unjust enrichment of the beneficiary is as clear in one case as in the other. The distinction is simply indefensible. Second, if the assets were originally sufficient to satisfy all legacies, but were subsequently wasted by act of the personal representative or otherwise, the legatee already paid may keep. The reason commonly given is that a dilatory beneficiary should not prejudice a more diligent who may have spent the bounty. If this means anything, it represents a combination of the defenses of laches and change of position. It is a sufficient answer to say that if there has been change of position by the defendant before notice in any of the cases where a refund is demanded it should be a complete defense both at law or in equity.141 But what of the many cases where there has been no change of position? The laches of the plaintiff should then not bar him. The defendant, if he disgorge what he has received or its equivalent, suffers no loss, for he has merely given up that which he has been holding without consideration and which would have gone to another had it not been for his windfall. Other decisions are put on the ground that the satisfied beneficiary has received no more than what was due him.142 But until every beneficiary is paid his share, it is only fair that each should bear proportionately the loss caused by depreciation of assets in the hands of the representative due to causes to which they are not parties.

IV

If an executor or administrator sues an overpaid creditor where the assets have unexpectedly proved deficient for the payment of creditors, he may recover.143 No case has been found where an unsatisfied creditor proceeded against an overpaid creditor. But upon principles considered above the right should exist.

141 See infra, page 344.

142 Lupton v. Lupton, 2 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 614, 626 (1817); Walcott v. Hall, 1 P. Wms. 495, note.

143 Mansfield v. Lynch, 59 Conn. 320, 22 Atl. 313 (1890) (semble); Wolf v. Beaird, 123 Ill. 585, 15 N. E. 161 (1888); East v. Ferguson, 59 Ind. 169 (1877); Tarplee v. Capp, 25 Ind. App. 56, 56 N. E. 270 (1900) (but see Beardsley v. Marsteller, 120 Ind. 319, 22 N. E. 315 (1889)); Morris v. Porter, 87 Me. 510, 33 Atl. 15 (1895); Walker v. Hill, 17 Mass. 380 (1821); Heard v. Drake, 4 Gray (Mass.) 514 (1855); Woodruff v. Claflin Co., 198 N. Y. 470, 91 N. E. 1103 (1910); Rogers v. Weaver, 5 Ohio, 536 (1832); Thorsen v. Hooper, 57 Oreg. 75, 109 Pac. 388 (1910). Carson v. M'Farland, 2 Rawle (Pa.) 118 (1828); Findlay v. Trigg, 83 Va. 539, 3 S. E. 401 (1887); Staples v. Staples, 85 Va. 76 7 S. E. 197 (1888), contra.

V

It remains to consider certain principles affecting all situations hitherto dealt with in refunding.

Negligence, or laches of the plaintiff in itself, unaccompanied by other circumstances such as change of position of defendant, in England properly constitutes no defense.144 The American law is not so clear.145 In other branches of the law of mistake it is often remarked that negligence or at least gross negligence will bar the plaintiff.146 But Pomeroy says that each instance of negligence must depend on its own circumstances; and that even a clearly established negligence may not be ground for refusing relief if the other party is not prejudiced thereby.147 And this statement has been quoted with approval or similar statements made in the cases.148 At law in cases of mistake it is clear that negligence without more does not prejudice the plaintiff.149 Generally delay in ap144 Ridgway v. Newstead, 3 De G. F. & J. 474 (1861); Blake v. Gale, 32 Ch. D. 571 (1886). In re Eustace, [1912] 1 Ch. 561.

145 In Wallace v. Swepston, 74 Ark. 520, 528, 86 S. W. 398 (1905), the unpaid creditor failed because "After this long lapse of time and the changes in the status of the parties, it seems to us to be inequitable to permit appellee to disturb the heirs.” Here change of position seems to have influenced the decision as much as delay. But see Wilson v. Smith, 117 Fed. 707 (Pa.) (1902).

