On

payable to his wife, if she survived him, if not, to his children. October 6, 1887, he obtained a further certificate payable to his wife and children. On August 12, 1891, he made his will bequeathing to his wife one-half of his life policies for her life and widowhood, and after her decease, to be given to his surviving children in equal proportions. Held, that Rev. St. Ont. 136,2 6, the act to secure to wives and children the benefit of life insurance, as amended by 51 V. c. 22, s. 3, and 53 V. c. 39, s. 6, applied to this case, and the wife was entitled to one-half the sum payable under the certificate first mentioned, for life, and the other moiety was untouched by the will, and went to her absolutely; while as to the second insurance, the wife was entitled to one-half for life and widowhood by virtue of the will.

In re Cameron, Mason v. Cameron (High C. of J., Can., Ch. Div.), 12 Canadian Law Times (April, 1892), p. 171.

Statute-Insurance Company-Benefit Society.-A beneficial society doing business through the lodge system, is not an insurance company within the meaning of the Act May 11, 1881 (P. L. 20).

Same-Action on Certificate-Defense-By-Laws. In a suit on a beneficial certificate, it is competent for the defendant to give in evidence the by-laws of the association, followed by proof of such a failure to comply with them as would make the certificate void, notwithstanding that the by-laws were not attached to the contract sued on, under act May 11, 1881.

Donlevy v. Supreme Lodge Shield of Honor (Phila. Co. C. P. C.), 49 Legal Intelligencer (April 8, 1892), p. 145.

Charter-Reincorporation-Change of Beneficiary. Deceased was insured in a society which was incorporated under the laws of Kentucky, which permitted a benefit certificate made payable to any person whom the member might name. The society afterwards received letters of incorporation from the state of Missouri, which, under the laws of that state, could issue benefit certificates to "such member of his family, person or persons dependent on or related to him, as he may have directed." Deceased had his benefit certificate changed from his daughter as beneficiary, to one who was then, and up to his death, his affianced wife, but who was never dependent upon him. Held, that the reincorporation in Missouri did not affect the rights of the parties insured under the Kentucky statute, as regarded the right to name beneficiaries, and the beneficiary named in the last certificate was entitled to the insurance.

Bachman v. Supreme Lodge K. & L. of H. (Ill. A. C.), 23 Chicago Legal News (April 16, 1892), p. 264.

Dissolution-Reserve Funds-Rights of Members-Death Claims. -A receiver found the assets of a mutual benefit association in such condition that the death fund was largely deficient in its ability to pay

the death losses accruing prior to the dissolution of the association, and by its constitution no death claim was to be otherwise due or payable. The reserve fund had been formed by laying aside twenty-five per cent. of the death assessments, and was not to be applied to death claims until it exceeded $100,000, which it never did, and then only where the claims exceeded the mortality tables, etc. Held, that the reserve fund was not in any event liable to be called upon for payment to those holding death claims. It was essentially a fund for the assistance of the living, to the entire exclusion of those who represented deceased members.

Same-Same-Same.-Thirty-four assessments had been made, and after a receiver had been appointed a thirty-fifth assessment was ordered by the court, which many members failed to pay. Held, that under the circumstances there was no absolute legal duty resting on the members to pay the thirty-fifth assessment, and the non-payment did not deprive them of the right to share in the reserve fund. The thirty-fifth assessment should be repaid, and all members who had paid the thirty-fourth, and were living when these proceedings were begun, should share in the reserve fund.

Same-Same--Same.-Those who are entitled to the reserve fund should be paid therefrom pro rata, according to the amount each had contributed thereto.

Same-Same-Same.-The date upon which to determine the rights of claimants upon the reserve fund should be the date of the commencement of the proceedings which terminated in the dissolution of the company.

Same-Same-Same.-The certificate-holders who died after the commencement of the proceedings have no claim upon the death fund, but their representatives share in the reserve fund.

