Sidebilder
PDF
ePub

tion and policy knew of this hay, and, as between him and the assured, it was understood that it was covered by the policy. The articles of incorporation of the company declared that only property under "the immediate control" of the assured should be subject to insurance. Held, that plaintiff was entitled to recover for loss of the hay.

Soli v. Farmers Mutual Ins. Co. of Manchester (Minn. S. C.), 52 Northwestern Reporter (Sept. 3, 1892), p. 979.

Contract-Forfeiture-Equity.-A policy of insurance upon a house, with a thirty days' vacancy clause, was renewed from year to year, for several years, by the agent simply giving a receipt for the premium upon request by the insured for renewal. At the time of last request, the company having adopted a new form of policy limiting time of vacancy to ten days, a new form of policy was given insured instead of the usual receipt. The insured took the new policy and kept it four months, without reading it, when the fire occurred. At the time of the fire the premises had been vacant for more than ten days. Held, that equity would not relieve the insured from the forfeiture, as he will be held chargeable with knowledge of the contents of the new policy.

Thompson et al. v. Southern Mutual Ins. Co. (Ga. S. C.), 15 Southeastern Reporter (Sept. 6, 1892), p. 652.

Policy-Waiver.-Though a fire policy, permitting alterations in the building not exceeding ten days, provides that any extension of the privilege must be previously consented to in writing by the secretary, or otherwise be void, still, if the local agent communicates to the officers of the company the fact of more extended alterations being made, and it makes no objections, the fact of the condition being violated can not be set up in discharge of the policy on occasion of a subsequent loss.

Stauffer v.Manheim Mut. Fire Ins. Co. (Pa. S. C.), 24 Atlantic Reporter (Sept. 7, 1892), p. 754.

Policy Statement of Interest-Forfeiture.-Under a policy of fire insurance stating that the entire policy shall be void if the interest of the insured be not truly stated therein, where one insures property in his own name without informing the company that it belonged to his wife, she can not recover for a loss, there being no case for reformation for fraud, accident or mistake.

Diffenbaugh v. Union Fire Ins. Co. (Pa. S. C.), 24 Atlantic Reporter (Sept. 7, 1892), p. 745; 23 Pittsburgh Legal Journal (Aug. 31, 1892), p. 37; 9 Lancaster Law Review (Aug. 15, 1892), p. 297; 25 Chicago Legal News (Sept. 17, 1892), p. 22.

Other Insurance--Estoppel.-Where an insurance company had notice, at the time its policy was issued, of other insurance on the property it is estopped in an action on the policy, from setting up the violation of a clause, therein prohibiting prior additional insurance without its consent.

Same-Forfeiture.

Where there was additional insurance at the time the policy was issued, in violation of the condition of the policy that it should be void in case the assured had other insurance without the company's assent, the policy is not made binding on the company by the fact that there is no additional insurance at the time the property is burned.

Same-Same. In an action on an insurance policy, which provided that it should be void if the insured had other insurance without the company's assent, plaintiff can not, in reply to a plea by defendant that there was such additional insurance, set up that the prior policy contained a like condition, rendering it void at the time defendant's policy was issued, since either both policies are void, or the second policy is void, and the first still valid because of the invalidity of the second.

Same-Notice to Agent-Estoppel.-Notice to the agent of an insurance company, at the time the policy is issued, of the existence of prior insurance, is not sufficient to estop the company to set up a condition in the policy prohibiting other insurance without the company's assent, unless the agent is a general agent, with full power to make contracts of insurance, and not a mere agent to receive applications and forward them to the company.

Reed v. Equitable F. & M. Ins. Co. (K. I. S. C.), 24 Atlantic Reporter (Sept. 14, 1892), p. 833.

Contract—Issuance of Policy-Jury.-Several days before the fire the agent of defendant was applied to for policies of insurance upon a lot of lumber belonging to plaintiff. The evidence was contradictory as to whether the policies were issued before the fire. The agent testified that the policies were so issued, but there were circumstances tending to discredit his testimony. Held, that it was error to instruct the jury that the policies were issued before the fire.

Same-Same.-Plaintiff applied to an insurance agent for a specified amount of insurance on certain property, and intended the policies to be issued at once, but the companies in which they should be issued were not mentioned, nor was the rate. The agent said he would issue them right away, but they were not delivered for several days thereafter, during which time the property was destroyed, and they were in the aggregate for a smaller amount than applied for. Held, though the policies were not delivered to or ratified by the plaintiff before the loss occurred, there was a valid contract existing at the time with each company in which the agent issued a policy, as the agent acted for plaintiff in choosing the companies and distributing the risk. Grant, J., dissenting.