146 Duke of Beaufort v. Neeld, 12 Cl. & F. 248, 286 (1845); Leuty v. Hillas, 2 De G. & J. 110 (1858); Besley v. Besley, L. R. 9 Ch. D. 103 (1878); Earl v. Van Natta, 29 Ind. App. 532, 64 N. E. 475 (1902); Citizen's Bank v. Judy, 146 Ind. 322, 43 N. E. 259 (1896); Diman v. Providence R. R., 5 R. I. 130 (1858); Voorhis v. Murphy, 26 N. J. Eq. 434 (1875); Dillett v. Kemble, 25 N. J. Eq. 66 (1874); Wood v. Patterson, 4 Md. Ch. 335 (1850); Capehart v. Mhoon, 5 Jones Eq. 178 (1859); Lewis v. Lewis, 5 Ore. 169 (1874).

147 2 POMEROY, EQ. JURIS., 3 ed., § 856.

148 Bush v. Bush, 33 Kan. 556, 563; Kinney v. Ensminger, 87 Ala. 340, 6 So. 72 (1888); Seeley v. Bacon, 34 Atl. (N. J.) 139 (1896); Collignon v. Collignon, 52 N. J. Eq. 516, 28 Atl. 794 (1894); Southern F. & W. Co. v. Ozment, 132 N. C. 839, 44 S. E. 683 (1903); Powell v. Heisler, 16 Ore. 412, 19 Pac. 109 (1888); San Antonio Nat. Bank v. McLane, 96 Tex. 48, 70 S. W. 201 (1902).

149 Kelly v. Solari, 9 M. & W. 54 (1841); Townsend v. Crowdy, 8 C. B. (N. s.) 477 (1860); Brown v. Tillinghast, 84 Fed. 71 (1897); Merrill v. Brantly, 133 Ala. 537, 31 So. 847 (1901); Devine v. Edwards, 101 Ill. 138 (1881); Brown v. College Road Co., 56 Ind. 110 (1877); Fraker v. Little, 24 Kan. 598 (1880); First Nat. Bank v. Behan, 91 Ky. 560, 16 S. W. 368 (1891); Baltimore R. R. Co. v. Faunce, 6 Gill (Md.) 68 (1847); Pingree v. Mutual Gas Co., 107 Mich. 156, 65 N. W. 6 (1895); Koontz v. Central Nat. Bank, 51 Mo. 275 (1873); Bone v. Friday, 180 Mo. App. 577, 167 S. W. 599 (1914); Douglas County v. Keller, 43 Neb. 635, 62 N. W. 60 (1895); Waite v. Leggett, 8 Cow. (N. Y.) 195 (1828); Hathaway v. County of Delaware, 185 N. Y. 368, 370, 78 N. E. 153 (1906); Simms v. Vick, 151 N. C. 78, 65 S. E. 621 (1909); James River Bank v.

plication for relief from error is a defense only if it is accompanied by circumstances prejudicing the defendant.150 It is often said that the right to set aside a fraudulent bargain must be exercised with reasonable promptness after discovery of the fraud.151 But "the question of how much time a party to a contract has permitted to elapse is not necessarily determinative of the right to rescind, the immediate consideration being whether the period has been long enough to result in prejudice to the defendant."152 The

Weber, 19 N. D. 702, 124 N. W. 952 (1910); McKibben v. Doyle, 173 Pa. 579, 34 Atl. 455 (1896); City Nat. Bank v. Peed, 32 S. E. 34 (Va.) (1899). But see Grymes v. Sanders, 93 U. S. 55 (1876); Stanley Rule Co. v. Bailey, 45 Conn. 464 (1878); Norton v. Marden, 15 Me. 45 (1838); Ash v. McLellan, 101 Me. 17, 62 Atl. 598 (1905); Wheeler v. Hathaway, 58 Mich. 77, 24 N. W. 780 (1885); Brummitt v. McGuire, 107 N. C. 351, 12 S. E. 191 (1890); First Nat. Bank v. Taylor, 122 N. C. 569, 29 S. E. 831 (1898); Simmons v. Looney, 41 W. Va. 738, 24 S. E. 677 (1896).

150 Newman v. Milner, 2 Ves. Jr. 483 (1794); Grymes v. Sanders, 93 U. S. 55 (1876); Kinney v. Consolidated Virginia Min. Co., 4 Sawyer (U. S. C. C.) 382 (1877); Paulison v. Van Iderstine, 28 N. J. Eq. 306 (1877); Holt v. Ruleau, 102 Atl. 934 (Vt.) (1918); Sable v. Maloney, 48 Wis. 331, 4 N. W. 479 (1880); Van Brunt v. Ferguson, 163 Wis. 540, 158 N. W. 295 (1916).