Same-Same-Same-Preference.-The thirty-third and thirtyfourth assessments were levied under the amended constitution, for a general purpose, and not for any particular death claim. Held, that the mere fact that a claim was approved by the executive committee before the assessment was made does not give such claim a preference.

Same-Expense of Dissolution.-The two funds should pay pro rata the expenses of the winding up. 16 N. Y. Supp. 80, modified.

In re The Equitable Reserve Fund Life Association (N. Y. C. A.), 43 New York State Reporter (April, 1892), p. 204; 30 Northeastern Reporter (March 25, 1892), p. 114; 21 Insurance Law Journal, 385.

Foreign Company-Jurisdiction-Estoppel.-A Boston insurance company, doing business in the state by permission of the state of New York, on condition that it shall subject itself to the laws of the state

and that process served upon it in the state shall be binding upon it, can not, in action on its policy issued in New York, brought in New York by a resident of the state of New Jersey, set up the defense that the policy was issued and executed in its home office in Boston and that therefore the courts of New York are without jurisdiction of the

case.

Proof of Death-Physician's Certificate-Excuse.-The obstinate and unjust refusal of a physician to furnish a certificate of the cause of death of the insured, so that those interested are prevented from complying with a condition of the policy requiring that all claims against the company shall be so attested, is sufficient to excuse the claimant from procuring such certificate.

O'Neil v. Massachusetts Ben. Assn. (N. Y. S. C.), 18 New York Supplement (March 31, 1892), p. 22; 43 New York State Reporter, 761.

Application-Breach of Warranty-Forfeiture.-Insured stated in his application that he had applied to another insurance company, but had not been rejected, whereas he had been rejected. Held, that such answer being part of the contract of insurance, and being false, avoided the contract.

Same-Same-Same-Knowledge of Agent.-It is not important that the party making the warranty believed its entire truth, nor does the mere knowledge of the agent at the time when it was made, that the warranty was false, prevent the defendant from setting up the breach as a defense to the action on the policy.

Clemens v. Supreme Assembly of the Royal Society of Good Fellows (N. Y. C. A), 43 New York State Reporter (April, 1892), p. 571; 30 Northeastern Reporter, 496.

Statute-Infant Members-Contract.-While the certificate of membership in a benefit society contains the contract of insurance, yet the same is governed by the charter and by-laws of the association, and the statutes of the state of its domicile. Under Laws N. Y., 1883, c. 175, providing for the incorporation of co-operative insurance associations, the fundamental principle of their creation is a mutual contract obligation; there is an implied requirement that they shall be of full age, and that all persons thereafter becoming members of the corporate body shall have the same qualifications; and hence they have no power to insure infants, for infants can not contract.

Same Same Same.-The fact that losses are to be paid from weekly dues, and not by assessments on the death of members, is immaterial, since the contract obligation extends to the payment of the one as well as to the other.

In re Globe Mutual Ben. Assn. (N. Y. S. C.), 17 New York Supplement (March 24, 1892), p. 852; 43 New York State Reporter, 756.

Insurance Company-Statute.-A society which does not confine its insurance exclusively to members, is not entitled to protection of section 43 of the Ins. Act, Rev. St. Can., c. 124, relating to fraternal and other societies, but must comply with section 49 of said act.

Regina v. Stapleton (High Ct. of J., Com. P. D.), 12 Canadian Law Times (April, 1892), p. 172.

Constitution-Reinstatement-Waiver.-The constitution of the association provided that the certificate should be forfeited for any violation of the "provisions of the certificate of membership or of the constitution and by-laws. But that the executive committee shall have power to reinstate a delinquent member at any time within one year, *** upon satisfactory evidence of good health," etc. After the certificate in suit had lapsed over a month the annual dues were paid by the employers of the insured and a receipt taken, which stated that it was given on the condition that the insured was living and of temperate habits and in as good health as when originally received as a member, and that otherwise the payment, receipt and original certificate should be null and void. The deceased was not of temperate habits and had been ill ten days, and the same evening was removed to the hospital, where he died the next forenoon of fatty degeneration of the heart. Held, that the defendant was not liable as on this state of facts the "satisfactory evidence of good health" could not be furnished, which was necessary to authorize the executive committee, under the constitution of defendant, to reinstate a delinquent member.