Policy-Delivery of Goods.-Insured property consisted of a large amount of lumber piled on docks. Some of it had been sold, piled by itself, and marked for purchaser, and speedy removal of all of it was

contemplated by vessel. The agent, when he issued the policy, knew of these facts, and was familiar with the methods of doing business at that place. The policy was for a year, and covered property owned by the insured, and "property held by it in trust, or sold and not delivered, and piled on the docks." Held, that there was no delivery, within the meaning of the policy, of the lumber sold and piled by itself.

Michigan Pipe Co. v. Michigan F. & M. Ins. Co. (Mich. S. C.), 52 Northwestern Reporter (Sept. 10, 1892), p. 1070.

FRATERNAL BENEFIT ORDERS.

Mutual Company-Action on Certificate-Proof Necessary to Recover.-In an action on a mutual benefit certificate by which the society agrees that in case of the member's death it will pay his wife "the amount realized from one assessment upon all the members, not exceeding the sum of $5,000," the plaintiff can not recover where there is no proof that an assessment was made or demanded, or what was the number of members, or what one assessment would realize.

Deardorff v. Guaranty Mutual Acc. Ass'n (Cal. S. C.), 27 Pacific Reporter (Aug. 13, 1891), p. 158.

Beneficiary-Illegal Designation-By-Laws.-Where the Royal Arcanum, a mutual benefit association, issued a certificate in which a person is named as beneficiary who does not sustain the relation to the member required by the rules of the association, upon interpleader, the association admitting its liability to some one, it is proper to decree the fund to be paid to those sustaining the required relation to the deceased member.

Parke v. Welch (Ill. App. Ct.), 33 Ill. App., 188.

Change of Beneficiary. The original certificate of membership in a mutual benefit society is superseded where, at the member's request, a new certificate is issued to another beneficiary without the original beneficiary's consent, although such consent was required by former rules of the society.

Thesing v. Supreme Lodge Catholic Knights of America (C. P.), 24 Ohio Law Journal, 401.

By-Laws-Re-instatement-Benefits.—Where the by-laws of a benefit society which pays "sick benefits" to its members and "mortality benefits" to their widows, provide that a delinquent member may be restored to membership by paying back dues, but that he shall not be entitled to benefits for one month thereafter, upon the death of a restored member within such month his widow is entitled to the mortality benefit.

Connolly v. Shamrock Ben. Soc. (Mo. App. Ct.), 43 Mo. App., 283.

Constitution-Payment of Dues-Waiver.-Where the constitution of a society provides that where a beneficiary certificate is suspended by reason of non-payment of assessments it "may be renewed if the member be living," upon conditions, an officer of the society can not waive the forfeiture by receiving payment after the member's death.

Bagley v. Grand Lodge, A. O. U. W. (Ill. App. Ct.), 31 Ill. App., 618.

Suicide-Accident-Evidence.-In an action on an insurance policy stipulating against liability in case the insured should commit suicide, whether sane or insane, where the evidence is conflicting and quite evenly balanced as to whether the death was caused by the intentional act of the insured, it will be presumed that death resulted from accident.

Change of Beneficiary--Insurable Interest.-The policy and the constitution of the order gave the member the right to change the beneficiary at will. The member changed the designation, making his brother his beneficiary. Held, that the fact that the brother had no pecuniary interest in the life of the member did not render the contract void as against public policy.

Ingersoll v. Knights of the Golden Rule (U. S. C. C.), 47 Federal Reporter (Oct. 13, 1891), p. 272.

Constitution and By-Laws-Suspension--Reinstatement.-The constitution and by-laws provided that any member failing to pay his assessment within thirty days after notice should stand suspended, but might be restored at any time thereafter by furnishing a new and satisfactory application and medical examination, according to the forms of the association, and paying all arrearages. The member became in arrears for an assessment, and after the thirty days presented to the association a new application and medical examination, which was rejected by the medical director as not being satisfactory. The member then brought this action in equity to be restored to membership. Held, on demurrer to petition, that the court has jurisdiction to determine the rights of the parties under the by-laws, and, if the membership therein ought to be restored, to compel the same to be done.

Failure to Pay Assessment-Equity.-In this case the member trusted his book-keeper to pay his assessments. The book-keeper neglected to pay the assessment in question, and thereafter absconded, a defaulter to the member to a large amount. Held, that the book-keeper was the agent of the member, and his failure to pay was attributable to the member.

By-Laws-Reinstatement--"Satisfactory" Examination.-Where the by-laws provide that the member may be reinstated upon furnishing a "satisfactory" application and medical examination to the medical examiner, the decision of the medical examiner, in passing upon such

« ForrigeFortsett »