151 Clough v. London, etc. Ry. Co., L. R. 7 Exch. 26 (1871); Upton v. Tribilcock, 91 U.S. 45 (1875); Pence v. Langdon, 99 U. S. 578 (1878); Mudsill Mining Co. v. Watrous, 61 Fed. 163 (1894); Blank v. Aronson, 187 Fed. 241 (1911); Bowden v. Spellman, 59, Ark. 251, 27 S. W. 602 (1894); Board of Water Comm'rs v. Robbins, 82 Conn. 623, 74 Atl. 938 (1909); Cedar Rapids Ins. Co. v. Butler, 83 Iowa, 124, 129, 48 N. W. 1026 (1891); Nichols & Shepard Co. v. Wheeler, 150 Ky. 169, 150 S. W. 33 (1912); Byrd v. Rautman, 85 Md. 414, 36 Atl. 1099 (1897); Boles v. Merrill, 173 Mass. 491, 53 N. E. 894 (1899); Barnard v. Campbell, 58 N. Y. 73 (1874); Ditton v. Purcell, 21 N. Dak. 648, 132 N. W. 347 (1911); Robinson v. Roberts, 20 Okla. 787, 95 Pac. 246 (1908); Koehler v. Dennison, 72 Ore. 362, 143 Pac. 649 (1914).

case.

152 Brown v. Young, 62 Ind. App. 364, 374 (1916). And see Basye v. Paola Refining Co., 79 Kan. 755, 101 Pac. 658 (1909); Armstrong v. Jackson, [1917] 2 K. B. 822, 830. In Roberts v. James, 83 N. J. L. 492, 495, 496, 85 Atl. 244 (1912), Judge Swayze said: "It is also settled that one who desires to rescind a contract, must act within a reasonable time. Dennis v. Jones, 17 Stew. Eq. 513; Clampitt v. Doyle, 3 Buch. 678. What is a reasonable time necessarily depends on the circumstances of each particular It is settled in the English courts that unless the situation of the other party has changed to his detriment, the contract continues until the party defrauded elects to avoid it, and he may keep the question open as long as he does nothing to affirm the contract. Clough v. London and Northwestern Railway (1871), L. R. 7 Ex. 26, 41 L. J. Exch. 17; Morrison v. Universal Marine Insurance Co. (1873), L. R. 8 Ex. 197, 42 L. J. Exch. 115; United Shoe Machinery Co. of Canada v. Brunet (1909), A. C. 330. He may even wait until action is brought against him (Clough v. London and Northwestern Railway, ubi supra), and a plea setting up the fraud amounts to a rescission of the contract. Lawton v. Elmore, 27 L. J. Ex. 141; Dawes v. Harness, L. R. 10 C. P. 166, 44 L. J. C. P. 194; Aaron's Reefs v. Twiss (1896), A. C. 273, 65 L. J. P. C. 54. The case last cited was an action by a company against

right to rescind a contract for repudiation or substantial breach by the other contracting party is frequently stated to depend upon its exercise without undue delay.153 It has been pointed out, however, that in many of these cases the facts show that the inaction of the plaintiff may be interpreted as election.154 There is no more reason why delay, pure and simple, should furnish a defense here than where the basis of rescission is mutual mistake. Indeed less consideration should be shown the defendant who repudiates or breaks his promise than him who has innocently and inadvertently received what equitably belongs to another. Many jurisdictions, doubtless to promote the marketability of realty, require an infant who has executed a deed of land to disaffirm promptly on arriving at majority.155 An equal number, with more a shareholder for calls upon his stock. In such cases the right of creditors and other stockholders to have the stock paid for requires a prompt disaffirmance of the subscription to stock; but inasmuch as in the case before the court, the rights of creditors and other stockholders were not involved, it was held enough to set up the fraud by way of defence when action was brought. . . ." "In the case of an executory contract, a refusal to perform any obligation thereunder and the defence of an action brought thereon are all that the defrauded party can do by way of asserting his right to disaffirm the contract, and unless his silence or delay has operated to the prejudice of the other party, he may first assert his right when his adversary first asserts his claim by action."

