application and examination, in the absence of fraud, is binding on the

courts.

Graveson v. Cincinnati Life Ass'n (Hamilton Co., Ohio, Com. Pl. Ct.), 26 Weekly Law Bulletin (Sept. 21, 1891), p. 183.

Right to Alter By-Laws-Injunction.-The plaintiff's certificate was issued in 1878. In 1889 the Supreme Lodge of defendant order divided the territory of Ohio into two districts, of which Hamilton county formed one, and provided that the mortuary assessment in said county should be 55, while in the other district it was fixed at 28. The defendant seeking to make assessments on this basis, the plaintiff seeks to enjoin the carrying out of the plan on the ground that it would be a violation of the principles of the order, and of his special contract with the Grand Lodge of Ohio. The Supreme Lodge was authorized to prescribe and determine the rights, duties and privileges of members of the order, *** and alter, amend, or abrogate the same, and generally to do all things which it might deem right and proper, for the promotion of the welfare, etc., of the order. Held, that when a person becomes a member of such association, he becomes subject to the laws, rules and regulations thereof, and can not properly apply to the courts for relief or redress on account of some action of the Supreme Lodge, unless there has been an invasion by it of some property rights of his, as by the breach of some contract made with him, or it is made without authority.

Same--Estoppel.—Where the member, after the change in the bylaws affecting the amount to be paid on each assessment, continues to pay his assessments, he is thereby estopped to deny the right of the order to make such change.

Steuve v. Grand Lodge Ohio, Ancient Order of United Workmen (Hamilton Co., Ohio, Cir. Ct.), 26 Weekly Law Bulletin (Sept. 14, 1891), p. 471.

Death in Common Disaster--Beneficiary--Constitution of Order. The certificate was made payable to the wife of the member. The husband and wife perished in a common disaster, viz.: the burning of an hotel. The by-laws provided: "Should all the beneficiaries die before the decease of the member, and no other or further disposition be made thereof, the benefit shall be paid to the heirs of the deceased member dependent upon him," etc. In an action between the administrator of the wife, and the sisters of the member, held, that the finding of the court that the husband and wife died at the same instant must be taken to be correct, and that the sisters of the member were entitled to the fund.

Paden v. Briscoe et al. (Tex. S. C.), 17 Southwestern Reporter (Sept. 14, 1891), p. 42.

Right to Amend By-Laws.-After the plaintiff had been sick nearly a year, the defendant amended its by-laws so as to reduce the amount of benefits. Held, that while the by-laws as amended would be binding as to future obligations to pay sick benefits, the society

could not, by adopting such by-law, reduce the amount which it had become liable to pay the plaintiff under the original by-law.

Becker v. Berlin Benefit Soc. (Pa. S. C.), 22 Atlantic Reporter (Nov. 4, 1891), p. 699.

By-Laws-Rejection of Claim-Right to Sue.-The society's laws provided that the society had power to pass on any claim for a death loss, and that its decision on any such claim should be final, and that no suit, at law or in equity, should be brought on such claim. Plaintiff's husband became a member of the society, and held an endowment certificate, which, upon his death while a member in good standing, would entitle the plaintiff to receive a certain amount. After her husband's death plaintiff presented her claim to the society, which, after a hearing, was rejected. Held, in an action by her on the certificate, where no charge was made that the society acted fraudulently, or contrary to its rules, that its decision was final.

Canfield v. Great Camp of Knights of the Macabees (Mich. S. C.), 49 Northwestern Reporter (Oct. 24, 1891), p. 875; 21 Insurance Law Journal, 3; 13 Lawyers' Reports, Annotated, 625.

Petition for Rehearing-Rule of Court.-The appellant assumes that the rule of the appellate court, that a petition for rehearing will only be entertained in a case not reviewable on appeal, is unreasonable. Held, the right to a rehearing is not a legal right, but one which courts allow of their own motion, and that the rule of the appellate court is reasonable and valid.

Supreme Lodge Knights of Honor v. Dalberg (Ill. S. C.), 24 Chicago Legal News (Nov. 14, 1891), p. 86.

