of position.157 In equity generally the better view is expressed by Stinness, C. J., in Chase v. Chase: 158

"Laches, in legal significance, is not mere delay, but delay that works a disadvantage to another. So long as parties are in the same condition, it matters little whether one presses a right promptly or slowly, within limits allowed by law; but when, knowing his rights, he takes no step to enforce them until the condition of the other party has, in good faith, become so changed that he cannot be restored to his former state, if the right be then enforced, delay becomes inequitable, and operates as an estoppel against the assertion of the right. The disadvantage may come from loss of evidence, change of title, intervention of equities and other causes, but when a court sees negligence on one side and injury therefrom on the other, it is a ground for denial of relief." 159

There is no reason, however, why delay longer than the period covered by the statute of limitations should not, without more, bar the plaintiff."

160

If after the receipt of the money the situation of the defendant has so altered that he cannot restore it without suffering a detriment which he would not have incurred had it not been for the

157 Henson v. Culp, 157 Ky. 442, 163 S. W. 455 (1914); Davis v. Dudley, 70 Me. 236 (1879); Prout v. Wiley, 28 Mich. 164 (1873) (semble); Allen v. Poole, 54 Miss. 323 (1877) (semble); Thomas v. Pullis, 56 Mo. 211 (1874); Emmons v. Murray, 16 N. H. 385 (1844); Wheaton v. East, 5 Yerg. (Tenn.) 41, 62 (1833); Gillespie v. Bailey, 12 W. Va. 70 (1877) (semble).

158 20 R. I. 202, 203, 37 Atl. 804 (1897).

159 Jonathan Mills Mfg. Co. v. Whitehurst, 60 Fed. 81 (1894); O'Brien v. Wheelock, 78 Fed. 673 (1897); Wheeling Bridge Co. v. Reymann Co., 90 Fed. 189 (1898); Hanchett v. Blair, 100 Fed. 817 (1900); London Bank v. Horton & Co., 126 Fed. 593, 601 (1903); Shea v. Nilima, 133 Fed. 209 (1904); Haney v. Legg, 129 Ala. 619, 30 So. 34 (1900); Pratt Land Co. v. McClain, 135 Ala. 452, 33 So. 185 (1902) (semble); Hovey v. Bradbury, 112 Cal. 620, 44 Pac. 1077 (1896); Ex-Mission Co. v. Flash, 97 Cal. 610, 32 Pac. 600 (1893); Brake v. Payne, 137 Ind. 479, 37 N. E. 140 (1893); Lindell Real Estate Co. v. Lindell, 142 Mo. 61, 43 S. W. 368 (1897); Fitzgerald v. Constr. Co., 44 Neb. 463, 62 N. W. 899 (1895); Daggers v. Van Dyck, 37 N. J. Eq. 130 (1883); Tynan v. Warren, 53 N. J. Eq. 313, 31 Atl. 596 (1895); Lundy v. Seymour, 55 N. J. Eq. 1, 35 Atl. 893 (1896); Law v. Smith, 59 Atl. 327, 68 N. J. Eq. 81 (1904); Farr v. Hauenstein, 69 N. J. Eq. 740 (1905); Parker v. Bethel Hotel Co., 96 Tenn. 252, 34 S. W. 209 (1896); Hamilton v. Dooly, 15 Utah, 280, 49 Pac. 769 (1897); Tidball's Executors v. Shenandoah Bank, 42 S. E. 867 (W. Va.) (1902); Ludington v. Patton, 111 Wis. 208, 86 N. W. 571 (1901); Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Hurd, L. R. 5 P. C. 221 (1874); Erlanger v. Sombrero Co., 3 App. Cas. 1218, 1279 (1878).

