Same-Same-Same.--The heirs of the husband, in this case, have no claim against the proceeds or against the beneficiary for premiums paid out from his separate estate.

Phelan, Admx., v. Phelan et al. (Parish of Orleans, La., C. A.), 21 Insurance Law Journal (Jan., 1892), p. 93.

Rescission of Contract-Powers of Agent-Evidence.-In an action by the insured to recover premiums paid on a policy of life insurance, on the question whether the defendant's agent was authorized to allow a rebate of premiums on a policy for $100,000, the court may receive the testimony of other policy-holders for the like amount, whose policies were written by the same agent, in the same locality, and about the same time that the company had accepted the agent's contracts with them for such rebate, and recognized his agency to make them. But where the company repudiated the contracts of such agent so far as they allowed a rebate of premium, and settled with the policy-holders after commencement of legal proceedings by them, on the basis of the risk incurred by the company during the continuance of their policies, their testimony to these transactions does not show such recognition by the company of the authority of the agent as to be admissible on the question of the validity of the contract with plaintiff.

Same-Same-Same.-Plaintiff also offered in evidence the depositions of witnesses residing in a distant state, showing that, a year after the transaction with plaintiff, the same agent made similar agreements with witnesses there, and that the agent had written a letter to the home office, stating his allowance of rebates to witnesses, but stating also that the allowances were to be deducted from his commission on the insurance, and requesting that, if the arrangement were satisfactory, the company should indorse its approval on the letter. The president of the company indorsed his approval and consent on this letter. It appeared from the letter in question, as well as other letters of the president of the company, that the allowance of the rebate was a personal matter between the agent and insured. Held, that the court erred in admitting in evidence these depositions and letters accompanying them, to show the authority of the agent to allow the rebate in question.

Same-Same-Same.-The evidence for plaintiff tended to show that the company, after having been fully informed of plaintiff's contract with the agent, directed another of its agents to accept from plaintiff, in satisfaction of his second premium, the amount thereof, less rebate agreed on by the agent. Held, sufficient evidence of ratification to justify the giving of an instruction to the jury that, if defendant ratified the acts of the agent in giving the rebate, it would be bound by his contract to allow the same.

Same-Same-Same.-Plaintiff had paid the insurance premiums for the first and second years, his contract with the agent not having

been repudiated by the company until after the premium for the third year was tendered. Held, that an instruction that he was entitled to recover the whole of the premiums paid by him, with interest, was not erroneous, notwithstanding the fact that he had received the benefit of insurance for those years.

Thompsen v. New York Life Ins. Co. (Or. S. C.), 28 Pacific Reporter (Feb. 11, 1892), p. 623.

Premium Note-Forfeiture.-A life insurance policy provided that it should lapse for non-payment of premium, and that this condition could not be waived by the company except in writing, signed by the president or secretary. On default of payment of a premium, the company accepted the insured's note therefor, containing a provision that if not paid at maturity the policy should lapse. The note was not paid when due, and the company notified the insured by letter that the policy had lapsed, and to advise the company if he desired to revive the policy. Insured took no notice of this letter, and never paid the note or the next premium when it became due. Held, that the nonpayment of the note and premium by the insured when notified was an abandoment of the policy, and the company was not liable thereon.

Same-Same-Waiver. In such case an oral agreement made by the secretary of the company out of the state in which the general office of the company is located, can not continue a policy in force which has lapsed for non-payment of premiums.

Mailing Letter-Presumption of Law-Where a letter is duly directed and mailed, the presumption of law is that it was received by the person to whom it was directed, in the regular course of the mail.

Hastings v. Brooklyn Life Ins. Co. (N. Y. S. C.), 17 New York Supplement (Feb. 18, 1892), p. 333; 44 New York State Reporter, 37.

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Reformation of Policy-Mistake of Law.-The chancellor has power to reform a written contract where there has been a mutual mistake of law as to the effect of the terms used, as well as where there has been a mistake of fact.

Same- Same-Evidence.-Where a policy of insurance, by reason of a mutual mistake of law as to the effect of the language used, fails to express the intention of the parties, the chancellor may, either upon the application of the insured during his life, or upon the application of the beneficiary after his death, correct the mistake. In this case, the applicant told the insurance agent that he wanted to insure his life for the benefit of his wife, and the application was so filled out, but the agent, conceiving that the application made out in that way in the absence of the wife would be irregular, induced the insured to consent that the application might be rewritten and the policy made payable to himself, which was done, the agent assuring him that his wife would get the

money under the second form of the application as well as under the first. The insured having died, his creditors insist that the money should be applied to the payment of their debts, while the widow insists that the insurance was taken out for her benefit, but by mistake, the policy was made payable to the insured. Held, that the chancellor has power to correct the mistake and give the fund to the widow.

Welch, Adm'r, v. Welch (Ky. Superior Ct.), 13 Kentucky Law Reporter (March 1, 1892), p. 639. (Not reported in full.)

Policy-Condition of Surrender-Forfeiture.-The policy provided that when at least three full annual premiums shall have been paid and the policy, duly receipted, shall have been transmitted to and received by the company before default in the payment of any premium due thereon or within 30 days thereafter, said policy may be exchanged for a term policy, paid-up. Upon suit brought on the paid-up policy, it appeared that a letter was addressed to the secretary of the insurance company demanding a paid-up policy, but the original policy was not returned receipted. Held, that the same rule of construction which applies to other contracts applies to this. It is to be construed according to the sense and meaning of the terms used. The right to the paid-up policy was dependent expressly upon the return and receipt of the original policy, and such not having been done, no suit can be maintained.

Universal Life Ins. Co. v. Devore et al. (Va. S. C. A.), 16 Virginia Law Journal (Feb. 25, 1892), p. 114; 14 Southeastern Reporter (March 15, 1892), p. 532; 21 Insurance Law Journal, 337.