Murder of Insured by Beneficiary-Forfeiture.-James May brick insured his life with the defendant for the benefit of his wife. The insured died and the wife was subsequently convicted of murdering him. Prior to the trial she assigned her interest in the policy to one of the plaintiffs. The assignees of the policy, and the executors of the deceased, sued the company to recover the amount due under the policy. Held, that the plaintiffs can not recover; that it is against public policy that a person who feloniously causes the death of another should profit thereby by recovering upon a policy on the life of the murdered man, and the fact that the beneficiary did not know of the existence of the policy, can not alter the rule.

Cleaver v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n (Eng. Q. B. D.), 44 Albany Law Journai (Nov. 7, 1891), p. 382; 65 Law Term Reports, 220.

Constitution of Order-Arrears of Dues.-Where the constitution of a mutual benefit association provides that a member shall forfeit all right to the endowment fund "when he is in arrears with his dues and assessments for a period of six months," such forfeiture does not occur as soon as he owes six months' dues, they being payable at the end of each quarter; for he is not six months in arrears until six months after the day when his payments are due.

Same-Right to Sue.-The provision of article four of the constitution of the defendant order that, in case of disputes, "the members shall exhaust their remedies in the orders before resorting to a court of law," has reference to a dispute of members among themselves, within the order, and does not apply to a contest with the order itself over payment of a death claim.

Bukofzer v. United States Grand Lodge of the Independent Order Sons of Benjamin (N. Y. S. C.), 15 New York Supplement (Nov. 12, 1891), p. 922; 40 New York State Reporter, 653.

Statute - Exemption from Taxation-Mandamus.-The auditor of state refused to license the petitioner to do business in the state for reason that the petitioner had failed to pay the 2 per cent. tax imposed by the laws of the state. The petitioner claimed to be exempt from the provisions of the tax laws by reason of the provisions of section 53 of the insurance laws of the state. In original action for mandamus to compel the auditor to admit the petitioner to the state, held, (1) that an association organized under the general incorporation laws of the state, the principal object and function of which are to secure to each member thereof the payment on his death, to his beneficiary or representative, of a certain sum of money, subject to the fulfillment of the conditions imposed by the charter and by-laws, is essentially a life insurance company, and the relations between such companies and its members are purely business relations, based upon contract; and (2) the fact that such an association restricts its membership to persons belonging to, and in good standing in, a fraternal or benevolent society known as "Free and Accepted Masons," under 50 years of age, does not make it a secret, benevolent, or fraternal society, and does not bring it within the proviso of section 53 of the insurance laws of the state.

Masonic Aid Ass'n v. Taylor, Auditor (S. Dak. S. C.), 50 Northwestern Reporter (Nov. 14, 1891), p. 93.

Certificate-Relationship of Beneficiary-Waiver.--Where a benefit society, which has issued a certificate conditioned to be void if the beneficiary is not a "natural heir" of the member, continues to collect assessments after knowledge that the beneficiary named is not related to the member, there is a waiver of the condition, and the policy is valid.

Same-Same-Statute.-Laws 21st Gen. Assem. Iowa, c. 65, ? 21, provides that no benefit society shall issue a certificate unless the beneficiary therein shall be the husband, wife, relative, legal representative, heir or legatee of the member. Held, that where a benefit certificate, issued before the passage of the act in favor of a beneficiary not included in the above description, was forfeited for non-payment of assessments, a reinstatement after the act took effect did not bring the certificate within this provision.

Reinstatement-Health of Member-Evidence.-The member on application for reinstatement certified that her health was good, and

that she was then free from all disorders and infirmities tending to shorten life or impair health. In an action on the certificate the truth of this representation was questioned, and the beneficiary testified that she was in good health, and was unusually strong and active for one of her age. The proofs of death admitted in evidence contained the affidavit of a physician, who never saw the member until after her death, stating that she had suffered from cramps of the stomach for two or three years past, which period covered the time she made the representations. Held, that as this statement must necessarily have been made from information obtained from others, it was not sufficient to prove the representations false.