160 Gray v. Goddard, 90 Conn. 561, 98 Atl. 126 (1916); Shelburne v. Robinson, 8 Ill. 597 (1846); Ely v. Norton, 1 Hals. (N. J. L.) 187 (1822). See Fitzsimmons v. Johnson, 90 Tenn. 416 (1891).

payment, he will not be compelled to disgorge. "Change of position" here,161 as elsewhere in the law of quasi contracts,162 is a defense. The change of position may consist in loss of rights on the claim or instrument on which payment is made,163 in delay in enforcing rights against others,164 the payment over by an agent of money to his principal,165 or by a fiduciary to his beneficiary.16

161 Brooking v. Farmers' Bank, 83 Ky. 431 (1885); Ridgway v. Newstead, 3 De G., F. & J. 474, 487 (1861). See Phetteplace v. Bucklin, 18 R. I. 297, 27 Atl. 211 (1893). 162 German Security Bank v. Columbia Trust Co., 27 Ky. L. R. 581, 85 S. W. 761 (1905); Pelletier v. State Nat. Bank, 117 La. 335, 41 So. 640 (1906); Wilson v. Barker, 50 Me. 447 (1862); Walker v. Conant, 65 Mich. 194, 31 N. W. 786 (1887); 69 Mich. 321, 17 N. W. 292 (1888); Pickslay v. Starr, 149 N. Y. 432, 44 N. E. 163 (1896); Continental Nat. Bank v. Tradesman's Bank, 173 N. Y. 272, 65 N. E. 1108 (1903); Ball v. Shepard, 202 N. Y. 247, 95 N. E. 719 (1911); Fegan v. Gt. Northern Ry. Co., 9 N. D. 30, 81 N. W. 39 (1899); Boas v. Updegrove, 5 Pa. 516 (1847); Atlantic Coast Line v. Schirmer, 87 S. C. 309, 69 S. E. 439 (1910); Richey v. Clark, 11 Utah 467, 40 Pac. 717 (1895). And see Deutsche Bank v. Beriro & Co., 73 L. T. R. 669 (1895); Maher v. Miller, 61 Ga. 556 (1878); Guild v. Baldridge, 2 Swan (Tenn.) 295 (1852); KEENER, QUASI CONTRACTS, 59; WOODWARD, QUASI CONTRACTS, §§ 26-30; Costigan, "Change of Position as a Defense," 20 HARV. L. REV. 212. If the mistake is due to defendant's fault, change of position is no defense, for he only has himself to blame. Union Bank v. United States Bank, 3 Mass. 74 (1807); Koontz v. Central Nat. Bank, 51 Mo. 275 (1873); Phetteplace v. Bucklin, 18 R. I. 297, 27 Atl. 211 (1893); Metcalf v. Denson, 4 Baxt. (Tenn.) 565 (1874).

163 German Security Bank v. Columbia Trust Co., 27 Ky. L. R. 581, 85 S. W. 761 (1905); Pelletier v. State Nat. Bank, 117 La. 335, 41 So. 640 (1906).

164 Behring v. Somerville, 63 N. J. L. 568, 44 Atl. 641 (1899); Fegan v. Great Northern Ry., 9 N. D. 30, 81 N. W. 39 (1899); Boas v. Updegrove, 5 Pa. 516 (1847); Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Schirmer, 87 S. C. 309, 69 S. E. 439 (1909); Richey v. Clark, 11 Utah, 467, 40 Pac. 717 (1895). Durrant v. Ecclesiastical Comm'rs, 62 Q. B. D. 234 (1880); Kingston v. Eltinge, 40 N. Y. 391 (1869); Houston R. Co. v. Hughes, 63 Tex. Civ. App. 514 (1911), Contra. It is doubtful, however, whether Kingston v. Eltinge, which is clearly erroneous, would now be followed in New York in view of Continental Nat. Bank v. Tradesman's Bank, 173 N. Y. 272, 65 N. E. 1108 (1903); Hathaway v. County of Delaware, 185 N. Y. 368, 78 N. E. 153 (1906); Ball v. Shepard, 202 N. Y. 247, 95 N. E. 719 (1911). See KEENER, QUASI CONTRACTS, 66, 67; WOODWARD, QUASI CONTRACTS, § 25, note; Costigan, "Change of Position as a Defense," 20 HARV. L. REV. 215, note.

