43 New York State Reporter (April, 1892), p. 872; 30 Northeastern Reporter (April 29, 1892), p. 572.

Complaint-Insurable Interest.-Where the charter of a benevolent association does not require the beneficiary of a certificate of membership to have an insurable interest in the life of a member, and the member himself made the contract with the association, the beneficiary, in an action on the certificate need not allege an insurable interest.

Change of Beneficiary--Vested Interest.-The beneficiary of a certificate of membership in a benevolent association has no vested right in the certificate before the death of the member on whose account it was issued; and the right of the member to change the beneficiary without the consent of the beneficiary, is not affected by the fact that the beneficiary has paid the assessments, and has possession of the certificate.

Same. Where neither the constitution or by-laws of the association prescribed any formalities for the change of beneficiary, the designation of a different beneficiary who should hold the fund in trust for certain legatees in the member's last will, formally executed and duly probated, wrought an effectual change of beneficiary.

Masonic Ben. Ass'n of Central Illinois v. Bunch et al. (Mo. S. C.), 19 Southwestern Reporter (May 2, 1892), p. 25.

Forfeiture-Reinstatement.-Where a member of a mutual insurance company is suspended for non-payment of assessments, and neglects during his lifetime to secure his re-instatement in accordance with the terms of his certificate and the provisions of the order, his restoration to membership can not be effected after his death by payment of the sum due from him to the company at the time of his death, though the period within which, if alive, he could have secured his re-instatement has not expired.

Modern Woodmen of America v. Jameson (Kan. S. C.), 29 Pacific Reporter (April 28, 1892), p. 473; 21 Insurance Law Journal, 711.

Forfeiture of Charter-Statute-Procedure. This action was brought against the defendant under the provisions of Gen. St. Minn., 1878, c. 76, 12, to restrain and prohibit it from further exercising any of its corporate rights, privileges and franchises. The defendant was incorporated under Gen. Laws, Minn., 1885, c. 184. The defendant contends that a corporation organized under chapter 184 can only be proceeded against after an examination and report of the insurance commissioner, supplemented by the opinion and formal application of the attorney-general. The question on appeal is whether the method of procedure prescribed in the act of 1885 has become exclusive. Held, that the method of procedure described in the act of 1885 is not exclu

sive, but such corporation may be proceeded against as prescribed in chapter 76, Gen. St. 1878, 212.

State, ex rel. Clapp, v. Educational Endowment Ass'n (Minn. S. C.), 51 Northwestern Reporter (April 23, 1892), p. 908; 21 Insurance Law Journal,

561.

Agent-Statute.-Where the regulations of an association having a benefit department require the secretary of each local division to certify to the health of every applicant for insurance, to keep a correct list of the members of the benefit department, to place thereon the name of any member of the benefit department joining his division by transfer from any other division, and also makes it the duty of members to notify him of any changes of residence, such secretary must be considered an insurance "agent" of the association, under Rev. St. Wis., ? 2637, subd. 9, and 1977, declaring who shall be considered agents of a foreign insurance company for the purpose of receiving service of process.

Dixon v. Order of Railway Conductors of America (U. S. C. C.), 49 Federal Reporter (May 17, 1892), p. 910; 21 Insurance Law Journal, 690.

Pleadings-Admissions-Practice. Where a complaint in an action by one of the beneficiaries in a life insurance policy against another beneficiary, admits that defendant is entitled to reimbursement for money advanced upon the policy, and, after defendant has answered, the complaint is amended so as to deny defendant's right to any part of the policy, a contention that defendant is estopped by facts admitted in the answer, to claim any part of it, can have no force which must not also be given to the admissions in the complaint.

Beneficiary-Trustee.-Where a person advances money to pay the premiums on another's life insurance policy under an agreement that he shall hold the policy as security for their repayment, and the name of the wife of such person is inserted as one of the payees of the policy upon the assurance of the husband that this is merely for the purpose of making his security more effectual, the wife has no beneficial interest in the policy except as trustee for the amount advanced by the husband.

McDonald v. Humphries et ux. (Ark. S. C.), 19 Southwestern Reporter (May 16, 1892), p. 234.

Death of Beneficiary-Will-Rights of Devisee.-Where a husband procures a policy upon his life payable to his wife, and the wife dies, but during her lifetime makes a will leaving all her property to her husband for and during his life, and after his death to her daughter, and during his lifetime the husband also makes a will, giving the benefits of said certificate to his daughter, and said wills have been properly probated, the proceeds of said certificate, when paid by the insurance company, pass to and become the property of the daughter.

Brew et al. v. Clement et al. (Kan. S. C.), 29 Pacific Reporter (May 12, 1892), p. 704; 21 Insurance Law Journal, 513.

Beneficiary--Amendment of By-Law.-An application for admission to membership in a benefit association provided that compliance by the applicant with all existing regulations of the order, and such as it should thereafter adopt, should be the condition upon which he should be entitled to the benefits of the order. Held, that a subsequent amendment of the laws of the order, to the effect that each member "shall designate" the person to whom the beneficiary fund due at his death "shall be paid," who “shall in every instance” be a member of his family, a blood relation, or a person dependent upon him, was not retroactive in its effect, and did not require the substitution of such relation or dependent person for one who had been previously designated as beneficiary.

Same Same. If retroactive, such amendment did not apply to a member who had no family, blood relations, or persons dependent upon him, and his previously designated beneficiary was entitled to the fund. Wist v. Grand Lodge A. O. U. W. (Ore. S. C.), 29 Pacific Reporter (May 12, 1892), p. 610.