Certificate-Damages-Pleading.-The certificate provided that the society would pay to the beneficiary "the net proceeds of one full assessment at the schedule rates upon all contributing members, and received within 30 days from the date of the notice thereof." In a suit in equity on the certificate, plaintiff prayed for "specific performance of the contract, and for such other relief as in equity he may be entitled to." Held, that the contract and prayer warranted a decree ordering the society to levy an assessment upon the members who were subject thereto at the time prescribed in the certificate, and that the cause should stand continued to await the result of the assessment.

Same-Same-Decree.-It was improper, however, in such a decree, to expressly reserve to the court the right to order the society by legal proceedings to collect the assessments from any members failing to pay the same, or to reserve the right to act upon any further supplemental applications which might be found necessary to protect or enforce the plaintiff's rights, since the court would have such powers without the reservation, and it is improper to provide for defaults which may never 44 Northwestern Reporter 685, modified. On rehearing.

Occur.

Lindsey v. Western Mut. Aid Soc. (Iowa S. C.), 50 Northwestern Reporter (Nov. 14, 1891), p. 29.

reserve

Dissolution of Company-Payment of Claims-Reserve Fund— Constitution of Society.-The constitution of a mutual benefit life association provided that its funds, which were derived wholly from assessments, should be divided into two portions designated respectively as the "death fund" for the payment of death claims, and the ". fund." There was no provision in the constitution as to what disposition of the reserve fund should be made in case of a dissolution of the association, but there was a provision that, in case any unforeseen deficiency of the death fund should occur, the reserve fund might be used for paying death claims. Held, on dissolution of the association, that the reserve fund was not distributable only among the holders of unforfeited certificates of membership at the time of the dissolution, but was liable for the payment of death claims for which the "death fund" was in

sufficient at the time of dissolution, ratably with all other creditors of the association.

Assessment to Cover Death Claim-Receiver.-A death claim accrued, and an assessment was levied, and an amount raised to pay the same prior to the involuntary dissolution of the company, payment of which amount was delayed without sufficient ground therefor, by reason of which delay the amount passed, with other assets, into the hands of the receiver of the association. Held, that such amount was liable in the hands of the receiver exclusively to the payment of the claim for which it was levied.

Death After Dissolution-Status of Claim.-On the involuntary dissolution of a benefit life association, a death claim, accruing after the dissolution, is not entitled to participate in the distribution of the death fund among claims which accrued prior to the dissolution.

Assessments by Receiver-Forfeiture.-An assessment may be ordered by a receiver by authority of court in proceedings for the involuntary dissolution of a benefit association, and, where the constitution provides that a certificate of membership therein shall be forfeited for non-payment of an assessment, the non-payment of an assessment so ordered by the receiver will operate such forfeiture.

In re Equitable Reserve Fund Life Ass'n (N. Y. S. C.), 16 New York Supplement (Nov. 19, 1891), p. 80; 40 New York State Reporter, 800.

Change of Beneficiary-Constitution and By-Laws.-A certificate issued by a benefit association, whose object of organization was to create a widows' and orphans' benefit fund, named as beneficiary one L., wife of insured. On a division of property on separation by divorce the certificate was given to L. as her own property, and for two years or more she paid all dues and assessments thereon. Some years after the date of the certificate, on an affidavit of the insured that the wife refused to surrender the certificate, pursuant to article 9, 5, of the constitution of the association, which provides that a member at any time while in good standing may surrender his benefit certificate, and take a new one as he may direct, and section 4 of the same article, which provides that "the beneficiary may be changed as the member may thereafter direct, *** and such change shall be entered in the benefit certificate," another certificate was issued, naming the insured's three adult children by a former wife, as beneficiaries. It also appeared that L. had small children by insured dependent upon her for support. The adult children were not dependent upon the insured in any way. Held,that while, under the constitution of the order, the insured had the right to change the beneficiary, he could only do so by naming a person within the class to be benefited according to the constitution of the association, and, his adult children not being of this class, the money should be paid to L. for the benefit of herself and children.