165 Holland v. Russell, 1 B. & S. 424 (1861); 4 B. & S. 14 (1863); Shand v. Grant, 15 C. B. (N. S.) 324 (1863); Hooper v. Robinson, 98 U. S. 528 (1878); Hibbs v. Beall, 41 App. D. C. 592; Maher v. Miller, 61 Ga. 556 (1878); Granger v. Hathaway, 17 Mich. 500 (1869). See Martin v. Allen, 125 Mo. App. 636, 103 S. W. 138 (1907); Mason v. Commerce Trust Co., 192 Mo. App. 528, 183 S. W. 707 (1915); 23 L. R. A. (N. s.), note. Through an extraordinary misconception of the true principles underlying the subject

166 Yarborough v. Wise, 5 Ala. 292 (1843); Beam v. Copeland, 54 Ark. 70, 14 S. W. 1094 (1890); Grier v. Huston, 8 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 402 (1822). But see Baylis v. Bishop of London, [1913] 1 Ch. 127.

Sale, consumption, or gift of the windfall before notice of the plaintiff's right cannot necessarily and always give a defense.167 If the defendant has spent it beneficially to himself, he should clearly refund the equivalent. If he carelessly loses it, or spends it in riotous living, he should still be liable. In these cases he should not be in a better position than the frugal man who has invested and kept the res. "It must be assumed that the defendant has had his money's worth of enjoyment." 168 If he gives the legacy to the Red Cross as his normal periodical contribution we should still reach, though without authority, the same result. Suppose, however, in consequence of the windfall he has altered his manner of living. He has journeyed to Palm Beach, an outing beyond his normal income, or he has shared his good fortune with Belgian refugees whom he otherwise could not aid. It is intimated in Brisbane v. Dacres, 169 and in Skyring v. Greenwood,170 that the plaintiff could not reach him.171 A real hardship would result if he were compelled to make whole the payer. The wiser view is to leave matters in statu quo, rather than shift the plaintiff's loss to the defendant's shoulders. The same result should be reached, though only on the authority of text-writers,172 if the property received has before notice been without defendant's fault accidentally lost, as by fire or theft. The claim that the defendant is a purchaser for value without notice from the overpaid creditor or legatee is clearly a defense both at law and in equity.173

the Court of Appeal in Baylis v. Bishop of London, [1913] 1 Ch. 127, held that change of position as a defense was confined to payment by an agent to his principal.

If the agent purported to act for himself in receiving the payment, it is no defense that he settled with his principal before notice. Newall v. Tomlinson, L. R. 6 C. P. 405 (1871); United States v. Pinover, 3 Fed. 305 (1880); Smith v. Kelly, 43 Mich. 390, 5 N. E. 437 (1880); Canal Bank v. Bank of Albany, 1 Hill (N. Y.) 287 (1841). See Costigan, 20 HARV. L. REV. 211. This distinction, however, is without merit.

167 Standish v. Ross, 3 Exch. 527 (1849); Continental Co. v. Kleinwort Co., 20 T. L. R. 403 (1904); Moors v. Bird, 190 Mass. 400, 410, 77 N. E. 643 (1906); Picotte v. Mills, 203 S. W. 825 (Mo. App.) (1918).

168 Costigan, "Change of Position as a Defense." 20 HARV. L. REV. 212, note. 169 5 Taunt. 143, 152.

170 4 B. & C. 281, 289 (1825).

171 But see Standish v. Ross, 3 Exch. 527, 534 (1849).

172 Costigan, "Change of Position as a Defense." 20 HARV. L. REV. 212, note. Compare WOODWARD, QUASI CONTRACTS, § 30.

173 Berton v. Anderson, 56 Ark. 470, 20 S. W. 250 (1892); Hoffman v. Armstrong, 90 Md. 123 (1899). See Thompson v. Samson, 64 Cal. 330, 30 Pac. 980 (1883).