153 Collins v. Tigner, 5 Pen. (Del.) 345 (1905); Mizell v. Watson, 57 Fla. 111, 49 So. 149 (1909); Harden v. Lang, 110 Ga. 392, 395, 36 S. E. 100 (1900); Carney v. Newberry, 24 Ill. 203 (1860); Axtel v. Chase, 77 Ind. 74 (1881), 83 Ind. 546 (1882); Mills v. Osawatomie, 59 Kan. 463, 53 Pac. 470 (1898); World Pub. Co. v. Hull, 81 Mo. App. 277 (1899); Alfree Mfg. Co. v. Grape, 59 Neb. 777, 82 N. W. 11 (1900); Lawrence v. Dale, 3 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 23 (1817); Caswell v. Black River Mfg. Co., 14 Johns (N. Y.) 453 (1817); NORTH DAKOTA, CIV. CODE (1913), § 5936; OKLAHOMA, STATS. (1910), §986; Thomas v. McCue, 19 Wash. 287, 53 Pac. 161 (1898).

154 "In most of them, either the plaintiff had received something from the defendant under the contract, or the contract was of such a nature that unless promptly informed the defendant would naturally proceed with his performance. Under such circumstances. . . an action may well be interpreted as an election not to seek restitution. Hence the statement that unless notice is promptly given restitution will not be enforced." WOODWARD, QUASI CONTRACTS, § 267.

155 Hastings v. Dollarhide, 24 Cal. 195 (1864); Kline v. Beebe, 6 Conn. 494 (1827); Wallace v. Lewis, 4 Harr. (Del.) 75 (1843); Nathans v. Arkwright, 66 Ga. 179 (1886); Bentley v. Greer, 100 Ga. 35, 27 S. E. 974 (1896); Hogan v. Utter, 95 S. E. 565 (N. C.) (1918); Cole v. Pennoyer, 14 Ill. 158 (1852); Blankenship v. Stout, 25 Ill. 132 (1860); Keil v. Healey, 84 Ill. 104 (1876); Tunison v. Chamblin, 88 Ill. 378 (1878); Hartman v. Kendall, Ind. 403 (1853); Scranton v. Stewart, 52 Ind. 68 (1875); Shroyer v. Pittenger, 31 Ind. App. 158, 67 N. E. 475 (1903) (but see Sims v. Bardoner, 87 Ind. 94 (1882)); Iowa, CODE (1897), § 3189; Goodnow v. Empire Lumber Co., 31 Minn. 468, 18 N. W. 283 (1884); Ward v. Laverty, 19 Neb. 429, 27 N. W. 393 (1886); O'Brien

logic, allow him to avoid the transfer at any time before the statute of limitations has run after he has attained full age,156 unless there are circumstances showing estoppel, promissory estoppel, or change

v. Gaslin, 20 Neb. 347, 30 N. W. 274 (1886); Englebert v. Troxell, 40 Neb. 195, 58 N. W. 852 (1894); Criswell v. Criswell, 163 N. W. 302 (Neb.) (1917); Weeks v. Wilkins, 134 N. C. 516, 47 S. E. 24 (1904); Gaskins v. Allen, 137 N. C. 426, 49 S. E. 919 (1905); Dolph v. Hand, 156 Pa. 91, 27 Atl. 114 (1893); Scott v. Buchanan, 11 Humph. (Tenn.) 468 (1850); Bingham v. Barley, 55 Tex. 281 (1881); Ferguson v. Houston Ry. Co., 73 Tex. 344, 11 S. W. 347 (1889); Bigelow v. Kinney, 3 Vt. 353 (1830); Richardson v. Boright, 9 Vt. 368 (1837); Washington, Codes & STATS. (1915), § 5293; Featherston v. McDonell, 15 U. C. C. P. 162 (1865); Foley v. Canada Loan Co., 4 Ont. 38 (1883). The same rule was applied to a transfer of personalty by an infant. Hastings v. Dollarhide, 24 Cal. 195 (1864); Iowa, Code (1897), § 3189; Gannon v. Manning, 42 App. D. C. 206 (1914); Baker v. Kennett, 54 Mo. 82 (1873); Summers v. Wilson, 2 Cold. (Tenn.) 469 (1865); WASHINGTON, CODE & STATS. (1915), § 5293. See Parsons v. Teller, 188 N. Y. 318, 326, 80 N. E. 930 (1907); Woolridge v. Lavoie, 104 Atl. 346 (N. H.) (1918). And to the executory contract of a minor. Johnson v. Storie, 32 Neb. 610, 49 N. W. 371 (1891) (surety on note); Chandler v. Jones, 173 N. C. 427, 92 S. E. 145 (1917). See Darlington v. Hamilton Bank, 116 N. Y. Supp. 678 (1909) note; Holmes v. Blogg, 8 Taunt. 35 (1817); Edwards v. Carter, [1893] A. C. 360; Carnell v. Harrison, [1916] 1 Ch. 328.