Forfeiture-Waiver-Evidence.--Defendant furnished the employers of deceased with blank proofs of death, which the latter had filled out under instructions of defendant's agent, and sent to Scotland, where plaintiff resided, and at the said employers' request the defendant furnished blanks for the certificate of the clergyman officiating at the funeral, and, upon it being filled out and returned, defendant's representative said he would lay it before the board, and that when the president returned the board would meet and pass upon the claim, and it would probably be paid in March following. Held, that these acts of defendant did not constitute a waiver.

Notice of Assessments-Statute.--It seems that mutual benefit associations are not subject to Ch. 341, Laws N. Y., 1876, amended by Ch. 321, Laws 1877, requiring previous notice of the due date of annual dues and premiums.

Ronald v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Assn. (N. Y. C. A.), 44 New York State Reporter (May, 1892), p. 407; 30 Northeastern Reporter (May 13, 1892), p. 739; 21 Insurance Law Journal, 634.

Membership-Decision of Trustees.--The charter and by-laws of the New York Cotton Exchange provide that death benefits arising from assessments shall not extend to a person who has ceased to be a member,

and that deaths in the membership are to be reported by the trustees to the managers who levy assessments. Held, that the liability to levy an assessment appearing to be absolute, the investigation of the trustees is not conclusive as to whether the decedent was a member or not.

Same-Evidence.-Hypothecation of a membership in the Exchange for a debt, with power of attorney to transfer the same, which is not exercised, but the debt is continued on the creditor's books, is not such a sale of the membership as will relieve the Exchange from liability to make an assessment on the member's death.

Same-Same.-In an action on such membership certificate, statements made by the creditor holding the certificate are admissible for the purpose of showing the nature of his claim thereto, but are not conclusive as to the decedent's title to the membership.

Dillingham v. New York Cotton Exchange (U. S. C. C.), 49 Federal Reporter (May 3, 1892), p. 719.

Beneficiary--Payment of Premiums--Vested Interest.-A person designated as beneficiary of a policy issued by a benefit society, who voluntarily and gratuitously pays the assessments thereon, and not under any contract with the assured, acquires no vested interest therein as against a person afterwards named as beneficiary by the assured.

Same-Same-Same-Evidence.-The evidence of a son of the assured that she had told him that she wanted plaintiff, her daughter, to have the insurance money, was properly received as tending to show that defendant, named as beneficiary, had no vested interest in the certificate.

Nix v. Donovan (N. Y. City Ct.), 18 New York Supplement (May 5, 1892), p. 435; 46 New York State Reporter, 21.

Non-Payment of Assessment-Forfeiture-Evidence.-By the rules of the defendant, if, after the payment of a life benefit, there was not enough in the fund of that class to pay the next benefit, the supreme secretary was authorized to notify the secretary of each section to assess each member $1.10, payable within 30 days. On the trial of an action on a benefit certificate, which defendant refused to pay on the ground of non-payment of assessments, defendant's counsel offered to prove the receipt by the section secretary of such notices from the supreme secretary, and that the former notified the insured, who failed to pay within the prescribed time, and was suspended. The evidence was rejected on the ground that it was not shown that the assessment was regularly made. Held, error; the notice from the supreme secretary was presumptive proof that there was not a sufficient sum in the fund to pay another benefit, and that an assessment was necessary. Reversing 38 N. Y. St. R. 979; 14 N. Y. Supp. 834.

Demings v. Supreme Lodge Knights of Pythias of the World (N.Y. C. A.),