A defendant obliged to refund is liable for interest from the date of demand and

177

The liability of several legatees and distributees, who have been overpaid, is not joint.174 Failure to join others is no defense. But, in Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, Ohio, Rhode Island, and Vermont, the court may at any time order joined other parties liable.175 And in Illinois the liability is joint.176 At common law in England, if the estate had been administered under order of the court, the belated creditor could proceed against any particular legatee or distributee only for such portion of his debt as the value of the legatee's or distributee's share bore to all legacies and shares.17 This rule, however, did not apply when the administration did not take place under order of court.178 In this country the authorities are divided, none of them seem to take the English distinction. In some jurisdictions the beneficiary is liable up to the full amount of his legacy or share for the plaintiff's claim, and must seek contribution in a separate suit from the other beneficiaries.179 In other states the defendant is only liable for his rateable proportion of the debt.180 A third view makes the defendant liable for a proportional amount unless the others liable are insolvent or beyond the jurisdiction. In that case he must make good the debt up to the amount he has received and seek contribution in another suit.181 Perhaps

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from that date only. Northrop v. Graves, 19 Conn. 548 (1849). And see Gittens v. Steele, 1 Swanst. 199 (1818); Jervis v. Wolferstan, L. R. 18 Eq. 18 (1874); Uffner v. Lewis, 5 Ont. L. R. 684 (1903).

174 INDIANA, ANNOT. STATS. (1914), § 2972; Rubell v. Bushnell, 91 Ky. 251, 15 S. W. 520 (1891); Rohrbaugh v. Hamblin, 57 Kan. 393, 46 Pac. 705 (1896); MASSACHUSETTS, REV. Laws (1902), c. 141, § 30; MICHIGAN, COMP. Laws (1915), c. 234, c. 56, § 25; Miller v. Shoaf, 110 N. C. 319, 14 S. E. 400 (1892); Walker v. Deaver, 79 Mo. 664, 679 (1883); NEBRASKA, REV. STATS. (1913), § 1414; OHIO, ANNOT. GEN. CODE (1912), § 10882; RHODE ISLAND, GEN. Laws (1909), c. 318, § 22; Gillespie v. Alexander, 3 Russ. 130 (1826).

175 See references in preceding note.

176 Cutright v. Stanford, 81 Ill. 240 (1876). See Lewis v. Overby, 31 Gratt. (Va.) 601, 619 (1879); McClung v. Sieg, 54 W. Va. 467, 46 S. E. 210 (1903).

177 Gillespie v. Alexander, 3 Russ. 130 (1826).

178 Davies v. Nicolson, 2 De G. & J. 693 (1858).

179 Rubel v. Bushnell, 91 Ky. 251, 15 S. W. 520 (1891); Miller v. Shoaf, 110 N. C. 319, 14 S. E. 800 (1892).

180 ALABAMA, CODE (1907), § 2785; ARKANSAS, DIG. STATS. (1916), c. 1, § 164; COLORADO, ANNOT. STATS. (1912), § 8027; Cutright v. Stanford, 81 Ill. 240 (1876); Lewis v. Overby, 31 Gratt. (Va.) 601, 618-20 (1879); Kansas, GEN. STATS. (1915), 84658; MISSOURI, REV. STATS. (1909), § 255. And see MICHIGAN, COMP. LAWS (1915), c. 234, C. 56, §§ 23, 25, 28; NEBRASKA, REV. STATS. (1913), §§ 1412, 1417; VERMONT, PUB. STATS. (1906), c. 137, §§ 2912-20.

181 INDIANA, ANNOT. STATS. (1914), § 2970; Massachusetts, Rev. Laws (1092),

the best solution is that suggested in a leading Virginia case. There by a creditor's bill all parties interested, including the personal representative, were brought into court and each held liable for his rateable proportion so far as that was possible without injury to the creditor's right. All conflicting rights may then be settled in one suit.1 182

HARVARD LAW SCHOOL,
CAMBRIDGE, MASS.

Joseph Warren.

C. 141, § 31; OHIO, ANNOT. GEN. CODE (1912), § 10881; RHODE ISLAND, Gen. Laws (1909), c. 318, § 24; WISCONSIN, STATS. (1915), § 3867; McClung v. Sieg, 54 W. Va. 467 (1903).

182 Lewis v. Overby, 31 Gratt. (Va.) 601, 619-20 (1879). See McClung v. Sieg, 54 W. Va. 467, 46 S. E. 210 (1903), where some parties were out of the jurisdiction.