Beneficiaries-Wife and Children--Statute.-A policy was taken out by the insured for the benefit of his wife and children, pursuant to the Married Woman's Property Act, 1870. The assured died leaving a widow and five children. Held, that the widow and children took the money payable under the policy as joint tenants. The dictum in In re Adams' Policy Trusts, 23 Ch. D. 525, not followed.

In re Davies' Policy Trusts (Eng. C. A., Ch. Div.), Law Reports, 1 Chancery Division (Feb. 1, 1892), p. 90.

Policy-Paid-up Insurance-Right of Action.-A life insurance policy after providing for the payment on the death of assured, of a fixed sum to his children, in consideration of annual premiums, declared that, after full payment of two or more premiums, "this policy becomes a paid-up non-forfeiture for an amount equal to a sum of onetenth of that hereby insured for each and every premium which shall have been so paid, requiring no further payment of premiums, subject to no assessments, but entitled to its apportionment of the surplus accumulation in the ratio of its contribution thereto." Held, that there was no agreement to issue a paid-up policy at any time, and there was

no right of action, before the assured's death, to determine the rights of his children in the policy.

Same-Same-Same.-Nor did the non-payment of premiums entitle the company to ask for the surrender and cancellation of the policy by way of affirmative relief. There was no right by either party until the assured's death.

Same-Same-Same-Judgment.-The only proper judgment was the dismissal of the case, and it was improper to incorporate therein findings showing the reasons for the judgment.

Lyons et al. v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co. (N. Y. S. C.), 17 New York Supplement (March 17, 1892), p. 756; 44 New York State Reporter, 581.

Non-Payment of Premiums Forfeiture-Waiver.-After a default in payment of premiums, the insurance company received the arrears from a person whom the insured had designated as beneficiary. Held, that there was no lapse of policy.

Beneficiary-Evidence.-A written designation of a person to whom the amount of a policy is to be paid, and request for such payment, addressed to the insurance company, made by the insured upon a paper furnished by the company, and in the form and manner therein provided, is sufficient evidence of the right of such person to recover on the policy.

Arnott v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America (N. Y. S. C.), 17 New York Supplement (March 10, 1892), p. 710; 44 New York State Reporter, 480.

Practice-Affidavit of Defense.-An affidavit of defense to a suit brought by the administrator of the insured, to whom the amount of the policy, by its terms, was payable, averring that the policy was issued and delivered to and the premiums paid by a third party who had no insurable interest in the life of the insured, is insufficient.

Brennan, Adm'r, v. Prudential Ins. Co. (Pa. S. C.), 1 Advance Reports (April 15, 1892), p. 524; 23 Atlantic Reporter (April 20, 1892), p. 901.

Assignment of Policy-Evidence.-C, an executor of an estate to which he was indebted, deposited a policy of insurance on his own life, for an amount greater than his indebtedness, with a paper stating that it was collateral for the payment of his indebtedness, whatever the deficiency might be, in a box with other papers of the estate. He testified that it was done so that, if he should drop off, they might take them with other securities. He kept the box and papers in his possession, and gave no notice of any attempted transfer to the insurance company, or any one interested in the estate. Held, that such acts did not assign the policy, or create a lien thereon, superior to the rights of a creditor which had attached by virtue of judicial proceedings.

Falk v. Janes, et al. (N. J. Ch. C.), 23 Atlantic Reporter (April 6, 1892), p. 813.

Contract-Insurance of Debtor by Creditor-Right of Redemption.-Trustees of an insurance company advanced £10,000 to C., on the security of a reversionary interest to which C. was entitled contingently on his surviving his father. As part of the loan transaction the trustees insured the life of C., against that of his father, for £34,500 in the society of which they were trustees, and paid the premium until C.'s death. C. executed a bond, charging the reversion with principal, premiums and interest on the principal and premiums. By written agreement the interest and premiums were to accumulate at compound interest for five years. The agreement contained special clauses providing (inter alia) to whom the policy, in certain specified events, should belong, and and declared that, in the event of C. paying the whole sum due before the death of his father the trustees should be bound to assign the policy to C., and that if C. should pre-decease his father, without having paid all principal, moneys, interest and costs, the policy should belong absolutely to the trustees, they being bound in that event to impute to the debt all moneys they might receive in respect of the policy. C. died in his father's lifetime, having never paid anything. Held, that upon the true construction of the documents, the contract was, not that the policy should be effected for the trustees' protection only, and for their sole benefit, subject to an option for C. to make it his own in the event of his paying off the debt in his lifetime, but that the policy was mortgaged to the trustees, and was the property of C. subject to the charge; therefore, in accordance with the equitable doctrine against fettering a mortgagor's right of redemption, C.'s representatives were entitled to the policy moneys after deducting all sums due.

Same-Same-Same-Dissenting Opinion.-Held (by Lord Hannen, dissenting), that upon the true construction of the documents, the transaction was not intended to be, and was not a mortgage of the policy; that the policy never belonged to C., but, in the event which happened, belonged absolutely to the trustees, subject to the obligation to impute to the debt the moneys received.

Salt v. Marquis of Northampton (H. of L., Eng.), 1 Appeal Cases, Law Reports (March 1, 1892), p. 1.

Premiums Paid With Stolen Money-Rights of Parties.-Life insurance for the benefit of the wife is procured, and all the premiums paid with money stolen by the insured from a firm of which he was a member. The amount stolen exceeded the amount of the policies. Held, that the entire proceeds of such policies belonged to the firm as against the wife.

Premiums Paid in Part With Stolen Money.-Where life insurance for the benefit of the wife is procured in part with the money of the husband, but the subsequent premiums are paid by him with money stolen by him from a firm of which he was a member, the wife is