to omit the merely ephemeral literature of the subject; and his principle of exclusion has been conservatively administered. He has appended pithy judicious annotations to each title, a practice which enormously increases the value of the work. The scope of the bibliography is shown by the chapter-headings: General Works, History of Utilities and of Regulation, Franchises, Public Service Commissions, Valuation, Rates, Taxation, Holding Companies, Municipal Ownership. There is an excellent index.