156 Wells v. Seixas, 24 Fed. 82 (1885); Gilkinson v. Miller, 74 Fed. 131 (1896); Tucker v. Moreland, 10 Pet. (U. S.) 58, 75 (1836) (semble); Irvine v. Irvine, 9 Wall. (U. S.) 617 (1869); Sims v. Everhardt, 102 U. S. 300 (1880); McCarthy v. Nicrosi, 72 Ala. 332 (1882) (but see Schaffer v. Lauretta, 57 Ala. 14 (1876)); Putnal v. Walker, 61 Fla. 720, 55 So. 844 (1911); Syck v. Hellier, 140 Ky. 388, 131 S. W. 30 (1910). Compare Hoffert v. Miller, 86 Ky. 572, 6 S. W. 447 (1888). But see Justice v. Justice, 170 Ky. 423, 426, 186 S. W. 148 (1916); Boody v. McKenney, 23 Me. 517, 523, 524 (1844) (semble); Davis v. Dudley, 70 Me. 236 (1879); Prout v. Wiley, 28 Mich. 164 (1873); Donovan v. Ward, 100 Mich. 601, 59 N. W. 254 (1894); Wallace v. Latham, 52 Miss. 291 (1876); Allen v. Poole, 54 Miss. 323 (1877); Shipp v. McKee, 80 Miss. 741, 31 So. 197 (1902) (but see Thompson v. Strickland, 52 Miss. 574 (1876)); Brantley v. Wolf, 60 Miss. 420 (1882); Peterson v. Laik, 24 Mo. 541 (1857); Thomas v. Pullis, 56 Mo. 211 (1874); Lacy v. Pixler, 120 Mo. 383, 25 S. W. 206 (1894); Linville v. Greer, 165 Mo. 380, 65 S. W. 579 (1901); Parrish v. Treadway, 267 Mo. 91, 183 S. W. 580 (1916); Jackson v. Carpenter, 11 Johns. (N. Y.) 539, 542 (1814); Voorhies v. Voorhies, 24 Barb. (N. Y.) 150 (1857); Eagan v. Scully, 51 N. Y. Supp. 680 (1898), aff'd 173 N. Y. 581, 65 N. E. 1116 (1902); Green v. Green, 69 N. Y. 553 (1877) (but see Jones v. Butler, 30 Barb. 641 (1859)); Drake v. Ramsay, 5 Ohio, 252 (1831). Cresinger v. Welch, 15 Ohio, 156 (1846); Lanning v. Brown, 84 Ohio St. 385 (1911); Wilson v. Branch, 77 Va. 65 (1883); Birch v. Linton, 78 Va. 584 (1884); Gillespie v. Bailey, 12 W. Va. 70 (1877).

The same rule was applied in the case of a transfer of personalty by a minor. Vaughan v. Parr, 20 Ark. 600 (1859); Hill v. Nelms, 86 Ala. 442, 5 So. 796 (1888). See Boody v. McKenney, 23 Me. 517, 525 (1884). And the same is true of an infant's executory contract. Buzzell v. Bennett, 2 Cal. 101 (1852); Magee v. Welsh, 18 Cal. 155 (1861); Tyler v. Gallop, 68 Mich. 185, 35 N. W. 902 (1888); Nichols Co. v. Snyder, 78 Minn. 502, 81 N. W. 516 (1900); Tupp v. Pederson, 78 Minn. 524, 81 N. W. 1103 (1900); New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Noyes, 32 N. H. 345 (1855); International Text Book Co. v. Connelly, 206 N. Y. 188, 99 N. E. 722 (1912).