Place of Contract-Evidence.-By the by-laws indorsed on the certificate it was provided that it could have no force until approved by the medical examiner at Elkhart, Indiana, and that it should not be binding until the membership fee was paid, and the application approved by the company at its home office; and it was further provided in the certificate that "this contract shall be considered as having been entered into at Elkhart, Ind., and shall be governed by, and construed in accordance with, the laws of said state." Held, that the contract was an Indiana contract, notwithstanding that the application was made in Michigan.

Beneficiary-By-laws-Insurance Interest.-Children, who, under the by-laws of an insurance company, are entitled to be named as beneficiaries in a policy on the lives of their parents, are entitled to recover on such a policy without otherwise showing on insurable interest.

Policy-Limitation of Action.-The policy provided that no suit should be maintainable thereon unless commenced within nine months next after the death of the person insured. After the death of insured the company negotiated for a settlement. The suit was not commenced until 23 days after the nine months had elapsed. Held, that until after negotiations had ceased, the law would not compel the bringing of the suit, and that period of time would have not only to be excluded, but that would excuse the bringing of suit within nine months.

Voorheis v. Peoples Mutual Benefit Society of Elkhart (Mich. S. C.), 51 Northwestern Reporter (May 21, 1892), p. 1109.

Payment of Dues-Waiver.-The certificate provided that the insured would pay all dues and monthly payments agreeably to the by

laws. The by-laws provided that the monthly payments should be paid the first of each month, with the remainder of the month as days of grace; that after the expiration of the days of grace, the payments would be accepted only on the presentation of a certificate of good health by the insured. The insured's payment for September, 1879, was paid October 4th; his payment for October was made November 1st; his payment for November was made December 2d; but his December payment was not made when he died, January 5, 1880. Held, that there had been a waiver of prompt payment of dues, and of the certificate of health.

Same-Same.-There was evidence that J., who, as agent of defendant, solicited the insurance, agreed with the insured on an extension of the time for the payment of December dues until January 5, 1880. J. was appointed as special agent under a written contract, which stated his duties to be soliciting applications for membership, collecting membership fees, and building up the defendant company. A witness testified that defendant's president stated that it was the duty of the agent that solicited a membership to look after and take care of his interest in the policy. The insured dropped dead while on his way to the company's office to pay his dues, on the 5th of January. Held, that the jury were warranted in finding that the time of payment had been waived, and a consent to accept payment on the 5th of January; and that the company was liable on the policy.

Painter v. Industrial Life Ass'n (Ind. S. C.), 30 Northeastern Reporter (May 20, 1892), p. 876.

Certificate-Beneficiary-"Legal Heirs"-Widow.-A widower, having two children, insured in a benevolent society, and took out his certificate payable to his "legal heirs," and subsequently married a second time. At the time of his death he left his wife surviving but no other children than the two by his first wife. Held, that the two children took the whole fund payable under the certificate, to the exclusion of the wife.

Mearns v. Ancient Order of United Workmen (Ont. H. C. J., Ch. Div.), 12 Canadian Law Times (May, 1892), p. 252. (Not reported in full.)

Proof of Death-Statement of Physician-Evidence.-Where a member of a benefit society died about 15 months after admission to membership, and the certificate of the physician, presented as part of the proofs of death, as required by the contract, stated that the cause of death was cancer, and the duration of the disease two years, the latter statement is not even prima facie evidence of the cause of death, since the law merely requires physicians to certify the cause of death, and not the duration of the illness or disease:

Muller v. The Order of Germania (N. Y. City Superior Ct.), 18 New York Supplement (May 26, 1892), p. 794; 46 New York State Reporter, 538.

Breach of Conditions-Waiver.-The policy provided that the company should be liable only for the premiums paid in case the insured took his own life, but that it might, at its option, pay any additional sum that might seem equitable. The insured having died, the company, pursuant to a by law, advanced $100 to the beneficiary. Afterwards she forwarded a sworn statement that the insured committed suicide, while insane. Held, that the company by requiring additional proof that the person signing such statement, whose first name appeared as "Marie,” was identical with the beneficiary, whose name appeared on the company's books as "Maria,” did not estop itself to deny the breach of the policy.

Proofs of Death-Estoppel.-A sworn statement by the widow in the proofs of death that her husband committed suicide while insane, does not estop her to show that she made the statement on the faith of what others told her, and not from actual knowledge, and that he took poison by mistake.

Same-Same.-The fact that the defendant is a mutual association, under the rules of which the amount of the policy, if payable, must be assessed on those persons who are members at the time of the insured's death, and that 1,000 members have since ceased to be such, does not estop the widow to assert the mistake in the proofs of death.

Same-Evidence.-In an action on the policy the sworn statement of the beneficiary, that her husband was insane, was admissible, as against her, to show his insanity.

Same-Same-Insanity of Insured.-Such affidavit, coupled with evidence that the insured, after living in reasonable harmony with his wife for twenty-three years, compelled her to apply for a divorce and make arrangements for a home elsewhere, in order that he might marry their adopted daughter, but fifteen years old; that it became necessary to send the girl away; and that on the day before his death the insured bewailed his fate on hearing that she was never to return, warrants submitting to the jury the insanity of insured; and where the beneficiary claims that the insured took poison by mistake, and, by the lex loci contractus, the policy is void if he committed suicide, whether sane or insane, the exclusion of such question is prejudicial to the company.

Bachmeyer v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n (Wis. S. C.), 52 Northwestern Reporter (June 4, 1892), p. 101.

Statute-Action on Certificate-Party Plaintiff.- A benefit certificate issued under Acts Mass. 1885, c. 183 ("An act relating to life and casualty insurance on the assessment plan"), before the passing of, but in conformity with, Acts 1888, c. 429 ("An act relating to fraternal beneficiary organizations"), comes under the application of the later act, providing for actions thereon by the beneficiary.